

**DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM
DOCTORAL THESIS
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)**

**NATURAL RESOURCE GRABBING IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN THE GOLD
MINING SECTOR OF TURKEY**

Melis EROĞLU

**Supervisor
Assist. Prof. İlkin Özdikmenli Çelikoğlu**

İZMİR – 2023

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as “Natural Resource Grabbing in Developing Countries: A Critical Analysis of Foreign Direct Investments in the Gold Mining Sector of Turkey” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

12/09/2023

Melis EROĞLU



ABSTRACT

Doctoral Thesis

Doctor of Philosophy(PhD)

**Natural Resource Grabbing in Developing Countries: A Critical Analysis
of Foreign Direct Investments in the Gold Mining Sector of Turkey**

Melis EROĞLU

Dokuz Eylül University

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

International Relations Program

The commodity boom of 2004-2015 has led to worldwide increase of investments in food, metals and energy resources production. Foreign direct investments in these sectors have increased dramatically. On the other side, in the capital importing countries with resources, it led to changes in institutional and legislative aspects of state governance, and to conflict-ridden relations between the state, companies, local communities and environmentalist protesters. Many scholars have conceptualised this phenomenon from different critical aspects: land grabbing, water grabbing, new extractivism, neo-extractivism, extractive imperialism, etc. Although Turkey is not a resource-rich country, it got its share from these developments. In this dissertation, to explain this phenomenon, the concept of primitive accumulation is discussed with its strong and weak points, possibilities of contemporary applications of the concept, and how it can be enhanced as an analytical tool to understand these developments. Primitive accumulation is, in simplest definition, is the process of divorcing the peasants from the means of production, which is crucial for the development of capitalist accumulation. In this context, state is the perpetrator of primitive accumulation. Therefore, with a special focus on the state, discussing its institutions and legislation as well as the analysis of data gathered from the interviews, this study aims to bring a new perspective to the natural resource grabbing phenomenon. A qualitative analysis by structured interviews

and their evaluation with thematic analysis technique are expected to achieve these ends.

Keywords: National Resource Grabbing, Capitalism, Primitive Accumulation, Autonomy of the State



ÖZET

Doktora Tezi

Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde Doğal Kaynak Gaspı: Türkiye Altın Madenciliği Sektöründe Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımların Eleştirel Bir Analizi Melis EROĞLU

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı

2004-2015 emtia fiyatlarının aşırı yükselmesi, dünya çapında gıda, metal ve enerji kaynakları üretimine yapılan yatırımların artmasına neden olmuştur. Bu sektörlerdeki doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar önemli ölçüde artmıştır. Öte yandan, kaynakları olan ve sermaye ithal eden ülkelerde, devlet yönetiminin kurumsal ve yasal yönlerinde değişikliklere ve devlet, şirketler, yerel topluluklar ve çevreci protestocular arasında çatışma yüklü ilişkilere yol açmıştır. Pek çok akademisyen bu olguyu farklı eleştirel açılardan kavramsallaştırdı: toprak gaspı, su gasbı, yeni maden çıkarma, neo-ekstraktivizm, ekstraktive emperyalizm vb. Türkiye kaynak zengini bir ülke olmasa da bu gelişmelerden nasibini aldı. Bu tezde, bu olguyu açıklamak için ilkel birikim kavramı, güçlü ve zayıf yönleriyle, kavramın çağdaş uygulamalarının olanakları ve bu gelişmeleri anlamak için analitik bir araç olarak nasıl geliştirilebileceği tartışılmaktadır. İlkel birikim, en basit tanımıyla, kapitalist birikimin gelişmesi için çok önemli olan köylünün üretim araçlarından koparılması sürecidir. Bu bağlamda ilkel birikimin faili devlettir. Bu nedenle, devlete özel olarak odaklanan, devlet kurumlarının ve mevzuatının tartışıldığı ve görüşmelerden elde edilen verilerin analiz edildiği bu çalışma, doğal kaynak gaspı olgusuna yeni bir bakış açısı getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Yapılandırılmış görüşmeler yoluyla nitel bir analiz yapılması ve bunların tematik analiz tekniği ile değerlendirilmesiyle bu amaçlara ulaşması beklenmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler: Doğal Kaynak Gaspı, Kapitalizm, İlkel Birikim,
Devletin Özerkliği**



**NATURAL RESOURCE GRABBING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN THE
GOLD MINING SECTOR OF TURKEY**

CONTENT

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
DECLARATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	vi
CONTENT	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	x
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. IMPERIALISM AND STATE	6
1.2. EXPLANATIONS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS	12
1.3. NATURAL RESOURCE GRABBING	19
1.3.1. Land, Water and Green Grabbing	19
1.3.2. Neo-extractivism, New Extractivism or Extractive Imperialism	21
1.4. GOLD MINING IN TÜRKİYE	23

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. IMPERIALISM AND WORLD ECONOMY	27
2.1.1. Dynamics of Capital Accumulation	28
2.1.2. Concentration and Internationalisation of Capital	31
2.1.3. Uneven and Combined Development of Capitalism	35

2.2. PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND AUTONOMY OF STATE	41
2.2.1. Primitive Accumulation in Marx	41
2.2.2. The Discussion on Continuity of Primitive Accumulation	44
2.2.3. A New Primitive Accumulation?	48
2.3. AUTONOMY OF THE STATE	53

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN GOLD MINING AND THE TURKISH STATE

3.1. MINING AS AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	61
3.2. GLOBAL GOLD MINING: AN OUTLOOK	62
3.3. GOLD MINING IN TÜRKİYE: AN OUTLOOK	65
3.4. NEOLIBERALISM AND TÜRKİYE: TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURAL, MINING AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIMES	69
3.4.1. Transformation of Agricultural Regime	70
3.4.2. Transformation of Mining Regime	73
3.4.3. Transformation of International Investments Regime	78

CHAPTER 4

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ON GOLD MINING IN TÜRKİYE

4.1. METHODOLOGY	80
4.2. FINDINGS	84
4.2.1. Roles of the State	84
4.2.2. Role of Foreign Capital	90
4.2.3 The Others	92
CONCLUSION	96
REFERENCES	100

ABBREVIATIONS

ARIP	Agricultural Reform Implementation Project
ÇED	Environmental Impact Evaluation
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAPEG	General Directorate of Mining and Petroleum Affairs
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MTA	General Directorate of Mineral Resource and Exploration
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLI	Ownership, Location, Internalisation
TMSF	Savings Deposit Insurance Fund
TRY	Turkish Lira
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute
UCD	Uneven and Combined Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USD	United States Dollars
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Gold Production by Country in Tonnes (Top 10 Producers and Turkey) in 2021	p. 62
Table 2: The World's Top Five Largest Gold Mining Companies by Production in 2020, (32 ounce = 0.001 tonnes).	p. 63
Table 3: Gold Mines in Turkey	p. 68
Table 4: General Information on Interviewees	p. 81
Table 5: Questions for Experts	p. 82
Table 6: State is a Gatekeeper	p. 85
Table 7: State Gets Paid	p. 88
Table 8: State is Balance	p. 89
Table 9: They are the Same	p. 90
Table 10: Foreign Capital is Resourceful	p. 91
Table 11: Locals are Self-centered	p. 92
Table 12: Workers are Impotent	p. 94
Table 13: Environmental Activists are not Thrust-worthy	p. 95

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Primary Commodity Price System	p. 64
Figure 2: Gold Prices (USD/Ounces)	p. 65
Figure 3: Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices by Kind of Economic Activity, Value	p. 66
Figure 4: Annual Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices by Kind of Economic Activity, Share	p. 66
Figure 5: Turkey's Gold Import in Tonnes	p. 67
Figure 6: Turkey's Gold Production in Tonnes	p. 67



INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-2000s prices of primary commodities are significantly increased in the world economy. This boom, started in 2004 and lasted until 2015, is considered the longest of all commodity booms (Radetzki and Wårell, 2021: 118). In addition, different than the previous commodity booms, it occurred in three main commodity groups: energy, metals, and agriculture. At the top levels, “before they began to fall in the second half of 2008, the real prices of energy and metals more than doubled over the past five years, while the real price of internationally traded food commodities increased 75 percent” (World Bank, 2009: 51). Therefore, it is not surprising that there has been a rush of capital to extraction of natural resources, food production or other raw material productions. This rush has been discussed through several conceptualizations such as land grabbing, water grabbing, green grabbing, neo-extractivism, new extractivism, extractive imperialism etc. The most common reasons offered for the commodity boom are the increased demand for energy and non-renewable natural resources in Chinese economy (Veltmeyer, 2013: 79) or the deterred investment due to relatively stable commodity prices during the 1990s (World Bank, 2009: 51).

This rush of capital into primary commodities production in developing and underdeveloped countries is not without contradictions. On the one hand, it utilizes stock of natural resources, which was once not feasible and profitable to extract, and it also bears the chance of a new development model for both post-neoliberal and neoliberal regimes as long as the taxed revenue from the operations of foreign capital is socially redistributed (Veltmeyer, 2013: 84). On the other hand, there is a great danger for the economic, social and environmental impacts. It affects the lives and livelihoods of the habitants of mining areas, hindering agricultural production and causes environmental degradation and social unrest. This contradictory outcome of foreign direct investments in mining in general, gold mining in particular, necessitate vast expropriations, changes in the legislation and policing the social unrest, therefore, state power. In other words, state needs foreign direct investments (FDI) for economic development and access to financial, technological and technical resources held by the multinational corporations (MNCs). At the same time, it has to deal with the environmental, social and political consequences of these investments.

In order to understand how states manage this contradiction, this dissertation proposes three interconnected theoretical discussions. Firstly, “Imperialism and World Economy” subchapter discusses the roots of MNCs’ structural advantages and their tendency to invest abroad by examining the dynamics of capitalist accumulation based on theoretical frameworks of Marx, Lenin and Hilferding. Competitive pressures derived from capitalist mode of production lead to centralisation and internationalization of capital, the creation of monopolies (MNCs) and export of capital (in this case not money capital seeking portfolio investments, but production capital seeking foreign direct investments). In addition, it scrutinizes how foreign direct investments (FDI) reproduces uneven and combined development of capitalism by transforming non-capitalist relations of production which leads to the contradictory outcomes for states.

Secondly, subchapter “Primitive Accumulation” proposes the concept of primitive accumulation for explaining these contradictions stemming from internationalization of capital. By internationalization of capital non-capitalist modes of production shatters and integrates into capitalist mode of production. This process is traditionally called primitive accumulation, which is the process of divorcing the peasants from the means of production as early as 17th century that opened the way for the initial capitalist accumulation. Some scholars following Lenin’s interpretation argue that primitive accumulation is a type of accumulation of pre-capital era. Others following Luxemburg’s interpretation argue that it is a continuing process, an inherent feature of capitalism. Following Luxemburg Harvey’s contemporary approach to primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, has been a popular argument despite its indistinctiveness. Harvey tend to intermingle accumulation by dispossession with capitalist accumulation and his positioning of the state is unclear. However, primitive and capitalist accumulation are ontologically different processes. The distinguishing factor is the state. Without the extra-economic power of the state – political, military and judicial- the necessary conditions for capital accumulation cannot be met. For starting accumulating capital, a mining company needs land (vast expropriations), legal framework for the protection of its investment, labour and, if necessary, suppression of dissidents which

necessitate the exercise of state power. On the other hand, state has to deal with the complications stemming from the investment.

Thirdly, the subchapter “Autonomy of State” questions the theoretical problems about state derived from the debates on continuity of primitive accumulation and proposes an amalgamation with approaches to autonomy of the state. The main problem of Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession is that as he intertwines primitive and capitalist accumulation state becomes obsolete. Sometimes state is considered non-capitalist in the sense that privatization of state enterprises facilitates capitalist accumulation. It is the victim of accumulation by dispossession. Other times, state becomes the perpetrator of primitive accumulation in the sense that state is the only agent “with its monopoly of power and definitions of legality” (Harvey, 2004: 74) for pursuing such a task. Therefore, I propose that in order to define the role of the state in the process of primitive accumulation state has to possess relative autonomy in order to manage the consequences of FDI. The discussion includes instrumentalist, structuralist and institutionalist approaches to autonomy of state.

Within this framework, the aim of this dissertation is to study the gold mining in Turkey. Turkey’s first gold mine started operations in Bergama, İzmir in 2001. It was a foreign direct investment of Canadian multinational mining company Eurogold. This particular FDI brought out debates about mining, ecology, development and imperialism to the centre of public discussions. It also engendered the first ecological/environmental activist movement in Turkey. Today there are 19 gold mining operations, 7 of them are or had been foreign direct investments, throughout Turkey with a total production of 39 tonnes of gold in 2021. This makes Turkey the top gold producer country in Europe except Russia. The public and academic debate surrounding gold mining in Turkey still continues.

Single case study has its own limitations. However, the intention of this dissertation is not to generalize the conclusions of the research, but to demonstrate another approach in comparison to the ones already there. Approaches to natural resource grabbing, in general, provide us with many case studies, mostly in Africa and Latin America, where natural resources are abundant. Turkey, on the other hand, is different from those countries in its levels of natural resources. Yet, in the last 20

years the gold mining sector in Turkey have grown dramatically. In these 20 years so far, gold production in Turkey has been raised to 42 tons a year from 0 (Çağatay, 2022). Parallel to the price boom there has been an increase in foreign direct investments on mining in Turkey and these investments provoked resistance, criticism and social conflicts. Therefore, the phenomenon of natural resource grabbing may fit into a broader theoretical perspective, primitive accumulation, which is not necessarily based on the dichotomy between abundance of natural resources in developing countries and lacking natural resources in the core countries.

Specifically, gold mining, in contrast to i.e. coal mining, is a capital-intensive economic activity (Reuters, 2013), highly depending on technological, technical and financial resources, which multinational mining companies have access to. Due to this characteristic, undisputed contradictions it creates and fitting timeframe, gold mining makes an excellent case. In addition, mining in Turkey had been a state-led economic activity, even if there were private companies. Mining sector was highly regulated and conducted by state institutions and enterprises and tied to a developmentalist paradigm. With the effect of neoliberal paradigm (liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation) after 1980 military coup, the traditional conduct of business in mining sector has changed over the years. Turkish state diminished its direct economic involvement in mining with its institutions and enterprises. Therefore, this case provides an opportunity to track the changes in role of the state in mining sector of Turkey.

Within this context, the main argument of this dissertation is that despite the neoliberal transformations in Turkey and general tendency towards claiming the erosion of state power, Turkish state exercises its power in gold mining sector. This argument stems from the assumption that state power is indispensable for managing the contradictions resulting from large foreign direct investments, in other words, managing the processes of primitive accumulation. In addition, state has to have relative autonomy from classes and class frictions as well as global pressures.

The case study chapter looks for empirical evidence that support or challenge the existing theoretical assumptions. It does so by looking at the relationship between mining and foreign direct investments, the general outlook of global mining industry to inquire the processes of centralization and internationalization of capital, the

general outlook of Turkey's gold mining industry to understand the scope and the process of internationalisation of Turkish state that led to transformation of three interconnected regimes: agriculture, mining and international investments and track the transformation of Turkish state's power.

The dissertation also includes a qualitative research based on interviews with six experts who are working or previously worked in the mining sector with sufficient experience and knowledge of the legislation, procedures and institutions. The interviewees were selected by snowball sampling due to the fact that since mining was a state-led industry in the past the people work in the industry tend to have a network of acquaintance. The interviews were conducted in Ankara between 15 and 19 August 2022. The questions are designed to reveal their views on the role of the state in the gold mining sector and foreign direct investments. The interview transcriptions are analysed by the thematic analysis approach with a theory-driven data coding and analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Codes coming together have built themes and through these themes I discuss the overlapping or contradicting aspects with regard to theoretical assumptions.

Structure of the dissertation is as follows: first chapter puts forward the general debates in related literatures; imperialism and state, explanations of FDI, natural resource grabbing and gold mining in Turkey. Second chapter provides the theoretical framework; processes of centralization and internationalization of capital and how foreign direct investments reproduce uneven and combined development of world economy and lead to contradictions. The second part of the theoretical framework addresses these contradictions by the concept of primitive accumulation and discusses autonomy of the state in managing these contradictions. Third chapter is the case study chapter providing general information on peculiarities of mining as an economic activity, gold mining in global and national contexts and discusses the transformations in agricultural, mining and international investment regimes of Turkey with regard to neoliberal restructuring of Turkish economy in order to track the changes in the role of state. Forth chapter includes a qualitative research based on interview on experts and deduces and discusses certain themes with regard to role of the state and foreign capital.

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review is divided into four parts dealing with different aspects of the phenomenon. “Imperialism and state” focuses on the state within the imperialism/new imperialism literature. “Explanations of FDI” discusses neoclassical, political economic and firm-based explanations of FDI. “Natural Resource Grabbing”

1.1. IMPERIALISM AND STATE

Imperialism, outside the Marxist theoretical framework, is a wide concept, sometimes seems as all-encompassing the political economic relations and structures in the world. This not only decreases its theoretical value and confines it to a mere slogan, but also it diminishes its explanatory power. For instance, according to liberal scholar Michael Doyle, “imperialism is the process of establishing and maintaining an empire” (Doyle, 1986: 19) and empires are “relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies” (Doyle, 1986:19). He discusses many empires from Athenian to Roman, from Spanish to Ottoman. His concept of imperialism is ahistorical as well as it is limited to political domination by neglecting the unique features of capitalism as a mode of production. In his two books on British and American empires, conservative historian Niall Ferguson (2004, 2005) not only conceptualizes imperialism as a necessary, but also as a desirable feature of world politics. The values spread around the world by the British Empire, such as free trade and “Western norms of law, order and governance” (Ferguson, 2004: xxi) is appreciated. Even it is claimed that some of the nation-states born out of the empire after World War II have experienced lower standards of living in comparison to the colonization period (Ferguson, 2005: 198). Similarly, Warren (1980) argues that colonialism was actually a progressive development since it introduces the unique achievements under capitalism, economics, cultural or political, to the less unfortunate ones.

On the other hand, the classical Marxist understanding of imperialism as a stage of capitalist development, mainly developed by Lenin (2010), Hilferding

(1981) and Bukharin (n. d.), provides the concept with historical background and ties it to the broader dynamics of capitalist accumulation and world economy. Imperialism, conceptualized as a stage of capitalism, is derived from the monopolistic developments in the late 19th century. Concentration of capital and the emergence of finance-capital at the national level produced high profits. These profits were transformed into capital and exported to non-capitalist countries in search of profitable investments, cheap labour and raw materials, which is the process of internationalization of capital. At the same time, the national blocs of capital entered into competition at the world level. These scholars thought that close interconnectedness of national capital blocs and their respective states, escalation of international competition and militarization were expected to lead to a world war and, in fact, that was the case.

Today we are still witnessing the processes of concentration and internationalization of capital in foreign direct investments by monopoly capitals. However, it is debated that relationship between national capitalist class and their nation-states is not as strong as it was at the end of the 19th century. Another process, internationalization of state, is at work.

After the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003, proliferation of works on imperialism was witnessed and a discussion was initiated among contemporary Marxists and post-Marxists on “New Imperialism”¹. Many Marxist scholars (Harvey, 2003; Callinicos, 2009; Panitch and Gindin, 2012; Wood, 2005) attempted to explain this phenomenon by theorizing the relationship between state and capitalism. On the other hand, post-Marxist theorists forecasted the erosion of the nation-state, as transforming into transnational state (Robinson, 2002) or into the Empire with no center of power or boundaries (Hardt and Negri, 2001).

In his book “The New Imperialism”, Harvey defines capitalist imperialism as “a contradictory fusion of ‘the politics of state and empire’... and ‘the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time’” (Harvey, 2003: 26). Following

¹ There are also previous some works on the novelty of imperialism, such as Panitch, L. (2000). The New Imperial State. *New Left Review*, 2(2), 5-20; Gowan, P., Panitch, L. and Shaw, M. (2001). The State, Globalisation and the New Imperialism: A Round Table Discussion. *Historical Materialism*, 9, 3-38; S. Amin, S. (2001). Imperialism and Globalisation. *Monthly Review*, 53(2).

Arrighi (1994), he differentiates between two logics of power: territorial (of state) and capitalist (of capital). Despite the traditional approach to imperialism, which assumes a rather easy correlation and coordination between the state and the capitalists, those two logics are contradictory. Although it is hard to achieve, the intertwining of these two logics in a dialectical sense is the core of his argument on imperialism (Harvey, 2003: 29- 30). However, while assuming the contradictory fusion of these two separate logics, he is criticized for not providing a distinctive territorial logic and even sometimes reducing territorial logic to the capitalist one in his analysis (Brenner, 2006b: 81- 82).

For Harvey, the imperialist expansion is driven by the problem of over-accumulation, which creates periodic crises and, therefore, pressure to outlet the abundant capital and labour (Harvey, 2003: 109). Over-accumulation can be absorbed by:

(a) temporal displacement through investment in long-term capital projects or social expenditures (such as education and research) that defer the re-entry of capital values into circulation into the future, (b) spatial displacements through opening up new markets, new production capacities, and new resource, social, and labour possibilities elsewhere, or (c) some combination of (a) and (b). (Harvey, 2003: 109).

Both options for the solution of over-accumulation problem necessitate some form of state intervention. If excess capital is invested in long-term projects, such as infrastructure or education, capital needs the state for redistribution. Similarly, for investments abroad, capitalists need some kind of protection from their states. While the development of welfare state can be an example for the former, late 19th and early 20th century intense competition among European powers can be an example for the latter. Yet, he is not clear about how these investment decisions of (a), (b) or (a) and (b) are made and by whom it is made. Going back to Brenner's argument before, it seems like capitalist logic surpasses territorial logic in making these decisions since capitalist logic can easily explain the post-World war II welfare state's creation of markets, building infrastructures for capitalist development, and social policies that increase demand by itself without the need of a separate territorial logic.

Panitch and Gindin (2012) have a mission to criticize "the false dichotomy between states and markets" (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 1) and demonstrate the complex relationship between states and capitalism. They argue that, in the literature,

American imperialist practices are generally connected to demise of its economic power. However, in fact, the strength of US capitalism is the main enabler of globalization and American state plays the role of “managing and superintending capitalism on a worldwide plane” (Panitch and Ginden, 2012: 1). In other words, after the end of World War II, the American state has actively planned and launched the expansion of capitalism and the making of a global capitalism; i.e. by exporting the New Deal to European countries, creating institutions for global governance of capitalism, such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), and establishing Bretton Woods system for facilitating international trade. At times, they argue, such attempts may be implemented against the desires of capitalist classes for the sake of the capitalist system as a whole (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 4). Therefore, their theoretical stance is that the state has some degree of autonomy from the classes in making such decisions, however, to the extent of their dependence on capitalist accumulation.

Ellen Wood follows a similar argument with regard to state and capital relations. In order to put forward the distinction between the old and new imperialism (and capitalism), Ellen Wood argues that the workings of capitalism and imperialism are not transparent in today’s world. Even if we acknowledge the transfer of surplus value from labour to capitalists, from periphery to core, due to the fact that coercion is hidden in the operations of markets it becomes hard to detect the relations of exploitation (Wood, 2005: 1-3). In other words, extra-economic force – political, military, and judicial; which is supplied by the state – became detached from economic force of capital leading to an understanding of neutrality of the state vis-à-vis capitalist accumulation (Wood, 2005: 4-5). Yet, while capital is outreach of any territorial boundaries in globalized world, it still necessitates the territorial state’s coercive power detached from economic power due to the lack of a global state. Therefore, discovering the nature of the relationship between extra-economic force and economic force today is crucial to understand new capitalism.

The detachment of economic power from political power is specific to capitalist mode of production. Since market has its own power, which is imposed on capitalists and labour alike, social relations are also regulated by the impersonal laws of the market (Wood, 2005: 8). However, for Wood, this does not necessarily pave

the way for the decline of the state power. State preserves its indispensable functions for “maintaining the system of property [and propertylessness] and social order, least of all the function of coercion that underlies all others” (Wood, 2005: 20). In other words, the nation-state is the provider of necessary conditions for capital accumulation. Although capitalism reaches far beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, it still requires coercive power of the state, since no other entity possesses such a power of guaranteeing “the regularity and predictability that capital needs in its daily transactions” (Wood, 2005: 24) and “compensate for its own disruptive tendencies” (Wood, 2005: 25). Without the detachment of economic power from extra-economic power, capital would not be able to globalize. On the other hand, exactly because of this detachment, capital depends on the nation-state even more.

While Marxist scholars try to theorize state’s autonomy in “the New Imperialism” debate, post-Marxists argued that sovereignty and power of state are in decline. By the rise of the transnational capital and transnational capitalist class, multinational corporations, supranational organisations and a global network of non-governmental organisations, states are no longer able to sustain its power and autonomy from capital. This is the basic premise of those approaches, though; two approaches mentioned below, differ from each other on how this change occurs.

In order to understand today’s capitalism, Robinson proposes periodization of capitalism into epochs: Mercantilism and primitive accumulation; Competitive or classical capitalism; Corporate (monopoly) capitalism; and Globalization (Robinson, 2002: 211). Since the 1970’s capitalism is in the fourth epoch. Globalisation, different from earlier epochs, erodes the autonomy of nation-state, introduces a single mode of production and integrates different counties and regions into the global economy (Robinson, 2002: 212). The state in globalization epoch is the “transnational state”, a concept he develops inspired by the transnational class studies (Sklair, 2001; Carroll, 2010). The transnational state is “a particular constellation of class forces and relations bound up with capitalist globalization and the rise of a transnational capitalist class, embodied in a diverse set of political institutions” (Robinson, 2002: 215). In other words, it is the transnationalization of class relations. By the erosion of its autonomy, the nation-state becomes more responsive to the demands of the transnational class rather than national classes, be it

capitalist or labour.

Hardt and Negri's book "Empire" was published in 2000 and initiated an immense debate on the globalization. They argued that the sovereignty of nation-states is eroding, but we are witnessing the formation of a different kind of global sovereignty, "composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule" (Hardt and Negri, 2001: xii), which they call Empire. Then, they move forward to differentiate between imperialism and Empire. They define imperialism as "an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries" (Hardt and Negri: 2001: xii). On the other hand, different from imperialism,

Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command (Hardt & Negri, 2001: xii-xiii).

In other words, Empire is considered the heart of the current global order, which has no center of power and no boundaries. It refers to a global capital domination detached from any national sovereignty including the American one. Like Robinson, Hardt and Negri, too, argue that the sovereignty of nation-states is eroding. However, Robinson explains this change through transnationalization of state while Hardt and Negri claim the rise of an unprecedented transformation of sovereignty, which is "both everywhere and nowhere" (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 208).

