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POWERS

Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Network
Peace, War and the World in European Security Challenges

International Conference

Security Perception in Liminal Spaces:

Opportunities and Challenges in the EU, Middle East and Russia

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Dokuz Eylül University
Faculty of Business
Department of International Relations
Izmir, Türkiye
12-13 May 2022
Venue: DEU Rectorate Building

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Zühal Ünalp Çepel
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Sinem Abka
Tuğcan Durmuşlar







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POWERS

DOKUZ EYLÜL ÜNİVERSİTESİ YAYINLARI

DEÜ. İŞLETME FAKÜLTESİ
International Security Conferrence
Security Perception in Liminal Spaces: Opportunities and Challenges in the EU, Middle East and Russia

Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Network
Peace, War and the World in European Security Challenges

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Yayın No : 09.1700.0000.000/BY.022.068.1137
ISBN : 978-975-441-566-7
E-ISBN : 978-975-441-567-4

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Table of Contents

Preface **9-12**

Welcome Speeches **15-25**

Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar **15**

Alla Akulshina **17**

Pınar Karacan **19**

Çağnur Balsarı **21**

Nükhet Hotar **23**

Keynote Session **27-46**

İlter Turan **27**

Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney **29**

Naciye Gökçen Kaya **37**

Panel 1: EU Security and Russia **47-98**

Armağan Gözkaman, "The Evaluation of the European Union's Security Policies in light of Russia's 'Special Operation in Ukraine" **49**

Sezgin Mercan, "The EU in the New War Concept and the War in Ukraine" **65**

Walid Abu-Dalbouh, "Strategic Thinking Reconsidered: The EU, the NATO and the MENA region in the aftermath of the War on Ukraine" **93**

Panel 2: Immigration and Security **99-134**

Tolga Bölükbaşı, "Political Economy of the Syrians in Turkish Labor Market and Beyond in the Age of Covid-19" **101**

Müge Aknur, "Populist Radical Right Parties and Securitization of Immigration" **107**

Zühal Ünalp Çepel, Tuğcan Durmuşlar & Sinem Abka, "Integration Prospects of Migrant Syrian Students in Türkiye" **127**

Panel 3: Trade and Energy Security **135-157**

Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar & Cengiz Mert Bulut, "China and Foreign Seaport Investments at Home and Abroad: Some Preliminary Remarks" **137**

Emre İşeri "Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean during Anthropocene Period" **153**

Ülviyye Sanılı Aydın, "Rethinking Energy Security Issues in the New Era" **155**

Panel 4: Humanitarian Concerns and Human Rights **159-188**

Paolo Bargiacchi, "In re-security: Evolving Trends, Diverging Interpretations and Escalating Confrontations" **161**

Serhun Al, "From Human Security to National Security: Illiberal International Order and New Multipolarity" **173**

Elem Eyrice Tepecikli, "Security Challenges in West Africa and Sahel" **175**

Panel 5: Emerging Themes in Security Studies **189-214**

Sıtkı Egeli, "Militarization of Space: Risks and Remedies" **191**

Senem Atavur, "Environmental Security and Climate Change" **195**

Sevgi Çilingir, "Temporary Protection in the EU" **211**

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Müge Aknur & Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar, Dokuz Eylül University, Faculty of Business, Department of International Relations, İzmir. Türkiye; Publisher: Dokuz Eylül University Publications, 2022, 214 pages. **"Security Perceptions in Liminal Spaces: Opportunities and Challenges in the EU, Middle East and Russia"** international conference as part of POWERS (Peace, War and the World in the European Challenges) Project**.**

The proceedings including the welcome speeches and key note speeches were divided by the editors into seven parts in line with the format of the International Conference titled "Security Perceptions in Liminal Spaces: Opportunities and Challenges in the EU, Middle East and Russia" held at Dokuz Eylül University, Faculty of Business, Department of International Relations, Izmir, Türkiye on May 12-13, 2022.

The articles reveal the research and views of Turkish, Italian and Jordanian academicians on the security perceptions in liminal spaces that challenge the EU and its neighbors. The international conference concentrated on EU security and Russia, immigrants and security, trade and energy security, humanitarian concerns and human rights, emerging themes in security studies such as space security and environmental security. The proceeding book aims to serve the undergraduate and graduate students and scholars who specialize on international security.

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views of the authors. The Commission cannot be held responsible from the ideas expressed in the proceedings.

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ISBN: 978-975-441-566-7

E-ISBN: 978-975-441-567-4

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

12 May 2022 Thursday

09.30-10.00 Registration

Welcome Speeches (10.00-11.00)	
10.00-11.00	**Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar**, *Professor*, Coordinator, DEÜ POWERS Network
	Alla Akulshina, *Dr, POWERS JM Network Coordinator*, Voronezh State University, Russia
	Pınar Karacan, *Professor*, Chair, DEÜ, Faculty of Business, Dep't of International Relations
	Çağnur Balsarı, *Professor*, *Dean*, Faculty of Business, Dokuz Eylul University
	Nükhet Hotar, *Professor, Rector,* Dokuz Eylül University

Keynote Session (11.00-13.00)	
Moderator: Müge Aknur, Dokuz Eylül University	
11.00-11.30	**İlter Turan**, *Emeritus Professor*, Bilgi University, İstanbul
11.30-12.00	**Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney**, *Professor*, *Presidential Security and Foreign Policy Council Member,* Nişantaşı University, İstanbul
12.00-12.30	**Naciye Gökçen Kaya**, *Ambassador*, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
12.30-13.00	**Discussion and Questions**

13.00-14.00 Lunch

Panel 1: EU Security and Russia (14.00-15.30)	
Moderator: Tolga Bölükbaşı, Bilkent University	
14.00-14.15	**The Evaluation of the European Union's Security Policies in light of Russia's 'Special Operation' in Ukraine** **Armağan Gözkaman,** *Professor,* Beykent University**,** İstanbul
14.15-14.30	**Russia and the West: Troublesome Partners or Strategic Adversaries?** **Alla Akulshina,** *Dr, POWERS JM Network Coordinator*, Voronezh State University, Russia
14.30-14.45	**The EU in the New War Concept and the War in Ukraine** **Sezgin Mercan,** *Associate Professor*, Başkent University, Ankara
14.45-15.00	**Strategic Thinking Reconsidered: The EU, the NATO, and the MENA region in the aftermath of the war on Ukraine** **Walid Abu-Dalbouh,** *Professor,* University of Jordan, Jordan
15.00-15.30	**Discussion and Questions**

15.30-15.45 Coffee Break

Panel 2: Immigrants and Security (15.45-17.00)	
Moderator: Sevgi Çilingir, Dokuz Eylül University	
15.45-16.00	**Political Economy of Syrians in Turkish Labor Market and Beyond in the Age of COVID-19** **Tolga Bölükbaşı,** *Associate Professor*, Bilkent University, Ankara
16.00-16.15	**Populist Radical Right Parties and Securitization of Immigration** **Müge Aknur** *Associate Professor,* Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir
16.15-16.30	**Integration Prospects of Migrant Syrian University Students in Türkiye** **Zühal Ünalp Çepel, Tuğcan Durmuşlar & Sinem Abka,** *Assistant Prof. & PhD Candidates,* Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir
16.30-17.00	**Discussion and Questions**

19.30 Dinner

13 May 2022, Friday

Panel 3: Trade and Energy Security (09.45-11.00)	
Moderator: Paolo Bargiacchi, Kore University of Enna	
09.45-10.00	**China and Foreign Seaport Investments at Home and Abroad: Some Preliminary Remarks** **Gül M. Kurtoğlu-Eskişar,** *Professor*, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir **Cengiz Mert Bulut**, *Ph.D. Candidate*, Shanghai University, China
10.00-10.15	**Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Anthropocene Period** **Emre İşeri,** *Professor*, Yaşar University, İzmir
10.15-10.30	**Rethinking Energy Security Issues in the New Era** **Ülviyye Sanılı Aydın,** *Associate Professor*, Celal Bayar University, Manisa
10.30-11.00	**Discussion and Questions**

11.00-11.15 Coffee Break

Panel 4: Humanitarian Concerns and Human Rights (11.15-12.30)	
Moderator: Armağan Gözkaman, Beykent University	
11.15-11.30	**In re-security: Evolving Trends, Diverging Interpretations and Escalating Confrontations** **Paolo Bargiacchi,** *Professor*, Kore University of Enna, Italy
11.30-11.45	**From Human Security to National Security: Illiberal International Order and New Multipolarity** **Serhun Al,** *Assistant Professor*, İzmir University of Economics, İzmir
11.45-12.00	**Security Challenges in West Africa and the Sahel** **Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu**, *Associate Professor*, Yaşar University, İzmir
12.00-12.30	**Discussion and Questions**

12.30-13.30 Lunch

Panel 5: Emerging Themes in Security Studies (13.30-14:45)	
Moderator: Gül M. Kurtoğlu-Eskişar, Dokuz Eylül University	
13.30-13.45	**Militarization of Space: Risks and Remedies** **Sıtkı Egeli,** *Associate Professor*, İzmir University of Economics, İzmir
13.45-14.00	**Environmental Security and Climate Change** **Senem Atvur,** *Associate Professor*, Akdeniz University, Antalya
14.00-14.15	**Temporary Protection in the EU** **Sevgi Çilingir**, *Associate Professor*, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir
14.15-14.45	**Discussion and Questions**

Preface

As the Department of International Relations of Faculty of Business, Dokuz Eylül University, we have been proud to organize the final international conference titled "Security Perception in Liminal Spaces: Opportunities and Challenges" of the POWERS (Peace, War and the World in European Security Challenges) Jean Monnet Network on the 12-13th of May 2022. We are grateful to our keynote speakers for their very informative speeches, Emeritus Professor İlter Turan of Bilgi University, Professor Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney of Nişantaşı University, and Presidential Security and Foreign Policy Council Member and Ambassador Naciye Gökçen Kaya, İzmir Representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We would also like to thank to our partners from Italy, Jordan, and Russia as well as Turkish scholars from İzmir, İstanbul, Ankara, Antalya, and Manisa universities for participating in our conference. We are grateful for their valuable presentations on the current war in Ukraine, EU security, immigration security, humanitarian issues, trade security, energy security, environmental security, and space security. In addition, we are thankful to the rector's office for providing us with a prime location for our conference and the Dean of the Faculty of Business and Chair of Department of International Relations supporting us at every stage while preparing the conference.

The strategic aims of the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet network "Peace, War and the World in European Security challenges", which took place between 2018 and 2022, included providing a multilateral approach to responses to European security challenges, developing a common vision of European security threats, and fostering policy dialogue and an exchange of views on political, geopolitical, and religious issues. The project's first objective is to create a network of nine leading universities located in regions or countries identified as key international players (the EU, the Middle East, Turkey, and Russia). The project also aims at providing a space for constructive dialogue about diverse visions regarding European security challenges. Thirdly, it intends to generate modern understandings of international security beyond the state-of-the-art by applying multi-disciplinary approach.

This project gave us, the DEU team members, an opportunity to present papers at international conferences and workshops as well giving lectures to undergraduate and

graduate students in various member universities. Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar and Müge Aknur, for example, presented a paper titled “EU’s Response to the Challenge of Returning Foreign Fighters” at the international conference “Non-State Actors and the Security of the Euro-Mediterranean Area Region” in Jordan between 29-31 January 2019. Sevgi Çilingir presented a paper titled “The Issue of Historical Christian Minorities in EU-Turkey Relations: The Case of Armenians” and Sinem Abka presented a paper titled “The EU’s Impact on the Changing Status of Greek Minorities in Turkey” at the international research workshop “Religious Fragmentation as Factor of Conflict" held by University of Goettingen on 23-24 April 2019.

At the international conference “Regional Strategies of International Security: The EU, Middle East and Russia”, held by Voronezh State University on 16-17 October 2019, Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar presented a paper titled “Perception of Turkish Think Tanks on the Syrian Refugees and Syrian War in Turkey: An Overview while” Müge Aknur presented a paper titled “The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe: A Security Threat Perception by Turkish Think Tanks”. Both scholars also gave a lecture on foreign policy analysis to political science students at Voronezh State University. At the workshop “(In)security and the dynamics of regionalism in the Euro-Mediterranean and Black Sea regions”, held by University of Bordeaux on 28-29 November 2019, Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar (co-authored with Tuğcan Durmuşlar) presented a paper titled “Far Right Parties in Europe and Turkey: A Comparison” while Zuhal Ünalp Çepel presented a paper titled “Overlapping or Clashing Political and Security Interests between Turkey and the EU: The Case of Readmission Deal".

At the International Online Workshop titled “Decoding the (Un)conventional Security Issues between EU and its Neighbors”, organized by the Dokuz Eylul University team on 15 October 2020, Müge Aknur presented a paper (co-authored with Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar) titled *“*Mapping the Political Science and International Relations Literature on COVID-19”, Zühal Ünalp Çepel presented a paper titled “COVID-19 and its Reflections over the European Identity”, and Sevgi Çilingir presented a paper titled “The Pandemic and the Populist Radical Right in Europe: Brexit Party”.

At the International Workshop “The Contribution of EU´s CSDP Missions and Operations to the Promotion of Human Rights in its wider neighborhood”, held by University of Seville on

18 June 2021, Zühal Ünalp Çepel presented a paper titled "European Union Global Strategy and Turkey: An analysis of the term 2016-2021". At the International Conference "Europe and the migration of Christian communities from the Middle East", held by University of Gottingen on 27-29 September 2021, Sevgi Çilingir presented a paper titled "Challenges of Religious Conversion in an Asylum Setting: Conversion to Christianity during the European Migration Crisis" while Sinem Abka presented a paper titled "The Integration Trajectory of Orthodox Greek Refugees in Mainland Greece".

Müge Aknur presented a paper (co-authored with Sevgi Çilingir) titled "Liberties vs Security during COVID-19 Anti-Vaccine Protests in Europe" at the International Conference "Deglobalization and Reglobalization: Security Challenges and the Implications of COVID-19 in the EuroMed", held by University of Jordan on 15-16 January 2022. At "The Online-Workshop: Identity Politics as a Tool of Security Policy", held by Perm University on 23 March 2022, Sevgi Çilingir presented a paper titled "Citizenship for Security: The Ideological War on Terrorism in the UK".