The main criticism to these approaches is that they cannot escape the dichotomy of nation-state and global capital (Kiely, 2006: 207). Nation-state is still the provider of necessary conditions for capital accumulation and possesses coercive power, which is crucial for capitalist development. This does not necessarily mean that the rise of global capital occurs at the expense of nation-state. Even it can be argued, "globalization is actually been promoted by some nations states" (Kiely, 2006: 208; Panitch and Ginden, 2012).

In conclusion, I would like to give empirical evidence in order to explain my position in the debate on imperialism and state power. There is a very intense global competition in chip production. Especially, high technology semiconductor chips are used in critical sectors such as weaponry, artificial intelligence and encryption. In

October 2022, the United States (US) banned the export of high technology semiconductor chips to China “made anywhere in the world with US equipment” (The Economic Times, 2023). After the declaration, Semiconductor Index (SOX) in Nasdaq Stock Market dropped dramatically and the US-based chip producer companies lost value. Before that time, Trump also took several initiatives; investigation of Chinese companies for espionage or making black lists for trade, but did not go so far as tightening export controls. Following Biden’s lead, in June 2023, Netherlands declared that they would limit sales of certain equipments of Dutch tech giant ASML to China. In return, China declared that starting in August 2023, it would ban the export of several metals, which are crucial for production of chips, such as gallium and germanium (Bloomberg, 2023). Back to the theoretical debate, what we observe here is two processes at work: First, American, Dutch and Chinese states made very protectionist decisions by tightening export controls despite the supposed benefits of free trade. Secondly, the American state took this action despite the short-term losses of semiconductor companies that export to China. However, in the long-term this may protect the leadership position of the US capitalism in technological development and its monopoly rents. Therefore, state still matters and the rules of globalization may be halted for some time and for some critical sectors. Also, states may decide against the short-term benefits of the capitalist class for the long-term benefits; i.e. protecting competitive power of American chip industry and its monopoly rents in the future.

1.2. EXPLANATIONS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS

This part of the literature chapter aims to sort out and discuss theorizing ventures of FDI of neoclassical economists, political economists and business economists (a classification taken from Gilpin, 2001) of FDI. According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2023), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is

a category of cross-border investment in which an investor resident in one economy establishes a lasting interest in and a significant degree of influence over an enterprise resident in another economy. Ownership of 10 percent or more of the voting power in an enterprise in one economy by an investor in another economy is evidence of such a relationship. FDI is a key element in international economic integration because it creates stable and long-lasting

links between economies. FDI is an important channel for the transfer of technology between countries, promotes international trade through access to foreign markets, and can be an important vehicle for economic development.

International investments are composed of international portfolio investments and foreign direct investments. In portfolio investments (bank loans, bonds, stocks and other financial assets) capitalists in origin and host countries cooperate since they both benefit from the success of an investment. However, in direct investments, the investment owner enters into direct competition with national corporations (Brawley, 1998: 180-181) for it is generally a part of their corporate strategy to be a part of another economy (Gilpin, 2001: 278). Therefore, for the host country's capitalist class, portfolio investments are more desirable than FDI since they have comparatively more power over managing portfolio investments and since FDI generates competition. Therefore, policies and politics of FDI are considered more nationalistic compared to portfolio investments (Brawley, 1998: 185).

Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are the agents of foreign direct investments. A multinational corporation is "a firm of a particular nationality with partially or wholly owned subsidiaries within at least one other national economy" (Gilpin, 2001: 278). They can make new investments in other countries in order to establish a subsidiary (called greenfield investments) or purchase existing companies, totally or partially, or merge with them (mergers and acquisitions, which are called brownfield investments) (Krugman et. al., 2023: 214).

Multinational corporation is not a new phenomenon. The companies from mercantilist era such as The Dutch East India Company or The East India Company are seen as precursors of modern capitalist multinational corporations. For Gilpin (2001: 279), the mercantilist companies were much more powerful in comparison to modern capitalist companies in the sense that the former had power to pursue separate foreign policies and enforce its power through its own land and naval forces for controlling vast territories. Another difference between the mercantilist and capitalist multinational corporations is that while the former were mostly operating in agriculture and extractive industries in suitable regions of the world, the latter are more focused on manufacturing and services in regional and global contexts (Gilpin, 2001: 279).

The integration of national economies is a long-standing aspiration of liberal scholars and the driving force behind the integration is conceived as trade and financial liberalization. By liberalization of trade, comparative advantage effectively works and countries increase their production in efficient sectors instead of inefficient ones and, therefore, trade between them will flourish and be beneficial for each of them (Ricardo, 2001; Ohlin, 1935). For example, if a country produces television more efficiently by using less of factors of production per unit, such as capital or labour, and if every country does the same, total production and total consumption increase for less input per unit and each country benefits (Brawley, 1998: 145). As long as it is assumed that the trade is balanced and there is full employment, comparative advantage works. However, these assumptions do not meet the real world (Brawley, 1998: 147). Similarly, neoliberals' approach to financial liberalization is derived from the theory of comparative advantage in the sense that liberalization of investments will flourish efficient sectors over inefficient ones and increase total investment, employment and revenues, promote growth and reduce poverty.

In addition, separating international portfolio investments and foreign direct investments is a relatively a new phenomenon. In Ohlin's analysis, international flow of investments (Ohlin, 1935: 76) is determined by interest rates, which is the cost of reproducing capital in a specific period of time. So, an international investor's decision to invest his money in either domestic or international ventures (also either in finance or production) is based on the difference between the interest rates of the countries.

Despite the role of the multinational corporations in global capitalism today, Gilpin (2001: 279-280) argues that the neoclassical economists have little interest in them due to three assumptions they made: (1) firm's nationality is seen insignificant as the firm's behaviour is based on market conditions; (2) international movement of factors of production (such as capital and technology) has the same effect with the international movement of goods; and (3) trade leads way to investment so that they tend to see it as globally reorganizing production based on international division of labour, distribution of factors of production and comparative advantage. Another reason is that since "MNC is largely a product of market imperfections and unique

corporate experiences” (Gilpin, 2001: 280) it is hard to come up with a general model consistent with different oligopolistic behaviors. Moreover, “Some market imperfections are created by national governments through such policies as trade protection and industrial policy; in fact, a government sometimes creates market imperfections to encourage foreign MNCs to invest in their economies” (Gilpin, 2001: 280). This creates complications in theorizing for economists, who have a market-oriented approach to economy rather than a political economic one. Starting with Stephen Hymer in 1960’s, economists and political economists would focus on theorizing the relationship between imperfect markets and MNCs.

Instead of assuming that perfect competition in domestic markets, Hymer (1960) assumes that imperfect markets provide MNCs with advantages compared to firms in the host country, such as access to factors of production (raw materials, labour, capital, etc.), economies of scale, differentiated products, advanced technology, know-how, patents and market imperfections created by the host government. These factors not only increase the company’s competitiveness in domestic market, but also diminish the cost of producing abroad and increase MNC’s competitiveness in other country vis-à-vis local producers.

Criticizing the neoclassical view that international investments are determined by rate of interest, Hymer (1960: 3) differentiates between portfolio and direct investments and claims that direct investments are determined by other factors. There are two main motivations for FDI: (1) FDI is motivated by the need to reduce or eliminate international competition among firms which sell in the same market in the conditions of imperfect markets; (2) MNCs aim to increase their returns stemming from their special advantages (Hymer, 1960:3). To summarize, Hymer argues that “the movement of capital is motivated by the desire to achieve control and not by differences in interest-rates” (Hymer, 1960: 4) and this also means that FDI can move from high-interest rate countries to low-interest rate countries against the neoclassical assumptions (Hymer, 1960: 4).

Hymer is one of the first scholars who opened the way for theorizing FDI in imperfect markets. His work would influence a tradition of firm-level or firm-strategy approaches to FDI, which will be discussed in the next part. However, his later works of Marxist political economic writings on international trade and

investments will be discussed here. For instance, he claims to defend a radical stance towards the American Empire by relating national and international crises at that time to changes in world economy by utilizing Keynes' highlighting of the dangers of world market for domestic development and Marx's theory on capital accumulation in general and reserve army in particular (Hymer, 1980a: 189). At the same book, in another chapter, he criticizes the classical and neoclassical glorification of international trade by utilizing the concept of primitive accumulation (Hymer, 1980b: 29). Telling the story from two reflections of Robinson Crusoe, he reveals that the perception of him as a hunter and fisherman who trades with others for mutual benefits "under conditions of equality, reciprocity and freedom" (Hymer, 1980b: 29-30) is a part of non-Marxist theorization of international trade. However, from a Marxist point of view, he is also a conqueror, robber, murderer and slave trader, which reflects the dark side of international trade.

Most importantly, in *Internationalization of Capital* article (Hymer, 1972), he argued that behind multinational corporate system there are three processes at work: internationalization of capital, internationalization of production and international government. Here his argument is that internationalization of capital and production in the hands of MNCs necessitates an "international mobilization of political power" (Hymer, 1972: 92). He examines the state and its changing roles throughout the history of internationalization of capital and production. (1) colonialist and mercantilist era when state supported accumulation of capital through international trade; (2) 16th and 17th centuries when capital needed to eliminate other national market's resistance to import cheap commodities and used state power to achieve this; (3) protecting its national capital against other nations by imperialism, and protectionism leading to two World Wars; and (4) after the end of World War II, assuming a task of coordination capitalism from above the market in order to decrease instability and socialize labour for compliance with the capitalist system (Hymer, 1972: 108). In general, in his political economic work he tries to integrate his firm-level explanation for FDI to a global system of multinational corporations. His Marxist work is mostly neglected; however, it provides a broader understanding of the world economy.

State-centric approaches are also important in the sense that they generally argue that macro and micro level explanations of FDI and MNCs are not enough to explain the proliferation of MNCs, this could be “only within a favorable international political environment” (Gilpin, 2001: 288). The cooperation of developed powers under the US hegemony had protected and strengthened the conditions favored MNCs expansionism. They also believe that if this cooperation ceases to exist, power of MNCs in world economy will diminish drastically (Gilpin, 2001: 288). In addition, they also assume that multinational firms are actually national firms competing in the international level (Gilpin, 2001: 288). They are products of their main countries’ social, economic and political values (Doremus et. al., 1998).

Business economists’ explanations of FDI are firm-level approaches. Due to the path Hymer opened by attempting to theorize in an imperfect markets; MNCs have driven more attention among increasing number of scholars of business economics. Three approaches will be covered: Vernon’s product cycle theory, Dunning’s OLI theory and Porter’s strategic theory.

Vernon’s product cycle theory (1971) suggests that every product has a five-stage cycle: introduction, growth, maturity, saturation and decline. A firm starts to produce a technologically advanced product and increases demand in the national market. Then, as the demand increases, production cost of the product decreases, profits increase, and company starts to export the product to high-income countries. High-income countries getting familiar with the technology may start to produce similar products domestically and are able to sell the product at a cheaper price because there are no transportation costs or import taxes, even they start to export back. In order to avert competition, the firm is forced to pursue foreign direct investment for the production in those countries. In the decline stage, competition is intensified; therefore, production moves to developing countries where labour costs less. While in the first cycles, company relies on monopoly rent and economics of scale, in the latter cycles, as the competition intensifies; firm invests in other countries to avoid its negative effects. Therefore, for Vernon, FDI is a tool in the hands of the firm in order to overcome future international competition, protect its monopoly rents and market share. His theory is based on a technological and wealth

gaps among countries, mainly referring to American technological supremacy in the aftermath of the World War II until 1970's. However, as other countries closed technological gap, the explanatory power of the theory diminished (Gilpin, 2001: 278).

Dunning and Reading School's eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1973) is another firm-level approach, not as a theory but rather as a paradigm which refers to a set of different explanations for MNCs' transnational activities (Dunning, 2001). Due to market deficiencies, companies seek to diversify their economic activities (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 99) and foreign direct investment is one way to do it. However, only some companies invest abroad and the factors behind their strategy are summerized as ownership, location and internalization (OLI model). These factors create advantages for MNCs in comparison to non-multinational companies. Ownership refers to specific firm-based advantages, such as property rights and access to intangible assets, i.e. know-how. If a company possesses ownership advantages, rather than selling them, they tend to make use of advantages and open subsidiaries abroad in order to be in control of these advantages, which is called internalization. Location of FDI is also important in deciding to pursue FDI. Factors such as input prices, import controls, incentives or disincentives for investment, host countries political, economic and judicial systems, etc. affect the decision to invest abroad. Given all these factors affect the decision positively, the long term strategy of the firm and the investment have to be compatible too (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 99-103).

In his strategic approach Porter (1990) argues that national "competitive" advantage in a given industry is composed of four interconnected determinants: firm strategy, structure and rivalry (how companies are constructed and strategize as well as domestic rivalries); demand conditions (the nature of domestic demand); factor conditions (presence or absence of necessary factors of production for a specific product); and related and supported industries (the presence or absence of other internationally competitive industries that the main industry engages with) (Porter, 1990). All these factors strengthen or weaken a firm's competitiveness in international markets. If they reinforce each other, firms are likely to decide for pursuing foreign direct investments in other countries.

Increasing numbers of MNCs appeared after World War II and neoclassical economists' inability to theorize them opened ways for political economists and business economists' attempts to understand and theorize FDIs. The business economists are still working within the neoclassical framework and tend to look at FDI as a beneficial tool for mutual benefits of MNCs and host countries. Hymer's work is both firm-level and international level analysis. He combines both levels for a substantial analysis.

1.3. NATURAL RESOURCE GRABBING

Since the mid-2000s prices of primary commodities are significantly increased. This boom, started in 2004 and lasted until 2015, is considered the longest of all commodity booms (Radetzki and Wårell, 2021: 118). Therefore, it is not surprising that there has been a rush of capital to extraction of natural resources, food production or other raw material productions. This rush has been discussed through several conceptualizations such as land grabbing (Borras Jr. et. al., 2012), water grabbing (Sosa and Zwarteveen, 2012), green grabbing (Fairhead et. al., 2012), neo-extractivism (Brand et. al., 2016), new extractivism (Gudynas, 2010), extractive imperialism (Veltmeyer, 2013) etc. This rush is generally explained by "the increased demand of energy and non-renewable natural resources in Chinese economy (Veltmeyer, 2013: 79) or the deterred investment due to relatively stable commodity prices during the 1990s (World Bank, 2009: 51).

Land, water, green grabbing and neo-extractivism are actually very interrelated phenomena. Especially water grabbing is in the midst of land grabbing and neo-extractivism since both land grabbing for large agricultural projects and extraction of minerals necessitate access to water. Since the focus of this dissertation is mining activities in particular, after giving a general review on land, water and green grabbing, neo-extractivism will be discussed in more detail.

1.3.1. Land, Water and Green Grabbing

Land grabbing literature focuses on the phenomenon of "foreign companies or governments moving into land-abundant poor countries in the south" (Borras et

al., 2012: 402). The geographical scope of the concept expands from the initial research in Africa (Cotula, 2009) to other regions such as Post-Soviet Eurasia (Visser and Spoor, 2011), Southeast Asia (Borras and Franco, 2011), Latin America and Caribbean (Borras et al., 2012; Alonso-Fradejas, 2012; Murmis and Murmis, 2012) and even Eastern Europe (Constantin et. al., 2017). This demonstrates that land grabbing is actually a very widespread phenomenon, geographically ranging from underdeveloped countries to developing countries.

In terms of their focus, some studies focus on land reforms and transfer of land property (Constantine et. al., 2017) or issues about labour (Li, 2011). There are also studies from perspectives of conflict and violence (Grajales, 2011) and gender (Udasmore and Prügl, 2021). On the other hand, there are studies that handle the phenomenon from a broader perspective i.e. struggles to control over value chains of food and agricultural industries (Amanor, 2012), changing food regimes (McMichael, 2012; Akram-Lodhi, 2012) or in relation to global capitalist accumulation responses to the “convergence of multiple crises: food, energy/fuel, climate change and financial” (Borras Jr. et. al., 2012).

Overwhelming number of studies has a critical approach to land, water and green grabbing. However, some also discuss the issue from the perspective of “agricultural outsourcing” (Azadi et. al., 2013) and focus on the positive outcomes of the developments.

Water refers to “a transfer of water control from farmers’ collectives and government agencies” to mining companies (Sosa and Zwarteveen, 2012: 360), hydropower companies (Islar, 2012) or agribusinesses (de Bont et al., 2016). There are also studies that focus on the intersection of land and water grabbings (Mehta, Veldwisch, and Franco, 2012; Woodhouse 2012) and water-mining dimension (Zwarteveen and Sosa, 2012; Budds and Hinojosa, 2012). Therefore, water grabbing appears as a process in the midst of production of food, energy and metal. Compared to land, water is hard to grasp for privatization since it is unfixed to a special location and local communities use it for many purposes. It is either handled explicitly in “massive scale privatization of use rights of water” or implicitly between the legal gaps since the public and private spheres of natural resource government is blurred (Islar, 2012: 379).

The concept of Green grabbing is different than land and water grabbing in the sense that it is critical of grabbing which is pursued for the sake of the environment (Fairhead et. al., 2012). Scholars argue that environment protection agenda is used as an excuse for land grabbing, especially including national parks, forest reserves, water sources or biologically diverse habitats.

1.3.2. Neo-extractivism, New Extractivism or Extractive Imperialism

This rush of capital into extractive industries in developing and underdeveloped countries is not without contradictions. On the one hand, it utilizes stock of natural resources, which was once not feasible and profitable to extract, and it also bears the chance of a new road for development for both post-neoliberal and neoliberal regimes as long as the taxed revenue from the operations of foreign capital is socially redistributed (Veltmeyer, 2013: 84). On the other hand, there is a great danger for the economic, social and environmental impact. It affects the lives and livelihoods of the habitants of mining areas, causes environmental degradation and socio-environmental conflicts (Bebbington, 2009; Bebbington and Humphreys-Bebbington, 2011). Some argue that it may result in “destabilizing conditions of political conflict and even resource wars (Bannon and Collier, 2003). In this context, new extractivism or extractive imperialism refers to

a reliance on foreign direct investment in the natural resource sector and the export of natural resources in primary commodity form. What is new about this strategic shift is that it is based on a new policy regime, designed to ensure a more equitable sharing of the resource wealth through the collection by the government of resource rents or that the resources themselves in some cases (Bolivia, for example) are nationalised and managed in a sustainable way (Veltmeyer, 2013: 82).

Veltmeyer choses to use phrase “extractive imperialism” since he argues that it is continuing practice in different forms in different ages: “the age of conquest, commercial capitalism, the rise of industrial capitalism and the emergence of monopoly capitalism to the present age of global mega corporations allied with financial capital” (Veltmeyer, 2012: 80). What is different with today’s extractive imperialism is that Latin American left and center-left governments’ claim that increased rents can be utilized for social policies and mitigation of the conflicts that

arises from new extractivism. The debate on new extractivism is, then, related to the post-neoliberalism debate in Latin America.

Pink tide, a series of left-wing administrations in Latin American countries coming to power after the electoral victory of Chávez in Venezuela, had initiated a debate of “post-neoliberalism”. Some were critical of the concept, calling it “reconstituted neo-liberalism” (Webber, 2011) or intensification of neoliberalisation (Bakker, 2013). Others were more enthusiastic to see it as a departure from neo-liberalism (Beasley-Murray et. al., 2009; Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009; Casteñada, 2006; Kaltwasser, 2011).

This debate also reiterated itself in the discussions of neo-extractivism. The initial motivation of these left and center-left governments were to continue extraction, but with a non-exploitative approach to nature and respect for indigenous people (Ettliger and Hartman, 2015). However, some studies demonstrated that these claims do not correspond to actual developments whether the regime of the country fall in the classification of neoliberal, post-neoliberal or resource nationalist (Veltmeyer, 2013: 83-84). Even others point out to “mutually constitutive nature of neoliberal and post-neoliberal projects (even in those countries in which political rhetoric is explicitly anti-neoliberal)” (Yates and Bakker, 2014: 83).

From economic point of view, the phenomenon is discussed within “resource curse” debate. It is argued that it can be a resource blessing, taking advantage of the boom in commodity prices while effectively managing any negative outcomes by institutions (Collier and Venables, 2011). Others are more critical of development based on natural resource extraction and highlight its ^[1]negative and disruptive effects, such as increased dependence on prices in world market, corruption, over-reliance on FDI, etc. (Auty, 2001). However, there are also empirical studies demonstrating that there is no curse or blessing stemming from the dynamics of markets (Haber et. al, 2012).

As the post-neoliberal framework of neo-extractivism dictates, role of the state in the process is crucial. State is trusted with the control of the whole system, collection of rents and utilizing them for social development projects. Even in some cases, such as Bolivia and Venezuela, state nationalizes of extractive industries. Also, states were expected to mitigate the negative effects of extraction by holding

MNCs accountable for environmental and social disruptions they cause and regulate their overall activities. Therefore, according to state's role, regimes were classified as populist, radical populist or resource nationalist (Barrett et. al, 2008; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009). In this context, the predicted types of interventionist state and regulatory regimes change throughout the region. Some examined the possibility of a rentier state approach (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014). Others focused on the processes of depolitization and repolitization of minerals (Hogenboom, 2012a) and claimed the return of the state (Hogenboom, 2012b).

On the other hand, critics focus on the fact that progressive governments, in order to achieve what they plan, must incorporate themselves into the new global commercial institutionalism and, therefore, restrict their own actions by the global institutional rules (Gudynas, 2010: 4). Besides, the prices of commodities are highly dependent on international intermediaries and commercial brokers, which refers to the inability to control the prices and accept a subordinate role within the whole global commodities system (Gudynas, 2010: 4).

The contemporary debate on new extractivism is limited in several points. First of all, the debate is focused on Latin American cases. Only few works are published regarding other regions, such as Africa (Ayelazuno, 2014; Greco, 2020) and Central Asia (Bashirov, 2021). Secondly, the literature on Latin American neo-extractivism heavily depends on a discussion of whether the increased foreign investments are opening the way for a new model (Veltmeyer, 2013), a development model specific to Latin America (Brand et al.: 2016) or South American Progressivism (Gudynas, 2010) and mainly get caught in regional political debates and fall short of developing a universal approach. However, the abundance of case study possibilities throughout the region in examining the different types of increasing state involvement offers possibilities for more universalized conclusions regarding the relation between new extractivism and role of the state.

1.4. GOLD MINING IN TÜRKİYE

Looking at the social sciences literature on gold mining in Turkey, two strands of works come forward in the field. One is the research on the environmental impacts of gold mining, which can be seen as a bridge between natural and social

sciences. Since gold mining is not extraction of large pieces of gold anymore due to the exhaustion of those kinds of mines today, the process of mining highly depends on several chemical processes that can harm environment more than the traditional mining of 19th century. Scholars who hold this perspective tend to propose institutional and legislative improvements in order to minimise the negative environmental effects of gold mining as well as minimising the possibility of obstruction for mining investments. Second is the research on environmental movements within the framework of social movements. Scholars written on this area tend to research on many distinctive aspects of the environmental movements, i.e. their interconnectedness with each other, cultural barriers defining the movement and its success, etc. However, they fail to propose a critical analysis of the role of the state in gold mining sector of Turkey.

Social studies on the environmental impacts of gold mining conclude with several proposals for institutional and legislative changes. For instance, Muezzinoğlu (2003) discusses environmental impacts of gold mining and compare and contrast mining processes, such as disposal of wastes in developed and developing countries and claims that in developing countries the gold mines with bad environmental pollution records keep on operations without any restrictions (Muezzinoğlu, 2003: 60). Drawing on these differences, Muezzinoğlu (2003) proposes a global regime of gold mining based on safe permitting and monitoring procedures, effective post-closure measures funded by the companies, and extensive environmental impact reports including fish and wild life. Similarly, Yıldız (2021) evaluate the discouraging effects of the Environmental Impact Assessment process in Turkey mining sector on investment attraction and proposes policy solutions such as different processes for every type of mineral groups and simplicity in institutional and legislative framework. Both studies reflect the differences in mining regimes in developed and developing countries and propose global or national restructuring of institutions and legislations. However, these studies lack a critical evaluation of the regimes, either global or national, and their proposals remain suggestions for reformative actions. Lastly, Aydın and Yilmazer (2020), based on the survey they conducted in Fatsa, Artvin, attempt to measure the environmental sensitivity of local people towards ecological implications of gold mining.

Although research on the environmental movements is more diverse and critically handled, political economic problematization of state as an actor is very limited. There are studies on subjects of the relation of sequential environmental movements in gold mining fields (Özen and Özen, 2011), leadership in local environmental mobilizations against gold mining projects (Özen and Özen, 2022a), resistance movement strategies to protect their legitimacy (Karakoç and Söylemez-Karakoç, 2023).

There are also studies on the reasons behind the successes or failures of local environmental movements against gold mining projects and their possibility of transforming into a national level struggle for environmental protection. For example, Özler and Obach (2019) suggests that cultural barriers, despite the inherent universality of environmentalism, are behind the relative weakness of environmental mobilization in Turkey. Based on interviews with environmental activists and government officials they found out that “developmentalism and suspicion of foreign influence on national affairs” (Özler and Obach, 2019: 774) are two values tend to hinder the flourishing of environmental movements as well as social division that can be traced back to early modernization in Turkey’s republican era (Özler and Obach, 2019: 774-775). Also, Özen (2009) analyses the transformation of local environmental movement in Bergama against the gold mining project to a national political struggle and the shifts in challenges it faced. In addition, Özen (2018) questions the possibility of local level resistances to mining projects of transforming into regional or national level counter-hegemonic movements. She finds out that factors, such as lack of political representation, ongoing pressures in the local scene, strength of the counter-discourse of the pro-mining power bloc etc. hinders this possibility.

Several discourse analysis studies exist in the literature. For instance, Özen and Özen (2022b) proposes a post-structural analysis of the effects of the objective particularities of the gold mining projects on the local resistance by focusing on how these particularities are articulated in the discourse. Orhan (2006) analyses the effects of discourses stemming from involved parties’ risk perceptions of gold mining in the case of Bergama. In addition, Avcı et. al. (2010) reveal the valuation languages (how people value the environment) used by the social actors in the Mount Ida gold

mining case either for or against the mining projects and find out that valuation languages affect the possibility of the conflict to be solved satisfactorily for every side. Additionally, Özen and Özen (2017) comes forward with a post-Marxist analysis of repression of the discourse of protests besides physical repression. They found out that due to ongoing hegemonic struggles of actors, even if the protests are suppressed physically, once established, hegemonic position of the protests might continue to affect other resistance movements (Özen and Özen, 2018). Moreover, Avcı (2017), focusing on the state-society relations, tries to explain how the Ida Mountains (Turkey) and Intag (Ecuador) cases of opposition to mining activities differ. It is revealed that hegemonic views on environmental injustice and development in both cases effect the movements (Avcı, 2017).

Few studies attempt to highlight the role of the state in gold mining within the framework of capitalist relations. For example, Konak (2008) compares ecological modernization and eco-Marxist perspectives' explanatory power in the Bergama case. According to Konak (2008: 108-109), while ecological modernization approach is useful in the analysis of institutionalization of environmental policies, especially with regard to the European Union membership process of Turkey, eco-Marxist perspective has more explanatory power with regard to the struggles of actors, namely Turkish state, private mining companies and civil movements, on the environmental policy. From a macro-institutional theoretical framework, Özen and Özen (2009) search how Bergama movement affected the institutional field in the mining sector within a broader perspective of neo-liberal order at national level. In addition, Hurley and Arı (2011) argues that opposition to mineral extraction projects is related to both the neoliberalization of natural resources regimes, as it is in the Third World perspectives, and amenity migrations (urban-to-rural migrations) as it is discussed in the First World framework. They argue that these two factors can be brought together as a single framework for explaining opposition to Ida Mountains mining projects from a political ecological perspective.

While single and comparative case studies are the strong pillar of the literature on gold mining in Turkey, it intensely focuses on social movements and lacks a framework for problematizing capitalist state and the role of state in maintaining and furthering capitalist accumulation. The discussion and application of

the concept of primitive accumulation in this dissertation is planned to fill this gap and discuss the role of the state in gold mining in Turkey as embedded in capitalist relations of production.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. IMPERIALISM AND WORLD ECONOMY

This part of the thesis is reserved for setting a framework of dynamics of capitalist accumulation, the processes of concentration and internationalisation of capital and the effect of FDIs on uneven and combined development of world economy. The title of this subsection could easily include globalisation. However, I preferred imperialism in order to stress the on-going attachment of national capital and their respective states, maybe a looser one in comparison to the late 19th century, and the exploitative nature of FDIs that reproduces uneven and combined development of capitalism.

Brenner (2006a: 25) suggests that capitalist relations of production lie in the midst of two dimensions, vertical and horizontal. Vertical dimension refers to “market and socio-political power relations between capitalists and workers” (Brenner, 2006a: 25). Horizontal dimension refers to “competition among firms that constitutes the capitalist system” (Brenner, 2006a: 25). In first two parts of this chapter, I will discuss these dimensions. As discussed in the literature review of explanations of FDI, MNCs possess advantages, such as access to factors of production (raw materials, labour, capital, etc.), economies of scale, differentiated products, advanced technology, know-how, patents, vis-à-vis companies in their original and host country. I argue that the advantages of the MNCs are based on the dynamics of capitalist accumulation that fosters competition among firms. As firms invest more and more, they tend to become monopolies where these advantages are also monopolized. This is not to suggest that every investment decision based on these advantages can be explained by economic reductionism, but that the material conditions of the advantages, which MNCs come to possess, stem from capitalist relations of production. Besides these vertical and horizontal dimensions, in the last

part, I also provide a framework for the world economy through the concept of uneven and combined development and discuss how the processes of centralization and internationalization of capital reproduces uneven and combined development of world economy.

2.1.1. Dynamics of Capital Accumulation

Capitalism is “a particular form of *commodity production*” (Brewer, 1990: 26), in which a number of individual producers involve in production mainly for selling their products on the market, not for their own use. Compared to other production forms, i.e. simple (petty) commodity production, its uniqueness comes from the fact that the means of production and labour, which are needed for the production process, are tradable in the market. In other words, the means of production (i.e. land) and labour-power are sold in the market as commodities. In this part, my intention is not to summarize all aspects of capitalist production, such as the labour theory of value, or the theory of wages, but specific characteristics of capitalist mode of production that helps out explaining the advantages of MNCs.

Surplus value is the difference between the value created in a day (the length of the working day) and the value of labour-power (money paid to the workers for a day) (Brewer, 1990: 27). This difference goes to the capitalist when he realizes it by selling surplus product in the market, which is called profit. Capitalist may use surplus value in money form for his own consumption or may transform it to capital form by investing in the means of production (i.e. adding new machinery) or hiring new workers. Therefore, independent from how profit is used, it occurs “when the workers produce more than they get” (Brewer, 1990: 28) during the production process.

In order to increase surplus value (profit), the capitalist has two options: increasing the work hours in a working day, which is called *absolute surplus value*, or increasing the productivity of labour-power (increasing the amount of surplus value created by the worker in a working day), which is called *relative surplus value* (Brewer, 1990: 32-33). In other words, the surplus value depends on the labour-power, which is the independent variable. However, absolute surplus value is limited

in the sense that because it is determined by the length of the working day a worker cannot work 24 hours a day. On the other hand, relative surplus value can be increased infinitely by increasing productivity. Profit-maximization based on absolute surplus value can be seen in early capitalism and production in colonies when working hours were long and wages were low. Profit-maximization based on relative surplus value is common in advanced capitalism (Brewer, 1990: 32-33).

I would like to discuss two models of capitalist accumulation that create surplus value: simple and expanded reproduction. According to Marx, simple production is where the revenue gathered from selling the products (realization of surplus value) is not invested or hoarded by capitalist, but consumed periodically (Marx, 1887: 401). Capitalists spend some of the surplus value to renew the machinery and labour force for the sake of the continuous process of production and keeping the levels of subsistence for both workers and themselves without investing in new means of production or more labour-power in order to increase production levels. In this case, therefore, there is no accumulation of capital. Expanded production, on the other hand, necessitates that at least some portion of the surplus value is transformed into new capital to be reinvested. This new capital can be utilized by purchasing labour power, fixed capital or raw materials. A capitalist economy is similar to the latter. Transformation of surplus value into new capital occurs because of the pressure of competition, which drives capitalists to produce more and/or more efficiently (Callinicos, 2009: 37). Thus, expanded production is increasingly producing more and consuming more and it necessitates an ever-expanding market. In both models, production is in balance with consumption, even in the latter it is assumed that increasing production is met with increasing consumption. Therefore, in expanded production accumulation of capital is assumed infinite.

Luxemburg would question the assumptions of expanded production and come up with her under-consumptionist thesis. In simple production, the capitalists consume the surplus value since it is not reinvested and transformed into capital. That is to say, capitalists buy from each other the commodities they did not produce or means of production to renew the existing ones. Consumption meets the production. In expanded reproduction, on the other hand, the output of commodities

increases as surplus value is transformed into additional capital to add more machinery, more labour. However, Luxemburg assumes that the consumption, both capitalist's own personal consumption and consumption as new investment, cannot meet increasing levels of production. From this difference lack of effective demand occurs (Luxemburg, 2003). This will be discussed in more detail in the "Primitive Accumulation" section of the dissertation since it is the basis of her interpretation of primitive accumulation and imperialism. Similarly, Hobson (1902), a liberal economist, argues that as long as the consumption levels are static why would any capitalist want to invest?

The problem with the under-consumptionist thesis is that they tend to dismiss the demand for means of production, such as new machinery, and focus solely on demand for consumption of goods (Brewer, 1990: 31). However, capitalist's decision between consuming the surplus goods and consuming new means of production (investing) is essentially based on profit-seeking (Brewer, 1990: 31). For instance, in favorable market conditions where high profits are expected, if capitalist decide to invest he hires more workers, therefore, increases the demand for consumption of goods to meet the increased production due to new investment. If high profits are not expected, the capitalist may decide to cut down investments and decrease the number of workers and demand for goods fall.

Here it is also important to mention the necessity of a reserve army of labour, "a pool of unemployed workers competing for jobs and keeping wages down (Brewer, 1990: 30). As capitalist production expands, it needs more workers. As the number of unemployed "available" workers decrease, the downward pressure on wages is diminished and labour discipline is disturbed. As the wages increase, production shrinks, the number of employed workers is decreased, and the reserve army of labour expands. Therefore, the existence of the reserve army of labour is crucial for the capitalist production. I highlighted the "available" because in Marx's model average wages are calculated within the boundaries of a national economy. However, now due to the technological developments and growing internationalization of production workers can be employed in other countries where average wages are low. Therefore, the reserve army expanded enormously and globally and provided MNCs an advantage in escaping the upward pressure on

wages in their home country.

2.1.2. Concentration and Internationalisation of Capital

The tendency for concentration of capital stems from the competitive pressures. Capitalists are under pressure to cut costs in order to compete in the market and try to invent new ways to increase labour productivity or a technological novelty. These novelties decrease costs and increase profits for a period of time. Capitalist makes high profits until this novelty emanates to other companies. When this happens, as costs decrease throughout the sector it also pushes prices and profits down. This levelling of prices and profits eliminates the producers who are not able to implement the novelty effectively and reduce their costs. This constant drive for reducing costs and not being left behind forces capitalists to accumulate and invest more and move from small-scale production to high-scale production. In other words, as the aim of capitalist production is profit and every capitalist strive for the largest possible profit, it becomes “the guiding principle of his economic action as a necessary consequence of the competitive struggle” (Hilferding, 1981: 183). Thus, a capitalist endeavour to maximize profit at the expense of others creates a tendency towards concentration of capital. Marx differentiates two actions that capitalists can take on.

Marx called growth through reinvestment of profits, concentration of capital. Bigger firms will be better able to survive, especially in slumps, and will be able to buy out smaller firms. The growth of the scale of production by amalgamation of capitals is called centralization of capital. (Brewer, 1990: 33)

This is how monopolies emerge. In mainstream economics monopoly refers to a single seller in a specific market, therefore, it faces no competition. However, in the Marxist tradition monopoly has a broader meaning. It refers to “any major departure from atomistic competition”, in which competition moves from simple price competition in the market towards a direct rivalry among few sellers (Brewer, 1990: 89). In other words, free competition eventually leads to the concentration of production and capital and monopolies (Lenin, 2010: 18). Therefore, there are two types of capitalism: free competition capitalism and monopoly capitalism. In the old type of competitive capitalism manufacturers are scattered producing commodities

for an unknown market (Lenin, 2010: 24). However, in monopoly capitalism production is concentrated in fewer hands and forming cartels, which become one of the fundamentals of the economic life (Lenin, 2010: 21; Hilferding, 1981: 21) and “inevitably penetrates into every sphere of public life, regardless of the form of government and all other ‘details’” (Lenin, 2010: 69).

The competitive pressure drives capitalists “to make the maximum possible use of natural conditions and resources to be found in different parts of the world” and expand to large-scale production in order to reduce costs (Brewer, 1990: 95). “Capitalists, must always seek, therefore, to maximize the territory open to them for their operations” (Brewer, 1990: 95) to increase labour force or commodity buyers and control natural resources.

Monopoly also creates mutual dependence among firms since they become more responsive to others’ action. The nature of this interdependence is determined by the amount of capital each firm or cartel possesses (Hilferding, 1981: 223). In other words, concentration of capital in fewer hands leads smaller firms to be dominated by bigger fractions of capital, unless they form their own cartel. Thus, once a sector faces concentration of capital, monopoly becomes “contagious” and “beyond a certain stage it tends to spread very rapidly” to different sectors, which, as a result, transforms capitalism fundamentally (Brewer, 1990: 91).

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of 20th century, Lenin, Hilferding and Bukharin witnessed a tendency for concentration of capital. What they witnessed was not only due to the fact that the tendency for concentration is inherent in capitalist system, but also due to other developments that foster this tendency (Brewer, 1990: 91). One is the spreading of joint stock companies and the other is the emergence of finance capital, a special kind of monopoly integrating production and financial capital.

Joint stock company arose as a new way of capitalist organisation. This type of companies eases the way for owners of large block capital in gaining control of the capital hold by small shareholders. Therefore, the rise of the joint stock company served as a means of extensive concentration of economic power and production (Brewer 1990: 90).

Marx also foresaw the proliferation of joint stock companies and how they are different from individual capital: (1) the scale of production and enterprises grows enormously, which is beyond limits of individual capitals; (2) the capital becomes the form of social capital in contrast to private capital, which refers to “the abolition of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself”; (3) the capitalist transforms into a manager and profit divided among the shareholders becomes a compensation for owning capital (Marx, 1999: 315). This change in the organisational structure of the capitalist economy intensifies monopolistic tendency of capitalist system.

Other central actors in the development of monopolies are banks. Not only they are affected by the overall tendency of monopoly, but also they promote cartelization among their clients because it increases the likelihood of recovering their payments. They also promote mergers, weaker firms are bought by the stronger ones, in order to guarantee their returns (Brewer, 1990: 92). The similarity between the functions of banks and joint stock companies is that they both can mobilise capital from many sources (Hilferding 1981: 122).

Hilferding examines all these transformations under the concept of *finance capital*. Fundamentally, Marx identifies three fractions of capital: “*industrial capital* (productive enterprises, including capitalist agricultural enterprises), *financial capital* (banks and similar capitalist enterprises dealing in money capital), and *commercial capital* (merchant’s capital; buying and selling goods rather than producing them)” (Brewer, 1990: 92). However, as a new development,

Finance capital signifies the unification of capital. The previously separate spheres of industrial, commercial and bank capital are now brought under the common direction of high finance, in which the masters of industry and of the banks are united in a close personal association. The basis of this association is the elimination of free competition among individual capitalists by the large monopolistic combines (Hilferding, 1981: 301).

This was a new development at that time because while separation of capital fractions identified by Marx is characteristic of competitive capitalism, fusion of them is the characteristic of monopoly capitalism (Brewer, 1990: 92-93). The rise of finance capital also led commercial capital to a subordinate status (Brewer, 1990: 105). The rationale behind this is that “as bank deposits grew, and opportunities for investment in commerce declined (because monopolies take direct control of buying

and selling), the banks were effectively forced into investing directly in production” (Brewer, 1990: 93). By the domination of finance capital over other capitals the industrial capitalist becomes more dependent on the bank (Lenin, 2010: 46). As banking is concentrated in fewer hands they are transformed from being intermediary institutions to powerful monopolies, which have a strong grip of money capital, means of production and sources of raw materials in many countries (Lenin, 2010: 32).

An ever-increasing part of the capital of industry does not belong to the industrialists who use it. They are able to dispose over capital only through the banks, which represent the owners. On the other side, the banks have to invest an ever-increasing part of their capital in industry, and in this way they become to a greater and greater extent industrialist capitalists. (Hilferding, 1981: 225).

It is important to note that Hilferding’s analysis depends on his observation of German capitalism. His concept of finance capital depends on the difference between early and slow development of capitalism in England and late and rapid development in Germany. “Predominance of capital accumulation in the hands of individual capitalists, one of the earlier and, as it were, organic features of English capitalism, was lacking both on the continent and in the United States” (Hilferding, 1981: 306). Since Britain was enjoying from a relative lead in commodity production and benefiting from trade monopoly, the pressure of competition was felt less compared to slightly less developed countries (Brewer, 1990: 94). On the other hand, lacking these advantages, German industrialists had to rely on the savings of other classes through joint stock companies and banks (Hilferding, 1981: 306).

The process of concentration of capital marked the transition from old capitalism to a new one, “from domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital” (Lenin, 2010: 53). Similarly, by the concentration of capital, profits increase, thus, export of capital becomes the typical feature of the new capitalism, while export of goods was the typical feature of the old one (Lenin, 2010: 74). The internationalization of capital is intensified and changes the form of capital exports. In countries with developed finance capital, capital export tend to take the form of direct investment in production controlled from the source of the finance capital because “the greater efficiency of finance capital in investment abroad is a

competitive advantage which hastens the transformation of capital into finance capital” (Brewer, 1990: 102).

Also, with the monopolies seeking protection in their direct investments, the process transformed the role of tariff. “From being a means of defence against the conquest of the domestic market by foreign industries it has become a means for the conquest of foreign markets by domestic industry” (Hilferding, 1981: 313). He argues that since monopolizing the world market is impossible, for trusts or cartels tariff protection becomes paramount in protecting prices, therefore, their advantageous position (Brewer, 1990: 96). In doing so, finance capital needed the state, first to ensure tariff protection and then to achieve territorial expansion (Brewer, 1990: 106).

All in all, the international movement of capital reached its peak in the immediate years before World War I (Brewer, 1990: 100) and the growth of capital export is related to the development of finance capital. Opportunities for capital export had been there all along, but the necessary organizational forms –joint stock companies and finance capital- were not present. By the development of joint stock companies, it became possible for subsidiaries to be established abroad more easily without the emigration of the capitalist. In addition, finance capital eased the access to funds (Brewer, 1990: 102).

2.1.3. Uneven and Combined Development of Capitalism

This section will look at how centralisation and internationalisation of capital reproduces uneven and combined development of world economy and how they create contradictions in FDI receiving countries. Uneven and combined development (UCD) is first used in explaining the relatively backward national economies’ integration of world economy. Trotsky developed the concept of uneven and combined development in order to explain the peculiarities of capitalist development in Russia and develop revolutionary strategies accordingly. He suggested that the backwardness of Russian development forces it to leap forward over stages in development (Trotsky, 1980: 4); i.e. bourgeoisie revolution.

Although capitalism was developing in Russia, it was slow and it had some self-contradictory results. For example, the inclusion of Western techniques into

production was primarily significant for development, but it also produced a negative effect: “strengthening of serfdom as the fundamental form of labour organization” (Trotsky, 1980: 5). While a technique helps Western states advance their development, when it was adopted by a backward country it may contribute to the persistence of primitive social forms. In other words, UCD consists of two historical processes, which were seen together in different geographies and epochs.

Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity, their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development—by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms (Trotsky, 1980: 5).

Although the phenomenon of uneven and combined development can be traced back to the distribution of agrarian surpluses, Trotsky highlights the success of capitalism in managing these processes. On the one hand, capitalist expansion has an equalizing effect.

In contrast to the economic systems which preceded it, capitalism inherently and constantly aims at economic expansion, at the penetration of new territories, the surmounting of economic differences, the conversion of self-sufficient provincial and national economies into a system of financial interrelationships. Thereby it brings about their rapprochement and equalizes the economic and cultural levels of the most progressive and the most backward countries (Trotsky, 1957: 19).

However, at the same time, it undermines the effects of its own expansion.

By drawing the countries economically closer to one another and leveling out their stages of development, capitalism, however, operates by methods of its own, that is to say, by anarchistic methods which constantly undermine its own work, set one country against another, and one branch of industry against another, developing some parts of world economy while hampering and throwing back the development of others (Trotsky, 1957: 19-20).

In today's global capitalism, one may not find any country experiences backwardness in Trotsky's understanding. Pre-capitalist social relations of production are hard to come by compared to his times. Therefore, there are attempts to redefine uneven and combined development “as internal to the dynamics of capitalism itself” and dismiss “the archaeology of past social and geographical difference” (Smith, N., 2006: 185). Uneven development is seen as explanatory as it

can be. However, in my opinion, as the pre-capitalist social relations of production are the main reason for geographical unevenness in the first place, it cannot be dismissed that easily. The process of transformation of these relations into capitalist relations of production has occurred differently around the world and it may be still useful in understanding the differentiation between capitalisms. Brewer highlights that for Marx this geographical pattern is not accidental and “the prospects for the development of capitalism depended crucially on the previous structure of society, which differed in different parts of the world” (Brewer, 1990: 37). In addition, the expansion of capitalism from advanced world towards the developing world still create contradictions, maybe not at the expense of its own development, but contradictions that have real effects on the lives of common people. Since this dissertation focuses on contradictions of neo-extractivism and how the host state manages these contradictions, I defend keeping the “combined”.

If we dismiss the “combined”, explanation of uneven development becomes solely economic, consisting of two opposing tendencies derived from the workings of capitalist system. On the one hand, it has a tendency of universalisation towards an equalisation of profit rate around the world (Smith, N., 2006: 198). As it was discussed in the previous part, any attempt to increase labour productivity, such as introducing a new technique, results in the emanation of the technique throughout the industry leveling the profits accordingly. Therefore, here the tendency of equalization of labour exploitation is at work.

On the other hand, as capital moves freely it reproduces the division of labour by differentiation, a tendency of differentiation. This stems from the needs of capitalist accumulation driven by profits leading to “a development of certain specialties and conditions of labour, different wage rates, different resources and different technologies in some places at the expense of others” (Smith, N., 2006: 189). This spatial differentiation of systems of financial circulation and of social production is embedded in the working of capitalism (Smith, N., 2006: 189).

Both conflicting tendencies are internal to the logic of capital accumulation whether in national or in global scale. This contradiction manifests itself in the “uneven geographical development, which establishes discrete places differentiated from each other and at the same time pressures these places, across borders, into a

single mould” (Smith, N., 2006: 190).

Considering the equalization tendency, like liberals of the “flat world”, Marx expected a fully integrated world economy. He saw the backwardness of some parts of the world as a transitional and temporary phenomenon in the formation of an integrated global capitalist economy (Brewer, 1990: 25). On the other hand, dependency theorists like Frank (1966) based their approaches on the assumption that the unevenness between the developed and the underdeveloped (or center and periphery) will not go away because this duality is, in fact, the essence of capitalism (Brewer, 1990, 26). Therefore, while liberals focus on the combined development part of the process, dependency school focuses on the unevenness of capitalist development (Kiely, 2012: 239).

Within this proposed structure of the world economy, how can we understand the internationalization of capital and the transformation of export capital (to direct investments in production)? What is their role in the uneven and combined development of global capitalism? Lenin suggests that export of capital accelerated the capitalist development in the host countries.

The export of capital affects and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it is exported. While, therefore, the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development in the capital exporting countries, it can do so only by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the world (Lenin, 2010: 77-78).

In order to achieve such development, the export of capital has enormously accelerated the transformation of old social relations. Hilferding argues that

Capitalist development did not take place independently in each individual country, but instead capitalist relations of production and exploitation were imported along with capital from abroad, and indeed imported at the level already attained in the most advanced country (Hilferding: 1981: 322).

Therefore, the export of capital also means the export of capitalist social relations of production, in fact, at the already attained level in exporting country. It is different from trade in the sense that trade can occur between different social relations of production. However, a direct capital investment in production “requires the creation of capitalist relations of production” (Brewer, 1990: 102-103).

Therefore, transformation of natural economies stems directly from the changing nature of exports. If necessary, the transformation is forced.

Violent methods are the essence of colonial policy, without which it would lose its capitalist rationale. They are just as much an integral part of it as the existence of a propertyless proletariat is a condition sine qua non of capitalism in general. The idea of pursuing a colonial policy without having to resort to its violent methods is an illusion to be taken no more seriously than that of abolishing the proletariat while maintaining capitalism in existence (Hilferding, 1981: 319).

The internationalization of capital also transformed the international division of labour among economies. Following Marx's terminology of *the social division of labour*, Bukharin describes international division of labour as "a division of labour between national economies, between various countries, a division of labour which oversteps the boundaries of the national economy" (Bukharin, n. d.: 18) resulting from the unequal development of productive forces (Bukharin, n. d.: 20). As every company is part of the national economy, every national economy becomes a part of the system of world economy (Bukharin, n. d.: 17). A similar analogy is also established between towns-countries and industrial-agrarian countries. Just as in the social division of labour in a capitalist economy, in this international division of labour, there are also towns and countries, towns referring to industrial countries and countries referring to agrarian territories (Bukharin, n. d.: 21). Thus, in international division of labour we have "industrial countries importing agricultural products and exporting manufactured goods, and agrarian countries exporting the products of agricultural production and importing the products of industry" (Bukharin, n. d.: 20). However, by the internationalization of capital and transformation of capital exports, the agrarian countries initiated capitalist production and then the trade among these countries is also transformed.

Another transformation is the transformation of competition. The monopolization of world economy, the total elimination of competition, is impossible. However, the concentration and internationalization of capital changed the form of competition. While previously competition was strong at the national level and weak at the international, by the intensification of internationalization of capital it became vice versa (Brewer, 1990: 115-116).

Lastly, there is thought to be one thing that has not changed: war. Bukharin believed that the concentration and internationalization of capital would eventually lead to war, however, he does not conceive war as an obstacle to the capitalist development. On the contrary, he suggests that war is a part of the centralization process, organizing the national economies under an increasing and “the combined rule of finance capital and the state” (Bukharin, n. d.: 148). War is only one of the “business operations” of the modern bourgeoisie and since the profit is the main principle of capitalist production, once war is over it would return to business as it is (Bukharin, n. d.: 148). The international division of labour determined by the unequal development of the productive forces cannot be destroyed, even by a world war. Therefore, Bukharin suggests that the processes of concentration and internationalization of capital would continue to create competition and conflicts in the world economy (Bukharin, n. d.: 148).

To conclude, this chapter was proposed for setting the framework for the movements of capital, how and why they occur, how they are transformed within the relations of capitalist production and how they reproduce uneven combined development of capitalism. The main drive for capital exports firstly stems from competitive pressures in the national markets. Pressures force firms to become monopolies. Monopolies have increased scales of production. They are able to collect high amounts of capital from new resources. They also buy or merge with companies in order to diminish competition. Constant drive for cutting costs results in more investment on know-hows for increasing labour efficiency. They also have access to a greater reserve army of labour in comparison to the national companies. Monopolies want to monopolise these advantages too. In the end, high profits stemming from the centralization of capital is exported to other countries as direct investments in order to have higher control over their investments. This double process of concentration and internationalization of capital transforms world economy. By looking through the concept of uneven and combined development, which rests in the heart of world economy, I tried to discuss these transformations. The existing unevenness of world economy is reproduced through circulation of direct investments on production. The double processes of universalization and differentiation lead to transformation of social relations in the host country. Capitalist

relations of production are exported to other countries (developing or underdeveloped) creating peculiarities, as Trotsky would say. Next part will focus on how this peculiarities occur.

2.2. PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND AUTONOMY OF STATE²

Since Marx, many scholars have interpreted the concept of primitive accumulation in many different ways and for many different purposes. The main axis of these Marxist debates has always been on the contemporaneity of the concept. While some of them argue that primitive accumulation has its theoretical significance in the prehistory of capitalism explaining the origins of capital, others propose that it is actually an on-going process throughout the history of capitalism and side by side with capitalist accumulation. Especially after the invasion of Iraq, which also marked the beginning of a “new imperialism debate”, David Harvey (2003, 2004), in relation to his imperialism arguments, made an attempt to reinvent a ‘new primitive accumulation’, by not only highlighting the continuous character of primitive accumulation, but also expanding its original meaning.