In the International Spring School titled "International Security, Human Security, and the EU Global Strategy: Regional Strategies and Different Perspectives from Europe, Middle East, and Russia" organized by Kore University of Enna on 27-29 April 2022, Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar presented a paper titled "Energy Security in the Middle East: The View from Turkey". Müge Aknur presented a paper titled "Impact of COVID-19 on the Move towards Authoritarianism and Its Implications on Security". Zühal Ünalp Çepel (with Damla Kızılkoca) presented a paper titled "The efficacy of international actors on the abolition of the death penalty in South Africa and Botswana". As the last partıcıpant of the DEU team, Sevgi Çilingir presented a paper titled, "The migration crisis as a fault line in the EU: the EU Court of Justice decisions regarding the Visegrad States" in the International Spring School of Kore University of Enna.

All Dokuz Eylül team members contributed to this current final conference: Müge Aknur presented a paper titled "Populist Radical Right Parties and Securitization of Immigration". Zühal Ünalp Çepel (co-authored with Tuğcan Durmuşlar and Sinem Abka) presented a paper titled "Integration Prospects of Migrant Syrian University Students in Turkey". Sevgi Çilingir

presented a paper titled “Temporary Protection in the EU”. Finally, Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar (co-authored with Cengiz Mert Bulut) presented a paper titled “China and Foreign Seaport Investments at Home and Abroad: Some Preliminary Remarks”.

In addition, both Zühal Ünalp Çepel and Gül M. Kurtoğlu (with Tuğcan Durmuşlar) published articles in journals from their presentations at the conferences and workshops. Müge Aknur and Gül M. Kurtoğlu gave online lectures to Italian and Russian students on various aspects of security.

12 May 2022

Thursday

Welcome Speeches (10.00-11.00)	
10.00-11.00	**Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar**, *Professor*, *Coordinator*, POWERS Network, Dokuz Eylül University
	Alla Akulshina, *Dr, POWERS JM Network Coordinator*, Voronezh State University, Russia
	Pınar Karacan, *Professor*, *Chair*, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Business, Dokuz Eylül University
	Çağnur Balsarı, *Professor*, *Dean*, Faculty of Business, Dokuz Eylul University
	Nükhet Hotar, *Professor, Rector,* Dokuz Eylül University

Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar

Professor, Coordinator, DEÜ POWERS Network

On behalf of my co-chair and our organization team, I am honored to welcome all of you to our final conference for the POWERS network, titled "Security Perception in Liminal Spaces: Opportunities and Challenges". As the Turkish partner of this Erasmus+ network since 2018, we, as the Dokuz Eylül team, are pleased to have participated in many academic events and collaborated in research activities with our coordinating and partner organizations from Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. Our wide range of academic research and activities, including scientific conferences, workshops, and training schools for students have enabled us to reinforce the importance of emphasizing the multifaceted and multi-layered aspects of regional security, the main theme of our network. They have also become showcases of successful international academic research collaboration.

Dear guests, recent global developments, ranging from the Syrian civil war to the Covid-19 outbreak and the latest war in the Ukraine, clearly indicate the need for complex solutions to complex global security issues. As the focus of our conference and the presentation themes of our esteemed speakers underline, in addition to the existing—classic, if you will—themes of security, there is also a growing requirement to identify and discuss unconventional security challenges in recent years. By representing diverse theoretical approaches, methodologies, and cases from different social sciences, including political science, international relations, history, law, and regional studies, the academic output of our network has successfully showcased the importance of international academic collaboration to promote multiple paths to regional peace. I remain confident that the valuable contributions of our esteemed speakers will further reinforce this trend.

Since we have a rather full program, and all our esteemed speakers will talk about a wide range of interesting and pivotal issues at hand, I do not want to prolong my speech. However, before stepping down, I would really like to extend my thanks and gratitude to everyone who has enabled us to prepare for this conference successfully. To begin with, I would like to

thank Dokuz Eylül University rector Prof. Nükhet Hotar for allowing us to use this venue and its facilities for our conference. I would also like to thank our department chair, Prof. Pınar Karacan, and our dean, Prof. Çağnur Balsarı, for always fully supporting our network-related academic activities. Furthermore, my special thanks go to all the esteemed conference speakers and moderators, who have gracefully accepted our invitation to discuss diverse facets of security. Similarly, I would like to thank our students, Ceyhun Tutar, A. Mücahid Ünsal, Zeynep E. Turgut, and Bilgehan Katipoğlu, for all their help in providing a smooth conference experience. Their enthusiastic involvement takes me down Memory Lane as I remember my own undergraduate years, when I used to volunteer for such events myself. Back then, we were discussing the end of the Cold War and its impact on global security, and some of the themes that we discuss today are reminiscent of those times. I am also greatly indebted to the members of our Conference Organization Committee, namely Research Assistant Tuğcan Durmuşlar, Asst. Prof. Zühal Ünalp Çepel, and Assoc. Prof. Sevgi Çilingir for all their efforts. Most importantly, I am deeply grateful to our POWERS team members, Research Assistant Sinem Abka, and my Conference Organization Committee co-chair, colleague, and old friend, Assoc. Prof. Müge Aknur, for devoting all their energy to ensuring a successful conference. Without you, I know that we could not have succeeded, and I would like to thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Alla Akulshina,

POWERS JM Network Coordinator, Voronezh State University, Russia

Dear colleagues,

It is an honor and great pleasure for me to be here today and extend my warmest greetings to the conference participants. I would like to express my gratitude to Dokuz Eylul University for hosting the final event of the international Network, Erasmus+ research project funded by the European Union Jean under Monnet Actions - Network Peace, War, and the World in European Security challenges.

As the project nears completion, it has never been as relevant as today. It is symbolic that a project devoted to European security started with an excellent scientific conference in Jordan, one of the key international actors in the Middle East, and will be completed in Turkey, which plays a significant role as a global security actor.

For three years, the network has provided us with an open platform for constructive dialogue about large-scale security issues, and their geopolitical, sociocultural, and religious factors. The project has allowed us to investigate threats and bring into focus diverse visions of different international actors.

I would like to remind you of the words from an evaluation report we received on summer day almost four years ago. In the section reporting on the project consortium, we saw only one comment: “The quality of the team is outstanding”. That’s absolutely true. We have jointly achieved significant scientific results and made a valuable contribution to shape the dialogue about diverse visions of European security.

More than once, the network has faced global challenges and had to adjust its planned activities to adapt to the current state of affairs. Nevertheless, we managed to fulfill our aims together.

Despite periods of extraordinary uncertainty, we carried out seven research workshops and four conferences with strong scientific contributions, two international schools, two student conferences, and more than thirty public lectures for postgraduate students delivered by leading experts in the field. We issued seven books, of which three are to be published next month.

The urgency of the present moment is to hear the voices of researchers in order to combine the efforts of the academic community and increase our chances of overcoming contradictions and restoring trust. Research communication is transforming the daily work of academics into a real mission. And I hope to remain committed to this mission, stay open to continuous communication and cooperation, and never forget how much education and science can help all of us to chart a path forward by maintaining dialogue, even in the toughest moments.

I would like to conclude with a definition of civilization, given by the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset: “Civilization is a will to coexistence”.

We hope that our civilization possesses this will. Thank you!

Pınar Karacan,

Professor, Chair, DEÜ, Faculty of Business,

Department of International Relations

Welcome everyone! Dear Rectors, dear ambassador, my dean, and all the distinguished guests. I am honored to be part of this conference titled "Security Perception in Liminal Spaces: Opportunities and Challenges". I am looking forward to listening to the presentations, particularly the keynote session. The POWERS project has been going on since 2018 and, although it was supposed end last year, it was extended for one more year due to Covid-19. It is great to have the involvement of nine universities from seven countries in this project, namely France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Russia, Türkiye, and Jordan.

We are lucky that the final conference is taking place in a conference hall rather than online, and with our students participating. The POWERS project and this final conference is an important academic activity for the Department of International Relations since six of our colleagues are active participants. Our POWERS team members, Gül, Müge, Zühal, Sevgi, Tuğcan, and Sinem, have been active by presenting papers in conferences and workshops, and teaching courses, both face-to-face and online, in various universities in Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. They have also had the chance to reflect their views to our students by giving them a chance to follow the conference and workshop presentations online.

In this two-day conference, we will be talking about many aspects of security, including energy, environment, space, migration, and trade, as well as the role of institutions. The conference aims to develop new approaches in international security. I know in the nice, warm, and sunny days of Izmir in the month of May, it is not easy to stay in a conference hall for two days, but I am sure the organizers of this conference have excursion plans for our participants. Again, I would like to welcome everyone and I am looking forward to listening to the interesting presentations.

Çağnur Balsarı

Professor, Dean, DEÜ, Faculty of Business

Hoşgeldiniz! Dear Rectors, dear ambassador, dear guests who have come from various universities in Türkiye, Europe, Russia, and Jordan. As the Faculty of Business, we are very happy to be part of the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Projects. As a business professor in this faculty, it is refreshing for me to take part in an international security conference. Since the beginning, I have enjoyed the theme of this project, particularly regarding unconventional security issues, since the world is busy analyzing classical security issues. However, following the Covid-19 pandemic and constant unrest in different parts of the world, we find ourselves dealing with many types of security problems, such as human security, food security, financial security, and environmental security. In fact, we need to talk about these issues in a multi-disciplinary way. As business people, we may have believed that we have solved many of these problems through our great logistic networks and trade. However, considering the latest developments in the world, it looks as we have not yet done so. We have to revise the system. We are living in an age in which our planet is under threat due to environmental problems. Therefore, we need to take these issues into consideration from the perspectives of different disciplines and talk about the security of this planet and how we can leave it for future generations.

While preparing this welcome speech, I looked up the term “liminal spaces” and discovered that it is an architectural term. This makes the security issue multi-disciplinary. In fact, its meaning refers to “crossing borders”, which is exactly what we are doing in this conference. We are “crossing the borders” of disciplines to talk about the world and how to make it a more secure and better place to live in. It actually starts here in Izmir, which has always been a borderline city between east and west, and between civilizations and ethnicities. To start this conference in Izmir by crossing the borders of disciplines is quite significant. I believe the discussions that will take place in this conference will make the world a better place to live in while the friendships that will be established will lead to more academic cooperation. I would really like to thank all the participants who are attending today, both face to face and

online. I would like to thank the organizing team led by Prof. Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar, Assoc. Prof. Müge Aknur, and the rest of the team, Assist. Prof. Zühal Ünalp Çepel, Assoc. Prof. Sevgi Çilingir, and Research Assistants Sinem Abka and Tuğcan Durmuşlar. I truly appreciate their efforts in organizing this conference. Finally, I would like to thank Dokuz Eylül University Rector, Prof. Nükhet Hotar, for providing us with all the necessary resources to put this conference together. Thank you very much. I wish a very successful conference to all of you.

Nükhet Hotar

Professor, *Rector*, Dokuz Eylül University

Esteemed faculty members and esteemed scientists, I would like to welcome you to this international security conference titled "Security Perception in Liminal Spaces: Opportunities and Challenges", organized by the Department of International Relations of the Faculty of Business at Dokuz Eylül University. The Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Project, which has the acronym POWERS, includes issues regarding peace, war, and the world in European security challenges. During this two-day international security conference, we will discuss the current security problems of European Union, periphery countries, and the world, as well as leading theories and approaches in international relations. On behalf of my institution and myself, I would first like to thank to the faculty members who worked hard to organize this conference and the participants who kindly agreed to contribute to it.

Dear guests, the concept of globalization not only includes economic formulas, national economies, of and international cooperation. From this perspective, besides the political attitudes of local, regional, or international actors, political discourses, national goals, and strategic partnerships come to the forefront. In this context, the limits of globalization, while overlapping with the interests and conflicts of international actors, at the same time become an instrument for populist discourses.

Different levels of development and living standards between societies has ultimately created the perception of center and periphery countries. These varying levels of development have created a distinction between the developed and underdeveloped world. This turn has threatened national security as well as basic human rights and freedoms. The fact that the values that are attributed to civilizations allows one group of countries to dominate the others creates risks for a sustainable peace environment. Here, the scientific world has a responsibility to share the right information with the public and decision-makers. It is the job of the scientists to lead the way in solving these problems and to help the societies to reach their goals. These issues form the main theme of this symposium.

Dear guests, one can easily witness today power poisoning in international relations, violation of states' sovereign rights, terrorist attacks, refugee problems, and irregular migration movements. All these undesirable developments bring with them further problems, such as human and drug smuggling, military threats, violation of border security, and environmental degradation.

At conferences like ours, rather than talking about individual and societal integration, sustainable competitions and peaceful goals, we unfortunately find ourselves discussing the human dramas in Syria and African countries. European Union members cannot stop people who are desperate from leaving their native countries by using barbed wire and establishing border controls. The international discourse triggers discriminatory policies concerning different cultures and values.

Since Syria's war began, almost a decade ago, Türkiye has hosted millions of foreigners. The approach of the Turkish nation to this issue has been constructive and positive while our government's efforts to establish a safe zone and provide humanitarian aid sets an example to the world. In fact, the Syrian problem is not a regional but a global issue. However, the international community did not pay enough attention to developments there. Instead, they decided to consider it as simple border security problem between Türkiye and Syria. Why were these people forced to leave their countries? Why did European countries try hard to stop them from immigrating to their countries? Why did they build border walls to keep these immigrants out of their countries? The answers to these questions should not only be answered by Türkiye and its neighbors but also by European countries and their governments.

In Eastern Europe Ukraine's struggle with Russia has brought back memories of World War II. It is essential to prevent the serious effects of this war before people start fleeing from their own countries. This a significant issue that should be discussed by the international community, including Europe.

Dear guests, in February 2021, in order to attract attention to these human dramas and show the troubles Türkiye is facing, we at Dokuz Eylul University organized an international conference titled "Migration: Projecting the Next Twenty Years and Beyond". During this international conference, in which our President honored us, we discussed how border security issues cannot be resolved only militarily, but through social and economic solutions. The results of this conference have provided a guide in the search for solutions to immigration problems. In fact, prior to this conference, our university was already organizing scientific programs on environment, energy, technology, and food security. Consequently, we do not consider international relations only from Türkiye's perspective but also in terms of what can be done universally.

Dear participants, we hope that there will be peace and stability throughout the world. We believe that reason and science offer a guide for peace. The development of international dialogue is important for us and we know that war can never provide the solution to any international problem. All countries, including those in Europe, deserve the right to protect their territorial integrity. We would like the international community to know that Türkiye has been following a constructive policy concerning border security and cooperation with other countries and has been sincere in its relations with the European Union. Türkiye supports global peace and stability in its relations both regionally and globally. We therefore believe in developing diplomatic relations and supporting developing and underdeveloped countries. No country can remain happy and stable by closing its doors to its neighbors and the world. We will continue to share our country's efforts on security and cooperation in the international world and in the scientific environment. We are hoping that this international security conference will serve this purpose and find new solutions to international security problems.