Especially with Harvey’s attempt to reinvent a ‘new primitive accumulation’, bringing primitive accumulation from prehistory of capital in order to explain today’s capitalism eventually led to a significant distortion in the meaning and the explanatory value of the concept. Despite primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation are originally separate, but complementary processes with significant explanatory power, they ended up referring identical processes.

2.2.1. Primitive Accumulation in Marx

The concept of primitive accumulation is originally derived from Adam Smith’s assumption that “the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated” (Smith, A.,

² Most of this chapter of the dissertation is published as a part of the requirements for the PhD degree. Eroğlu, M. (2022). Contemporaneity of Primitive Accumulation in Understanding Current Trends in Capitalism and Capitalist State. *Pamukkale Journal of Eurasian Socioeconomic Studies*. 9(2): 170-185. DOI: 10.34232/pjess.1219358

1977: 361). This stock is understood as stock of goods, which has to be produced beforehand and made ready to be traded in the market for the producers' other needs since the modern industrial society necessitates a division of labour. Following this initial stock, division of labour is introduced and leads to an increasing accumulation of stock, which is eventually transformed to capital. Here the concept of previous accumulation in its practice has a methodological value since Smith utilizes it for explaining the origins of capital. However, it is detached from history and does not really say anything about the social developments that lead to the formation of capital.

Marx, on the other hand, criticizes Smith from that very point and called it "the so-called primitive accumulation" (Marx, 1887: 508) and reintroduced it with a deeper historical significance in the development of capitalism. Therefore, he devotes the last part of Capital Volume I to the concept of primitive accumulation and defines it as "the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production [and] ... it forms the prehistoric stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it" (Marx, 1887: 508).

Since the capitalist system presupposes a complete separation of peasants from the means of production so that they are free to exchange their labour in the market, the primitive accumulation is the means to achieve this. When capitalist production sets in, it only reproduces this separation (Marx, 1887:507). In other words,

The process [of primitive accumulation], therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage labourers (Marx, 1887: 507-8).

According to Marx, therefore, the process of primitive accumulation as the separation of peasants from the means of production is significant for the capital accumulation in two ways: Firstly, it creates a labour force free from land, a wage labourer, so he can travel wherever there is a market for his labour. As well, he is also free from guilds of old order, which have strict regulations for labour. Secondly, the emancipation of labour from old ball and chains could be enough for a bourgeois historian, he claims, but the path to being a free labourer necessitates being "robbed

of all their means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements” (Marx, 1887: 507-508) which will be transformed into capital. Like the separation of an atom into small pieces and releasing energy, practices of primitive accumulation separates the peasants from the means of production and this process leads to the creation of capital and, consequently, to the accumulation of it.

In other words, from other way around, from the end to the beginning, “the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labour power in the hands of producers of commodities” (Marx, 1887: 507). These presuppositions need one more to escape this “vicious circle”: a primitive accumulation “preceding capitalistic accumulation which does not depend on capitalistic mode of production” (Marx, 1887: 507).

Marx clearly exemplifies this process of separation of peasants from the means of production, and how it was a bloody one. He calls the Acts for Enclosures of Commons, beginning as early as 17th century, as “robbery”, “a parliamentary *coup d’etat*”, “bloody legislation against the expropriated” (Marx, 1887: 507-522). Landlords were robbing the land, which was previously common, transforming communal property into private property. Here the landlords are the real perpetrators of primitive accumulation through utilization of state and laws, not the protocapitalists. Protocapitalists mainly benefited from this new class of expropriated free workers and privatized property, which are crucial for capitalist accumulation. When labourer is free to exchange his labour in the market, he becomes the sole creator of surplus value, which eventually transforms into capital and reinvested in production leading to capitalist accumulation. Rather than private property as a concept for itself, this transformation of peasants into wageworkers and the process of losing their direct relation to the means of production becomes the core of the argument because without it the capitalist accumulation would not be possible.

While analysing the English case in detail, Marx also reminds that there is not one single form of primitive accumulation. The expropriation of the peasant from the soil, from the means of production as well of the means of subsistence, is not specific to the development of capitalism in England. He claimed that “the history of this

expropriation, in different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods” (Marx, 1887: 508).

From Marx’s handling of the concept of primitive accumulation, there appear three conclusions. Firstly, primitive accumulation is a process of creating a free work force and private property. Secondly, the perpetrator of primitive accumulation is a class, aristocratic class in this sense, and it is pursued by the use of state power. Therefore, there is a need to define the relations between classes or class fractions and the state. Thirdly, it seems relatively clear in Marx’s writings that spatial variations of primitive accumulation in different regions exist. Considering the expansion of capitalism into other countries and into other modes of production did not have a strict time frame, primitive accumulation has occurred in different regions at different times. Later scholarship, therefore, disagrees on these variations across time, and discusses whether it is a phenomenon of the past or a contemporary one.

2.2.2. The Discussion on Continuity of Primitive Accumulation

Considering the continuity of the primitive accumulation two positions developed since Marx. The scholars in the first position argue that primitive accumulation refers to a specific moment in the past, a part of precapitalist history, and sometimes a specific geography, England. Therefore, the utilization of primitive accumulation as a tool in understanding contemporary capitalism becomes impossible. The second position, on the hand, claims that the primitive accumulation is not only precapitalist setting for creating the conditions for capital accumulation, but also an inherent and continuous process of capitalism. De Angelis (2001: 3-4) names these two traditions as “historical primitive accumulation” and “inherent-continuous primitive accumulation” respectively.

Vladimir Lenin can be considered as one of the earlier figures of historical reading of primitive accumulation based on the understanding of primitive accumulation in his work ‘The Development of Capitalism in Russia’ (Lenin, 1974). In this work, primitive accumulation is understood as a process amid feudal and capitalist modes of production. The utilization of the concept in his book manifests

itself as the classical divorcing of people from the means of production, from which the capitalist accumulation flourishes. He strongly stood at that position in order to challenge the Narodnik claim that the absence of a market would impede capitalist development in Russia. Lenin argued that the feudal relations of production were already in the process of dissolution, local markets were being replaced by a national market, production moved beyond subsistence and a class division had already occurred in the rural between landowners and agrarian workers. Therefore, the setting for capitalist development and accumulation were already at its place. Here, Lenin defines and utilizes primitive accumulation as a precursory phenomenon for capitalist development.

There are successive scholars who follow this path to highlight the precapitalist history of primitive accumulation and utilize it as a tool to explain transition from feudalism to capitalism.³ Dobb, for instance, makes a distinction between “accumulation of means of production themselves” (Dobb, 1946: 177), capitalist accumulation, and “an accumulation of claims or titles to wealth, capable of being converted into instruments of production although they are not themselves productive agents” (Dobb, 1946: 177), primitive accumulation. Accumulation of means of production is hardly specific to precapitalist history since there is no reason for capitalists to stock machines or raw materials until a future point where they will be enough for initiating production; they are also able to provide any means of production during the capitalist production. Therefore, what is called primitive accumulation as “*in prior in time*” has to be understood as “an accumulation of capital *claims* – of titles to existing assets which are accumulated primarily for speculative reasons” (Dobb, 1946: 178) and the class that holds these assets has to be capable of transforming this stock of wealth into the means of production. Therefore, “when one speak of accumulation in an historical sense, one must be referring to the *ownership* of assets, and to a *transfer* of ownership, and not to the quantity of tangible instruments of production in existence” (Dobb, 1946: 178). Even though there are differences among their ideas, many scholars from Paul Sweezy (1950;

³ The main contours of the debate can be found in Hilton, Rodney. (ed). (1978). *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*. London: Verso.

1986) to Robert Brenner⁴ and later on others (Gottlieb, 1984; Leibman, 1984; McLennon, 1986) have shown interest in the issue of primitive accumulation as an important part of the trans from feudalism to capitalism and abstained from extending it to a period when capitalist (expanded) production had achieved its dominance on other types of production.

The second tradition of “inherent-continuous primitive accumulation”(De Angelis, 2001: 3-4), on the other hand, stands that primitive accumulation has a continuous character. This point flourished from Rosa Luxemburg’s approach to primitive accumulation. Luxemburg in “The Accumulation of Capital” (Luxemburg, 2003) accepts historical primitive accumulation as discussed above, that is a process of transition between modes of production, but her theoretical position is to give primitive accumulation a continuous character and intertwine it with capitalist development. In her words, “the accumulation of capital, seen as an historical process, employs force as a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but further on down to the present day” (Luxemburg, 2003: 351). This coincides with her efforts to explain the violence of colonialism, militarism and imperialism at her times. Luxemburg argues that primitive accumulation, in this sense, can be both a part of the past and today and the future of capitalism.

But how and why primitive accumulation is a continuous and inherent feature of capitalism? The difference between simple and expanded production was discussed in the “Dynamics of Capitalist Accumulation” part of the framework. To remind here, expanded reproduction occurs when the capitalist reinvests a portion of surplus value, to raw materials, machinery or labour, and transforms it into capital. Luxemburg questions Marx’s model of expanded production with two classes, capitalists and workers, and argues that expanded production is impossible in a purely capitalist economy (Brewer, 1989: 60). A part of the commodities are sold in order to renew the means of production and to keep the level of subsistence of workers and capitalists in simple and expanded production models. This part does not create a problem for her analysis since all consumption is met for the continuation of the production. However, the demand for rest of the commodities,

⁴ Brenner’s arguments were collected in Aston, T.H. & Philpin, C. (eds). (1985). *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

which are surplus to be transformed into capital to be reinvested, is not met. Her question is: who buys these commodities?

Since capitalists consuming each other's commodities cannot be the definitive feature of a capitalist system, she presupposes that there has to be non-capitalist buyers for these commodities, a third party outside capitalist production. In fact, "the surplus value cannot be realized by sale either to workers or to capitalists, but only if it is sold to such social organisations or strata whose own mode of production is not capitalistic" (Luxemburg, 2003: 332). Without their existence accumulation cannot be achieved since the production is ever increasing and there are only capitalists and workers in this model of society, shortage of effective demand will inevitably occur (Tarbuck, 1972: 21-22). She contends that this shortage has to be met with non-capitalist buyers, either within the national economy or as a non-capitalist country. Thus, accumulation is "more than an internal relationship between the branches of capitalist economy; it is primarily a relationship between capital and a non-capitalist environment" (Luxemburg, 2003: 398).

Marx presupposes that consumption is only met by capitalists and workers and that there is "the universal and exclusive domination of the capitalist mode of production" (Luxemburg, 2003: 328), however, "real life has never known a self-sufficient capitalist society under the exclusive domination of the capitalist mode of production" (Luxemburg, 2003: 328). Luxemburg argues that not only capitalist accumulation necessitates non-capitalist buyers (or societies), but also it transforms them. Non-capitalist countries, which trade commodities with capitalist countries, eventually will be broken up (Brewer, 1989: 58-59). Their natural economies will be substituted by simple commodity economies since the ultimate aim of the accumulative process is developing "the exclusive and universal domination of capitalist production" worldwide and in all levels of the economy (Luxemburg, 2003: 397).

To summarize, non-capitalist other is indispensable for capitalist accumulation (Callinicos, 2009: 36) and it is inescapable since it is rooted in the dynamics of capitalist reproduction. In other words, non-capitalist other is significant for balancing the capitalism's inner conflicts (Harvey, 2003: 141), without which the dynamics of capitalist expansion is imperiled.

Similar to Luxemburg, world-systems (Wallerstein, 1979) and dependency school theorists also highlight the continuous character of primitive accumulation. For instance, Amin suggests that while wealth from primitive accumulation is essential for capitalist development in developed countries, it is also the reason for underdevelopment in the periphery (Amin, 1974: 22). For Amin, primitive accumulation is not a part of the past, it is structural and contemporary, and it is the essence of interaction between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production (Amin, 1974: 3).

Highlighting primitive accumulation's continuous character and intertwining it with capitalist accumulation brought its own problems, which will be discussed below. The historical and inherent-continuous versions of primitive accumulation dominated the discussion of the concept in the 20th century. However, the 21st century discussion is more based on whether or not to transform the concept in a way to explain the widespread atrocities of neoliberal capitalism.

2.2.3. A New Primitive Accumulation?

After the invasion of Iraq 2003, many scholars suggested that it was the beginning of a new era for global capitalism. 'The New Imperialism' is one of these approaches, which became well-known after the book of David Harvey in 2003, published right after the beginning of the war. By the turn of the 21st century, the events highlighted the debate around state and capitalism within the Marxist tradition in social sciences. What was new at that time in world politics is the shift from a hegemony based on multilateralism to unilateralism of the US. Despite the arguments on the demise of the state power, the 21st century began with a demonstration of state power. This part includes Harvey's main arguments about imperialism and accumulation by dispossession, how he associates them to understand contemporary global capitalism and criticisms towards his concept of 'accumulation by dispossession'.

David Harvey in "The New Imperialism" defines "capitalist imperialism" as "a contradictory fusion of 'the politics of state and empire'... and 'the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time'" (Harvey, 2003: 26). Following Arrighi, he differentiates between two logics of power: territorial and capitalist, the

former representing the state and the latter representing the capital. Despite the previous approaches to imperialism, which assumes a rather easy correlation and coordination between the state and the capitalists, these two logics are contradictory. Although it is hard to achieve, the intertwining of these two logics in a dialectical sense is the core of his argument on imperialism (Harvey, 2003: 29-30). It is important to mention that he also differentiates capitalist imperialism from other conceptions of empire. In capitalist imperialism, he argues, there is the domination of capitalist logic over the territorial logic, with exceptions (for example, Vietnam War) (Harvey, 2003: 30-33). Thus, while assuming the contradictory fusion of these to separate logics, he is criticised for not providing a distinctive territorial logic and even sometimes reducing territorial logic to the capitalist one in his analysis (Brenner, 2006b: 81-82).

Harvey argues that the imperialist expansion is driven by the problem of overaccumulation, which creates periodic crises and pressure to outlet the abundant capital and labour (Harvey, 2003: 109). In other words, in accordance with Marx's theory of falling rate of profit, capitalism produces crises of overaccumulation of capital, which can be absorbed by:

(a) temporal displacement through investment in long-term capital projects or social expenditures (such as education and research) that defer the re-entry of capital values into circulation into the future, (b) spatial displacements through opening up new markets, new production capacities, and new resource, social, and labour possibilities elsewhere, or (c) some combination of (a) and (b) (Harvey, 2003: 109).

In this sense, for instance, while the post-World War II welfare state period corresponds greatly to a temporal displacement, imperialist periods such as period from late 19th century to end of World War II and new imperialism in neoliberal era mostly correspond to spatial displacement of capital. Either the overaccumulation is absorbed with opening up more spaces for export of capital, nevertheless not without crises of deindustrialization or devaluation, or global competition intensifies into trade or currency wars, even into military conflicts (Harvey, 2003: 122-124).

As the imperialism becomes new, in Harvey, primitive accumulation has also

become a new concept, which he names “accumulation by dispossession”⁵, which lies at the core of the contemporary imperialism today (Harvey, 2003: 182). He argues that Marx excludes primitive accumulation from his general theory of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2004: 73). Primitive accumulation is precapitalist practices, can be accomplished only the agency of the state “with its monopoly of power and definitions of legality” (Harvey, 2004: 74), such as the commodification and privatization of land, commodification of labour power, conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights; imperial policies to appropriate natural resources in other countries etc. (Harvey, 2004: 74). Today, Harvey sees similar processes around the world, which has become central features of capitalism, especially in finance, such as:

Stock promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset stripping through mergers and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt encumbrancy that reduce whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage, to say nothing of corporate fraud, dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) by credit and stock manipulations (Harvey, 2004: 74-75).

There are also new mechanisms for accumulation by dispossession: “escalating depletion of the global environmental commons (land, air, water) and proliferating habitat degradations that preclude anything but capital-intensive modes of agricultural production” (Harvey, 2003: 147-148), “the patenting and licensing of genetic material, seed plasma” (Harvey, 2003: 147-148), “the commodification of cultural forms, histories and intellectual creativity” (Harvey, 2003: 147-148) and so on.

Harvey also utilizes Luxemburg’s idea that “capitalism must perpetually have something ‘outside of itself’ in order to stabilize itself” (Harvey, 2003: 140). Therefore, accumulation by dispossession means an on-going process of primitive accumulation around the world; i.e. promoting privatization of public goods by international institutions, accessing cheap raw materials and labour power, speculating in financial markets, etc.; in order to provide profitable outlets for overaccumulation of capital. In other words, overaccumulation crisis is solved with a

⁵ He claims that he did not want to use the term primitive accumulation because it is not a part of the past, but an ongoing process (Harvey, 2004: 74). In other article, he claims that “an shift in language can be far more politically effective” (Harvey, 2006: 158).

discharge of properties at cheaper prices so that capital can transform them into profit (Harvey, 2003: 149).

In Marx, state and the landlords were the perpetrators of primitive accumulation. In several occasions, Harvey agrees that state “with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality” (Harvey, 2004: 75) achieved the precapitalist separation of peasants from the means of production “even against popular will” (Harvey, 2004: 75). Today state is giving up its own duties of conservation of labour and the environment (Harvey, 2003: 148), reversing of common property rights (Harvey, 2003: 148). To sum up, the concept of accumulation by dispossession, similar to other scholars of “inherent-continuous primitive accumulation” (De Angelis, 2001: 3-4) camp, proposes that primitive accumulation is not only a phase which set the conditions on which capitalism prospers and achieve expanded reproduction, but also a continuing process.

The main problem with the intertwining of capitalist and primitive accumulation is that it becomes hard to understand where capitalist accumulation (or reproduction) begins and ends. Harvey is criticized for extending the scope of accumulation by dispossession and treating capitalist accumulation and accumulation by dispossession as the same thing by putting “workers’ loss of employment through their firm’s bankruptcy, which is a standard result of a well-established process of capital accumulation, and the expropriation of peasants from their land – in the English enclosures of the eighteenth century” (Brenner, 2006b: 101) in the same bag. His examples of accumulation of dispossession are so wide that it eventually means everything and nothing. From lost pensions in Enron’s collapse to intellectual property rights in TRIPS agreement, from degradation of environment to commodification of cultural forms, from privatization of universities to attacks on national health care (Harvey, 2004: 75), he exemplifies many processes as accumulation by dispossession and, eventually, the new term loses its explanatory power since it becomes the logic behind every process that is associated with capitalism. Even in 2010 he claimed that “the extraction of surplus-value is, after all, a specific form of accumulation by dispossession of the laborer’s capacity to produce value in the labour process” (Harvey, 2010: 311). In the end, even extraction of

surplus value, the basis of capitalist accumulation and exploitation, has become a part of accumulation by dispossession.

In addition, he dismisses all kinds of difference among these processes of accumulation. For example, privatization of the commons and the privatization of state institutions have to be treated differently since in the latter case “a wage-labor class that existed before such privatization took place” (Das, 2017: 600).

Secondly, some of the processes that the concept of accumulation by dispossession refers to are actually the processes of capitalist exploitation and production, which are already covered in Marx’s theory of capitalism. For instance, he suggests that whenever there is a crisis of overaccumulation, accumulation by dispossession processes come to rescue capital from the diminished profits. However, for imperialist activities in the South, one can also expect that since:

imperialism is (increasingly) a system of exploitation –and indeed, super-exploitation- of workers of imperialized countries, by capital of the imperialist countries, with the aid of their militarized states, and complicity of pliant states and capital in the periphery, ... such system of exploitation in the periphery, by putting pressure on wages in imperialist countries, increases the rate of exploitation in these countries as well (Das, 2017: 602).

Harvey would call it, too, a process of accumulation by dispossession since he came to use the term interchangeably with capitalism even though it is how labour market in capitalism served this purpose throughout centuries.

Thirdly, Harvey borrows from Luxemburg the idea that capitalism needs ‘others’ outside of the capitalist reproduction in order to maintain continuity. However, he mistakenly identifies it with not only precapitalist structures wherever it prevailed around the world, but also proposes that the state is non-capitalist in the sense that privatization of state enterprises facilitate capitalist accumulation as a response to the problem of overaccumulation. Marxist debate on the state has eventually reached a general definition that state provides and sustains the conditions for capitalist development. It is integrated in capitalist system; whether this integration may be instrumentalist, parasitical, developmental or relatively autonomous etc. depends on positions of scholars. However, in Harvey’s writings, sometimes state or a strong state is the perpetrator of accumulation by dispossession, other times, it is the victim of it. This ambiguity surrounding the position of the capitalist state has to be addressed properly.

Accumulation by dispossession argument has these shortcomings and ambiguities that create questions about its explanatory power. The continuity debate originally does not necessitate such an expansion in the meaning and scope of primitive accumulation. Yet, Harvey undertook such a task, which only led to the conclusion that accumulation by dispossession became a concept not only for the explanation of primitive accumulation practices today, but also for already explained capitalist accumulation processes. Therefore, I propose to discuss the continuity of primitive accumulation with an amalgamation with approaches to the autonomy of state.

2.3. AUTONOMY OF THE STATE

State sometimes is a subject, which does or must do things; other times, it is a thing, which used as a tool by others, i.e. political parties, classes etc. in their pursuit of their interests (Jessop, 2007: 132-133). Like Harvey's approach mentioned in the previous chapter, the state is both the perpetrator and the victim of primitive accumulation, can the state be both?

It is acknowledged that regardless of their intentions, Marx and Engels did not propose a complete capitalist state theory in their works. At least, they did not offer "a theoretical analysis of the capitalist state to match the scope and rigor of *Das Capital*" (Jessop, 1977: 354). At best, Marx's understanding of state can be derived from "a fragmented and unsystematic series of philosophical reflections, contemporary history, journalism and incidental remarks" (Jessop, 1977: 354). Thus, many theoreticians searched for clues or depictions of state or any other reference in Marx and Engels' writings in order to develop a Marxist state theory. However, it would not be a mistake to make a general definition of state in orthodox Marxist framework. State was considered "an essentially repressive instrument that is manipulable exclusively and at will by a single, economically dominant, unitary class subject"⁶ (Jessop, 1965). Lenin calls it "state machine" (Lenin, 1992) in many occasions referring that it is actually a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie that has to

⁶ Jessop's deduction from Nicos Poulatzsas's "Préliminaires a l'étude de l'hégémonie dans l'état" (1985).

be smashed. Probably the most famous quote on the Marxist analysis of the state is the following sentence from the Communist Manifesto: “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels, 1998: 33).

Lenin’s (1992) “State and Revolution” reiterates this view. He was the pioneer theoretician, who made the instrumentalist approach the orthodoxy in Marxist studies of the state. Lenin witnessed that with imperialism, the phenomenon of finance-capital and monopoly-capital, the state machine became extraordinarily stronger and enlarged “with the intensification of repressive measures against the proletariat both in the monarchical and in the freest republican countries” (Lenin, 1992: 30). Lenin also perceived that “The forms of the bourgeois states are extraordinarily varied, but their essence is the same: all these states somehow or other in the final analysis simply have to be a *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*” (Lenin, 1992: 29). In other words, the state power is independent of the political regimes of the states, but not from the bourgeoisie.

After the World War II, spread of Keynesian economic principles and pluralist theory of state in the developed world have motivated Marxists to further Marxist theory on state. 1960’s were marked with the debate between instrumentalist and structuralist Marxist approaches to state. It became a paradigm of Marxist state theory. Instrumentalist state approach was pioneered by Ralph Miliband. The main problematic that Miliband dealt with in “The State in Capitalist Society” (Miliband, 1969: 5) was the unchallenged dominance of the concept of pluralist- democratic approach to state in political sciences.

Pluralist-democratic approach is best expressed in Dahl’s (2006) “A Preface to Democratic Theory”. The theory suggests that politics is competition among different interest groups, almost identical in power. This neutrality of state vis-a-vis all interest groups and assumption of interest groups’ almost identical powers were criticized by Mills. Mills demonstrated that the normal citizens and their initiatives have almost no power against the corporate, military and political elites (Mills, 1956). However, Miliband claimed that “the most important alternative to the pluralist-democratic view of power remains the Marxist one” (Miliband, 1969: 5). The Marxist theory of the state does not have to be built, it has to be renewed with

empirical research reflecting “the concrete socio-economic *and* political *and* cultural reality of actual capitalist societies” (Miliband, 1969: 6) in order to challenge the prevailing mainstream pluralist approach to the state.

As mentioned before, with the Keynesian interventionism spread through developed world and the rise of welfare state, Miliband witnesses “the vast inflation of the state’s power and activity in the advanced capitalist societies” (Miliband, 1969: 1). For Miliband, an instrumentalist understanding of state is repeated throughout the texts of Marx and Engels (Miliband, 1969: 5). Although they sometimes introduced an “account for a certain degree of independence which they believed the state could enjoy in ‘exceptional circumstances’” (Miliband, 1969: 5), they always defended the position that “in capitalist society the state was above all the coercive instrument of a ruling class, itself defined in terms of ownership and control of the means of production” (Miliband, 1969: 5). When Miliband wrote ‘The State in Capitalist Society’, it was already the orthodox approach to capitalist state, in which Marx provided “a conceptual foundation for the socioeconomic analysis of capitalist societies” (Barrow, 2000: 90), Lenin provides “guidance for a political analysis” (Barrow, 2000: 90), and Gramsci provides “the conceptual apparatus for a cultural and ideological analysis of capitalist societies” (Barrow, 2000: 90). So, what Miliband offered was a profound discussion of the state theory with references to actual workings of the contemporary state. The aim was not to challenge it, but to make an “empirical and historical analysis to give concrete content to this thesis and its theoretical concepts” (Barrow, 2000: 90).

Miliband builds upon this already existing understanding of the instrumentalist state in order to challenge the pluralist – democratic state approach by highlighting “the social background, personal ties and shared values of economic and political elites” (Jessop, 1977: 357) and “the impact of government policy on such matters as the distribution of income and wealth” (Jessop, 1977: 357). According to Miliband, the ruling class is in control of the means of production and the power derived from this possession makes them capable of instrumentalizing the state in order to pursue their ends (Miliband, 1969: 23). In other words, economic power of the bourgeoisie brings the political power and the state becomes an instrument, a tool, in the hands of the ruling class. Therefore, the ruling class is also able to use the

state and determine its policies in order to enhance its economic power too. In addition, due to private property lying in the heart of the system and bourgeoisie ideology producing consent for class rule of capital, even if the state can be relatively autonomous from the capitalist class, it still serves the needs of capital (Greg and Jenson, 1989: 182).