I would like to once again thank our university members who helped to organize the conference. I would like to greet you all with love and the hope of meeting you in healthy days in the future.

12 May 2022

Thursday

Keynote Session (11.00-13.00)	
Moderator: Müge Aknur, Dokuz Eylül University	
11.00-11.30	**İlter Turan**, *Emeritus Professor*, Bilgi University, İstanbul
11.30-12.00	**Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney**, *Professor*, *Presidential Security and Foreign Policy Council Member,* Nişantaşı University, İstanbul
12.00-12.30	**Naciye Gökçen Kaya**, *Ambassador*, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
12.30-13.00	**Discussion and Questions**

Challenges and Threats to Global Security and Prosperity

İlter Turan*

The challenge of ensuring global security and prosperity has become complex. During the Cold War, there was a clearly identifiable adversary and the problem was to stop its geographical and ideological expansion. NATO provided an effective answer for achieving security while the institutions designed to operate a market economy, buttressed by development and assistance programs, helped to achieve prosperity.

The global challenges we face these days are complicated, with multiple problems generated by climate change, uneven economic development, highly unequal distribution of wealth, unauthorized population movements, wars, including proxy wars that tend to destabilize neighbors and eventually entire regions, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the challenge of global governance. These are not only difficult to overcome individually but also often interact, rendering them more complex and difficult to address.

Some have thought that increasing globalization would enhance our capabilities to address global problems with a global mindset and organize accordingly. It seems, however, that the unqualified commitment to globalization has ended. Even regional systems are being reevaluated while security arrangements are all coming under critical review.

It appears that we must work on building a system of global governance to address the complex global challenges that we are facing. We must make sure that the world is spared from total destruction through security failures or accidents; we must find a way to achieve sustainable development rather than experience economic ups and downs that often also harm nature; and we must find a way to distribute wealth more fairly. To do so, we need a

* Emeritus Professor of Political Science, İstanbul Bilgi University, İstanbul, Türkiye

global system of governance that manages rules-based competition between states while demonstrating responsiveness to changes in the international system.

Is such a system of global governance possible? Although it is difficult, there are some grounds for more optimism than before. First, for the first time in history, market economies prevail across almost all of the global economy, thereby creating a common interest in protecting and developing the system. Second, the global economy has reached a high level of interdependence among states, creating more favorable conditions for their cooperation than earlier. Third, though intensifying somewhat at this moment, the international system is still less polarized than in earlier times. Fourth, the status of the superpowers is declining, making it possible to build a more inclusive system of global governance.

Major changes in the international system may be pending. We must be aware, however, that change is a slow and often frustrating process. The new arrangements made and the new institutions created are never perfect and may be insufficient to meet the challenges they were developed to overcome. Furthermore, any period of change harbors many difficulties and unpredictable elements, suggesting that times of change are difficult to cope with. Nevertheless, if we want to move to a more satisfactory form of global governance, we must be ready to live through the difficulties we shall encounter during the process.

New World Order

Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney*

The New World Order is the most commonly debated theme of international relations nowadays while the most important focus of current politics is focused on the war in Ukraine. However, by concentrating on this war, the world community seems to be ignoring important developments that is happening in the rest of the world regarding food security, human security, and environmental concerns. A variety of issues can be covered under the umbrella of security. I will briefly touch upon these issues and their negative effects, particularly on the Global South. I will also focus on hard security matters, such as the New World Order. A few questions needed to be answered; like whether this present world order has ended or there is another order that is under transition to replace the old one. Hence whether International Relations community needs to take precautions to maintain the current order or not.

In international relations, a term has become quite common recently to refer a new kind of great power rivalry, namely labeled as the New Cold War. This is quite different from the original Cold War that lasted between the mid-1940s and the end of 1989. In this regard, three differences stand out; First, the new Cold War has no ideological base. Current alliances are not solid as it used to be and constantly in flux. They can rather better be called alignments and belts instead of alliances such as those emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean following the discovery of new gas fields. The reason for that is –the interested countries that participate in these alignments in fact meet for their own interests. Therefore, these alignments are benefit oriented and non-ideological.[1] Consequently, they

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[1] Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney and Vişne Korkmaz, ''A New Axis in the Eastern Mediterranean Cold War: What the Abraham Accords Mean for the Mediterranean Geopolitics and Turkey'', *Insight Turkey*, Vo:23, No:1, Winter 2021.

seem to be flexible enough that the benefitting countries do change their alignments from one gathering to another-when conditions gets mature enough. This is exactly what has happened in the Eastern Mediterranean since 2021.

Due to these new interest-based alignments, we see the rise of gradual new waves of normalization between countries that used to oppose each other in Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). Türkiye, for example, has started to normalize its relations with some former opponent countries, such as the Gulf countries, Israel, and Egypt. Another example is the al-Ula agreement, reached at the GCC Summit in January 2021, whereby GCC member states ended a regional dispute among Quartet- Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt- and Qatar by signing an agreement to restore ties with Qatar. Likewise, the UAE also started normalizing relations with Türkiye, Iran, and several other countries. Such developments prove the different character of new alliances that are in the making today.

Likewise, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not the same international security organization as it used to be during the Cold War-when it was very clear what NATO stood for and what the real threat was before the Alliance. Previously, it was very clear that NATO aimed to safeguard the freedom and security of all members against the Soviet Union militarily and ideologically. Despite a few divisions in NATO, it was a solid organization which is no longer the case. Due to common converging interests related to Russia and the Ukrainian war, there are still serious divisions present between NATO members. It is true that, the current US President, Joe Biden, has been able to gather and unite NATO's 30 members around Washington thanks to the outbreak of Ukrainian war. But it is still a challenging job for him to heal the wounds of the Alliance that was caused during President Trump's era. Although NATO remains one of the Biden administration's areas of priority, we do not know how long this current unity in the Alliance will last as the Ukrainian war of attrition prolongs.

Moreover, the role of the European Union (EU) in world affairs seems to be lessening compared to previous decades in the past, particularly regarding the MENA region. For example, the Barcelona Process, launched in 1995 to strengthen relations between Europe and Southern Mediterranean countries has not yet achieved its aims. Especially, starting with

the outbreak of Arab Spring and its aftermath the EU has displayed little impact in the affairs/events of Eastern Mediterranean whereas both external and some regional powers, engaged in regional proxy wars. In March 2022, the EU to increase its area of influence/ effectiveness in world politics tried to go beyond its borders and included the Indo-Pacific region when the Council of the European Union adopted the ''European Strategy for Cooperation'' in Indo-Pacific on 19 April 2021.[2] On 16 September 2021, the European Union Commission and the High Representative, as per the guidelines of the Council, unveiled the ''EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific'' document that outlines a cooperation plan with the Indo-Pacific.[3] According to EU's standards this was in fact a remarkable achievement. Until then, Indo-Pacific was not recognized in official statements of the EU. It was only considered a matter for individual European states that had close economic ties with China in the region. Moreover, it was only countries like France and few others who had the chance to have an access to region due to their colonies or marine capability. However, once the war broke out in Ukraine, EU had to adjust its priorities. As the war Ukraine has continued longer than expected the EU countries are trying to cope with several crisis including energy due to their worsening relations with Moscow. As a result, some EU members have started to develop divergent views in facing this important energy crisis challenge. Such divergent policies may ruin the present unity in the EU most probably in the coming winter. There are already signs of cracks emerging in Brussel where for example Bulgaria is showing inclination towards to Russia in attaining gas supplies.

When we look at the European landscape, NATO and the EU are the two international organizations that are responsible for preserving Europe's security. Since 2014, following Russia's annexation of Crimea, and since NATO's Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO members have started to develop antagonist thoughts about Russia. Consequently, NATO's earlier policy that was labeled as "Russia first" aimed to have cooperative relations with Moscow had to be replaced with focusing on how to constrain Russia. Through the implication of this new policy in NATO, the USA and its allies are trying to stop Russia making further gains or

[2]''Council Conclusion on a EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific'' ,*Council of the European Union*, pdf (europa.eu), visited on 10 September 2022.
[3] Ibid.

increase its influence beyond what it had achieved since 2014. Thus, both NATO and the EU's current policy towards Russia radically varied from the well-known containment policy of the Cold War. However, since Western community has launched economic war against — via imposing sanctions— Russia during the Ukrainian war, we can say that West under NATO and to a certain extend EU itself has now returned to its previous containment policy.

I can today blame certain actors for not preventing the war in Ukraine as numerous sides have made important mistakes. For example, following Germany's reunification, Western powers promised Russia that the newly independent states in Eastern Europe would not host NATO military arsenal once they became full NATO members. Unfortunately, they did not hold their promises. Similarly, with 1994 Budapest Memorandum three states Great Britain, US and Russian Federation provided negative security assurances concerning the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine once they accept to become a member to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Additionally, Ukraine as the third largest state that inherited this arsenal from the collapsed Soviet Union at the end of the Cold war once agreed to relinquish its nuclear arsenal. When Ukraine decided to join the NPT agreement, the three great powers UK, Russia and USA had agreed to guarantee Ukraine's territorial integrity. However, this assurance also has been denied by the mentioned three countries.

This in turn reminds me of another similar issue. In 2003, when Libya abandoned its nuclear capacity and its leader, Qaddafi, agreed to eliminate Libya's weapons of mass destruction program, including a nuclear weapons program, this decision was not able to save Libya country from outside powers' intervention. During the 2003 Iraqi War, while General Powell was showing the presumed locations of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, it was North Korea that was building up its nuclear capacity. But despite the lack of UN mandate, US led unilateral Iraqi intervention was realized in 2003. Following this intervention, we have seen how Iraq has become fractured country. These historical developments concerning nuclear weapons and other developments which we did not mention here- are significant events that have helped for us to observe the current problems.

We would try here, to give short examples about some of the negative impacts of the ongoing Ukrainian War that started on February 24, 2022. Every day we hear news about the European energy problem and how European countries can save themselves from depending on Russian natural gas. The main headlines of newspapers are full of news on how the European countries can protect themselves from an economic crisis or an increasing inflation rate related to the energy crisis. Moreover, people pay attention to President Zelensky's speeches every single day. Scholars try to analyze the war in Ukraine from different perspectives. Some scholars argue that Cold War has never ended. Other scholars claim that the war in Ukraine is the 1.5 version of Cold War and some others state that it is the 2.0 version of new Cold War. Some even interpret it as "mini Cold War" in Europe. However, identifying the war in Ukraine as "mini" does not put away fragility and fractured state situation that Kyiv is in now. It does not mean that Russia is going to use nuclear weapons immediately, but even the bringing the subject to the attention of IR community, shows the significance of the situation. Resorting to nuclear weapons is against the NPT Treaties whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. Moreover, scholars legitimately argue that a nuclear power will never use its nuclear weapons against a country that does not have nuclear weapons. This was known to be as the negative security assurance.

Despite all these negative developments, although the world order is cracked it still survives. We are thankful that the current situation is not yet divided into two rival poles at this moment. You will be surprised to hear that; it is China that has not yet decided to become part of the expected bipolar polarization in the world. Because China on one hand declares that it respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine but on the other hand, it expresses its concern regarding Russia's security. Chinas support the resolution of this crisis through diplomacy. Surely, China's future policies will have a significant impact on the course of the war between Ukraine and Russia. In addition, American policies towards the war still carries its significance. There might be changes in the American Congress due to the upcoming regional elections in the United States which might bring some changes in the US policy towards the war.

All in all, multi-polar world order is still being preserved now. The sanctions towards Russia by the European countries and the United States is aiming at give a message to Russians warning the Moscow government that once they break the world order, they will be punished. However, this should not go to the level of crushing the Russian ordinary people. I am personally against these sanctions since these restrictions do give damage to the Russian people who are economically badly hurt. In the long run, sanctions will not be able to stop or assure Putin to stop the war. Even, in the case of Iran, sanctions have not prevented Tehran to develop nuclear know how and become a near nuclear power. Beyond Russian borders it is the global south that is at most hurt by these sanctions due to the increasing oil prices and prices of other supplies. Thanks to Türkiye and UN that the realization of export of grain from Ukrainian ports to Global south countries have now saved these people from serious food crisis. In fact, these sanctions will bring other complications to the European states in the middle term and long terms. Due to these sanctions, European countries will face new challenges. Currently, they need to substitute the raw materials they used to buy from Russia with countries either from Africa and Middle East or elsewhere. However, these countries from Africa and Middle East are usually fragile and ruled by autocratic regimes and therefore are not reliable.

In order to talk about the world order, it is necessary to look at some numbers. It is significant to examine the resources provided by Russia to the international community that are significant to the whole world community and particularly for Europe. For instance, EU currently relies on Russia for almost 40 percent of their imported natural gas and 11 percent of oil. So how would you substitute these resources in one night when you start applying sanctions? Cutting the world from these resources might create serious global economic problems. We are witnessing many countries in the world today are fighting with high rates of inflation due to not having access to Russian fossil resources. Currently, this is one of the dilemmas we are facing. So, this reality necessitates Russia also to be part of the global system as long as it abides with the existing liberal rules. If we want to preserve this multi-polar system, we are living in; the system must be inclusive in which all the great powers are included.

The diversification of energy sources is not an easy task for the EU. Concerning this issue, there is short-term, middle-term, and long-term suggestions: Among these, one suggestion has attracted my attention. The method they will follow to replace the Russian gas and oil will lead Europeans to resort to Eastern Mediterranean sources (when combined with Iraqi sources), Azeri and Iranian resources. They may also search for alternatives from MENA region as well as Africa and North Sea. Geography wise Türkiye is located to be in the middle of these alternatives. In Oxford Energy Center publications, they argue that all these short-term, middle-term and long-term suggestions concerning finding energy sources other than Russia and finding other types of energy resources is not that feasible in a short time. Therefore, this creates the significant dilemma of the European Union. If the war ends whether with a peace deal or whether there is going to be a stalemate without a peace deal, in both cases EU countries might have challenging times for resetting their relations with Moscow since it is quite deteriorated. The big challenge ahead of the Europeans is that geographically Moscow government is a close neighbor of EU.