From the instrumentalist perspective, with regard to the discussions in primitive accumulation section, the state, then, was in the hands of the aristocracy to dismantle the relationship between peasants and the means of production. In contemporary capitalism, similarly the state is an instrument of the bourgeoisie utilized to pursue primitive and capitalist accumulation.

In a polemical fashion Poulantzas developed another approach came to be known as structuralist. He appreciated Miliband for contemporary discussion of the question of the state in Marxist theory since Marxists neglected it (Poulantzas, 1969: 67). However, in contrast to Miliband's 'revealing' approach to the Marxist state theory, the approach of Poulantzas is 'building' a Marxist state theory. In *Political Power and Social Classes* (Poulantzas, 1975), Poulantzas attempted to build a systematic political theory of state. For Poulantzas, the autonomy of the state refers to the "state's relation to the field of the class struggle, in particular its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the classes and the fractions of the power bloc" (Poulantzas, 1978: 256).

Poulantzas proposes a distinct reading of the "raw materials" which are the basic Marxist texts to reveal information about any concept; i.e. state, and then moving towards building theoretical knowledge of the object (Poulantzas, 1975: 12). Althusserians in general, Poulantzas in particular, believe that "to produce a theory of the capitalist state, it is not only necessary to 'read *Capital*', but to 'write *Capital*' (or at least its political equivalent)" (Barrow, 2000: 92).

Rejecting the instrumentalist approach to the state Poulantzas argued that "state is a complex social relation" (Poulantzas, 1969). According to Jessop, this has double meaning:

Firstly, classes should not be seen as simple economic forces existing outside and independently of the state and capable of manipulating it as a passive instrument or tool. For the political influence of classes and class fractions depends in part on the institutional structure of the state and the effects of state power. Secondly, class struggle is not confined to civil society, but is

reproduced within the heart of the state apparatus itself. He [Poulantzas] also argues that the state has an objective function to perform in maintaining social cohesion so that capital accumulation can proceed unhindered (Jessop, 1977: 358).

In other words, “State is a social relation” (Poulantzas, 1969) means that state cannot only be a tool; it is the result of a complex historical development, as capital is. State is a living entity and social classes and their relations necessarily reflect themselves in the state mechanism. It is not independent or above the society, it lies in the heart of it.

From this very point, Poulantzas criticises Miliband for defining the state as a tool in the hands of political/economic elite and dismisses the structural built-up of the state within the society (Poulantzas, 1969). He accuses Miliband for searching for “*finalist* explanations founded on the *motivations of conduct* of the individual actors” (Poulantzas, 1973: 242). He also questions the logic behind the instrumentalist argument. He argues that

Miliband constantly gives the impression that for him social classes or ‘groups’ are in some way reducible to inter-personal relations, that the State is reducible to inter-personal relations of the members of the diverse ‘groups’ that constitute the State apparatus, and finally that the relation between social classes and the State is itself reducible to inter-personal relations of ‘individuals’ composing social groups and ‘individuals’ composing the State apparatus (Poulantzas in Blackburn, 1973: 242).

The solution to the problem is not addressing to the differences of economic elite based on their diverging aims, but to “*the differences and relations between fractions of capital*” (Poulantzas, 1973: 244). In other words, plurality of elites is an illusion. The problem is not that of “a plurality of ‘economic élites’ but of fractions of the capitalist class” (Poulantzas, 1973: 244). Miliband takes away the autonomy of state by reducing it to interpersonal relations of the elites. On the other hand, Jessop argues that Poulantzas’s structural approach to the state appears to be self-contradictory throughout his texts. “Either he endows the state with complete independence from the economic base or he denies it any independence at all (Jessop, 1977: 358).

The problem with both approaches is that they explain the relative autonomy of state in terms of its results (Albo and Jenson, 1989: 183). Presupposing that state is essential for the continuation of capitalist accumulation refers to an inherent

functionality (Albo and Jenson, 1989: 183). Focusing on the results diminishes the importance of the nature of state-capital relations since the state will always do what the continuation of capital necessitates at the last second. If the state is a direct product of the relations among elites or societal structures, how can the state take an action at all?

Skocpol was one of the critics of this functionality. She argued that the state has a “real autonomy” from economy and classes; it is an autonomous “organizational structure with its own logic, internal dynamics, and processes” (Albo and Jenson, 1989: 183; Skocpol, 1985). In other words, in comparison to Miliband’s no autonomy and Poulantzas’s relative autonomy, Skocpol argues that states in capitalist societies have complete autonomy and capacity to pursue policies and “shape the structure of society according to their own interests” (Albo and Jenson, 1989: 183).

According to this neo-Weberian or institutionalist approach, sometimes called organizational realism, the problem with the instrumentalism and structuralism is that both approaches assume that the state has an interest in the continuation of capitalist accumulation and state policies reflect a given balance among social powers between and within classes (Barrow, 1993: 126). In contrast, Skocpol has seen the possibility that “state organizations and elites might under certain circumstances act *against* the long-run economic interests of a dominant class, or act to create a new mode of production” (Barrow, 1993: 126). In other words, because these “society-centered” theories suggest that the reasons and results of a state action must always reflect the interest of the capitalist class, these approaches fall short of explaining some-what extraordinary circumstances such as “policy realization failures, social-democratic political and economic reform, or even successful revolution” (Skocpol, 1979 :25)

Skocpol, on the other hand, dismisses such a relation to the classes that reduces state to an image of mode of production or to a political reflection of class relations (Barrow, 1993: 126). Only way to study the extent of the autonomy of the state is by looking at the terms “specific to particular types of sociopolitical systems and to particular sets of historical international relations” (Skocpol, 1979: 29) rather than presuming given class relations. Therefore, she suggests case studies to determine the factors or conditions of state’s real autonomy and looks at general

state-specific tasks to track them. For example, while state struggles with the capitalist class in collection of taxes, in areas such as keeping domestic order and managing international relations state elites tend not to challenge existing economic and class structure in order to perform smoothly (Skocpol, 1979: 29). State's exercise of its autonomous power also depends on the existence of coherence among state officials who are not relatively subjected to the interests of the dominant class etc. (Skocpol, 1985: 9). However, these types of generalisations are highly circumstantial. There are so many factors that may affect the autonomy of the state and these factors are not very well defined. One of the findings is that autonomy of state can be exercised unevenly across policy areas (Skocpol, 1985: 13) That is to say, a state may be strong in regulating the mining sector and weak in education based on the "patterns of centralization, elite recruitment, bureaucratic expertise and ideological orientation" of state concerning these policy areas (Barrow, 1993: 134). Skocpol's approach is generally criticized for magnifying state's ability to direct accumulation or instead of explaining the autonomy in terms of class struggles within society she tends to focus on bureaucratic struggles within the state (Albo and Jenson, 1989: 183).

Now we go back to the main question of this subchapter: Can the state be both the perpetrator and victim of primitive accumulation? Let's assume that we have contradictions stemming from an action: a foreign mining company invests in a rural area which means development, employment, utilization of natural resources and possibility of technology transfer. On the other hand, we have substantial social change, especially for local people, which also has disrupting effects for the state: social unrest, environmental problems, expropriation of their land, the diminishing agricultural production, etc. In this situation, if the state is the perpetrator of primitive accumulation, it means that state is controlled by a class or class friction be it a national one or a finance capital from a developed country. It acts in contrast to its own interests, if it has any. Its power and objectives are of the ruling classes. State has no autonomy. On the other hand, if the state is the victim of primitive accumulation, then again state has no real power or autonomy. The finance capital comes and goes as it pleases and does not even need a state to manage the negative consequences of its actions and it is not clear that state has that much power in the

first place. Now we have a conundrum of an obsolete state. Therefore, in order to solve this problem, state needs to be autonomous.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN GOLD MINING AND THE TURKISH STATE

Mining sector generated 1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Turkey in 2019 (Turkish Statistical Institute - TURKSTAT, 2020), which may not seem very significant. Turkey is not a resource-rich country like other case studies in natural resource grabbing such as many African and Latin American countries. However, it attracts global mining capital in line with the global trend. In particular, gold mining is a new phenomenon in Turkey. It started in early 2000s and mining law was amended in 2004 for attracting foreign capital to invest in mining operations by opening new areas to mining, which were previously protected by the state due to natural and cultural value and decreasing Turkish state's claimed rent from these operations (Legal Gazette, 2004). In last 20 years, gold production in Turkey has raised from 0 tonnes a year to 42 tonnes a year in 2020, 39 tons a year in 2021 and it is expected to reach 40 tons a year in 2022 (Çağatay, 2022). However, gold mining has also been a very controversial issue in Turkey in terms of ecological degradation. The process of surface mining drastically affects the environment, organic or inorganic, and the lives and livelihoods of the habitants of these small towns.

This chapter is composed of three parts. The first part discusses mining as an economic activity in order to understand its limitations and differences from other economic activities. Second part provides and discusses data on global gold mining and the commodity boom between 2004 and 2015. Third part includes and discusses economic indicators related to gold mining in Turkish economy. The last part evaluates the transformation of agricultural, mining and international investment regimes within the context of neoliberalism in Turkey.

3.1. MINING AS AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

According to Cambridge Dictionary, mine is “a hole or systems of holes in the ground where substances such as coal, metal and salt are removed” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022) and mining is “the industry or activity of removing [those] substances... from the ground by digging” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). Construction materials such as sand and gravel, fertilizers such as potash and phosphates, fuel minerals such as coal and oil, metals such as gold and nickel, non-metals such as selenium and sulphur and industrial minerals such as diamonds and salt are the examples of mined commodities (Hodge et al., 2022: 589). These commodities are used as inputs across many industries from construction to energy, from manufacture to agriculture. Therefore, the growth of mining industry and prices of mined commodities affect whole economy.

A mining activity is composed of several phases: “(1) exploration and discovery; (2) site investigation; (3) regulatory review and approvals; (4) operation; (5) closure; and (6) post-closure” (Hodge et al., 2022: 589). Among 1000 mineralization, that are discovered in the exploration phase, only one becomes an operational mine (Hodge et al., 2022: 589). It is impossible to guess the quality and quantity of ore in question. The discovered amount may not be economically feasible, necessary permits to establish an operational mine may be declined by the government and so on. This fact demonstrates the great risks for investment in mining.

The life span of a mine can range between a few years to centuries based on the amount of the ore. This timeframe makes it difficult to foresee the environmental or social implications as well as to fulfil related financial obligations (Hodge et al., 2022: 590). In addition various interested parties have different meanings for time ranging from “the quarterly and annual perspective of the investor through 2-5-year election cycle of politicians, and the multi-generational perspective of indigenous people, families, and communities” (Hodge et al., 2022: 590). In terms of flexibility, while a manufacturing company can carry its operations to an overseas country in order to increase its profits, a mining company cannot carry the mine embedded in a specific land. Therefore, it has to be treated differently from other economic activities, which have shorter lifespans and more flexibility.

Mining activity also necessitates long-term investments and is capital-intensive. From the phase of exploration of the ore to selling in the market, the period is considerably long. Also, some of the operationally important infrastructures such as mine galleries, buildings and roads are sunk costs that will not be recovered after the closure of the mine.

In conclusion, in an economic sense mining activities are different than other economic activities; i.e. manufacturing, in three ways: Firstly, mining activities affect other sectors of the economy, mostly industries, since it provides raw materials and energy resources for their operations. Secondly, mining activities have longer lifespans and since the mine is embedded in land it cannot move easily. Thirdly, they necessitate a commitment for long-term investments, which are also capital-intensive and include high sunk costs.

3.2. GLOBAL GOLD MINING: AN OUTLOOK

The aim of this section is to give general data on gold production and prices, monopolistic tendencies of the sector and the effect of commodity boom of 2004-2015 in general.

According to World Gold Council, worldwide total production of gold in 2021 is 3303,9 tonnes (2021). The chart below is the top ten gold producing countries and Turkey and their production in tonnes. Based on this data, Turkey is the 24th among 45 gold producing countries worldwide, and after Russia it is 2nd in Europe.

Table 1: Gold Production by Country in Tonnes (Top 10 Producers and Turkey) in 2021

China	332
Russian Federation	330,9
Australia	315,1
Canada	192,9
United States	186,8
Ghana	129,2
Peru	127,3
Mexico	124,5

Indonesia	117,5
South Africa	113,6
Turkey	39,5

Sources: Metals Focus, 2021; World Gold Council, 2021.

The estimated number for mining companies throughout the world is 25,000 in 140 countries (Hodge et al., 2022: 593-594). In production category, it is estimated that 50 (0.2%) of these companies belong to Global Giants with approximate total assets above 12 billion United States Dollars (USD), 250 (1%) of them belong to Seniors with 6-12 billion USD in assets. Intermediates owns 3200 (13%) of total companies with approximate total assets 3-6 billion USD, and Production Juniors owns 10,500 (42%) companies with 0.5-1 billion of total assets (Hodge et al., 2022: 595).

Table 2: The World's Top Five Largest Gold Mining Companies by Production in 2020 (32 ounce = 0.001 tonnes)

Newmont (The United States)	5,8 million ounces (181,25 tonnes)
Barrick Gold (Canada)	4,8 million ounces (150 tonnes)
AngloGold Ashanti (South Africa)	3 million ounces (93,75 tonnes)
Polyrus (Russia)	2,8 million ounces (87,5 tonnes)
Kinross Gold (Canada)	2,4 million ounces (75 tonnes)


Source: NS Energy, 2021.

The table above shows the largest gold mining companies of the world with their based headquarters and their production levels in 2020. In 2020 3241 tonnes of gold produced around the globe (LePan, 2021) and 587,5 tonnes of this was produced by five largest global companies demonstrating a 17% of total production. In comparison to the Table 1, if the Newmont Corporation were a country it would be the 6th biggest gold producing country in the world.

In the mid-2000s prices of primary commodities increased dramatically. This boom, started in 2004 and lasted until 2015, is considered the longest of all commodity booms (Radetzki and Wårell, 2021: 118). In addition, different than the previous commodity booms, it occurred in three main commodity groups: energy, metals, and agriculture. At the top levels, “before they began to fall in the second half of 2008, the real prices of energy and metals more than doubled over the past five years, while the real price of internationally traded food commodities increased 75 percent” (World Bank, 2009: 51). Therefore, it is not surprising that there has

been a rush of capital to extraction of natural resources, food production or other raw material productions. The most common reasons for the commodity boom are the increased demand of energy and non-renewable natural resources in Chinese economy (Veltmeyer, 2013: 79) or the deterred investment due to relatively stable commodity prices during the 1990s (World Bank, 2009: 51).

Figure 1: Primary Commodity Price System




Source: International Monetary Fund, 2022.

The Figure 1 demonstrates the peaking prices of agricultural raw materials, gold, metal and precious metals indexes of International Monetary Fund (IMF) in comparison. The period of the commodity boom between 2004 and 2015 is clearly demonstrated. Starting at the lowest level in 2015, prices began to increase again.

Figure 2 below demonstrates the increase in gold prices in USD per ounce. For example, in 2012 the price of one ounce gold is more than 6 times of the price in 2001.

Figure 2: Gold Prices (USD/Ounces)




Source: Turkish Gold Miners Association, n. d.

3.3. GOLD MINING IN TÜRKİYE: AN OUTLOOK


The value created by mining and quarrying activities in Turkey within GDP is constantly in increase as Figure 3 demonstrates below. Figure 4 also demonstrates a slight increase in the share of mining and quarrying activities in GDP in comparison to the decreased share of agriculture, forestry and fishing in GDP in year 2021. In terms of value both agricultural and mining sectors are increasing. However, in terms of share of GDP while mining's share is still increasing agriculture's share has been decreasing drastically. In the following section, the reasons for this decrease in the agriculture's share will be discussed.

Figure 3: Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices by Kind of Economic Activity, Value



Source: TURKSTAT, 2021.


Figure 4: Annual Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices by Kind of Economic Activity, Share



Source: TURKSTAT, 2021.

According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data ores and metals composes 5% of total exports in Turkey in 2021 (UNCTAD, 2022). Despite this fact, Turkey is a gold importing country as it can be seen in Figure 5. The demand for gold does not match the production levels in Figure 6. Gold demand in Turkey highly depends on the fact that gold is seen as an investment instrument. It is an important input in the jewelry production and it is stocked in the Central Bank reserve.


Figure 5: Turkey's Gold Import in Tonnes



Source: Turkish Gold Miners Association, 2021; Borsa Istanbul 2021.

Figure 6 demonstrates that gold production in Turkey was 0 tonnes in 2000 and increased in years with more mines became operational. In 2021, 39 tonnes of gold was produced in Turkey. despite the decrease in the production from 2013 to 2017, overall, the gold production in Turkey has been on the rise.

Figure 6: Turkey's Gold Production in Tonnes



Source: Turkish Gold Miners Association, 2021.

Table 3 shows the gold mines, start of the operations and owner companies. In Turkey it is hard to achieve correct information about the owners or capital and partnership structures of companies. There are several reasons: First, due to the usufructuary leases which refer to the renting of mining licences, exploration or

operation, by the licence owner to the third parties, natural person or legal entity. Secondly, not all companies are publicly traded in Borsa İstanbul, which obliges the companies to be transparent. Thirdly, as regulated in the Article 6 of the Mining Law No: 3213, mining rights are given to natural persons who are citizens of the Republic of Turkey, legal entities which are established according to the laws of Turkish Republic and state institutions. Since all foreign investors have to establish a company in Turkey with regard to the Turkish laws, the capital and partnership structures get more blurred unless the company exposes this information. Therefore, Table 3 is composed of public information taken from websites of companies, Borsa İstanbul and Turkish Gold Miners Association.

Table 3: Gold Mines in Turkey

Gold Mine	Company	Type	Start of Operation
İzmir - Ovacık	Koza Altın* (Previously Eurogold)	National (Publicly traded) (Previously Foreign)	2001
Manisa - Sart	Pomza	National	2002
Uşak - Kışladağ	Tüprag	Foreign	2006
Gümüşhane - Mastra	Koza Altın*	National (Publicly traded)	2009
İzmir - Çukuralan	Koza Altın*	National (Publicly traded)	2009
Erzincan - Çöpler	Anagold	Partly Foreign	2010
İzmir - Efemçukuru	Tüprag	Foreign	2011
Eskişehir - Kaymaz	Koza Altın*	National (Publicly traded)	2011
Niğde - Bolkardağ	Gümüştaş	National	2012
Gümüşhane - Midi	Yıldızbakır	National	2012
Kayseri - Himmetdede	Koza Altın*	National (Publicly traded)	2013
Fatsa - Altıntepe	Altıntepe	National	2015
Sivas - Bakırtepe	Demirexport	National	2015
Konya - İnlice	Esan	National	2015
Balıkesir - Kızıltepe	Zenit	Partly Foreign	2017
Çanakkale - Lapseki	Tümad	National	2018
Balıkesir - İvrindi	Tümad	National	2019

Kayseri - Develi	Öksüt	Partly Foreign	2020
Balıkesir - Gediktepe	Lidya	National (Previously Partly Foreign)	2022

Source: Turkish Gold Miners Association, 2022; Borsa İstanbul, 2022; Websites of Companies.

*Owned by Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF)

According to General Directorate of Mining and Petroleum Affairs (MAPEG) in Turkey, in 2020, number of workers who are in mining sector is 131.161 (of 117.768 works in private sector) in 6268 workplaces (of 6200 is privately owned) (MAPEG, 2020). At the end of 2021, total number of permits is 14.721 including 4.946 exploration permits and 9.775 operation permits (MAPEG, 2021).

In general, mining, particularly gold mining, sector is expected to grow in the future. The increasing trend in the production and increasing demand for gold in Turkey are important indicators for the future as the increasing contribution of mining and quarrying in Turkey's GDP.

3.4. NEOLIBERALISM AND TÜRKİYE: TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURAL, MINING AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIMES

Populist economic policies of the 1960's in Turkey was based on a balance between the public and private, agricultural and industrial sectors, as well as between the ruling and working class. It demonstrated reconciliation between the long-term interests of the ruling class and the short-term interests of the masses in the context of import substitution industrialization (Boratav 2012: 123). State-led economic development and industrialisation was the main paradigm. However, this reconciliation ruptured in 1970's due to the global oil crisis, which would turn into economic depression by 1977. Despite that populist policies continued. Therefore, when the IMF's involvement was proposed as an option, political parties opposed it. Instead, they tried to mitigate the effects of the crisis by patching up short-term policies. However, bloodshed between the socialists and the nationalists and unsuccessful coalition governments one after another created instability and

interrupted implementation of these policies. Moreover, working class movements were intensified and unveil the underlying class conflict.

In the midst of the economic and political crises, a stabilisation programme, which would be called “24 January Decisions”, was initiated in 1980. This program was reflecting the global agenda of the World Bank and IMF urging structural reforms and IMF’s stabilisation policy package, which have been dictated to many developing countries in the 1970’s (Boratav 2012: 149). On the other hand, due to the instability and clinging to populism, the government was ineffective to implement these policies. With the military coup in September 1980, however, it became possible to implement the programme that included a massive economic and political restructuring under the principles of neoliberalism. Liberalisation, deregulation and privatization triad has become the main paradigm of Turkish economy and development fostering the supremacy of market imperatives. At the same time, Turkish economy has become more open to the influences of international organisations and multinational capital. Within this context, this part aims to put forward the transformation of agricultural, mining and foreign investment regimes in Turkey since policies in all directly affect the mining sector.

3.4.1. Transformation of Agricultural Regime

From a modernist point of view, before the effect of neoliberal deregulation policies, industrialization and urbanization are expected to diminish the significance of agriculture. However, in Turkey the transformation of agriculture and rural areas was slow due to its centrality in the agricultural industries and necessity of food flow to newly industrializing cities. Therefore, state-led developmentalism continued to subsidize the agricultural production “through *inter alia* cheap credits for mechanisation, support price policies, subsidies for agricultural inputs, and above all a protectionist trade regime” (Adaman et. al., 2019: 522). These policies protected farmers from market fluctuations (Adaman et. al., 2019: 522). From 1980 onwards especially with the 1994 economic crisis, agricultural sector experienced some level of liberalization and decrease in subsidies as a part of overall neoliberal transformation of Turkish economy. However, the substantial transformation started with the introduction of Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) in

2001.

The ARIP's (Türkiye Tarımsal Reform ve Yatırım Programı) main aim was to deregulate agricultural sector by removing subsidies and limiting state procurement. It was actually a direct World Bank project with a budget of 600 million dollars and the aim was removing all subsidies in order to increase productivity and comparative advantage and softening the negative effects of this "transition to efficient production patterns", transitioning from price-oriented subsidies to direct income subsidies, as well as to help fiscal stabilization in Turkey (World Bank, n. d.). In result, all input subsidies were removed, state procurement of agricultural products diminished and farmer sales cooperatives became more self-reliant (Çakmak, 2004: 11). However, the privatization of state-owned agricultural firms was slow and the aim of transforming the price-oriented subsidies to direct income subsidies fell short of the program (Akder, 2010: 47).

Treasure of Turkish State needed this reform for fiscal stabilization at the end of 1990's in parallel to overall structural adjustment program's aim to reduce state spending and appealed to the World Bank not only for financing and implementation but also for justification (Akder, 2010: 48). Also, World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement (Turkey is a member since 1995) created pressure for the reform in order to eliminate subsidies that were disruptive of trade (Akder, 2010: 49). At the same time, eliminating these large subsidies, which were also disrupting macroeconomic indicators, would be ease Turkey's accession to the EU (European Union) (Akder, 2010: 49).

In line with ARIP several new laws were introduced: Sugar Law (2001), Tobacco Law (2002), Agricultural Law (2006) and Seed Law (2006). These laws were "the final nails in the coffin to force impoverished farmers to enter into contract farming with agribusiness firms to produce the crops desired by them" (Aydın, 2010: 152). Especially, the changes in the tobacco production were severe. When the new Tobacco Law was accepted there were 406 thousand tobacco farmers, this number decreased to 50 thousand in 2021 (Çiftçi-Sen, 2022).

The privatization of state-owned agricultural enterprises were already within neoliberal agenda since changes made with Law No: 3291 in 1986, but ARIP increased the pace. Et Balık Kurumu, SEK, YEMSAN, Türkiye Zirai Donatım

Kurumu (TZDK), Türkiye Gübre AŞ., Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları Anonim Şirketi, TEKEL, Çay İşletmeleri and Tarım Satış Kooperatifleri Birlikleri were privatized since 1986. TEKEL's privatization was especially important. It was a monopoly of all production and sales of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes. In 2003 alcoholic beverage department was sold to MEY A.Ş. (a consortium), the sale was completed in 2008 and two years later 90% of shares were sold to Texas Pacific (an American investment company). In 2008 TEKEL was sold to global tobacco giant British American Tobacco. Before its privatization 30,124 workers were employed in TEKEL, which diminished drastically (Tekgıda, 2009).

In 2004 Agricultural Strategy (2006-2010) was declared as a initial work for the planned new Agricultural Law (No: 5488). It was a policy document aiming to create a competitive, organised and sustainable agricultural sector with regard to economical, social, environmental and international dimentions, especially the EU membership process (High Planning Council, 2004). The document proposed that all annual agricultural funds should not be less than 1% of GDP. It also proposed new subsidies, in a way, overruling basic premise of ARIP: removing all subsidies (Akder, 2010: 59).

ARIP direct income subsidies led to land fragmentation since it was possible to get more payment. The mistake was corrected by increasing direct income subsidies to farms larger than 50 hectares. However, it directly contradicted the project's criticism of the old price subsidy system that only large farms were benefiting from it (Akder, 2010, 55). In addition, this enabled national or multinational big corporations to enter the sector achieving "a near monopsony [a market with one buyer] in some crops and localities" (Adaman et. al., 2019: 523).

As a result of structural adjustments pursued for facilitating integration to the world economy, privatisations and deregulations and ARIP, farmers are left to the mercy of the market competition. This led to the transformation of the rural which affected the farmer's living and production conditions as well as population dynamics (Adaman et. al., 2019: 523). The farmers started to look for non-agricultural income besides their agricultural income (Keyder and Yenal, 2010: 13; Sönmez, 2001, Aydın, 2001). Also, due to the advancements in technology and transportation and spread of consumption-based cultural processes some villages

have survived in their demographic performance and did not lost population to the urban areas (Keyder and Yenal, 2010: 19). Both developments resulting in pushing farmers away from their agrarian livelihoods and created a (semi)proletarianized work force in the rural (Adaman et.al., 2009: 516; Çelik, 2023).

In summary, since the 1980's international institutions are effective in setting policies, however, in the case of ARIP, it was the state that pursued their involvement. Multinational corporations have involved in Turkish agricultural sector by purchasing state-owned agricultural enterprises, by contract-farming activities and they even became monopsomies in some products. The rural population and labour force is diminished and, as a result, increasing number of people is becoming a part of the reserve army of labour. In addition, as a solution to decreased incomes farmers look for non-agricultural incomes. Therefore, a semi-proletarianized work force was created in the rural.

3.4.2. Transformation of Mining Regime

In the constitution of the Republic of Turkey, state owns the natural resources, and it has the power to delegate its exploration and exploitation rights to other parties. Constitution Article 168 clearly states that

Natural wealth and resources shall be under the authority and at the disposal of the State. The right to explore and exploit these belongs to the State. The State may delegate this right to persons or corporate bodies for a certain period. Of the natural wealth and resources, those to be explored and exploited by the state in partnership with persons or corporate bodies, and those to be directly explored and exploited by persons or corporate bodies shall be subject to the explicit permission of the law. The conditions to be observed in such cases by persons and corporate bodies, the procedure and principles governing supervision and control by the State, and the sanctions to be applied shall be prescribed by law (Constitution of Republic of Turkey, 2019).

As a part of 1980's neoliberal restructuring of Turkish economy, mining sector in Turkey also opened to privatization, marketization and liberalization policies. Mining Law No: 6309 of 1954 annulled by a new Mining Law No: 3213 in 1985. The new law was proposed as a remedy to the problems created by the old one, which includes problems in execution of the law and ambiguity it bears, increased number of bureaucratic procedures keeping state departments overloaded. Since the

old law fall behind technical and financial needs, the new one aimed to bring speed, direction and efficiency to mining activities and reduce the obligations of the state to a minimum (Mining Law No: 3213, 1985). Thus, neoliberal spirit in Turkey in 1980's manifested itself in this law as a criticism of ponderous bureaucracy, the fear of lacking behind the world in international competition and a proposed minimum role for the state.

In the next several years it became clear that the new law did not provide what was expected of it. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources wanted to conduct some changes in the law. Other parties such as Chamber of Mining Engineers in Turkey declared that it is Mining Law No: 3213 and amendment bills have to be abolished and a new mining law, which has a consistent mining policy, must be prepared (Chamber of Mining Engineers in Turkey, 1990). They criticised the mining law from a broad perspective focusing on the developments after the 12 September 1980 military coup including the economic policies of subsequent civil governments and claimed that the natural resources of the country have been granted to multinational monopolies by privatization policies and by this law which lacks mechanisms for proper inspection of the process (Chamber of Mining Engineers in Turkey, 1990). Also, in particular to the preparation of the law and the amendment, the chamber claims that the legislation is far from guiding the mining sector and detached from the problems of the sector, implementers and specialists, and application (Chamber of Mining Engineers in Turkey, 1990). In addition, Foundation for Development of Domestic Mining proposed a new law too since 38 out of 52 articles were supposed to change with the amendment (Chamber of Mining Engineers in Turkey, 1990).

Mining Law No: 3213 has been amended 21 times since 1985. It is generally criticised for its contradiction with the constitution and other legislations and the lack of inspections in its application. It contradicts with The Law on the Conservation of Cultural and Natural Property No: 2863 (Kültür ve Tabiat Varlıklarını Koruma Kanunu), The Law on Land Protection and Use of Property No: 5403 (Toprak Koruma ve Arazi Kullanımı Kanunu) and the law known as Olive Law No: 3573 (Zeytinciliğin Islahı ve Yabanilerin Aşılattırılması Hakkında Kanun).

Another contradiction occurred after the 2004 amendment of the Mining Law. Out of 21 amendments of the Mining Law of 1985, five were made in Article 7 which regulated areas where mining activities takes place. The 2004 amendment in the Article 7 about the permissions of mining activities opened previously protected areas under different laws to mining activities, such as forests, special protected reserves, national parks, water basins, coastal areas and territorial waters, agricultural lands and pastures, military areas, natural and historical areas, and tourism zones, etc. The rules and procedures regarding mining activities in these areas were determined at the regulation level. Therefore, the change in the article was annulled by the Constitutional Court's decision in 2009 (Legal Gazette, 2009) on the grounds that this changed part had to be regulated by law. Therefore, the article once changed in 2010 and designed accordingly, either by explaining the rules and procedures in the mining law or with references to the other existing laws.

The laws and regulations regarding mining activities have changed dramatically throughout years and they bear contradictions within themselves and with other laws and constitution. Experts claim that it is very hard even for lawyers to grasp the legislation and its execution and mining law has lost its restrictive properties (Ünlü, 2021). These restrictions are crucial since the constitution Article 56 of the Constitution states that:

Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment. It is the duty of the State and citizens to improve the natural environment, to protect the environmental health and to prevent environmental pollution. The State shall regulate central planning and functioning of the health services to ensure that everyone leads a healthy life physically and mentally, and provide cooperation by saving and increasing productivity in human and material resources (Constitution of Republic of Turkey, 2019).

It is state's duty to protect its citizens' right to live in a healthy environment and protect the environment. The Mining Law has lost its connection to this article of the constitution.

Before 1985 Mining Law the mining sector in Turkey was almost completely state-owned and controlled. General Directorate of Mineral Research and Explorations (Maden Tetkik ve Arama Genel Müdürlüğü, MTA, formerly known as

Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü) and ETİ Bank were the two core state institutions of mining exploration, operation, and financing.

MTA was established in 1935 under the Prime Minister's Office. In 2002, it was linked to Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. It is a scientific institution, which is tasked with conducting ore and raw materials exploration and mapping activities, developing more efficient ways for mining operations and training a specialised work force for mining sector including engineers, scientists, and workers (Law of General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration No. 2804, 1935). By the privatisation of mining sector intensified after 1980, MTA's role has diminished in exploration and operation levels. ETİ Bank was also established in 1935 as a state-owned bank in order to utilize Turkey's natural resources, produce necessary ores, raw materials and energy resources and collecting necessary finances for these operations. In 1993, commercial activities of ETİ Bank and mining operations were separated and commercial banking was privatised and disappeared in years through mergers and acquisitions. Mining operations company stayed as state-owned and became ETİ Holding as a public company. In years, mining operations such as silver, chromium and aluminum extractions, chemical factories, power plants etc. within the company have been separated and privatised and only boron operations stayed as state-owned. Now it is called ETİ Maden (ETİ Mine Works) and it operates under the Turkey Wealth Fund since 2017.

Today the mining activities are regulated among three ministries of Turkish Republic: the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, in particular its subsidiary institution General Directorate of Mining and Petroleum Affairs (Maden ve Petrol İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü (MAPEG)), is the core institution, which distributes licences for exploration of ores and operation of mines and is authorised to conduct inspections or cancellation of licences. It was established by a presidential decree in 2018 and follows the jurisdiction and responsibilities of two previous general directorates focusing on mining and petroleum separately (Legal Gazette, 2018).

The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry gives permissions of land use for mining activities in agricultural lands and forests. Especially after the 2004/2010

amendments, its role has grown in decision-making since the Ministry decides whether the land in question is appropriate for mining activities. In 2010, as well as the Mining Law, Forestry Law No: 6831 has amended accordingly. Article 16 states that within the state-owned forests, permits for the necessities of mining activities, such as buildings, roads, energy supply, water supply, communications and infrastructure, are granted by the Ministry and the Ministry collects fees (Forest Law No: 6831, 1956/2010).

The Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change handles the process of Environmental Impact Evaluation Reports (Çevresel Etki Değerlendirme Raporu (ÇED)) based on the Article 10 of the Environment Law No: 2872 and Environmental Impact Evaluation Regulation (2022). The procedure of ÇED Reports have entered the legislative and executive processes after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 (also known as Rio Conference). The purpose of ÇED Report is to assess any possible damage to environment and determine necessary measures to avoid or minimise such damage. In the Regulation mentioned above, the Ministry classifies projects assessed in ÇED process in two sections: the projects that necessitate mandatory ÇED report and the projects whose necessity of ÇED Report is determined by the Ministry. In the second section the Ministry has power to decide that the projects does not need to go through ÇED process. Mining activities, which are “mining operations planned on 25 hectares and above” in surface land (2022) and ore enrichment facilities and/or waste facilities related to these enrichment facilities, are compelled to get a positive ÇED Report in order to start their operations (2022). On the other hand, other mining activities, which are smaller mining operations and all the projects for the exploration of ores, are evaluated by the Ministry in terms of the necessity of ÇED Report (2022). Therefore, the necessity of ÇED report for relatively smaller mining operations and all exploration projects is in the Ministry’s initiative. Another problem in the process is that ÇED reports do not have to be prepared by any public institution, such as universities. The mining company applies to the Ministry for starting the process. However, private consulting firms working on environmental issues eventually prepare the report. This makes the process questionable and raises

problems of conflict of interest since the applicant pays the private consulting firm for this service.

Looking at the contemporary legislation, state institutions and the processes for mining activities, two conclusions are achieved: First, it is not exaggerating to state that the legislation is chaotic. The continuous amendments of laws and regulations create profound contradictions among laws, regulations and constitution. Besides, these changes are far from being a remedy for the mining sectors problems and the legislation does not reflect a consistent national mining policy. Secondly, because of the contradictions in the legislation there are many loopholes, which can be exploited. Either in the process of applying for licences for mining activities, the process of ÇED Report or the process of obtaining permits for conducting mining activities in agricultural lands and forests, the ministries mentioned above have too much power, which does not depend on the legislation, but on the loopholes in the legislation.

3.4.3. Transformation of International Investments Regime

In neoliberal paradigm foreign direct investments are welcomed due to the expectation of its contribution to economic development, however, Turkey was unable to increase its foreign direct investments until mid-2000s for several reasons. With the capital account liberalisation in 1989 the role of financial capital has increased dramatically, but the economy became dependent on private financial resources (Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010: 113). Specifically, capital account liberalisation was immature due to lack of regulatory framework and fiscal and monetary discipline and made the economy dependent on speculative short-term capital (Öniş, 2009: 411). Turkish state failed to cultivate state capacity for regulation and implementation of necessary actions (Öniş, 2009: 411). High interest rates pushed the direction of the economy from production towards finance and destabilized it resulting in three financial crises in 1994, 1998-1999 and 2001. In the subsequent crises period Turkey was not able to attract significant foreign direct investment and relied mostly on portfolio investments, which also served as a destabilizing factor. In addition, weak legal protection for investments, hardship of

obtaining investment permits and legal and public resistance to privatization had negative influence on potential investors.

At the global level, in late 1990s international financial institutions such as the IMF started to impose conditionality clauses to developing economies in exchange for financial aid. Fiscal discipline, liberalisation of trade and investments, tax reforms and privatisation of state enterprises were part of these conditions. However, Turkish economy was not stable enough to meet them during 1990's. After 2001 crisis, Kemal Derviş, a senior officer in the World Bank, became the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Treasury. He was able to make reforms in line with the demands of international institutions, such as establishing the Central Bank autonomy, structural reforms in the banking system, creating a flexible labour market, commitment to privatisation, degradation of the welfare system and anti-inflation policies.

Besides international institutions, the role of the European Union (EU) was significant in stabilizing the economy. The announcement of candidacy of Turkey in Helsinki Summit in 1999 created an anchor not only for the steady continuation of economic restructuring but also for pursuing political reforms (Öniş, 2009: 417). Öniş (2009: 417) argues that the EU and the IMF double-conditionality in the sense that the EU membership process facilitated the economic restructuring demanded by the IMF. At the same time, the EU membership process generated a global interest in long-term investment opportunities in Turkey, especially in buying privatized state enterprises (Öniş, 2009: 418). As a result of this political and economic reform era between 2001-2004, legal protection for investments was guaranteed, procedures for investment were facilitated by a new Foreign Direct Investments Law No: 4875 (in 2004), corporate tax rate was decreased (in 2005) and regulatory institution in the economy became more autonomous from other state institutions. All these factors contributed to dramatic increase of foreign direct investments in comparison to the 1990s (Öniş, 2009: 423-424).

The previous Foreign Direct Investment Law (No: 6224), entered into force in 1954, was a very liberal in essence. However, despite continuous reforms, in neoliberal paradigm it fell behind of the necessities dictated by new dynamics of internationalization of capital and state. The reasons for this were that some articles

were prone to restrictive interpretations and it included only the new investments, i.e. buying a privatized state enterprise was not included (Gökyayla and Süral, 2004: 133). Therefore, a new Foreign Direct Investment Law (No: 4875) entered into force in 2003 in line with the other developments mentioned before. The objectives of the new law were promoting foreign direct investments and protecting the rights of foreign investors in accordance with international standards, and removing the procedures for acquiring investment permits and introducing procedures only for informing the institutions of Turkish state (Foreign Direct Investment Law No: 4875). The new law became the basis for and promoter of late-blooming foreign direct investments in mid-2000's.

CHAPTER 4

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ON GOLD MINING IN TÜRKİYE

In the previous chapter, economic indicators demonstrating the growing significance of gold mining, and institutional and legislative changes corresponding to this growth have been handled. In order to evaluate this change and the role of the state and foreign capital, this chapter includes a qualitative research. Research includes interviews with experts with experience in the field and the analysis of data with the thematic analysis approach.

4.1. METHODOLOGY

Interviews were conducted with experts who are working or previously worked in the mining sector with sufficient experience and knowledge of the legislation, procedures and institutions. The interviewees were selected by snowball sampling (also known as chain sampling or network sampling) (Patton, 2015: 408). Since mining activities in Turkey were previously state-dominated with core and centralised institutions, interviewees are acquainted with many people in the sector, public or private. The first person I reached during the research was not interviewed, however, with the reference he provided I was able to reach several experts, and they also provided me other contacts, among which the interviewees were selected according to their occupations and whether they are working in private or public

spheres for establishing a balance, and then, their availability. For instance, I reached the Department of Natural Resources in the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources for possible interviews with experts working there. They could not or would not give me any names or contact information and they proposed that I should ask MAPEG for possible interviews and suggested that any issue concerning mining was their job.

All interviews were conducted in one week between 15 and 19 August 2022 in Ankara. In almost all cases the interviewees accepted participating in the research after they saw the questions. Questions (and ethics board's permit for the research even though no one asked) were sent to them before the interview, but no written answers were accepted. Especially, the interviewees, who were working in a state institution at that time, were more suspicious of the research even though I reached them with a reference from their associate. I was not able to interview them alone without the presence of their associates and none of them accepted the proposition for recording the interview even though the measures protecting their anonymity were clearly explained to them before the start. Only 2 out of 6 interviews were recorded. All interviewees are male and there was only one possible female interviewee in my contacts list, but unfortunately, she was not available. Here blow the general characteristics of the interviewees:

Table 4: General Information on Interviewees

Experts	Sex	Age	Occupation⁷	Years of Experience	Work Place
Expert 1	Male	44	Geological Engineer	17	MTA
Expert 2	Male	56	Mining Engineer	34	MTA
Expert 3	Male	67	Mining Engineer	31+	Turkish Gold Miners Association
Expert 4	Male	64	Mining Engineer	45	TMMOB Chamber of Mining Engineers of Turkey (retired)
Expert 5	Male	53	Mining	30	TMMOB

⁷ Some of the occupations are defined very specifically by the interviewees. Therefore, in order to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, simple versions are used here.

			Engineer		Chamber of Mining Engineers of Turkey
Expert 6	Male	35	Mining Engineer	12	MAPEG

Source: Prepared by the author based on interviews.

The questions asked to the interviewees are in Table 5 below. Other than these, they were asked of their age, occupation, and contact information. The first two questions were designed to get a better understanding of the interviewees' experiences. Questions (3) and (4) were asked in order to learn about their views on legislation amendments, their sufficiency and impact as well as their opinion of whether implementation of these legislation are different for foreign and national capital. Question (5) intends to learn their opinions on the foreign direct investments in mining sector and their effect on the economy of Turkey. Question (6) inquires their insights about the role of the state concerning mining and the nature of this role. Question (7) and (8) looks for their knowledge concerning the government policies on mining and agriculture. However, when the first interviewee understood the question (8) as if it refers to mining activities in agricultural and forest zones and answered accordingly, I explained this double meaning, versions of the question to other interviewees. Question (9) aims to understand their stance in conflicts between state, and local and environmental activists, which is far more conflicting than, for example, assessing state's role in economic development. The purpose of the Question (10) is to round up the interview and make sure that the interviewee is able to add comments he missed throughout the interview.

Table 5: Questions for Experts

(1) How long have you been working in your current position?
(2) Can you explain your job? What do you think about the importance of your job?
(3) In comparison to previous version, what do you think about the impact of 2004 amendment of the Mining Law on the sector?
(4) Do you think that the exploration and operation procedures of mining defined in related the laws and regulations are appropriate and sufficient? Do you think that there is a difference in procedures applied to foreign and national capital?
(5) What do you think about the investments of foreign capital in mining sector

in Turkey? In your opinion, what is the importance of these investments in the development of the country?

(6) What do you think about the role of the state in mining sector? In your opinion, does the state undertake encouraging, regulatory, protective, coercive roles and etc.?

(7) As far as you remember, what do you think about the mining policies of the governments?

(8) As far as you remember, what do you think about the agricultural policies of the governments?

(9) What do you think about environmentalist and/or local groups organizing against various mines? What do you think about the behaviour of police and/or gendarmerie forces towards the protests of these groups?

(10) Do you want to add anything else upon your thoughts generated by the interview?

Source: Prepared by the author.

The transcript of interviews is analysed with thematic analysis approach developed by Braun and Clarke (2006) as “a method for systemically identifying, organizing, and offering insight into patterns of meaning (themes) across a data set” in order to “see and make sense of collective or shared meanings and experiences” (Braun and Clarke, 2012: 57).

While conducting a thematic analysis the researcher may take a position along three main lines: “inductive versus deductive or theory-driven data coding and analysis, an experimental versus critical orientation to data, and an essentialist versus constructionist theoretical perspective” (Braun and Clarke, 2012: 58). In this analysis, my approach stands closer to the deductive approach “where the researcher brings to the data a series of concepts, ideas, or topics” in order to use to code and interpret the data (Braun and Clarke, 2012: 58) without dismissing the possibility of new constructed ones from the close examination of data. Deductive thematic analysis approach, or theory-driven approach, is also expected to be “often critical in its orientation and constructionist in its theoretical framework” (Braun and Clarke, 2012: 59). An in-depth inductive and experimental approach would be not wise to adopt since not all participants allowed the recording of their interviews. Their interview transcription was derived from the notes taken during the interview. Also,

in this dissertation I had a theoretical problematique too and did not want to get too dispersed.

Braun and Clarke identify six phases in a thematic analysis:

- (1) “Familiarizing Yourself With the Data”
- (2) “Generating Initial Codes”
- (3) “Searching for Themes”
- (4) “Reviewing Potential Themes”
- (5) “Defining and Naming Themes”
- (6) “Producing the Report” (Braun and Clarke, 2012: 60-69).

I have read the data with several times and I noticed that the interviewees get out of the topic and miss the purpose of the question very often. One of the question’s answer was ending up in another question’s answer. They liked to tell stories, their personal history in the sector and experiences in the field in the midst of their answers. The transcribed data became a ball of meanings detached from the questions. Therefore, I decided to treat them one set of data per interviewee. I started to take notes on the side as codes, which “identify and provide a label for a feature of the data that is potentially relevant to the research question” (Braun and Clarke, 2012: 61). After coding, themes start to reveal. A theme “captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of *patterned* response or meaning within the data set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82). Then, I reviewed the possible themes that can be derived from the data and assessed their commonness in as many as interviewees and eliminated them. The themes derived from the data and their evaluation is in the next section. I gathered themes under three topics: Role of the state, Foreign Capital and The Others.

4.2. FINDINGS

4.2.1. Roles of the State

The most common theme derived from the data is “State is a Gatekeeper”. Gatekeeper is a person who controls the access to something. It is close to the meaning of state as a regulator. However, regulation has a meaning of impartiality, it works like a machine or an algorithm. However, gatekeeper includes a sense of choice. A gatekeeper may refuse someone to pass the gate for several reasons, for lack of money, for messy clothes, or just because he does not like the person. He is

pretty much an independent actor. State, as well, as you can see from the quotes, have power to decide who have access to mining licences, information or mining operations. According to Expert 1, before 2010 amendment the licences accumulated in the hands of third parties (here the third party is licence owners who is not MAPEG or MTA, state agencies) and the third parties were not using licences to explore ores. They were able to keep them for a long time. The new law shortened the time of exploration licences and most of the licences went back to the licence pool in MAPEG instantly and reissued to other individuals, companies and MTA. This action was not taken on behalf of any particular class interest; state itself benefited the most because it would collect licence fees when newly returned licences issued again. Secondly, state has power to decide who can access to information. According to Expert 3, at the end of second table, the state cuts down 34 million cubic meters of trees per year and no one knows about this. Trees cut down for mining purposes are very small in percentage. According to him, once this information is disclosed it would affect the public opinion positively against mining. State also controls who has access to mining operations. Expert 4, the nationalization of coal mines in 1978, due to the global energy crisis, and then returning it to their owners in 1980, right after the military coup in Turkey, reflects the state's flexibility as gatekeeper. Expert 4 also mentions the local and environmentalist protests concerning mining in Kazdağları, which is a protected natural zone, and how the state was able to invoke the forest permits of the company, which is 100% foreign investment, probably because of the public opinion risking international arbitration.

Table 6: State is a Gatekeeper

Theme	Expert	Data Extracts (Direct Quotes)
State is a gatekeeper	Expert 1	<i>[Before the mining law amendment in 2010] Exploration licenses could remain in the hands of third parties. Search warrants were dropped when licenses became difficult.</i>
		<i>The Expropriation Valuation Commission in Agriculture can expropriate and transfer it to the company.</i>
	Expert 2	<i>[2004 amendment] It paved the way for mining. It is a change that has truly improved mining, facilitating the entry of mining capital in the world.</i>
		<i>... the long duration of some permits requested in the legislation can have a complicating effect. The lack of mechanisms to take quick decisions creates difficulties in terms of time, but time is important in investment.</i>
		<i>Most of the mines are outside of agricultural areas. Metallic mines</i>

		<i>are generally the biggest problem in forests and areas subject to Olive Law. According to the Olive Law, even the search is difficult. In the new regulation, if it is for energy, it can be done according to the permission of the Ministry.</i>
	Expert 5	<i>With the new mining law, foreign capital was invited to the country, [foreign capital] demanded some conditions for entry. They said we don't want a lot of control, let it be a subcontractor. In the continuation of the foreign capital law, the license guarantees, and the reduction of the fee guarantees paved the way. Revocation of licences changed to fines. Until 2010-15, the number of licenses increased a lot. ... A company has a problem, the law changes to change that article, sometimes it passes in a bill bag.</i> <i>In 1978, we nationalized the boron. Their prices had fallen from the competition. There are laws, policies, practices, but the state cannot be successful.</i> <i>The public interest must prevail. Planning must be done. The state should regulate the sharing of underground and surface wealth. Because the company that operates the mine is stronger than the villagers, they [state] do what they say.</i> <i>In all kinds of protests, the police and gendarmerie are already harsh. When they are in charge of protecting the demonstrators, they act the opposite.</i>
	Expert 6	<i>Since the mines are under the rule and disposal of the state, mines cannot be extracted if there is no state.</i> <i>The profit that can be obtained from an agricultural enterprise can be obtained in one year in a mining operation. Whether it is professional agriculture, agriculture made on a hundred square meters at the top of the mountain will not contribute to the country's economy.</i>
	Expert 4	<i>...here is marble, quarries are included in the mining law, marble, not to mention quarries, marbles are included in the mining law,... [after 1985]</i> <i>...When you look at the fact, the mentality of the companies that ignores the priorities and demands say they can solve my business in Ankara because they are strong. This has unfortunately damaged the sector. In other words, maybe 3-5 companies did their job, but in the long run, there was a serious public opinion against mining.</i> <i>Unfortunately, what we call the day-saving policies in Turkey, which I say will happen with these laws, needs to be determined by laws and regulations. If you say state share is 3-2%, the state gets 2% and the rest 98% is taken by somebody else, this situation happens.</i> <i>Some say that the state does not have a mining policy. There is, but there is a wrong policy. In other words, it exists, we cannot say it does not exist, in the end, the Republic of Turkey is not a state to be taken lightly, it is a big state. There is a mining policy, but that policy does not serve the priorities I just described. On the contrary, it serves someone, it serves capital, it serves the capitalist class, it serves the rich. Today, it [mining policy] serves 3-5 companies, which we call 3-5 rich, whose names are always known.</i> <i>But since [foreign capital] is coming to this country, at least there should be a serious control in this country, there should be a serious follow-up, this cannot be done either. Why can't it be done? Because</i>

		<i>they make the laws. ... Their sphere of influence is much, much larger than ours. It's terrible... I went to the parliament in those years [before 2004-2010 amendments], the parliament was active, not like it is now. There were serious lobbies, that is, these things revolved around the deputies, but we also saw that the deputies acted as if they were the spokespersons and representatives of a company, let's not say all of them, but a certain part of them. Unfortunately.</i>
		<i>The one in 1978 was caused by the unique conditions of that year, there was a serious oil crisis in the world, and it turned into an energy crisis. There are small coal fields in the hands of the industry. The state says that these are my property anyway, as are mines and coal, which are constitutionally under government control. Government says I will process my own property now, I will not let you operate it. In fact, we shouldn't call it nationalization, it takes back the right to operate something that is already owned by the state, the right it has given to the private.... But for some reason, this process, which happened in 1978, when the military revolution happened in 1980, the fields are returned to their former owners with the law in the first parliament.</i>
	Expert 5	<i>In the Kaz Mountains, they started to cut trees. Some said 60 thousand trees, some said 300 thousand trees were cut down, the forest management said 40-50 thousand trees. Even 1 tree is important, but even its number could not be understood, there was no transparency.</i>
		<i>Tens of thousands of people walked in the Kaz Mountains and they couldn't, why couldn't they? Because there was a very serious reaction. Their licenses have not been renewed and remain for now, but that doesn't mean it won't happen in the future because if there's gold there, they won't leave it alone.</i>
	Expert 3	<i>If 100 thousand trees are cut down in Turkey, 1 of them is for mining activities. Last year, 34 million cubic meters of trees were cut down in forests, 34 million cubic meters per year. The share of mining in this is the drop in the ocean, which is cut as a necessity for mining. Now, it's normal for people to be outraged when they don't know these numbers. Because these figures are not disclosed.</i>

Source: Prepared and translated by the author based on interviews.