Concerning the Middle East there is hope for normalization- although this is only a regional development and does not include the influence of the great powers. The normalization of the relations in MENA that stretches over the Gulf is a positive development. This development is mainly connected to the dynamics in MENA. There is the Iranian nuclear capacity that brings concerns to the region particularly to Israel and Gulf countries. In addition, the Iranian militias who are active in different conflict areas in the region is another source of concern. Once this deal is finalized-yet nobody knows whether it is going to be finalized or not by the time of writing this piece- with Iran, it will not involve the missiles and local militias. But the deal will confirm the lifting sanctions on Iran and unfreezing of Iranian assets. So, this Iranian influence that is expected to increase in the region after lifting sanctions is one concern that is leading to cooperation and thawing of relations among the states in region. Second reason that is pushing MENA and GCC countries to the direction of improvement of their relations is about feeling of abandonment due to the US involvement during the war in Ukraine. Thirdly, al-Ula agreement that ended Qatari embargo by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt has helped the rising thawing of relations in the region. Lastly, the Abraham Accords that were signed in August 2020- are a joint statement between

Israel, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan- is said to be improving the normalization of relations between some Arab countries and Israel. Moreover, the MENA region was tired of what is going on for decades, particularly because of instability emanated due to the Arab Spring that has turned into Arab winter and its aftermath. This led to the initiation of proxy wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen etc. among great powers and regional actors. These countries got into alignments related to energy and other issues that they were against Russia, Türkiye and Iran. They figured out in time that these alignments were not bringing any substantial benefits for them. Hence, these mentioned states have become putting an end to the alignments that aimed to counter countries like Türkiye, Russia, and Iran.

This is the picture ahead of us and apart from what is happening in Ukraine I am quite hopeful about what is going on due to the normalization of relations in the MENA region and the Gulf region- which is still holding on to multi-polar system.

However, the war in Ukraine must be somehow stopped immediately because it is not benefitting anyone. Rather, it reflects the reality of new Cold war where West and Russia as rival actors are competing one another in the Ukraine war. Meanwhile it is the Ukrainians who are losing their lives. I am hoping that this war can be stopped and the conflict between the warring sides could be solved diplomatically.

Key Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy

Gökçen Kaya[*]

Turkish foreign policy today lies in liminal spaces. Politically and economically, global fractures have led to an era of rapid and profound transformations. including changing balances of power and unpredictable geopolitical equations. There are also new threats to global peace and stability, particularly in liminal spaces, such as governance failures, conflicts, refugee crises, terrorism, rising populism, and climate change. In line with its growing means and capabilities, Türkiye has been following a multidimensional, proactive, enterprising, and humanitarian foreign policy that aims at remaining strong, both on the ground and at the negotiating table.

The coronavirus pandemic has caused various changes, firstly by accelerating current global trends. It has also eroded multilateralism and universal norms while increasing fragilities, governance failures, geopolitical competition, multi-polarity, regionalization, and digitalization.

Türkiye's current enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy is vigilant and proactive, balanced, open to dialogue, constructive, bridging, principled, and multi-dimensional. It takes a broad perspective while always siding with the vulnerable. In that, it follows its founding principle, stated by the Republic of Türkiye's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: "Peace at Home and Peace in the World".

Türkiye's current foreign policy can be summarized through the following eight elements: advancing Türkiye's strategic relations, managing crises and strengthening stability, protecting the rights of citizens and kin communities abroad, fighting against terrorism, developing ties with all geographies, strengthening Türkiye's economic-commercial

[*] *Ambassador*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, İzmir Representative.

relations, increasing cooperation with global and regional organizations, and enhancement of its soft power. These will now be considered in turn.

1. Advancing Strategic Relations

Advancing strategic relations includes Türkiye's membership in NATO, the EU, and with the United States, Cyprus, and the Eastern Mediterranean. As an international security organization, NATO can be considered as one of the world's strongest and most successful politico-military alliances, which forms the backbone for transatlantic security. Türkiye, which has been a member since 1952, has NATO's second largest army, is among the top five contributors to NATO operations and missions, and among the top eight contributors to its joint budget. Türkiye has recently taken over command of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in Tekirdağ. Another factor explaining the advance of strategic relations in Turkish foreign policy is Türkiye's relations with the USA, which have been allies for almost 70 years, during which they established a strategic partnership. Türkiye has adapted its relations with the USA according to the regional and international environment, and strengthened its solidarity with the USA in the fight against terrorism and global challenges.

Türkiye's attempts to become a full EU member have also advanced its strategic relations. The Association Agreement with the EU with an aim of full membership was signed in 1963. Türkiye entered the Customs Union in 1996 before starting accession negotiations in 2005. On 18th of March 2016, the Türkiye-EU Agreement was signed concerning migration crisis. Türkiye still has the Reform Action Group (RAG), Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), and Association Council mechanisms with the EU while EU membership remains a strategic goal, along with updating the Customs Union, visa liberalization, and migration cooperation.

Another issue for advancing Türkiye's strategic relations with the EU concerns Cyprus, for which Türkiye believes in seeking a fair, lasting, and a sustainable settlement. Unfortunately, several rounds of negotiations based on a federal model have failed. Turkish foreign policy aims at equality for the two communities and entered a new era after the most recent TRNC presidential elections. Türkiye's approach is based on the realities of the island, hence the

Turkish government believes in a two-state solution based on sovereign equality. It also supports the informal 5+UN meeting, which includes the leaders of the two communities, in addition to Greece, Türkiye, and the UK. The Turkish government is also open to restarting negotiations, although this depends on the objectives and framework.

The final issue concerning advancing Türkiye's strategic relations with the EU relates to the Eastern Mediterranean. Given that Türkiye has the longest Mediterranean shoreline, its priority is to preserve the legitimate rights and interests of itself and Turkish Cypriots, based on international law. The delimitation of maritime jurisdictions is another aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye is open to dialogue. For example, the government's proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference with all littoral parties, including the TRNC, remains on the table while the 63rd round of consultative talks with Greece have been conducted to discuss the two countries' differences.

2. Managing crises and Strengthening Stability

Türkiye faces active, frozen, and potential conflicts in its surroundings, along with fragility, governance problems, lack of immunity to regional shocks. There is also forced migration, economic destruction, and human loss. The government believes that the only way to resolve these regional problems is through dialogue.

Regarding crisis management and regional security and stability, Türkiye has implemented trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation, such as in the following agreements: Türkiye-Afghanistan-Pakistan (2007), Türkiye-Bosnia Herzegovina-Serbia (2009), Türkiye-Bosnia Herzegovina-Croatia (2010), Türkiye-Iran-Azebaijan (2011), Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan (2014), Türkiye-Poland-Romania (2016), Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan (2017), Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Iran (2018), and Türkiye-Malaysia-Pakistan (2019). Meanwhile, to enhance dialogue with other counties, Türkiye has organized cooperation mechanisms at foreign ministerial level and high level strategic cooperation councils with 27 countries, in addition to holding four intergovernmental summits.

Another aspect of crisis management and strengthening stability is humanitarian diplomacy. Türkiye currently hosts the world's largest refugee population, with approximately 3.7 million Syrians under temporary protection. Thus, given that it has spent more than 40 billion US dollars, Türkiye has been the world's most generous country in terms of the ratio of humanitarian aid to national income while official development aid has reached 9 million US dollars.

Another aspect of crisis management and strengthening stability concerns Coronavirus for which the Minister of Foreign Affairs established a coordination and support center. Türkiye sent medical assistance to 160 countries and 12 international organizations and became the second biggest medical assistance donor. It also conducted the largest evacuation operation in its history by repatriating over 100,000 Turkish citizens from 142 countries. Through evacuation flights, Türkiye also provided support to 91 other countries to help repatriate their citizens and evacuate over 5,500 foreigners from 67 countries. This has continued during both the pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

3. Protecting the Rights of Citizens / Kin Communities Abroad and Providing Consular Services

Türkiye has a global diaspora of approximately 7 million people, of whom 5.7 million live in Europe, including 3 million in Germany. More than 2.5 million consular transactions took place in 2021 alone while there is a 24/7 call center operating in eight languages. This center has received approximately 7 million calls since its launch in 2007, including 621,154 calls in 2007 alone.

Türkiye is also trying to increase the number of countries offering visa-free travel to Turkish citizens. Consequently, the number has increased from 42 countries in 2002 to 74 in 2021. Konsolosluk.Net has conducted 1.9 yearly consular transactions on average while over 35 million visas were issued online through the E-visa system, also established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 190,000 transactions since 2019 through Virtual POS.

4. Fighting against Terrorism and its Propaganda

Türkiye believes that terrorism is a threat to both regional and global security, so the fight against all forms and manifestations of terrorism is very important for Turkish foreign policy. Türkiye is currently fighting against several terrorist organizations, including FETÖ, PKK/PYD/YPG, DAESH, and DHKP-C. Türkiye has actively contributed to international efforts by acting as the Co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) between 2011 and 2016, the GCTF-Horn of Africa Working Group in 2017, and the Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) Working Group within the Coalition Against Daesh in 2015.

5. Outreach to all Geographies

Through outreach to all geographies, Türkiye can contribute to peace and international security. Concerning Africa, for example, the number of Turkish Embassies increased from 12 in 2002 to 43 in 2021 along with five new Consulates-General. Ankara currently hosts 37 African embassies while over 500 high-level visits have taken place in the last five years. The 3rd Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit was hosted in Istanbul by President Erdoğan on December 16-18, 2021, and was attended by 16 Heads of State and Government, and 100 Ministers, including 25 of Foreign Ministers.

Since 2013, Türkiye has adopted a partnership policy with African countries. At the Istanbul summit, a five-year Action Plan was adopted along with a follow-up mechanism for its implementation. Relations with regional organizations have been increased significantly. Türkiye has been an observer (2005) and strategic partner (2008) to the African Union, and gained IGAD Partners Forum membership (2008) and non-regional membership of the African Development Bank (2013). It is also accredited to various regional economic organizations, such as IGAD, ECOWAS, EAC, COMESA, and ECCAS. Meanwhile, Türkiye's trade volume with Africa rose from 4.3 billion dollars in 2002 to 25.3 billion dollars in 2020 while investment by Turkish companies reached 6 billion dollars. Türkiye has started 1,200 projects worth 70 billion dollars and established 22 TİKA Program Coordination Offices while Turkish Airlines currently flies to 60 destinations in 39 African countries.

Türkiye's foreign policy outreach has also extended to the Asia-Pacific, through various means. It has strategic relations with China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore, along with has free trade agreements with Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore. It has been harmonizing with the Belt and Road and Middle Corridor initiatives and launched the. Asia Anew initiative in 2019 during the Turkish Ambassadors Conference. Türkiye's diplomatic presence includes 15 embassies, including in all ASEAN member states, six consulates-general, and one trade office. Türkiye has also improved relations with various regional organizations, including signatory to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (2010), membership of the Dialogue Partner to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (2013), Pacific Alliance Observer Status (2013), membership of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (2013), Post-Forum Dialogue Partner to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (2014), and Sectoral Dialogue Partner to ASEAN (2017).

Concerning Latin America, Türkiye launched a LAC (Latin America and Caribbean) Action plan in 1998, which was revised in 2006, when Türkiye was a candidate for the UN Security Council, hence the need to start the outreach policy. Türkiye also improved relationships with regional organizations in Latin America. For example, during my tenure in Chile, Türkiye became a full member of ECLAC (UN Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean), a regional mechanism for political dialogue and cooperation. Türkiye also developed a Consultation and Cooperation mechanism with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (2011), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (2011), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). As of 2022, Türkiye has 17 embassies and one consulate-general in Latin America, along with TİKA offices in Colombia and Mexico. During my tenure, Chile was the only Latin American country that Türkiye had a Free Trade Agreement with, although an agreement has recently been signed with Venezuela while negotiations continue with Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador.

6. Strengthening Economic and Commercial Relations

Turkey is the world's thirteenth largest economy (per PPP) and fifth largest economy in Europe (per PPP). Regarding economic and commercial relations, Türkiye is a G-20 member.

While serving the embassy in Canada, I dealt with economic issues and launched an initiative in 1999 to demarche to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada, when Canada held the G-7 presidency. After I mentioned that Turkey would like to become a participant, the request was taken into consideration at the Financial Ministers meeting. Finally, Turkey was accepted to the G-20. In 2008, G-20 organized a leaders' summit while Türkiye took the presidency for 2015, when it organized an important meeting in Antalya while I was working as the Deputy Director General for Multilateral Economic Affairs. Türkiye also launched several initiatives to enlarge the scope of the G-20.

7. Increasing Cooperation with Global and Regional Organizations

Türkiye has become a unique country in its region through its development of various organizations. For example, along with Russia, it initiated BSEC (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation). This interesting organization has enabled many countries having conflicts with other to sit at one table. Türkiye has therefore been very happy to host this organization's secretariat in Istanbul, which also hosts the secretariat of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), an Asian political and economic intergovernmental organization. Türkiye is a founding member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Conference on Interaction and Conference Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Türkiye also initiated the Organization of Turkic States, and is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (IOC), the Regional Cooperation Council, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations.

Türkiye has taken various term presidencies, such as in the Organization of Turkic States between 2021 and 2022, the Asia Parliamentary Assembly between 2017 and 2021, and the Parliamentary Union of OIC Member States (PUIC) since 2021. Moreover, top Turkish diplomats currently have served in several international organizations. For example, Ambassador Volkan Bozkır was excellent as President of the 75th United Nations General Assembly during the September 2020-2021 term, which was a particularly crucial time during the pandemic. Ambassador Altay Cengizer was President of the General Conference

of UNESCO during the November 2019-2021 term while Ambassador Halit Çevik is currently Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

Türkiye also aims to make Istanbul a regional hub for the UN. While serving as Deputy Director General for Multilateral Economic Affairs, I organized the opening of UNDP's regional office (UN Population Fund Regional Office) in Istanbul. In 2011, Türkiye organized the 4th UN Conference on Least Developed Countries, which was the biggest international conference that Türkiye had organized, with 10,000 participants. The World Food Program Office has also opened an office in Istanbul while the UN Technology Bank for LDCs is headquartered in Gebze. One of the headquarters of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is located in Istanbul while a UN Youth Center is under progress. Finally, the Istanbul International Center for Private Sector in Development UNDP was established in 2011.

Other aspects of cooperation include Türkiye's non-permanent UN Security Council membership between 2009 and 2010, its presidency of the 75th UNGA, active contribution regarding all issues on the UN Agenda, and close cooperation with UN agencies. The Alliance of Civilizations, organized by Turkey in 2005, reached 152 countries while it founded the Group of Friends of Mediation in September 2010 to promote and advance the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, and resolution. This group currently has 60 members. With the initiative of Türkiye, ten Ministerial Meetings and four UN General Assembly resolutions have taken place to raise awareness on mediation. Regarding Türkiye's UN Security Council membership, I am proud to say that I prepared a successful strategy paper as head of the department of the United Nations following my return from Canada, which helped Türkiye to achieve non-permanent membership in 2008. Türkiye has actively contributed regarding all issues on the UN's agenda by closely cooperating with all UN agencies while trying to make Istanbul a hub city for UN meetings.