Another theme derived from the transcript is that state is paid. In many occasions, interviewees mention that the state gains revenues through taxes, state rent or fees for exploring or operation licences, the last two is specific to natural resource mining. For instance, the state rent is a special tax, which is collected only from the mining sector. While some of the interviewees consider it an additional tax, others claim that it is the right of state to collect rents since it is the sole owner of natural resources and mining is actually a type of production does not necessitate raw materials as much as a manufacturing operation. Almost in all interviews Article 168 of the constitution was mentioned explicitly or implicitly, which states that “Natural

wealth and resources shall be under the authority and at the disposal of the State. The right to explore and exploit these belongs to the State” (Constitution of Republic of Turkey, 2019). State here has a role of a landlord, renting his house or land and taking rent as return. Also, when the mining activity is in a forest and demanding cut of trees, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry charges for permits.

Table 7: State Gets Paid

Theme	Expert	Data Extracts (Direct Quotes)
State gets paid	Expert 1	<i>It is above the world average in terms of state rent in the world.</i>
		<i>We are one of the countries with the highest forest cost in the world. General Directorate of Forestry receives income from miners, forest share. ... Roads are opened in mineral exploration. ... In the Kaz Mountains, in Kirazlı, Alamos paid a forest fee of 54 million TL.</i>
	Expert 5	<i>State rent is taken from revenues. The mining employers say that we are charged double tax. There is raw material input cost in every sector, but not in mining. The state rent was introduced for the first time in 1954. Income tax and state rent are collected. You will pay per ton you produce.</i>
	Expert 4	<i>The company also says that I already gave the money for that tree to the forest management.</i>
	Expert 3	<i>If you produce 1 ton of gold in Turkey, 30% of it is tax, permission and license fees and taxes, 50% are operating expenses, the rest is almost 20% of the investor's earnings. Including state and corporate tax. ... apart from that, all industrialists pay social security premiums, VAT, stamp duty. We pay them an additional state entitlement, we also pay license and permit fees, plus we pay for rehabilitation later on. Now, we are a sector that pays more taxes and permits to the state compared to other industrialists. Again, you have to spend serious money on mine closure. When you look at it from that point of view, the state has a serious income due to both the taxes and permissions it receives in the mining sector.</i>
		<i>You pay social security premiums, you pay taxes, you contribute to the economic and social development of the region. And you are reducing the current account deficit in that area, can there be anything more valuable than that?</i>

Source: Prepared and translated by the author based on interviews.

The last theme on the role of the state is that state is balance. In the extracts below, state is either a balance or it ought to be balance. For instance, Expert 2 in the first data extract mentions that it builds a balancing between environmentalism and economic benefits. On the other hand, Expert 5 mentions that state is not fulfilling its balancing role. Also, in the last two extracts state's role as a balancing factor between economic gains of mining and disturbance of local people. When state as an

economic actor investing in a mining operation, it brings not only the employment opportunities, but also social and educational services, infrastructure, “life” to the community living in the expected mine. Private mining companies try to imitate this kind of engagement with the communities by social responsibility projects, restoring local public buildings, offering scholarships for bright students. However, they are not very successful since they fail to create the trust like state did in the past.

Table 8: State is Balance

Theme	Expert	Data Extracts (Direct Quotes)
State is Balance	Expert 2	<i>The current government sees mining as a very important area, it knows that we are highly dependent on foreign sources, and to minimize this, it is the policy to bring every mine that can be found into the economy in a short time. It tries to act in a way that creates maximum benefit without ignoring environmentalism, but by creating a balance between the two.</i>
		<i>The state is taking steps to stop the business before it gets out of hand. Sometimes they withdraw. Whether it happens or not, we take a step back in the mines. If the relevant department insists, a way is sought to persuade the public. Sometimes it is found, sometimes not.</i>
	Expert 5	<i>Occupational accidents and occupational diseases are an important problem in mining. One of the most important tools is control, but it is not enough on its own. Measures and legislation, and most importantly, the working peace between the state, the worker and the employer must be balanced. It's out of balance right now. That's why control doesn't make much sense.</i>
		<i>Not only mining, but every economic activity is polluting the environment. The demands of the citizens are true. The state has a balanced and regulatory role.</i>
		<i>In the past, the state brought employment, roads, schools and culture, as it was through the public. The private sector does not. It creates a public life, like Zonguldak. The private sector does not create such a life.</i>
	Expert 4	<i>There was such a situation that the entire society was turned against the mining industry. Mind you, a lot of protests started in all the locales. Are these objections justified? There is too much.... For example, when I entered the sector in 80, we also made investments on behalf of the public in Erzurum, Zonguldak and Soma, but there would be no such objections. There were no environmental priorities, such sensitivity in the society, this is one pillar of the society, but the other pillar thought that the state doing this job, the state would not make us suffer too much, that is, people had the belief that at least it wouldn't bother us that much.</i>

Source: Prepared and translated by the author based on interviews.

4.2.2. Role of Foreign Capital

The other topic I focused is foreign capital in order to understand how interviewees place foreign capital in overall economic activities and particularly in mining activities. Two themes came up: One is “They are the same”. According to the laws and regulations, they all agree that state is not treating national and foreign capital separately. Even Expert 4 and Expert 3 has expressed a holistic view of capital.

Table 9: They are the Same

Theme	Expert	Data Extracts (Direct Quotes)
They are the Same	Expert 1	<i>There is no difference between domestic and foreign companies.</i>
	Expert 2	<i>Legally there is no difference. .. There is no difference between the procedures applied to domestic and foreign capital. Even MTA gets licenses on equal terms. MTA can get priority if it applies based on the basin belt clause.</i>
	Expert 6	<i>The procedures are the same. The incentives and conveniences applied to anyone who is a Turkish citizen or a company established according to the Turkish Commercial Code No. 3213 is the same. I don't know if the Department of Commerce and the Department of the Treasury are promoting it themselves.</i>
	Expert 4	<i>legally, a separate procedure is not applied to domestic and foreign capital. The mining law says: In order to obtain a license, you must be a citizen of the Republic of Turkey or establish a company established under the laws of the Turkish Republic. In other words, you will either establish a company as a legal entity or become a Turkish citizen as an individual.</i>
		<i>our laws do not define domestic and foreign capital separately, they see capital as a whole.</i>
	Expert 3	<i>There is no such thing as domestic foreign capital. Every company established according to Turkish law is subject to the same practices. There is no difference. In other words, there is no domestic or foreign capital, direct investment capital is subject to the same conditions in a sector.</i>

Source: Prepared and translated by the author based on interviews.

On the other hand, another theme is derived in relation to foreign capital emphasizing that foreign and national capital may not be the same in other aspects: Foreign capital is depicted as resourceful. First of all, foreign capital has access to stock exchanges, wide credit opportunities, i.e. credits from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and their revenues are higher. It is not to say that national capital in Turkey is banned from credit opportunities, it is a structural problem. Mainly, in the national level companies the corporate structures are not very much developed to achieve this end and they lack enough capital

accumulation, as Expert 5 mentioned. Also, ETİ Bank was a specialised bank on mining, they employed experts, who knew about the mining operations, and the bank was covering this capital-deficit to a certain point. After its privatisation, this specialised banking opportunities for mining have weakened. Secondly, foreign capital has a strong grasp of technology, research and development and know-how which national capital lacks. All these features of foreign capital make them the pioneers, especially, in ore exploration because they have structural advantages that minimise the risk in exploration. President Erdoğan once said “not all seekers can find, but finders are the ones who seek” (Star, 2020), he could well say this while thinking about foreign mining capital. They are resourceful in the latent and apparent meaning of the term.

Table 10: Foreign Capital is Resourceful

Theme	Expert	Data Extracts (Direct Quotes)
Foreign capital is resourceful	Expert 1	<i>Because they are listed on the stock market, they fund mining more easily. There has also been a transfer of know-how since the 1990s. It also contributed to the industry.</i>
		<i>They came to look at Kışladağ from Europe. IBRD awarded 10% of the \$200 million. Banking is not enough for us. If they don't have assets to mortgage, they won't.</i>
	Expert 2	<i>Foreign capital developed and disciplined mining in Turkey, highlighted the importance of occupational health and safety, brought technological developments and contributed to specialization. Smooth mining is sustainable mining. Even environmental awareness came with foreign capital.</i>
		<i>Foreigners also make all the investments (environment, education, social responsibility, opening schools..) It also disciplines our private sector. “Take your cream top, never mind the rest” kind of mining was done in the past.</i>
	Expert 5	<i>It has no contribution except employment. The reason is lack of capital accumulation and lack of know-how.</i>
	Expert 6	<i>It should not be seen as foreign capital. It is important to bring natural resources and mines that will increase the welfare level of the country. Domestic capital can also apply to the IBRD. We force Turkish businessmen to invest money in the mining sector, but foreigners look at it differently. If the foreigner has a hundred licenses, he is looking for all of them. Turkish investors do not like risk. Therefore, the importance of foreign investors in development is so great.</i>
		<i>Prejudices on the mining industry and foreign capital coming to Turkey need to be removed. If science is to come to this country with foreign capital, if prosperity will increase, foreign capital must be supported. Those who developed the mining culture in Turkey are foreign companies, Turkish companies took them as an example.</i>
	Expert	<i>When you look at the revenues of [foreign companies], when you</i>

	4	<i>look at their R&D and know-how, they are as strong as a state. Most companies are stronger than the state, even the mining company is stronger than most states in the world.</i>
	Expert 3	<i>We were unfamiliar with gold production technology, Bergama started in 2001. Along with him, a training process started in gold mining in Turkey. And in many gold mining, both geology and mining, hundreds of people have trained, experts have been trained, and this is a very important gain for our country.</i>
		<i>Especially in metal mining, foreign capital contributed very seriously in terms of exploration venture capital. In particular, the vast majority of gold reserves were discovered by foreign-owned exploration companies. And these were put into production, making a very serious economic contribution.</i>

Source: Prepared and translated by the author based on interviews.

4.2.3 The Others

The third topic is The Others. Within the transcripts I came across similar ideas about other actors, which have not been discussed until know: Locals, Workers, and Environmentalist Protesters. About locals, there is one theme: Locals are self-centered. It is either used as referring to a greedy behaviour or as an appreciation that locals have learned how to protect their land and rights. Expert 1 and Expert 2 mentioned that behind their resistance there could be a secret agenda. For example, in the example Expert 1 gives below locals are using the forestland, cutting trees themselves and using it for hazelnut production. Therefore, when the mining company comes to the area for starting a mining operation, they get afraid to lose the income due to the cutting of the trees in these areas. Other times, it is implied that the mining company, with a promise of job or money, can buy them. On the other hand, protecting the environment is considered a right and a normal thing by the Expert 4. He also gives an example of locals not abandoning their resistance for job opportunities.

Table 11: Locals are Self-centered

Theme	Expert	Data Extracts (Direct Quotes)
Locals are self-centred	Expert 1	<i>The local people are resisting, they can stop the resistance when their two children are hired in the mine. Machinery is rented from the villager. Let me be insured.</i>
		<i>For example, they used the forestland in Çorum Orak for hazelnut production, and if there is a mine, they will lose it as well.</i>
	Expert 2	<i>...farming is not continuous, he can do both jobs. There is not enough mining to affect the decline of agriculture. There is an agricultural incentive. Treasury lands are opened to agriculture. The number of</i>

		<i>people who will leave agriculture to work in the mine is not very high.</i>
		<i>Local community groups are made up of people who are exposed to disinformation (environment, health, etc.), not consciously, but led by some provocative people among them. There are reports that those who prioritize provocation are getting paid. Both the state and the private sector have a role to play. It is necessary to conduct a public relations study that will eliminate these disinformations, how sustainable mining will be done, and emphasize its contribution to the country and the region.</i>
	Expert 4	<i>...the public interest, which we call the public interest, must be taken into account. In other words, the total public interest should definitely be considered rather than the benefit of the company or the benefit of a group.</i>
		<i>In recent years, there has been a serious opposition to companies because of the policies I have described. This opposition turned into a structure made up of local people, but also supported by academics or supported by different groups. Those who made such actions were wanted to be stigmatized as illegal or traitor.</i>
		<i>Nobody wants a cyanide pit on their doorstep. So think as a citizen.... This is also a human thing. Protecting your environment is a normal thing in terms of living better.</i>
		<i>...we call it the consent of the local people, in fact, it is not in the law, there is no such thing as approval. But at least consent must be obtained. It does not happen without the consent of the local people.</i>
		<i>Now, village women are keeping watch in Muğla Akbelen Forests. Just because there will be 3 employees from that village, they don't allow, and the villagers don't allow anymore.</i>
	Expert 3	<i>Even MTA has become unable to search for minerals. Let me show you a newspaper clipping, it says MTA cannot enter our village. If even the state's mineral exploration agency, founded by Atatürk, becomes unable to search for minerals, it is very thought provoking.</i>

Source: Prepared and translated by the author based on interviews.

Another theme is extracted from the transcript is about the workers: Workers are seen impotent. First of all, no one asks for their opinion. Gold mining workers are said to be more educated than workers in coal mining since gold mine workers requires specialised skills and abilities. Gold mining is a more complex activity than coal mining or quarrying necessitating these skills. On the other hand, as Expert 4 highlights, mine workers actually have not got a choice. They are not educated. Especially coal miners are not trained enough. In addition, their main livelihood, agriculture and livestock production, have decreased in value due to wrong agricultural policies.

Table 12: Workers are Impotent

Theme	Expert	Data Extracts (Direct Quotes)
Workers are impotent	Expert 5	<i>The law-making process has changed. They don't get an opinion. Every incoming MAPEG General Manager says he will enact a new law. Neither the employer nor the engineers want change anymore. Workers don't have much of a say.</i>
		<i>The mine has a feature that prevents migration. When we extract it in certain regions, it can also cause migration. If Sivas Divriği and Zonguldak were not mines, there would be migration.</i>
		<i>Mining is such an industry that if they had another chance, they would not do it. Education level and living standards are very low.</i>
	Expert 4	<i>A miner indirectly employs 12 employees. In other words, even its sub-sectors, when you consider all of them, are really important sector in terms of employment, public benefit and added value, and being a welfare society.</i>
		<i>Soma basin falls into the Aegean Region as a region, you know, Akhisar, Kınık, those regions are agricultural regions, an area where vegetables and fruits such as tobacco, olives and grapes are produced very intensively is an area suitable for agriculture, but as a result of giving up production in agriculture due to wrong practices in agricultural policies, people and young people became unemployed. They were forced to work in private sector mines there. Unfortunately, in 2014, one of the world's deadliest and Turkey's biggest mining disaster happened in Soma with 301 deaths, because people and young people, they did not know the risks and the mining culture there.</i>
		<i>... a section of young people who were cut off from agriculture, young people who were left unemployed, young people who were forced... these young people were sent to their deaths in plain sight...</i>
		<i>Already, people with low education go there because they are in need. Secondly, it is a very high-risk sector. There is always the possibility of an accident, especially in underground mining.</i>
	Expert 3	<i>You know mines usually in the countryside. Nobody can invest easily in rural areas because such an environment does not exist. But the miner has to, they have to extract the mine from where it is, there is no chance to change its location. Therefore, what happens when a large mine is opened there, the first choice is to create employment for the people in that region and even make them have a profession and train them in a way, which is something we attach great importance to, especially in gold mining. We say that almost 70-80% of them employ the people of that region. In that respect, when a mine is opened in agricultural areas, people work there and make serious economic contributions to themselves.</i>

Source: Prepared and translated by the author based on interviews.

Last theme in the Others topic is about the environmental activists. They are seen as not trust-worthy for different reasons. Firstly, Experts 1 and 6 does not trust the environmental activists because they think they have secret agendas or they are paid to protest. Secondly, they are seen as defending a position of total objection to

mining and it is not find convincing since we need natural resources for the products we use every day, housing, transportation, etc. Also, they are accused of lacking intersectional solidarity. They tend to blame the locals or mine workers for unsuccessful protests.

Table 13: Environmental Activists are not Thrust-worthy

Theme	Expert	Data Extracts (Direct Quotes)
Environmental Activists are not trust-worthy	Expert 1	<i>The German lobby is funding local organizations specifically against gold prospecting. It joins the marginalized groups.</i>
	Expert 5	<i>While TŪMAG was working, there was not much noise in Kaz Mountains. Environmentalists criticize the silent public and say they sold it.</i>
		<i>The Akbeli (Milas) area is expanding towards the forest, environmental groups are objecting to this, and the workers are objecting to them asking whether they will be unemployed.</i>
		<i>The demands of environmental activists are also meaningful, but every economic activity has environmental risks. It is not meaningful to say either mining or environment. We have to produce for our needs.</i>
	Expert 6	<i>Environmentalism and local protection are relative concepts. I don't think that's the point.</i>
	Expert 3	<i>There are some activist groups, think as if against all gold mining, against all of them, against mining, it could be. But on the other hand, we say to him that if you are against mining, then give the key to that car ... go to the cave, give that phone, don't use that fridge, right?</i>

Source: Prepared and translated by the author based on interviews.

All in all, the themes derived from the transcripts of interviews with experts draw a picture of the role of the state and foreign capital in mining sector. In addition, several themes are derived concerning other actors. There are other topic cluster about the role of the international, about dependency and exploitation. However, these issues need to be researched in more detail in order to generate meaningful themes.

CONCLUSION

Natural resource grabbing has become a very common phenomenon in the last 20 years. However, the scholars approaching to this phenomenon refrain from developing a substantiated theoretical framework. They focus on case studies extensively and caught in the politics of natural resource grabbing. The objects of their case studies are resource abundant countries. However, natural resource grabbing is a worldwide phenomenon not exclusive to resource abundant countries.

The intention of this dissertation is to study the phenomenon of natural resource grabbing and propose a theoretical approach in order to understand it. It proposes a broader perspective in relation to globalization and new imperialism debates and understand it as a process of reproduction of uneven and combined development of capitalism. Within this context, FDI creates positive impact in relation to development, growth, utilization of natural resource and opportunities of technology transfer. However, at the same time these investments create negative economic and social effects on people who are living in close to the mining area. Therefore, there generally occurs social unrest, environmental protests, and vast land expropriations affecting farmers. This contradictions of FDI can be understood with the concept of primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation refers to the process of divorcing the peasants from the means of production. Similarly, natural resource grabbing deprives local people of land and water. When capital moves to non-capitalist environment; i.e. small towns, it transforms the lives and livelihoods of locals dramatically. It transforms local people, who make their living by mostly agricultural and livestock production, into workers or pushes them out of land. This is happening worldwide, not only in the resource rich countries of the South. In addition, within the context of primitive accumulation, role of the state in shaping these developments comes forward. Between the primitive and capitalist accumulations, the state stands. It was the perpetrator of primitive accumulation as early as 17th century, and it is now too.

The data demonstrates that Turkey has also witnessed a rush of capital to its mining sector and its share in the GDP is rising constantly. Gold mining in particular is a new phenomenon in Turkey since Turkey has become a gold producer country as recent as 2001. Since it is a capital-intensive economic activity in exploration and

operation levels, foreign capital has advantages derived from the level of capitalist development in its home country.

Evaluating the case study and results of qualitative interviews, I conclude that Turkish state is relatively autonomous from classes, class frictions as well as international organisations, institutions and MNCs etc. in its actions in the mining sector. The role of Turkish state in mining sector may have stumbled at first two decade of neoliberalism, but its power has not eroded totally. Rather, it has transformed. Thus, neoliberal restructuring of Turkey can be periodised. The first period from 1980 to 2001 was a shock therapy for Turkish state and economy. The financial instabilization and crises throughout these years hindered Turkish state's ability to respond to the neoliberal transformations, especially, capital account liberalization. With capital account liberalization in 1989 Turkish economy has become more vulnerable to the effects of portfolio investments, especially hot money flows. The political, social and financial crises followed and crippled Turkish state's power to response. However, Turkish economy started to stabilize within the neoliberal dynamics after 2001 and a lot of reforms came to being. The Turkish state wrote new laws for mining, foreign direct investments, agriculture in order to adopt to the transformed conditions of world economy. In the mining sector some institutions were cut of power, MTA's role is diminished in mining sector, especially in operations, and MAPEG role has increased as the distributor of licences. Almost all of the mining enterprises of the state were privatized, except ETİ Maden. At the same time, some institutions such as Ministry of Urbanization, Environment and Climate Change claimed regulatory power, especially with its control over ÇED reports, and state exercises this power through the loopholes in the legislation. The Ministry of Treasure asked for funding and legitimacy from the World Bank for facilitating already-at-work rural transformation, which was a burden on fiscal balance. The changing nature of subsidies served to this purpose and Turkish state exercised its power against international institutions and started to increase price subsidies in 2006. At times state took risks of international arbitration for no apparent reason other than avoiding contradictions in local level, multinational Alamos company's gold mining operations were cancelled. Therefore, it is hard to argue that state power has eroded.

I derive similar conclusions from the evaluation of interviews with experts in the mining sector. The analysis of the data gathered with interviews has been achieved with thematic analysis approach. From the transcript of the interviews ‘codes’ have been raised. Then these codes then came together and created themes which are common meaning clusters and resonate throughout the text. Three topics have been generated: the role of the state, foreign capital and other actors. Under these topics, there are three themes for the role of the state. First, state appears as the gatekeeper. State decides who has access to mining activities, mining licences or information. Therefore, it refers to a relative autonomy of the state where state is the provider of the conditions for capitalist accumulation. Also, another theme is that state is paid. State is paid more when it comes to mining with regard to other industries. State is paid with licence fees, state rents, and extra fees for establishing mining operation in the forest. This can be seen as a real autonomy with regard to Skocpol’s proposal since it means that state has a separate interest from classes and class fractions, even in contradiction with their interest. Lastly, the theme is that state is the balance. State has a balancing role, whether it uses it or ought to use it. It is believed to possess a balancing power between environmental protection and development, locals and mining companies. In the state-led industrialization paradigm before 1980 state had extensive regulatory power, but its power mainly rested in state enterprises as a sublet of direct exercise of power in the economy. When state invested in mining it was a part of a bigger developmental project. With mines and jobs, state provided education and health services, road to the rural. However, this direct involvement has changed into an indirect regulatory power. I propose that the political economic role of the state has transformed into a political role. This does not mean that Turkish state has no power in regulating the mining sector, but its form has changed.

On the topic of foreign capital, two themes derived. ‘They are the same’ theme reflects a common ground among the interviewees that foreign and national capital is not differently treated in terms of law. On the other hand, “Foreign capital is resourceful” theme demonstrates that foreign capital has many advantages in comparison to the national capital. Better opportunities for funding, banking systems and making research and development are the main difference while national capital

has limited capital accumulation and lacks know-how. Because of these advantages, the foreign capital mostly invests in the mine exploration activities, which is seen risky for national capitals.

The last topic is called 'The others'. It includes the interviewees' opinions on locals, environmental activists and workers. In the mining sector, workers are seen as 'impotent', they have no say and, most of the time, they have no choice but to work in mines. The environmental activists are seen as 'not thrust-worthy' because of their impossible demands and, also, because they lack the ability for intersectional solidarity when things are not going well. The locals are considered self-centered in two senses: they are seen as greedy and for money or jobs they can terminate their resistance to the company. In addition, they are also self-centered in the sense that they know what is important to them and they fight for their rights. Within this picture I conclude that state is still conceived as above actor's interests delivering a general interest as it was before 1980 in its mining investments. This perception of the state seems to be survived through neoliberal paradigm.

This case is not enough for generalization of the conclusions. In this sense, single case study has its limitations. However, since the literature on new extractivism focuses mainly on resource abundant countries, Turkey stands out as thinking-out-of-the-box case for further development of the theoretical approaches. I achieved conclusions about the role of the state in gold mining in Turkey case. I propose that a more comprehensive study must conduct sociological studies in the rural of Turkey where there are gold mining operations and track the socioeconomic changes in farmers' lives in the area.

The expected theoretical contribution of this dissertation to the literature is that the problematization of state within the framework of primitive accumulation. Concept of autonomy of state is proposed to resolve the contradictions stemming from bringing the concept of primitive accumulation today. On the other hand, the literature on gold mining in Turkey is very diverse especially in case studies. However, the literature mainly focuses on social/environmental movements and does not problematize state. Therefore, expected empirical contribution of the dissertation to the literature is that it proposes a new focus on the state as the actor between FDI and locals/environmentalists from the critical perspective of primitive accumulation.

REFERENCES

- Adaman, F., Arsel, M. and Akbulut, B. (2019). Neoliberal developmentalism, authoritarian populism, and extractivism in the countryside: the Soma mining disaster in Turkey. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*. 46(3): 514-536.
- Agricultural Law No: 5488. (2006).
- Akder, H. A. (2010). How to Dilute an Agricultural Reform: Direct Income Subsidy Experience in Turkey (2001-2008). *Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish Agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's Strategy* (47-62). Editors Barış Karapınar, Fikret Adaman, and Gökhan Özertan. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Akram-Lodhi, A. H. (2012). Contextualising land grabbing: contemporary land deals, the global subsistence crisis and the world food system. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement*. 33(2), 119-142.
- Alonso-Fradejas, A. (2012). Land Control-grabbing in Guatemala: The Political Economy of Contemporary Agrarian Change. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*. 33(4): 509-528.
- Amanor, K. S. (2012). Global resource grabs, agribusiness concentration and the smallholder: two West African case studies. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*. 39(3-4): 731-749.
- Amin, S. (1974). *Accumulation on a world scale: a critique of the theory of underdevelopment (Vol.1)*. New York & London: Monthly Review Press.
- Amin, S. (2001). Imperialism and Globalization. *Monthly Review*. 53(2): 6-24.
- Arrighi, G. (1994). *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*. Verso: London.
- Aston, T. H. and Philpin, C. (eds). (1985). *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Auty, R. M. (2001). The political economy of resource-driven growth. *European Economic Review*. 45(4-6): 839-846.
- Avcı, D., Adaman, F. and Özkaynak, B. (2010). Valuation languages in environmental conflicts: How stakeholders oppose or support gold mining at Mount Ida, Turkey. *Ecological Economics*. 70: 228-238.
- Avcı, D. (2017). Mining conflicts and transformative politics: A comparison of Intag (Ecuador) and Mount Ida (Turkey) environmental struggles. *Geoforum*. 84: 316-325.

Aydın, M. and Yilmazer, A. (2020). Altın Madenlerinin Çevresel Etkilerine Yönelik Bir Araştırma: Fatsa Örneği. *Journal of Environmental and Natural Studies*. 2(2): 86- 95.