Türkiye has also taken a leading role in mediation regarding Iraq (2005, 2010), Lebanon (2008), Syria-Israel indirect talks (2008), Kyrgyzstan (2010), and Iran's nuclear issue (2010). In addition, Türkiye also took a leading role in Somalia-Somaliland talks, the Southern Philippines Peace Process, and in Venezuela. Türkiye was a co-chair of the Groups

of Friends of Mediation at the UN, the OSCE, and OIC. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized the 3rd OIC Member States Conference on Mediation in 2019 in Istanbul, and hosted the 7th Istanbul Mediation Videoconference in September 2020.

8. Enhancing Türkiye's Soft Power

Türkiye's increasing soft power can be seen from activities concerning TİKA (*Türk İşbirliği Koordinasyonu Ajansı*-Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), which shares Türkiye's development experience with other countries. It is active in 60 countries and has 62 Program Coordination Offices active in 150 countries. Turkish Airlines is a soft power that operates in 127 countries and flies to 319 cities and 323 airports. Turkish Red Crescent has helped people in 138 countries in the last decade and 147 in total, particularly during disasters. The Turkish Maarif Foundation, which provides educational services abroad, is active in 67 countries, including 340 schools and 42 dormitories in 43 countries. The Yunus Emre Institute, which tries to enhance worldwide recognition of Türkiye and its international credibility and prestige by increasing the number of people who forge bonds with it, has 58 cultural centers in 46 countries. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities has received 145,700 applications for Turkish scholarships from 167 countries. Finally, the Turkish diaspora, including teachers and students worldwide, can be considered agents of soft power.

Tourism plays a significant role in cultural diplomacy. Tourism income totaled 24.5 billion dollars in 2021 while the foreign tourists' income totaled 29.4 million dollars. In 2021, Türkiye had 19 active efforts in UNESCO concerning cultural heritage as well as 21 intangible cultural heritage projects. Izmir municipality, for example, is working hard to include various sites on the UNESCO heritage list. The number of scholarships for foreign students in Türkiye rose from 25,000 in 1992 to 150,000 in 2020 while the number of foreign students in Türkiye increased from 16,000 in 2002 to 185,000 in 2020.

Türkiye's Minister of Foreign Affairs is also aware of changing diplomacy and foreign policy issues. Accordingly, Türkiye has launched several new initiatives, such as Asia Anew in 2019

at the XIth Turkish Ambassadors Conference. Another important forum initiated by the Ministry was the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in 2022, which has played a significant role in world politics. Part of this concerned digital diplomacy, whereby the Ministry of Foreign Affairs capitalized on the transformative power of technology, including big data and artificial intelligence, in all avenues of foreign policy. This initiative was implemented multi-dimensionally by including IT infrastructure, consular services, public diplomacy, diplomatic analysis, and strategic foresight. A joint project with Germany aims at creating a curriculum to equip diplomats with the necessary skills for the digital age.

The Asia Anew Initiative was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. He pointed out that Asia was becoming the 21st century's center of gravity. Accordingly, he aimed to create a new comprehensive and holistic vision for Türkiye's policies towards the continent. The initiative is now led by an ambassador. The initiative capitalizes on Türkiye's unique position as simultaneously the westernmost Asian and the easternmost European country. It aims at capitalizing on potential opportunities for cooperation with Asian countries and prioritizing economic and trade cooperation with Asian partners. The initiative, which targets cooperation mechanisms and inter-agency coordination, has Action Plans for 31 countries in 40 main fields of activity to form an interactive data platform.

The Antalya Diplomacy Forum, held between 11-13 March 2022 under the title 'Recoding Diplomacy', was the second such forum. It was attended by 17 Heads of State and Government, 80 Ministers, and 40 representatives of international organizations. Several leaders' panels and round-table meetings were held where businesspeople, parliamentarians, and defense industry companies could meet with the visiting country representatives. The forum aimed at creating a major platform for diplomatic discussions among opinion-makers. For example, the Turkish Foreign Minister brought together two foreign ministers from Ukraine and Russia to discuss the problems between their countries. This important initiative, which was later repeated in Istanbul, shows how actively Türkiye participates in international affairs and contributes to international peace and security.

12 MAY 2022
Thursday

Panel 1: EU Security and Russia (14.00-15.30)	
Moderator: Tolga Bölükbaşı, Bilkent University	
14.00-14.15	**The Evaluation of the European Union's Security Policies in light of Russia's 'Special Operation' in Ukraine** **Armağan Gözkaman,** *Professor,* Beykent University**,** İstanbul
14.15-14.30	**Russia and the West: Troublesome Partners or Strategic Adversaries?** **Alla Akulshina,** *POWERS JM Network Coordinator*, Voronezh State University, Russia
14.30-14.45	**The EU in the New War Concept and the War in Ukraine** **Sezgin Mercan,** *Associate Professor*, Başkent University, Ankara
14.45-15.00	**Strategic Thinking Reconsidered: The EU, the NATO, and the MENA region in the aftermath of the war on Ukraine** **Walid Abu-Dalbouh,** *Professor,* University of Jordan, Jordan
15.00-15.30	**Discussion and Questions**

The Evaluation of the EU's Security and Defence Policies in light of Russia's 'Special Operation' in Ukraine

Armağan Gözkaman*

Abstract:

The military operation that Russia has been carrying out since 24 February 2022 is a crucial challenge for the European Union in many ways. Arguments of security and revenge justify Kremlin's "special operation". The war in Ukraine has led to changes in the European Union, both in strategic thinking and in operational terms. The alliance between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean has been subject to changes as well, which leads to some optimism for the future of European security and defence.

Key words: European Union, Russia, Ukraine, NATO, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

Introduction:

On February 21, 2022, the Russian Federation officially recognized Donetsk and Lugansk, the two separatist entities that had proclaimed their independence following the internationally unrecognized referendum of 2014. Moscow's decision met with the strong condemnation of the European Union (EU) at its highest level: The presidents of the European Commission and the European Council defined it as a "blatant violation" of international law and of the agreements reached in Minsk in 2014 and 2015 (European Commission, 2022a). A much more blatant violation came three days after the recognition, when Russia launched a military offensive against Ukraine.

The assault, named as "special operation" by Kremlin, has led to a series of reactions from the EU side. The policy-makers of the European Union -both at the domestic (governmental)

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and EU level- have announced their willingness to bring political, economic and military support to Ukraine. The declarations came out despite the clear signs that the war would be long and multifaceted -requiring thus difficult choices in various domains. The objective of this study, as its title suggests, is to focus on the security and defence aspects of the EU's (and its member states') choices. In order to explain how the so-called special operation has shaped them, at least four avenues must be explored. Kremlin's (Putin's) view on the "Ukrainian reality" is one of them (I). Then will come the portrayal of the Russian threat in the EU's strategic documents (II). In close connection with the latter, the institutional aspect deserves attention (III). Because of the quasi-impossible dissociation between the European security and defence formulations and the transatlantic debate, US and NATO relations will also be among the focal points (IV).

I. Ukraine as a "security threat" for Russian Federation

According to Eltchaninoff, the philosophical sources of "Putinism" fall into two broad categories: The "idea of empire" and the "justification of war". These two are the amalgamation various paradigms. They include the Soviet ideology, the "white imperialism" (developed especially by Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin), conservatism (where a special reference to Konstantin Nikolayevich Leontiev's contributions to the literature was clear), Pan-Slavism (centered on the writings of Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky) and Eurasianism (with simultaneous emphasis on the founders and the contemporary works of Dugin). The founder of the far-right newspaper Den, Alexander Prokhanov, has also had an increasing effect on the decision-making processes in Kremlin (Eltchaninoff, 2015).

With the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, two hardly reconcilable processes have come out. On the one hand, the central and eastern European countries (CEECs), formerly under the control of Moscow, have chosen the liberal-democratic path. On the other hand, Russia -as the successor of the USSR- aimed to maintain its "great power" status and dominate its *Near Abroad*. Within this context, Ukraine was of crucial importance for Russian policy-makers, for democracy and independence posed the biggest challenge to Russia's national interests (D'Anieri, 2019).

Worse still, the CEECs' accession to NATO has created a security concern -if not paranoia- in Moscow. For Russian decision-makers, the 1999[4] and 2004[5] waves of enlargement were already a source of resentment. An utterly unacceptable declaration came out only four years after the accession of three former Soviet Republics and four Warsaw Pact members: During the summit in Bucharest, the North Atlantic Council announced that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of the Alliance (NATO, 2008).

Putin also aimed to capitalize on the ideas deeply ingrained in Russian history and the new international order portrayed above helped him achieve his aim. At this point, it seems pertinent to underline that the Russian president was also successful in exploiting the desire of revenge in the society. The reason of this desire is twofold. The first one is about the collapse of the USSR. Putin describes it as the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century" (Brzezinski, 2008). The annexation of Crimea is in line with the invasion of Georgia, and both of these moves relate to this "catastrophe". To maintain that the *leitmotiv* has been the same for the "special operation" seems legitimate.

The second one is about Russia's "metamorphosis into a democracy" (Eltchaninoff, 2015). In time, Putin has developed an autocratic system and used nationalist discourses to justify foreign policy actions. He believed that this would guarantee the regime's endurance. A *grandeur* would be possible only with an assertive foreign policy (Stoner, 2021). From this vantage point, the "special operation" may be conceived as more than a reaction to Ukraine's willingness to become a member of NATO. An existential issue is at stake.

Putin's desire to *leave his mark in history is an important parameter to take into account while pondering on the reasons of the "special operation".* As Sabine Dullin rightfully reminds, Putin is simultaneously guided by the imperial past and haunted by the decline of Russian power (Noël, 2021). He believes that Russia deserves to be conceived a first-rank power alongside the United States. This strategic vision inevitably leads to a hostility towards the post-Cold-War international system.

[4] Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999.
[5] Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia took part in the 2004 enlargement.

This perception of Kremlin has not changed since 1991. Russia has never felt at ease with Ukraine's independence. The fact that Ukraine is historically part of Russia -and that it cannot be considered a country- is "deeply ingrained" in Russian politics (Düben, 2020). To justify his "special operation", Putin also used the pretexts of "demilitarization" and "denazification" which leads to believe that a regime change in Ukraine is among the main objectives of the military assault (Lennon, 2022). The following excerpt from his speech of February the 24th, 2022 (date of inception of his military operation) is indicative of his objectives concerning -and his perception of- the "Ukrainian question":

> *"*[T]*he leading NATO countries, in order to achieve their own goals, support extreme nationalists and Neo-Nazis in Ukraine.* (…) *The course of events and the incoming information show that Russia's clash with these forces is inevitable.* (…) *We have been left no other option to protect Russia and our people, but for the one that we will be forced to use today. The situation requires us to take decisive and immediate action. The people's republics of Donbas turned to Russia with a request for help.* (…) *I have decided to conduct a special military operation. Its goal is to protect the people that are subjected to abuse, genocide from the Kiev regime for eight years, and to this end we will seek to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and put to justice those that committed numerous bloody crimes against peaceful people, including Russian nationals."* (Al Jazeera, 2022; TASS, 2022a).

II. Evaluating Russian aggression via the EU's strategy documents

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022 has resulted in a crucial shift for defence issues in Europe. Having a look at the consecutive strategy documents adopted at the EU confirms this assumption. The European Security Strategy of 2003[6] puts forward a clear optimism on the relations between Russia and the European Union. The document

[6] See: Council of the European Union (2009). "European Security Strategy - A secure Europe in a Better World." Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world/#:~:text=The%20European%20Council%20adopted%20the,based%20on%20our%20core%20values

presents Russia as a "partner" that the EU cooperates while coping with the international conflicts. It also recognizes the necessity and significance of strengthening relations with Moscow for the "security and prosperity" of the Europeans.

In time, the perception of partnership has eroded. Five years later, the implementation report -that Javier Solana and the European Commission have jointly elaborated- come out. The content and the tone of the report tend to reflect the characteristics of realism more than the Strategy Paper of 2003 did. Although it stresses the importance of the energy for the relations of the EU with Russia and points at domains of cooperation on both global and regional issues, it also reveals the negative perception on Russian Federation: It is a source of concern for the stability of Europe and the outside world. He also reminds that some conflicts, previously frozen, were leading to concerns in the vicinity of the European continent. Georgia, mentioned as a crisis territory in the document, illustrates this point. The EU had to undertake the "leadership" of -and contribute to- the international response to the Russo-Georgian conflict. (Council of the European Union, 2008).

The implementation report signalled the necessity for Russia to fulfil its commitments so as to restore the broken confidence between the two sides -and enumerated the values and principles of the EU. As expected, it also reminded the importance of partnership with Russia in dealing with the global problems. In time, however, it became apparent that Moscow had a significantly different agenda. The "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe", published two years after Russia's annexation of Crimea, places a special emphasis on the crisis in Ukraine and describes it as a substantial challenge for the European security. Although the document identifies the management of relations with Russia as problematic, some pragmatism is also perceptible:

> "[T]*he EU and Russia are interdependent. We will therefore engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our interests overlap. In addition to those foreign policy issues on which we currently cooperate, selective engagement could take place over matters of European interest too, including climate, the Arctic, maritime security, education, research and cross-border cooperation*."

The Strategic Compass adopted by the European Council on March 22, 2022 devotes long sections to Russian impact upon the EU's security perceptions and policies. In the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the Global Strategy of Federica Mogherini (EUISS, 2016), one can see a "postmodern" trend (Darnis, 2022). To put it another way, they insisted on crosscutting issues such as the maintenance of peace and stability, fight against terrorism and criminal networks in the perspective of liberal-democratic international order. The Compass unambiguously portrays Russia as a threat.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is distinctively salient from the foreword to the conclusion of the Compass which aims to be the EU's "White Paper" of defence for the next decade. The (r)evolution of the EU's look at Russian Federation is clear: As a threat, Moscow's military offense to Ukraine has led to a "tectonic shift" for European security with various ramifications. The 27 member states are "fully mobilized" to neutralize the "weapon" of energy, a card that Moscow plays very effectively. The Compass also reminds that Russian revisionism has upon the European security goes beyond the conflict in Ukraine. Russia causes instability in various regions of the world, including the geographies very close to the EU -in Georgia and Belarus for instance. The threat is also present in the Middle East and Africa, as the Libyan, Syrian or Malian examples illustrate. By creating this environment of insecurity, Kremlin has united the EU in using all the assets of power at its disposal. It has also proven the central position of NATO in the EU's defence (Council of the European Union, 2022).