Aydın, Z. (2001). Yapısal uyum politikaları ve kırsal alanda beka stratejilerinin özelleştirilmesi: Söke'nin Tuzburgazi ve Sivrihisar'ın Kınık Köyleri Örneği. *Toplum ve Bilim*. 88: 11–32.

Ayelazuno, J. A. (2014). The 'new extractivism' in Ghana: A critical review of its development prospects. *The Extractive Industries and Society*. 1(2): 292-302.

Azadi, H., Houshyar, E., Zarafshani, K., Hosseininia, G. and Witlox, F. (2013). Agricultural outsourcing: A two-headed coin?. *Global and Planetary Change*. 100: 20-27.

Bakker, K. (2013). Neoliberal Versus Postneoliberal Water: Geographies of Privatization and Resistance. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. 103(2): 253–260

Bannon, I. and Collier, P. (eds.). (2003). *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. World Bank: Washington D.C.

Barrett, P., Chávez, D. and Rodríguez-Garaví, C. (eds.). (2008). *The New Latin American Left*. Pluto Press: London.

Barrow, W. C. (1993). *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist*. The University of Wisconsin Press.

Barrow, C. W. (2000). The Marx Problem in Marxian State Theory. *Science & Society*. 64(1): 87-118.

Bashirov, G. (2021). New extractivism and failed development in Azerbaijan. *Third World Quarterly*. 42(8): 1829-1848.

Beasley-Murray, J., Cameron, M. A. and Hershberg, E. (2009). Latin America's left turns: an introduction. *Third World Quarterly*. 30(3): 19-330.

Bebbington, A. (2009). The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?, *NACLA Report on the Americas*. 42(5): 12-20.

Bebbington, A. J. and Humphreys-Bebbington, D. (2011). An Andean avatar: Post-neoliberal and neoliberal strategies for securing the unobtainable. *New Political Economy*. 16: 131–145.

Bedirhanoglu, P. and Yalman, G. L. (2010). State, Class and the Discourse: Reflections on the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. *Economic Transitions to Neoliberalism in Middle-income Countries: Policy Dilemmas, Economic Crises*,

Forms of Resistance (107-127). Editors Saad-Filho Alfredo and Galip L. Yalman. Routledge: NY.

Boratav, K. (2012). *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2009*. İmge Kitapevi Yayınları.

Brawley, M. (1998). *Turning Points: decisions shaping the international political economy*. Broadview Press: Canada.

Brenner, R. (2006b). What Is, and What Is Not, Imperialism?. *Historical Materialism*. 14(4): 79-105.

Brenner, R. (2006a). *The Economics of Global Turbulence*. Verso Books.

Brewer, A. (1990). *Marxist theories of imperialism: A critical survey*. Routledge.

Borras, S. Jr., and Franco, J. C. (2011). *Political Dynamics of Land Grabbing in Southeast Asia: Understanding Europe's Role*. <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/political-dynamics-of-land-grabbing-in-southeast-asia-understanding-europes-role>, (31.12.2022).

Borras, S., J. Franco, S. Gómez, C. Kay, and M. Spoor. (2012). Land Grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 39(3-4): 845-872.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006). *Thematic Analysis: A Practical Guide*. California: Sage Publications.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2012). Thematic Analysis. *APA handbook of research methods in psychology, Vol. 2. Research designs: Quantitative, qualitative, neuropsychological, and biological* (57-71). Editors Cooper, H., Camic, P. M., Long, D. L., Panter, A. T., Rindskopf, D., & Sher, K. J. American Psychological Association.

Budds, J. and Hinojosa, L. (2012). Restructuring and rescaling water governance in mining contexts: The co-production of waterscapes in Peru. *Water Alternatives*. 5(1): 119-137.

Bukharin, N. (n. d.). *Imperialism and World Economy*. Martin Lawrance Limited: London.

Burchardt, H. and Dietz, K. (2014). (Neo-)extractivism - a new challenge for development theory from Latin America. *Third World Quarterly*. 35(3): 468-486.

Callinicos, A. (2009). *Imperialism and Global Political Economy*. UK: Polity Press.

Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.). *Mine*. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/mine>, (31.12.2022).

Carroll, W. K. (2010). *The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class*. Zed Books: New York.

Castaneda, J. G. (2006). Latin America's left turn. *Foreign Affairs*. 85(3): 28-43.

Chamber of Mining Engineers of Turkey. (1990). 3213 Sayılı Maden Kanunu ve Değişiklik Tasarısı Tümden Kaldırılmalı, Tutarlı Bir Madencilik Politikası Olan "Yeni bir Maden Kanunu" Hazırlanmalıdır. *Madencilik Bülteni*. 6: 1-2.

Collier, P. and Venables, A. J. (2011). *Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction*. Palgrave Macmillan: London

Constantin, C., Luminița, C. and Vasile, A. J. (2017). Land grabbing: A review of extent and possible consequences in Romania. *Land Use Policy*. 62: 143-150.

Constitution of the Republic of Turkey & Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (2019).

Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R. and Keely, J. (2009). *Land Grabs or Development Opportunity: Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Çağatay, G. (21.09.2022). Altın üretiminin yıl sonunda 40 tonu aşması bekleniyor. *Anadolu Ajansı*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/altin-uretiminin-yil-sonunda-40-tonu-asmasi-bekleniyor/2690864>, (30.12.2022).

Çakmak, E. (2004). Structural Change and Market Opening in Agriculture: Turkey Towards EU Accession. *ERC Working Papers in Economics*. 4/10.

Çelik, C. (2023). Extractivism and Labour Control: Reflections of Turkey's 'Coal Rush' in Local Labour Regimes. *Critical Sociology*. 49(1): 59–76.

Çiftçi-Sen. (2022). Tütün avans parasına üretiliyor, Çiftçi borçtan kurtulamıyor! [http://www.ciftcisen.org/2022/05/19/ciftci-sen-tutun-avans-parasina-uretiliyor-ciftci-borctan-kurtulamiyor/#:~:text=Tütün%20Yasası%27nın%20çıktığı%202002,2021%20yılında%2050%20bine%20düşmüştür,\(10.09.2023\)](http://www.ciftcisen.org/2022/05/19/ciftci-sen-tutun-avans-parasina-uretiliyor-ciftci-borctan-kurtulamiyor/#:~:text=Tütün%20Yasası%27nın%20çıktığı%202002,2021%20yılında%2050%20bine%20düşmüştür,(10.09.2023)).

Dahl, R. (2006). *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. The University of Chicago Press.

Das, R. (2017). David Harvey's Theory of Accumulation by Dispossession: A Marxist Critique. *World Review of Political Economy*. 8(4): 590-616.

De Angelis, M. (September 2001). *Marx and primitive accumulation: The countinuous character of capital's "enclosures"*. <https://thecommoner.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Marx-and-primitive-accumulation-deAngelis.pdf>, (14.12.2022).

de Bont, C., Veldwisch, G. J., Komakech, H. C. and Vos, J. (2016). The fluid nature of water grabbing: the on-going contestation of water distribution between peasants and agribusinesses in Nduruma, Tanzania. *Agriculture and Human Values*. 33(3): 641-654.

Decision of the Constitutional Court of Turkey No: E: 2006/99, K: 2009/9 (Regarding Law No: 5491 and Dated). (8 July 2009). Legal Gazette (No: 27282). <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/07/20090708-9.htm>, (31.12.2022).

Decree-Law on Making Amendments to Certain Laws and Decrees in order to Adapt to the Amendments Made in the Constitution (2 July 2018). Legal Gazette (No: KHK/703). <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180709M3-1.pdf>, (31.12.2022).

Dobb, M. (1946). *Studies in Development of Capitalism*. London: G. Routledge and Sons.

Doremus, P., William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, and Simon Reich. (1998). *The Myth of the Global Corporation*. Princeton University Press.

Doyle, M. W. (1986). *Empires*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London.

Dunning, J. H. (1973). The Determinants of International Production. *Oxford Economic Papers*. 25(3): 289-336.

Dunning, J. H. (2001). The eclectic (OLI) paradigm of international production: past, present and future. *International Journal of the Economics of Business*. 8(2): 173–90.

Dunning, J. H. and Lundan, S. M. (2008). *Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Environmental Impact Evaluation Regulation (29 July 2022). Legal Gazette (No: 31907). <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=39647&MevzuatTur=7&MevzuatTertip=5>, (31.12.2022).

Environment Law No. 2872 (1983/2006)

Eroğlu, M. (2022). Contemporaneity of Primitive Accumulation in Understanding Current Trends in Capitalism and Capitalist State. *Pamukkale Journal of Eurasian Socioeconomic Studies*. 9(2): 170-185.

Ettlinger, N., and C. Hartmann. (2015). Post/Neo/Liberalism in Relational Perspective. *Political Geography*. 48: 37–48.

Expert 1. MTA. 15 August 2022. Ankara

Expert 2. MTA. 15 August 2022. Ankara

Expert 3. Turkish Gold Miners Association. 18 August 2022. Ankara.

Expert 4. TMMOB Chamber of Mining Engineers of Turkey (retired). 17 August 2022. Ankara.

Expert 5. TMMOB. 17 August 2022. Ankara

Expert 6. MAPEG. 18 August 2022. Ankara

Fairhead, J., Leach, M. and Scoones, I. (2012). Green Grabbing: a new appropriation of nature?, *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 39(2): 237-261.

Ferguson, N. (2004). *Empire: Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*. Basic Books: New York.

Ferguson, N. (2005). *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*. Penguin Books.

Foreign Direct Investment Law No: 6224. (1954).

Foreign Direct Investment Law No: 4875. (2004).

Forest Law No. 6831 (1956).

Frank, A. G. (1966). *The Development of Underdevelopment*. Monthly Review Press.

General Directorate of Mining Affairs. (2020). *Madencilik İş Kolunda Faaliyet Gösteren İş Yeri ve İşçi Sayıları*. <https://www.mapeg.gov.tr/Custom/Madenistatistik>, (31.12.2022).

General Directorate of Mining Affairs. (2022). *Yıllar İtibariyle Türkiye Geneli Ruhsat Sayıları*. <https://www.mapeg.gov.tr/Custom/Madenistatistik>, (31.12.2022).

Gilpin, R. (2001). *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton University Press.

Gottlieb, R. S. (1984). Feudalism and Historical Materialism: a Critique and a Synthesis. *Science and Society*. 48(1): 1-37.

Gowan, P., Shaw, M., and Panitch, L. (2001). The State, Globalisation and the New Imperialism: A Roundtable Discussion. *Historical Materialism*. 9(1): 3-38.

Grajales, J. (2011). The rifle and the title: paramilitary violence, land grab and land control in Colombia. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*. 38(4): 771-792.

Greco, E. (2020). Africa, extractivism and the crisis this time. *Review of African Political Economy*. 47(166): 511-521.

Greg, A. and Jenson, J. (1989). A Contested Concept: The Relative Autonomy of the State. *The New Canadian Political Economy* (180-211). Editors Wallace Clement and Glen Williams. McGill-Queen's University Press: Kingston,

Gudynas, E. (2010). The New Extractivism of the 21st Century Ten Urgent Theses about Extractivism in Relation to Current South American Progressivism. *Americas Program Report*. <http://postdevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NewExtractivism10ThesesGudynas10.pdf>, (10.09.2023).

Haber, Stephen H. and Menaldo, Victor A. (2012). *Natural Resources in Latin America: Neither Curse Nor Blessing*. Oxford Handbook of Latin American Political Economy.

Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2001). *Empire*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

Harvey, D. (2003). *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, D. (2004). The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. *Socialist Register*. 40: 63-87.

Harvey, D. (2010). *A Companion to Marx's Capital*. London: Verso.

High Planning Council. (2004). High Planning Council (Yüksek Planlama Konseyi) Decision No: 2004/92.

Hilferding, R. (1981). *Finance Capital: A study of the latest phase of capitalist development*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hilton, R. (ed.). (1978). *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*. London: Verso.

Hobson, J. A. (1902). *Imperialism: A Study*. James Pott & Company: New York.

Hodge, R. A., Ericsson, M., Löf, O., Löf, A. and Semkowich, P. (2022). The Global Mining Industry: Corporate Profile, Complexity, and Change. *Mineral Economics*. 35(3-4): 587-606.

Hogenboom, B. (2012a). Depoliticized and Repoliticized Minerals in Latin America, *Journal of Developing Societies*. 28.

Hogenboom, B. (2012b). The Return of the State and New Extractivism: What about Civil Society?. Democratisation, Civil Society and the State in Left-Led Latin America: Representation versus Participation. Editors Cannon B. and Kirby, P. Zed Books.

Hurley, P. T. & Arı, Y. (2011). Mining (Dis)amenity: The Political Ecology of Mining Opposition in the Kaz (İda) Mountain Region of Western Turkey. *Development and Change*. 42(6): 1393–1415.

Hymer, S. (1960). *The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Investment*. Doctoral Dissertation at MIT.

Hymer, S. (1972). The Internationalization of Capital. *Journal of Economic Issues*. 6(1): 91-111.

Hymer, S. (1980a). Internationalization of capital and international politics: a radical approach. *Growth profits, and property: Essays in the revival of political economy* (189-203). Editor J. Edward. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Hymer, S. (1980b). Robinson Crusoe and the secret of primitive accumulation. *Growth, profits, and property: Essays in the revival of political economy* (29-40). Editor J. Edward. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge

International Monetary Fund (n.d.). *IMF DATA*. <https://data.imf.org:443>, (31.12.2022).

Islar, M. (2012). Privatised hydropower development in Turkey: A case of water grabbing?. *Water Alternatives*. 5(2): 376-391.

Jessop, B. (1977). Recent theories of the capitalist state. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*. 1(4): 353-373.

Jessop, B. (1985). *Nicos Poulantzas Marxist Theory and Political Strategy*. Macmillan.

Jessop, B. (2007). Dialogue of the deaf: reflections on the Poulantzas-Miliband debate. *Class, Power and the State in Capitalist Society: Essays on Ralph Miliband*. (132-157). Editors P. Wetherly, C. W. Barrow and P. Burnham. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Kaltwasser, C. (2011). Towards Post-Neoliberalism in Latin America?, *Latin American Research Review*. 46(2): 225–234.

Karakoç, M. & Söylemez-Karakoç, B. (2023). A Struggle to Keep Environmental Protests Above Party Politics: The Cerattepe Case. *Alternatif Politika*. 15(2): 264-288.

Keyder, Ç. And Yenal, Z. (2010). Rural Transformation Trends and Social Policies in Turkey in the post-Developmentalist Era. *Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish Agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's Strategy* (11-28). Editors Barış Karapınar, Fikret Adaman, and Gökhan Özertan. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Kıratlı, B. (4 July 2023). Bloomberg, Yeni bir çip krizi mi?. <https://www.bloomberght.com/yeni-bir-cip-krizi-mi-2333974>, (4.09.2023).

Kiely, R. (2006). United States hegemony and globalisation: What role for theories of imperialism?. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 19(2): 205-221.

Kiely, R. (2012). Spatial hierarchy and/or contemporary geopolitics: what can and can't uneven and combined development explain?, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 25(2): 232-248.

Konak, N. (2008). Ecological Modernization and Eco-Marxist Perspectives: Globalization and Gold Mining Development in Turkey. *Capitalism Nature Socialism*. 19(4): 107-130.

Krugman, Paul. K., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, Mark J. (2023). *International Trade: Theory and Policy (12th edition)*. Pearson.

Law of General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration No. 2804. (1935).

Leibman, D. (1984). Modes of Production and Theories of Transition. *Science and Society*. 48(3): 257-294.

Lenin, V. I. (1974). *Collected Works Volume 3: The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Lenin, V. I. (1992). *The State and Revolution*. London: Penguin Books.

Lenin, V. I. (2010). *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Penguin Books: London.

LePan, N. (2021). *Visualizing Global Gold Production by Country in 2020*.
[https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-global-gold-production-by-country-in-2020/#:~:text=In%20total%2C%20miners%20produced%203%2C241,3%2C300%20tonnes%20mined%20in%202019,\(10.09.2023\).](https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-global-gold-production-by-country-in-2020/#:~:text=In%20total%2C%20miners%20produced%203%2C241,3%2C300%20tonnes%20mined%20in%202019,(10.09.2023).)

Li, T. M. (2011). Forum on Global Land Grabbing: Centering Labor in the Land Grab Debate. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 38(2): 281-298.

Luxemburg, R. (2003). *The Accumulation of Capital*. London & New York: Routledge.

Macdonald, L. and Ruckert, A. (eds.). (2009). *Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas*. Palgrave: New York.

Marx, K. (1887). *Capital: a Critique of Political Economy Volume I*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Marx, K. (1999). *Capital: a Critique of Political Economy Volume III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole (Edited by Frederick Engels)*. International Publishers: NY.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1970). *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

McLennon, G. (1986). Marxist Theory and Historical Research: Between the Hard and Soft Opinions. *Science and Society*. 50(1): 157-165.

McMichael, P. (2012). The Land Grab and Corporate Food Regime Restructuring. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 39 (3–4): 681–702.

Mehta, L., Veldwisch, G. J. and Franco, J. (2012). Introduction to the Special Issue: Water grabbing? Focus on the (re)appropriation of finite water resources. *Water Alternatives*. 5(2): 193-207.

Miliband, R. (1969). *The State in Capitalist Society*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.

Mills, C. W. (1956). *The Power Elite*. Oxford University Press.

Mining Law No. 3213 (1985).

Murmis, M. and Murmis, M. R. (2012). Land Concentration and Foreign Land Ownership in Argentina in the Context of Global Land Grabbing. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*. 33(4): 490-508.

Müezzinoğlu, A. (2003). A Review of Environmental Considerations on Gold Mining and Production. *Critical Reviews in Environmental Science and Technology*. 33(1): 45–71.

NS Energy Staff Writer. (4 May 2021). *Profiling the top five largest gold mining companies in the world*. <https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/features/largest-gold-mining-companies/>, (31.12.2022).

OECD. (2023). *Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)*. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/foreign-direct-investment-fdi/indicator-group/english_9a523b18-en, (31.08.2023).

Ohlin, B. (1935). *Interregional and International Trade*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

Orhan, G. (2006). The politics of risk perception in Turkey: discourse coalitions in the case of the Bergama^[1] gold mine dispute. *Policy & Politics*. 34(4): 691–710.

Öniş, Z. (2009). Beyond the 2001 financial crisis: The political economy of the new phase of neo-liberal restructuring in Turkey. *Review of International Political Economy*. 16(3): 409-432.

- Özen, H. (2009). Located locally, disseminated nationally: the Bergama movement. *Environmental Politics*. 18(3): 408-423.
- Özen, H. and Özen, Ş. (2011). Interactions in and between Strategic Action Fields. *Organization & Environment*. 24(4): 343-363.
- Özen, H. and Özen, Ş. (2018). What comes after repression? The hegemonic contestation in the gold- mining field in Turkey. *Geoforum*. 88: 1–9.
- Özen, H. (2018). Yerellik-Popülerlik Ekseninde Türkiye’de Çevre Mücadeleleri. *Alternatif Politika*. 10(2): 181-209.
- Özen, H. and Doğu, B. (2020). Mobilizing in a hybrid political system: the Artvin case in Turkey. *Democratization*. 27(4): 624-642.
- Özen, H. and Özen, Ş. (2022a). Leadership in local mobilization against goldmining: The cases of Artvin and Eşme, Turkey. *The Extractive Industries and Society*. 9: 1-8.
- Özen, Ş. and Özen, H. (2009). Peasants Against MNCs and the State: The Role of the Bergama Struggle in the Institutional Construction of the Gold-Mining Field in Turkey. *Organization*. 16(4): 547–573.
- Özen, Ş. and Özen, H. (2022b). Altın madeni projelerinin özellikleri yerel toplulukların direniş düzeyini nasıl etkiler? Karşılaştırmalı bir araştırma. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi*. 42: 493-524.
- Özler, Ş. İ. and Obach, B. K. (2019). Cultural Barriers to Environmental Mobilization in the Republic of Turkey. *Sociological Perspectives*. 62(5): 773–793.
- Panitch, L. (2000). The New Imperial State. *New Left Review*. 2(2): 5-20.
- Panitch, L. and Gindin, S. (2012). *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire*. Verso.
- Patton, M. Q. (2015). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice (Forth Edition)*. California: Sage Publications.
- Petras, J. and Veltmeyer, H. (2009). *What’s Left in Latin America? Regime Change in New Times*. Ashgate Publishing Ltd.: Surrey, UK.
- Porter, Michael E. (1990). *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*. Free Press: New York.
- Poulantzas, N. (1969). The Problem of the Capitalist State. *The New Left Review*. 58: 67-78.

Poulantzas, N. (1973). The Problem of the Capitalist State. *Ideology in social science: readings in critical social theory* (238-253). Editor Blackburn, R. Vintage Books.

Poulantzas, N. (1975). *Political Power and Social classes*. NLB.

Radetzki, M. and Wårell, L. (2021). *A Handbook of Primary Commodities in the Global Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Regulation Amending the Mining Regulation. (1 March 2022). Legal Gazette (No: 31765). <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/fihrist?tarih=2022-03-01>, (31.12.2022).

Ricardo, D. (2001). *On Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*. Batoche Books: Canada.

Robinson, W. (2002). Capitalist Globalization and the Transnationalization of the State. *Historical Materialism and Globalization* (210–229). Editors Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith. London: Routledge.

Seed Law No: 5553. (2006).

Sklair, L. (2001). *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. Blackwell: Oxford.

Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and Social Revolution*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Skocpol, T (1985). Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. *Bringing the State Back In* (3-37). Editors Evans, P. B. Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. Cambridge University Press.

Smith, A. (1977). *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations*. University of Chicago Press.

Smith, N. (2006). The geography of uneven development. *100 years of permanent revolution* (180–195). Editors Bill Dunn and Hugo Radice. Pluto: London

Sosa, M. and Zwarteveen, M. (2012). Exploring the Politics of Water Grabbing: The Case of Large Mining Operations in the Peruvian Andes. *Water Alternatives*. 5(2): 360–375.

Sönmez, A. (2001). Doğu Karadeniz Bölgesi fındık üretim kuşağında toprak ağalığı, köylülük ve kırsal dönüşüm. *Toplum ve Bilim*. 88: 69–105.

Star Staff Writer. (23 August 2020). *Başkan Erdoğan'ın söylediği 'Her arayan bulamaz lakin bulanlar arayanlardır' sözü kimindir? İşte o sözün yazarı*. <https://www.star.com.tr/guncel/her-arayan-bulamaz-lakin-bulanlar-arayanlardir-kimin-sozu-iste-baskan-erdoganin-soyledigi--haber-1567074/>, (31.12.2022).

Sugar Law No: 4634. (2001).

Sweezy, P. M. and Dobb, M. (1950). The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism. *Science and Society*. 14(2): 134 - 167.

Sweezy, P. M. (1986). Feudalism to Capitalism Revisited. *Science and Society*. 50(1): 81-95.

Tarback, K. (ed). (1972). *The Accumulation of Capital – An Anti-Critique by Rosa Luxemburg / Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital by Nikolai Bukharin*. New York & London: Monthly Review Press.

Tekgıda-iş Sendikası. (12 May 2009). TEKEL ÖZELLEŞTİRMESİNİN SONUÇLARI. <https://www.tekgida.org.tr/tekel-ozellestirmesinin-sonuclari-7496/>, (10.09.2023).

The Economic Times Staff Writer. (2023). *Timeline of US actions against China's chip industry*. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/timeline-of-us-actions-against-chinas-chip-industry/articleshow/101382551.cms?from=mdr>, (4.09.2023).

Tobacco Law No: 4733. (2002).

Trotsky, L. (1957). *The Third International after Lenin*. Pioneer Publishers: New York.

Trotsky, L. (2008). *History of Russian Revolution*. Haymarket Books: Chicago.

Turkish Gold Miners Association. (n.d.). *Altın Fiyatları*. <https://altinmadencileri.org.tr/dunya-altin-fiyatlari-2/>, (31.12.2022).

Turkish Gold Miners Association. (2021). *Turkey's Gold Imports*. <http://turkishgoldminersassociation.org/turkeys-gold-imports/>, (31.12.2022).

Turkish Gold Miners Association. (n.d.). *Türkiye'deki Altın Madenleri*. <https://altinmadencileri.org.tr/aktif-olan-altin-madenleri/>, (31.12.2022).

Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). (31 August 2022). *Yıllık Gayrisafi Yurt İçi Hasıla, 2021*. <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Yillik-Gayrisafi-Yurt-Ici-Hasila-2021-45834>, (31.12.2022).

Udasmoro, W. and Prügl, E. (2021). 'No Matter What—I've Got Rights': Women's Land Grab Protests in Banyuwangi, East Java, *International Development Policy [Online]*. 13. <http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/4655>, (07 September 2023).

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (20 October 2022). *General Profile: Türkiye*. <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/792/index.html>, (31.12.2022).

Ünlü, B. (4 May 2021). *Maden Kanunu 21 kez kimler için, nasıl değişti?*. <https://gezegen24.com/maden-kanunu-degisiklikleri/>, (30.12.2022).

Veltmeyer, H. (2013) The political economy of natural resource extraction: a new model or extractive imperialism?, *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement*. 34(1): 79-95.

Vernon, R. (1971). *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. London: Longman.

Visser, O. and Spoor, M. (2011). Land Grabbing in Post-Soviet Eurasia: The World's Largest Agricultural Land Reserves at Stake. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 38(1): 299-323.

Wallerstein, I. (1979). *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Warren, B. (1980). *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*. Editor John Sender. NLB.

Webber, J. R. (2011). *From rebellion to reform in Bolivia: Class struggle, indigenous liberation, and the politics of Evo Morales*. Haymarket Books.

Wood, E. (2005). *Empire of capital*. Verso.

Woodhouse, P. (2012). New investment, old challenges. Land deals and the water constraint in African agriculture. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*. 39(3-4): 777-794.

World Bank. (n. d). *Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP)*. <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P070286>, (10.09.2023).

World Bank. (2009). *Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads*. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2581>, (31.12.2022).

World Gold Council. (9 June 2022). *Global Mine Production*. <https://www.gold.org/goldhub/data/gold-production-by-country>, (31.12.2022).

Yates, J. S. and Bakker, K. (2014). Debating the 'post-neoliberal turn' in Latin America. *Progress in Human Geography*. 38(1): 62–90.

Yıldız, T. D. (2021). How can the effects of EIA procedures and legislation foreseen for the mining operation activities to mining change positively in Turkey?, *Resources Policy*. 72: 1-15.