III. The "European" Reactions to the War in Ukraine

In the last decade, a pro-Russian sentiment has grown in the EU member countries. Yet, the war that started on 24 February 2022 in Ukraine has imposed a clear shift and undermined the sympathy that Russia has garnered over the years. This change of attitude has found an echo at the domestic (governmental) and EU level. The 27 member states could agree on a series of economic and financial sanctions to Russia. How far they could go is indeed debatable. Nonetheless, it is possible to maintain that they could at least show some solidarity with the Ukrainians. They also could take action to defend themselves in a

multidimensional warfare. The field of (dis)information, an integral part of Russian military campaign, is one of the battlefields. Kremlin has developed a propaganda war and instrumentalized media outlets such as Sputnik and Russia Today (RT). The EU reacted to this "weapon" of Russia via a regulation in early March 2022 and suspended the broadcasts of these two corporations (Journal Officiel de l'Union Européenne, 2022). In a similar vein, the use of social media has also turned out to be useful for Kremlin. The response that came from the European Commission was the *Digital Services Act* (DSA). The Act aims to offer an opportunity to create a safer digital environment that reflects the EU's values and support the fight against misinformation and illegal content (European Parliament, 2020; 2022b). The arrangement will thus oblige digital platforms and search engines to take necessary measures in crises similar to Russia's war against Ukraine (Browne, 2022).

Russian military operation has also been a determinant in the European defence spending equation. After years of budget cuts in the military sector, the EU and its members are willing to increase their expenditure. Member states have announced an additional defence spending that nears a total of €200 billion for the years to come. At this point, German government's reaction to Russian military attack particularly stands out[7]. In June 2022, the *Bundestag* approved the additional allocation of €100 billion that Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced at the very early stage of the conflict in Ukraine. Scholz has also made clear that Germany's yearly defence expenditures would exceed the 2% of the Gross Domestic Product. This objective was agreed during the NATO summit in 2014 but unfulfilled by the majority of NATO members, including Germany, so far (Pfeifer and Foy, 2022).

Indeed, this picture comes with questions. As the European Commission rightfully notes, between 1999 and 2021, the rise of the spending was measured at 20% for the EU whereas the percentage points were 66 for the US, 292 for Russia and 592 for China (European Commission, 2022b). The additional funds will partially cover the military pay raise and refill the arsenals depleted while supporting Ukraine (Pfeifer and Foy, 2022). Besides, it is not clear how the governments will use the extra funds. Germany, again, is a case in point: 35

[7] It is important to remember that both the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) and the political culture of the post-World-War-II restrict Germany's military operations outside its borders. See Rameau, H., and Roux, P. (2022). "Défense de l'Europe et Europe de la défense (1/2)." *Revue Défense Nationale*, 849(4): 82-87.

fighter jets (model F-35) and 60 heavy-lift helicopters (model CH-47F) that Berlin will purchase are US-made.

In this context, the European Commission proposed a "short-term EU instrument" in July 2022. The proposal aims to build a joint procurement mechanism to help EU member states "fill the most urgent and critical gaps" and preconizes a fund of €500 million covering the period 2022-2024. The main idea is to prevent intra-European competition in military sectors and consequently lower the production costs. Stronger interoperability is also among the expected benefits (European Commission, 2022c).

Besides, various cooperation schemes within the 27-member Union provide grounds for optimism. The *European Peace Facility* is one of them. Between February and July 2022, this mechanism served to provide an assistance totalling €2,5 billion to Ukraine in the form of military equipment outside the EU multiannual financial framework (Council of the European Union, 2022). This assistance is unprecedented in a sense that it gives the possibility to equip a third country with lethal military weapons systems (European Parliament, 2022a).

The provision of a military dispatch component by the Strategic Compass merits underlining as well. In the document, J. Borrell invokes a new "EU rapid deployment capacity" consisting of 5.000 troops that will be trained to deal with various sorts of crises. In addition, he announces an unprecedented initiative: Regular joint military exercises (involving land and sea forces) that will improve the readiness of EU member states' armed forces. The amelioration of the existing military command and control structures is among the projects laid out by the Compass as well (Council of the European Union, 2022a).

IV. The (hopeful) future of transatlantic links

With the end of the Cold War, NATO-Russia relations have entered a new era. Since 1991, Russia has been taking part in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council / Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council mechanisms. The Partnership for Peace framework has provided practical cooperation opportunities (as illustrated by the peace-support deployments in the

Western Balkan territories) until Russia's annexation of Ukraine in 2014. The *NATO-Russia Founding Act* of May 1997 crowned this process by institutionalising the cooperation between the two sides via the *NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council* (PJC). Despite a hiatus in relations in 1999 due to the Alliance's aerial operation in Kosovo, the Rome Declaration of 2002 substituted NATO-Russia Council (NRC) for the PJC and created a broader framework of partnership. Although the NRC meetings and some cooperation frameworks were suspended following Russia's military intervention of 2008 in Georgia, the 2014 Ukraine crisis led to the ongoing suspension of all practical and military cooperation (NATO, 2022) and brought the relations between Russia and the West to the "point of no return" (TASS, 2022b).

It is also important to remember that NATO, as an alliance, has been in a difficulty before Russia's attack on Ukraine. This was due to two main reasons: Joe Biden's contempt towards the Alliance, and the questions concerning the future of the organisation. The "special operation" has been, in a way, an "electro-shock" (RFI,2022) that saved the Alliance from the "brain death" (The Economist, 2019) that he has been suffering, as French President Emmanuel Macron has stated. Even Finland and Sweden, formerly "neutral" states, have decided to become members of NATO. At first sight, the "rise" of the Alliance and the European dependence on the US may appear in contradiction with the idea of the EU's long-sought strategic autonomy. However, as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has made the point on various occasions, the two processes are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they complement each other. In his view, there is a recurrent confusion on the meaning of autonomy. Autonomy and independence are two different concepts. It does not signify giving up on multilateralism, NATO or the partnership with the US (Borrell, 2020; Stroobants, 2020).

That the Compass singles out the EU-NATO strategic partnership for the Euro-Atlantic security supports this assumption. From this standpoint, the presence of the US troops on the European continent does not constitute a barrier for the development of European strategic autonomy. The training and equipment that Washington provided to Ukraine since 2014 is worth around $10.4 billion (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The increase of 25% in

the US military (troop) presence in Europe from January to March 2022 (Stroobants and Vincent, 2022) shows the impact that the conflict had in a matter of weeks.

To overcome the bitterness caused by the "submarine crisis" of November 2021,[8] US President Joe Biden has backed the reinforcement of European defence as a complement to NATO (Herszenhorn, 2021). Obviously, it will not be difficult for the Europeans to meet Biden's condition. As Hubert Védrine, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, once stated, the Europeans could not so far -and do not want to- defend themselves. They prefer to rely on the United States (Ricard and Stroobants, 2022). The EU has aimed to become a world power able to dispatch military forces since the end of the Cold War. Its takeover of Petersberg missions from the Western European Union, adoption of the Helsinki Headline Goal and the creation of the battle groups justify this desire. All the same, although the EU was successful in institutionalisation of defence, it has not achieved a satisfactory level of military capabilities (Major and Mölling, 2020). Political divergences certainly play a role in this problem. The EU prefers to define itself as a "civilian" and "soft" power, despite the "evolving reality" that requires otherwise (EUISS, 2016).

Conclusion:

What can be done if a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council attacks a peaceful sovereign state for the so-called security reasons and for "correcting mistakes that were made in the past"? The answer is what we all observe today: Not much. The war that Russia initiated will be long, had warned analysts and politicians. Time did not prove them wrong.

It would be a truism to state that the war in Ukraine has had (and will continue to have) crucial consequences for the future of the European continent. It offers real opportunities

[8] On 22 November 2021, Australia signed an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom within the framework of the trilateral defence alliance known as AUKUS. The agreement would allow Australia to equip with nuclear-propulsion submarines. It brought about the cancellation of a contract worth €55 billion agreed earlier with France for the purchase of 12 diesel-electric submarines. It has therefore led to a crisis between Paris and Canberra (Le Figaro, 2021).

for a profound change in the European security and defence policies in two ways. “Reawakened” EU member states will definitely invest more in their defence within the EU structures -which gives hope for the future of the so far uncommon foreign and security policy.

The second line of thought is that the transatlantic Alliance has regained a momentum and proved that it has not become obsolete. The US authorities have become more willing to be engaged in Europe, and the Europeans have lesser doubts on the future of NATO. Political decisions and actions that have been taken since the beginning of the “special operation” suggest that this trend will dominate for years -most probably, decades.

It is important to see that the parallel security-and-defence-related developments in the EU and NATO lead to a synergy. They are not detrimental to each other, as some experts and policymakers argue. The empowered NATO will certainly compensate the weaknesses of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Thanks to the war in Ukraine, Europeans are better disposed to understand the futility of NATO-versus-CSDP debates.

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The EU in the "New War" Concept and The War in Ukraine[1]

Sezgin Mercan[*]

Policies pursued under current conditions such as complex relation networks, identity politics, interdependencies, globalization, market dynamics, as well as the multiplicity of actors on the national and international levels have transformed war. The result of this transformation is the new wars. Those who study the European Union (EU) face two pillars when analyzing the new wars. There are the realists who emphasize "cold peace" and liberals who point to the importance of "hot peace". The liberal perspective in the context of the EU has been generally accepted. This has some reference points. First, in the EU, ranging from the spheres of economy to law there is a wide degree of cooperation. Second, authority may be transferred to supranational institutions. These may be increased.

In a study of the new war concept, another reference needs to be made to the geopolitical perspective. Classical approaches to geopolitics emphasize domination over an area. Critical geopolitical perspective on the other hand points towards political structures and stresses the internal-external and domestic-foreign divides, and cultural traits and interpretations. This per-spective evaluates under what circumstances security, threat, fear, and violence may be defined. It would be apt to add to this the fact that the monopoly on war no longer only belongs to the nation-state. Now wars are shaped by actors other than regular armies and such actors fight against regular armies themselves. A shift has also happened from an enemy-centered per-spective to a people-centered perspective. Another shift can also be seen from state security to human security. Mutual interpretations and interpretive

[1] This article was written reconsidering the article of the author: "Yeni Savaşların Avrupa Birliği ve NATO'da Yarattığı Etkiler: Uluslararası Kurumlarda Zorunlu Dönüşüm", in Erhan Büyükakıncı editor. *Savaşın Dönüşümü: Yeni Dinamikler, Aktörler ve Araçlar*. Ankara: Adres Yayınları; 2021, p. 591-634.

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processes have gained an importance. Thus, not just military security but also social psychology, manageient and organization, have become areas of importance for the contexts of human and public security.

The EU has prioritized developing a common foreign and security policy since the 1990's. This development, in a process ongoing to this day, has shifted towards conflict prevention. In other words, a shift has happened from the period of classic wars with its hard power characteristics to the new period's soft power characteristics. Yet, the EU has not been able to restrain its need for hard power. The EU has needed law enforcement officers to prevent conflict and to intervene during crises. In time, on the international and regional levels, developments that required the use of force have shown the EU's shortcomings. To remedy this, the EU has specifically focused on its member states collective conduct, multilateralism, and openness to dialogue. It has been found that conflict diverges into various dimensions on the points where border conflict turns to identity conflicts, and the physical violence aspects of classic wars to conflict resolutions. The EU is also working to face these dimensions.

In this article, the concept of new war will be concretized through the crisis management tendencies and operations of international organizations such as the EU and through the debates on security and intervention from states to the international system. First, the concept of new war will be defined in a way that will help to understand the cases and transformations in this chapter. Next, the EU's foreign and security policy alongside counterterrorism practices will be examined by considering its security and global strategies. Following this, the kinds of transformations facing the EU will be examined, with its new responsibilities and in the context of the Ukraine War.

Reflections of the "New War" concept on the EU

Crises and conflicts during globalization have been taken on under the new war concept. The changing nature of war after the Cold War has necessitated a focus on the external ties of civil wars and the local sources of global conflicts. The new war period has necessitated a

focus on international ties and complex relational networks, and has corresponded to a difficult process. Contrary to the old wars, which included ideological and geopolitical goals, in the new wars identity politics came to the fore. The goals are no longer to capture territory through military means, but to steer society through the instruments of political control. As a consequence, in the new wars, political and armed violence may be directed towards the civil population. These actions may result in infringements of human rights, migration, refugees, and displaced persons amongst other tragic humanitarian problems (Post, 2015, p. 76).

The fundamental elements of the new wars, identity politics, the decentralized distribution of violence, the globalization of the war economy, have become globally apparent. The new war considers identity politics, and the attempts at entrenching an identity to be at the base of political violence. Crime networks that go beyond national borders, terrorist attacks on the global scale, and drug wars emerge as new grounds for violence (Kaldor, 2012, p. 185, 186; Sheehan, 2013, p. 152). Liberal democracies have tended to fight ideological wars against illiberal threats. Consequently, explanations at the international level have gained a specific importance. Under such conditions the future tendencies of security policies have been uncertain. In many parts of the world, the economic crises in states or groups of states have been liable to lead to large waves of protests, and these may have the effect of progressively lessening trust in political institutions. As such, states facing untraditional threats have had to further embrace new approaches to security (Kaldor, 2012, p. 187, 188).

In the process of history, wars have transformed from the pre-nation-state conditions to the unconventional conditions in which nation-states and other international actors participate. This transformation happened along the transformations from an agrarian society to a knowledge society, and from the sword to the technologically advanced tools of warfare. Amongst others, those such as Martin van Creveld and Qiao Liang may be added to the list of references who have studied the great conflicts among great powers and made contributions to the topic (Gürcan, 2012, p. 75, 76; Creveld, 2002, p. 3-15). The situation of war without fronts which can be seen in unconventional warfare has emphasized references to abstract concepts such as resolve and determination rather than the classical and concrete military aims. Psychological and ideological aims have also been added to the list. Wars, besides being

a military topic, now also have the status of being damaging to civilians and also including civilian's struggle. In other words, war has now become a means of political, military, and social struggle. New strategies of war now include both military and civil dimensions. Conflict zones now also include settlements with significant civilian populations. In this situation, new wars must take account of the public and its circumstances. In fact, getting the public's support while fighting a war has now become considerably important. After the World War II and beginning with the Cold War, in current conditions, through the parliament, national opinion has become more interested in foreign and security policy decisions. In the possible case of an operation, for the members of parliament, it has become a priority to first garner national support (Gürcan, 2012, p. 92-107).

Another reading of this tendency may be made in the context of the expanded security concepts. Security studies under contemporary conditions, alongside the national security concept focused on elements such as state, sovereignty, territorial integrity, military power, now takes as a fundamental reference point: societal security which includes social groups and different identities, human security which includes individuals, the environment and life standards, environmental security and its emphasis on ecosystemic protection, gender security and its examination of social gender relations, minorities, solidarity and patriarchy (Sandıklı and Emeklier, 2012, p. 27).

When looked at the historical process, it can be seen that realist mechanisms have led to a cold peace in Europe whereas liberal strategies led to a warm peace. From liberal perspectives, the emergence of warm peace in Europe depends on the democratization of states such as Germany which is key to the security of Europe. An important role may be attributed to liberal strategies for achieving regional peace (Miller, 2010, p. 134).

Table 1 – Cycle of War and Peace (Miller, 2010, p. 136)

Force is actively used	**War is possible in the short-term**	**War is possible, but not in the short-term**	**War is not likely, but it is not unthinkable**	**War is nearly unthinkable**
Hot War	Cold War	Cold Peace	Normal Peace	High-level peace
			Warm peace	

Table 1 presents a separation based on regional security outputs and the war and peace outputs in light of the possibility of war. Hot war is the use of force for the purposes of destroying the military capabilities of the enemy. After the World War II, the Middle East was regarded as one of the regions where the use of force was intensive. The Arab – Israeli Conflicts, Iran – Iraq War and the Gulf Wars during and after the Cold War were the foremost examples of hot wars. The term cold war on the other hand corresponds to a situation of negative peace. In other words, the parties involved, while are not yet in a situation of hot war, are under conditions where war is momentarily possible. The parties involved are capable of managing crises without the need for war. Although they can not be said to be willing to solve the fundamental issues in-between them. As the parties wish to coerce and have a deterrent force over one another. When deterrence is out of the picture, they lose the ability to coerce and pressure one another. While diplomacy plays a significant role between the parties, the form of diplomacy is violent. In other words, military tools are used for diplomatic purposes. Defining interests and guarantees, the drawing of red lines are taken in this context. There is an aspect of cold war which also covers the diplomacy of hot war, as indicated by ceasefire agreements. Cold peace, has a structure that is protected by formal

agreements and diplomacy amongst the parties. Although far from a complete solution, the underlying causes of the conflict are softened. Although the use of force in the near future is unlikely, the threat of the use of force in the long-term exists as international and regional conditions change, and the parties further empower themselves leading to the security dilemma. The possibility of war in a warm peace is highly unlikely and parties are in a relationship of cooperation. Warm peace is also divided into normal and high-level peace (Miller, 2010, p. 135-36). The likelihood of war is lower in a normal peace in contrast to a cold peace, as the parties have solved most problems between them. States recognize the sovereignty of one another, and have a mutual understanding on topics such as borders and resource usage (Miller, 2010, p. 137).

High-level peace instead emphasizes the sustainability of the peace. The parties do not consider the possibility of armed conflict between them in the foreseeable future. They also do not perceive a threat between them. Whether or not international, regional, or national conditions change the parties do not expect war. Hence, such states do not have preparations for war. To settle disputes, they follow institutionalized principles. Under these conditions, amongst the parties a pluralistic security community is formed (Miller, 2010, p. 137).

In current conditions, Europe corresponds to a state of high-level peace. There are factors that support such a view. These factors go beyond a realist peace and reflect liberal expectations in international relations. First is an expanded scope of cooperative action in the spheres of economy, law, culture amongst others. Second, the deepened integration and the transfer of authority in certain areas of sovereignty to supranational institutions. Third, the cooperation between interest groups and multinational corporations, and the relations which go beyond national borders and cover the free movement of goods and services. Fourth, is the cooperation and partnership between the military units of differing states. Fifth, is the creation of a security community where the change in other states military capabilities are not regarded as a threat. Sixth, the creation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Finally, thanks to the Lisbon Treaty, is the conjoining of the EU's foreign policy with a strong foreign representative supported by a network of international diplomats (Miller, 2010, p. 139).

As can be seen in Table 2, for the realist perspectives, while peace making is attempted through arms control or reduction, this corresponds to a cold peace and there is the possibility of war between states. On the other hand, for the liberal perspectives, there is a vision of warm peace through democratization. Granted, realists question whether or not democracy can always lead to a warm peace (Miller, 2010, p. 139,140).

Table 2 – Types of peace and the means of achieving them (Miller, 2010, p. 141)

Goals vis-à-vis the adversary	**Offensive**	**Defensive**
Realism	Cold peace through hegemony	Balancing/Cold war/peace through deterrence and arms control
Liberalism	Warm peace through democracy	Multilateralism/Global and regional cooperation /Warm peace through integration

The 2003 Iraq War can be taken in this scope, EU member states welcomed democratization in Iraq, yet they opposed the use of force to create a regime change. Conversely, the United States (U.S.) emphasized the necessity of regime change, accusing the regime of supporting

terrorism and argued that change may also be achieved through the use of force. The realist tendency which rules U.S. foreign policy, has not been sufficient to create a European type of high-level peace (Miller, 2010, p. 152).

A look at history would have shown that what prevented the global powers from being drawn into a nuclear war during the Cold War was an international policy that involved efforts to control nuclear armaments. It is of course arguable how necessary it is to have such a viewpoint regarding arms control in post-Cold War period. The ever-changing world order and international conditions lead to the rise of new questions. The classical approach to geopolitics still holds its relevance. The reflections of this can be found in the U.S.' attempts at sustaining its international military dominance and its attempts at associating this with modernization and democratization. States, NGOs, and social movements may be in cooperation regarding arms control. In this matter and regarding counter actions against armament such as, who owns what type of weapons, where the weapons are used, and which types of weapons are used come to the forefront. Another question raised is on which parties are a part or not a part of treaties on arms control and disarmament. This is the point where critical geopolitics enter the fray. Critical geopolitics focuses on the conditions in which security, danger, threat, fear, and violence are defined. It also emphasizes the importance of the tendencies of states regarding all the concepts regarding armament and arms control (Dalby, 2011, p. 42, 43).

The opposition to the Iraqi War in 2003 in the international arena, the reaction against the use of weapons, and a general anti-war tendency has constrained political action. Morality, consent, and political popularity have been altogether elements regarded as valuable by peace activists worldwide. The emphasis on morality may be overshadowed due to its possible harm to some geopolitical fictions. In other words, hostilities used to mobilize people and the resulting armament is a geopolitical fiction that suffers by the emphasis on morality. The victor in this competition is often geopolitics (Dalby, 2011, p. 50-52).

Reminiscent of classical geopolitical tools, and corresponding to the new wars, there have been certain tendencies in the development of armed forces in Europe Post-Cold War period. First is the professionalization of armed forces. Secondary is the changing functionality. In

the past armed forces were focused on the protection of national borders, now armed forces are focused on participation in peace operations, humanitarian interventions, and crisis management. Third, is the internationalization of missions. Fourth, the decreasing attractiveness of the armed forces from the perspective of human resources. Fifth, in the public perspective, the progressively decreasing socializing role of the armed forces. Sixth, the complex nature of civil – military relations regarding education, services, and personnel recruitment. Consequentially, what is happening is not a reproduction of classical geopolitics, but operationalizing the new roles and approaches necessitated by the change of war (Malešič, 2005, p. 1, 2).

There are six points regarding the new military roles. First, the protection of national borders in the classical sense. Second, the state of war requiring mobilization, again in the classical sense. Three, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions. Fourth, defense diplomacy. Fifth, internal military support. And sixth is the internal security operations. These are not independent of each other but complementary. For example, counterterrorism is necessary for the defense of national borders. Peacekeeping operations are also conducive to national security. International military cooperation regarding peacekeeping operations are an element of defense diplomacy (Malešič, 2005, p. 2).

Henceforth, on the road from the great power conflicts to the regional and international effects of interstate conflicts, it has become a natural characteristic of global politics that states suffer from acts of low-level violence. Some readings regard this as heralding an oncoming state of anarchy.

The increasing participation of the international society in global events in which the civilian – military divide is increasingly muddied, and the regional effects aggravated due to international migration and moves towards rearmament, has led to the internationalization of the new wars. The EU is attempting to respond to this internationalization (Cottey, 2013, p. 45-47).

The New Wars and the changing EU

The EU is a regional union attempting to adapt to the changing conditions of war by defining and undertaking new missions. To show what the changing conditions of war and the new missions correspond to, first it is necessary to define the dimensions of conflict which closely interest the EU. Border conflict is the most classical of these dimensions. Since the 1990's, classic border conflict has been waning in the EU. As an example, the tensions stemming from the conflict between Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania regarding minorities have been settled through the EU's international conventions on the protection of minorities, and through the first half of the 2000's, arrangements have been made regarding the case. Disagreements have also led to border conflict. The debate around the status of Gibraltar between Spain and England is one example, the matter has been settled by the EU's legislation regarding external border management in a way that will not result in instability. Border disputes may also stem from perceptions. Greece and Macedonia have had a conflict regarding borders and on naming. Greece has persuaded the EU that Macedonia should be called the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the matter was settled. Conflicts may also be based on subordination, here the use of physical force can be seen. The border conflicts of the Yugoslavian Wars are an example. The EU at first, while the war was at the stage of border conflicts, was ineffective. Only when the conflict emerged as a conflict of subordination was the EU capable of transforming the conflict using the matter of integration. There are dimensions of these conflicts which intertwine with each other. Identity conflicts may also involve physical violence. It must be understood that when conflict moves beyond a subordination conflict to an identity conflict that conflict resolution is at work. Yet when identity conflict is in the process of reverting to a subordination conflict, stability is at risk of breaking down. Israel – Palestine is the most typical example. Conflict resolution and the reaction to the new wars is aimed at preventing such turns. The EU involves a vision that includes this vision (Diez, Stetter, and Albert, 2004, p. 6-10).

To make a more grounded analysis of the EU's reaction to the changing war, alongside conflict dimensions and visions, it is necessary to scrutinize the EU's current perspective

towards international relations. The EU is an actor which approaches international relations from a socially and economically liberal perspective. The EU places itself as a soft-power and transformative actor through an emphasis of universal values, but at the same time it is also an actor that pursues operational and defensive policies and needs to portray itself as an actor with low-intensity hard power. With the shift from classical wars to the new wars in global politics, the EU has also shifted its strategic vision from a focus on security to a focus on the global. In other words, security strategy has left its place to global strategy, a transformation from the exclusionary aspect of the former to the inclusive aspect of the latter. Finally, in the context of geopolitical approaches, the EU has added on the conception of the geography of EU member states to the already established geographical definition of continental Europe. Through this, a European identity and its constituent elements have been conceptualized and defined and made a point of reference.

Based on these issues that define the international political perspective, the EU is in a position of trial in the context of the new war. If the EU is a global power, its capacity to achieve security must be at around the level of its members, although it may even be accepted as greater. This assumption imagines a militarily united EU and involves a traditional defensive model. The threats targeting the EU are presumed to be coming from states with weapons of mass-destruction and states which support terrorism. In such a context, the question that needs to be asked is how well the EU can protect itself with a traditional defensive model against the new wars? The discrimination of states outside the EU borders on the matters such as corruption or weak political institutions presents a situation that feeds the new wars. The EU as a peace project featuring a philosophy of the Enlightenment, presents a transnational ground for dispute settlement and reconciliation similar to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The reason why a classical war between France and Germany is now unthinkable is precisely due to this reconciliatory ground. A cosmopolitan approach to Europe and global security will work to bring together states in conflict, and to ensure the transnationalization of armed forces. Representatives of such an approach are the EU, NATO, the United Nations (UN), and even the African Union. What is mainly important is how security is reconceptualized and not the names of this or that union or organization. With this reconceptualization, security includes political and

economic approaches, and institutions which transcend borders are defined as international law-makers (Kaldor, 2012, p. 196-198).

As a representative of both security and the reconceptualization of war, the EU's foreign policy perceptions are of particular importance. While studying the EU's foreign policy perceptions, the Common Foreign and Security Policy upon which member states agreed and cooperated for, comes to the fore. In the 2000's and the early 2010's, no EU member state has been directly threatened regarding territorial integrity. As such, a leading element of the classical war which is national defense has, for the EU, lost its relevancy. In that period, what was relevant for the EU was the matters of counterterrorism, crisis management, peacekeeping, and stabilization and so on (Zuhssipbek, 2009, p. 73, 74).

The Treaty of Maastricht, which was a cornerstone in European integration, compromises the aims of strengthening the security of the EU and its member states, ensuring international peace along the principles of the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter, developing and expanding international cooperation, and the expansion of democracy, the rule-of-law, human rights and the fundamental liberties (Smith, 2000, p. 153). Europe with the end of the Cold War has faced new and unexpected threats at the national and the international level. Anti-democratic states, economic crises, international terror, ethnic conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, organized crime, crisis of governance of states, infringements of human rights and the rule-of-law, are amongst the foremost national, regional, and international threats to the EU. The EU's attempts to combat such threats has led the EU to advance common foreign policy methods and use a variety of foreign policy tools as can be seen in the Maastricht Treaty (Cameron, 2007, p. 173, 174). Combating international crime especially after the events of September 11, 2001, has been of particular importance for the EU. However much the European Community in the 1970's had also targeted international crime. September 11 was when this struggle against international crime gained new dimensions and served as a breaking point. So much so that the EU Commission arranged an emergency meeting on 21 September 2001 and decided upon a new counterterrorism action plan. This plan has led to a first, the preparation of a list of organizations considered to be terrorist organizations by the EU (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2006, p. 70). At the same time this was aimed to enhance the cooperation

between law enforcement and law, the development of international law mechanisms, fighting the financing of terrorism, advancement of aviation-security, and to coordinate the EU's global actions on these areas.[2]

The 2001 Gothenburg Program and the 2003 European Security Strategy are the products of this process. Gothenburg Program was accepted with the purpose of preventing violent conflicts. The main points of the program are, the determination of political priorities on the actions regarding conflict prevention, early-warning systems in the face of conflict, ensuring the unity of action and policy, and the development of long-term and short-term solutions towards conflict resolution processes, also the construction of a cooperative relationship between states, and related other institutions and organizations regarding conflict prevention. For the first time in EU history, there has been an official document regarding global security, this was the *European Security Strategy*. The Strategy, taking into consideration the principle of multilateralism, aimed to find the sources of security problems such as poverty, lack of education, anti-democratic tendencies and so on. Parallel to this was the development of the *preventive engagement* concept. In other words, hard power based on military capabilities was put on the background of a soft power based on political, economic, and social capabilities (Solana, 2003; Cameron, 2007, p. 174, 176).

Post-September 11 period and under the scope of international counterterrorism, the EU focused on the prevention of terror attacks and the development of necessary tools for it, and aimed to strengthen cooperation. Conflict prevention and crisis management requires a strategic framework under the scope of security. European Security Strategy has given the EU such a framework. In the strategy, the main threats were taken as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. In the fight against these threats, the EU has worked to put to the front soft power tools such as export controls rather than military methods, political and economic pressure, intelligence gathering, humanitarian tools, and civil society (Cornish, 2005, p. 809, 810). Cooperation with international organizations was also regarded as important. Especially post-September

[2] For a look at the decisions of the emergency meeting see, European Council (2001) *Conclusions and Plan of Action of The Extraordinary European Council Meeting*,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20972/140en.pdf, (Accessed: 15.01.2020).

11, the further strengthening of EU– NATO relations can be seen. In the fight against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear proliferation, and counterterrorism a cooperative approach was taken by both organizations. Under these conditions, European Security and Defense Policy was also strengthened (Cornish, 2005, p. 816, 818).

The emphasis on soft power in the EU's strategy does not necessarily mean that hard power may not be utilized. In the process of time and due to the necessity of the international conditions, the EU has progressively needed to use hard power, especially in the 1990's the experience of war in the Balkans has led the EU to enhance cooperation in the area of security. The EU, stemming from its failure in solving a war on its own continent, has focused on its weakness in political integration. In order to grant the EU the potential capability of solving international crisis and thus to increase its standing in international matters, member states signed the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. After that, in 1998 under the leadership of the UK and France, the Saint Malo Summit was organized with the aim of further EU-NATO cooperation. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Petersberg Tasks were defined which covered humanitarian missions, rescue operations, peacekeeping, and crisis management. With the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the European Security and Defense Policy was implemented (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2006, p. 72). In this summit, it was decided to enhance the EU's crisis management capabilities. According to this, it was seen fit to have 50.000 to 60.000 military forces to be ready in the span of 60 days if necessary to undertake missions regarding humanitarian help, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management. Nearly two years after this decision, an event occurred where the Helsinki decisions would be tested, the September 11 attacks. September 11 showed that the EU was not ready or too weak to take military action and manage crises in times of emergency. The emergency summit after the events of September 11, put to the front fundamentally non-military topics such as a definition of terrorism, procedures of arrest, and help to Afghanistan (Cornish, 2005, p. 802, 803).

A major step in enhancing the EU's military capacity was the establishment of the European Defense Agency in 2004. The aim was to increase the EU's defensive capabilities under the scope of crisis management and to enhance European military industries. The Feira Summit of 2000 also pointed to the need to increase civil capacities and to support peacekeeping

missions (Cornish, 2005, p. 805). Various missions have been undertaken in this direction. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Georgia, and Iraq are amongst the foremost missions (Cornish, 2005, p. 807). In the EU Summit of December 2009, the Stockholm Program was accepted for the period of 2010-2014, through this it was aimed to gain new perspectives towards internal security with the presumption of the EU as an international actor. In other words, the EU had externalized internal security. The EU's externalization of the EU's internal security was based on four fundamental factors. First is the union of EU's internal security goals with its foreign relations strategy. Second, cooperation with third parties (non-EU states). Third, to work towards increasing capabilities in non-member states. Fourth, to work together with international organizations and to have common missions. As can be understood from these factors, the Stockholm Program's internal security goals were united with foreign policy strategy, with the view that a strong foreign policy would ensure achieving internal security goals. The program, in conjunction with internal security, has determined geographical priorities in-line with the third factor. Accordingly, regional priorities of foreign policy strategy which affect internal security were defined as organized crime and corruption in the West Balkans, the states participating in the European Neighborhood Policy in the context of upholding the rule-of-law and combating corruption, Black Sea states regarding border control and migration management and transborder crimes, border control and drug-trafficking in the Mediterranean states, and West African states regarding international crimes and drug-trafficking (Monar, 2010, p. 26-35).

In the EU, the social and defensive aspects of security are generally apparent. In terms of social security, it is aimed to protect economic and fiscal interests, and to ensure the security of the environment, culture and language, and health. Uncontrolled migration, organized crime, instability in states neighboring the EU, failed states, global conflicts, populations in poverty and terrorism are regarded as sources of threat by the EU (Anderson, 2007, p. 36). The EU's counterterrorism past dating back to the 1970's, due to the shortcomings of the EU in the face of terrorist activities has progressively led to a sense of need for a common stance and action against terrorism. In 1976, as a consequence of this necessity, at the level of the European Community, TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extreme Violence International)

consultation system was formed. TREVI aimed to enhance operational and political cooperation between member states regarding counterterrorism (Kedikli, 2006, p. 56). In addition, in 1985 the European Community, a limited participation Schengen Agreement was agreed upon. Member states to this agreement, required a comprehensive cooperation which common action against unlawful activities including terrorism. The agreement signed by the states of France, Germany, and the BENELUX, concerned the removal of internal borders, cooperation between law enforcement and border guards, and precautions regarding international crime and illegal immigration. While the agreement allowed suspects and terrorists to be watched beyond national borders, it did not allow trans-border arrests. In 1990, the Schengen II Agreement was signed which was accepted by all members except the UK, Ireland, and Denmark. Through this agreement, Schengen Information System (SIS) was activated which held information on registered persons and allowed the sharing of information. Due to this, the system became important tool in fighting international crime and for counterterrorism activities alongside enhancing cross-border law-enforcement and judicial cooperation. In later period, to combat terrorism, the drug trade, and other international crime, EUROPOL was formed to ensure cooperation (Kedikli, 2006, p. 58).

EU member states are also practicing their own national security policies and strategies in light of international developments. Member states may develop unilateral, multilateral, or regional cooperation amongst themselves. Yet the insufficiency of this has led to the development of tools conducive to cooperation at the EU level. These tools are first EUROPOL, which can ensure the prediction of potential threats through analyses of possible future scenarios. Second, the action programs developed to plan, program, and analyze results so as to ensure the best possible response to threats. To this extent, the EU Civil Protection was formed to coordinate the response of member states to rising threats. EUROPOL is preparing the ground for the cooperation of offices with the authority for legal sanctions. EUROJUST enhances the cooperation and effectiveness of judicial authorities. FRONTEX, ensures cooperation regarding the protection of EU borders (European Council, 2010, p. 16-18).

A reference to the EU's strategic culture needs to be made in cases where the EU has used force or forceful tools. The strategy culture is a constrictor or a facilitator of policies for a

strategic actor. When studying the EU's strategic culture, it is necessary to take note of the fact that the 2003 European Security Strategy is positioned as an important value for the EU and member states have an inclusive approach in regard to this. Through this, security goes beyond a matter of interest between member states. With the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world, as in the world, the EU has also faced a change in security conditions. This transformation has laid a significant role of security on the EU. As priorly mentioned, the EU originated as a peace project, before taking on the role of an actor in the provision of global security. This peaceful origin had an effect on constraining the EU's military action. Yet, and as referenced in the security strategy, the EU through adding international intervention to its strategic culture has taken the potential to break through this constriction (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 517).

National security strategies generally have an aspect that is shaped by the specific national experiences of war. The EU's strategy, which on one hand, has to take account of its origins as a European peace project, and on the other hand, has been shown to be weak due to developments that require the use of force at the regional or international levels. The EU Security Strategy has included that one of the fundamental tasks of the EU is to ensure regional stability, and points out that the EU can take responsibility at the global level to provide security. In addition, it has emphasized that the EU has a responsibility to spread universal values in its neighborhood. The weakness of the military force aspect of the strategy is due to the lack of a mutual agreement amongst member states (Nordheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 524, 525).

In the European Security Strategy, the one reference to the necessity for the use of force is in the case of re-establishing order in failed states. After 2003, member states have come to view the necessity for the use of military force to further the EU's international capacity and political weight. They also considered participations in military operations would enhance hard power. Yet, an EU with strengthening hard power would eventually contradict its normative narrative. (Nordheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 525, 526). The EU, attempts to avoid this contradiction through a profile of benign interventionism. The EU also attempts to maintain its peaceful profile by avoiding identifying specific enemies (Nordheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 527, 528). These attempts, has made clear that the EU Security Strategy's most

significant project, effective multilateralism, is to be the basic tenet of an international order constructed by the EU. Through this tenet, it was emphasized the need to develop a solution process based on cooperation and dialogue between interested parties. It has been emphasized that international peace and security depends on international law (Mercan, 2008, p. 16-20).

The EU's 2016 Global Strategy is directing member states towards a collective approach to achieve its security goals. This direction includes international and regional cooperation where needed. The Global Strategy which defines the priorities of the EU in the international arena, has put forward terrorism, hybrid threats, economies vulnerabilities, climate change, energy insecurity as the threats facing the EU. It has also pointed out that cooperation with alliances such as NATO may enhance EU's collective security. It has also determined that a comprehensive approach towards conflict is needed to construct peace and human security. It has underlined the necessity to work at the different levels of administration at the local, national, regional, and global (European Union Global Strategy, 2016, p. 9, 10). Amongst the principal tenets of the strategy is to keep the parties at the negotiating table and to maintain multilateralism. The creation of a new multilateralism was aimed at through: reforming multilateralism in cooperation with the UN, to increase funding, improve its practice, creation of regional and smart multilateralisms, to deepen it through various agreements. Such a multilateralism must also be in consideration of the matters of migration, climate change, and human rights. The operation of a decision-making mechanism supported by intelligence agencies, the strengthening of the EU's capability to conduct joint-operations with NATO through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the activation of sea-space-cyber security strategies were amongst the strategic reactions the EU has made in reaction to the new international security conditions. At the same time, new references have been created on conflict and crisis management. It has suggested a policy of resilience to increase the states capacity on the topics of security, migration, law, finance, education, health, food security, and employment. African states are the first example. The EU, for conflict resolution, has embraced an *integrated* approach paying heed to the identity, socio-economic, environment, and energy factors (The European Union's Global Strategy: Three Years On, Looking Forward, 2019, p. 10-26).

For the EU, global strategy is a long-term survival strategy. Besides being a security management roadmap, it is also a tool that enables the proactive protection of the EU's standing in the international arena. The EU has been pursuing the principle of effective multilateralism since 2003, and this was reflected both in the contemporary sensitivities of the EU's security strategy and is still reflected in the new global strategy. The EU still stands against unilateral intervention and operations. As such, there can be said to be a continuity in both of the EU's strategic framework (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 375, 376, 379). European Security Strategy, has been a tool to support the EU's role as an international actor and to prevent division against the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The EU Global Strategy on the other hand is regarding the tasks of keeping the peace and security in Europe. From this perspective, while the security strategy is a micro-scale, the global strategy is macro-scale (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 382). The EU Global Strategy when contrasted with the Security Strategy, contains more concrete and modest aims. At the same time, in a more threatening security environment, has a more idealistic content. It has also created concepts such as p*rincipled pragmatism* and *common responsibility* (Davis Cross, 2016, p. 404) As an act of reconceptualization, liberal democracies in the conditions of new wars are also in a state of ideological war against illiberal threats. This is also a type of interpretation (Giannessi, 2017, p. 10). Under the conditions of ideological war, questions regarding the EU's process of integration and its future are tried to be overcome by a new strategic vision. How the relations with the non-EU world will develop in the future are attempted to be answered by the EU Global Strategy. It is in this answer where the EU's aims of transforming its security through a global economic and political model lies (Gianessi, 2017, p. 27).

As the EU enhances its own security, it has attempted to pursue this through not just strategies, but through policies (and the revisioning of policies) towards its near neighborhood. The European Neighborhood Policy is an important example of this. The policy, pursued since 2004, was first revised in 2011, which stemmed from the hardships the policy faced as a result of the Arab Spring. With this revision, the EU decided to give financial support to the states party to the policy based on their levels of reform-making. The Arab Spring has led to radical changes in many countries party to the European Neighborhood Policy on the matters of stability, welfare, and security. The European Neighborhood Policy

was revised again in 2015 due to these conditions. With this revision, the aim was to enhance the resilience of partners. This aim is in parallel to the EU's current Global Strategy. Alongside this, the EU has put importance to designing win-win policies in accordance with its aims of realizing global governance with the presumption that this necessitates strong cooperation with neighboring states. The EU has taken interest in not just global governance, but also governance at the local, national, and regional levels. The civil wars in Syria and Libya have been current areas of action for the EU. Yet these areas have posed significant challenges to the EU.

At the first stage, the Syrian Civil War, has threatened and created contradictions regarding the EU's civil and normative power. This war has made it hard for the EU to turn its soft power theory into actual practice. Because such civil wars create security concerns for international actors as well as local actors. Prevention of terrorist activities and establishing stability gain importance while coercive methods and military force can come to the fore. However, the EU has, in the first stages of the war chosen non-military methods of intervention, in the later stages changing circumstances could have changed the EU's methods as military operation emerged as a strong option as the war went on. The character of civil power necessitates the mobilization of international and regional actors to cooperate, but the EU could not succeed in establishing such a cooperation in Syria. The disagreement between France and the U.S. regarding the creation of buffer zones and no-fly zones, and the unsuccessful talks held to change Russian and Chinese positions on Syria point to a weakness in the EU's policy (Mercan, 2012).

In the second stage was the refugee crisis stemming from the Syrian Civil War. The refugees had hoped to reach Europe, while the EU did not present an attractive profile. EU member states, who regarded the refugee crisis as a problem of sovereignty, did not only regard refugees as an economic and social problem, but also a security problem. Especially with the 2005 refugee wave to Spain, the EU took refugees as a serious problem and tried to combat illegal immigration waves. The effects of the economic crisis, integration problems, and the problems surrounding the sustainability of common policies facing the EU left the refugee crisis without a solution, yet the crisis itself continued to reproduce the EU's problems regarding further integration (Mercan, 2015).

The War in Ukraine and the EU

Ukraine reflects a geostrategic importance for the EU. This importance includes a fault-line based on regional political conflicts in which geostrategic interests of Russia and the EU collide. These conflicts arise from competing territorial claims as seen in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. These types of conflicts include state and non-state armed actors and also have a risk of unpredictability. In recent years, eastern Ukraine has been added to these conflicts. The EU has avoided engaging these territorial conflicts keeping reluctance to confront Russia until Ukraine war. It is acceptable to say the EU has been changing its position since Russian-Georgian war of 2008. This war rised EU criticism against Russia's use of force and violation of international law with military operation in Georgia. But the top point for this criticism is current Ukraine war. Russian support for separatism in the eastern regions of Ukraine, Donbas and Luhansk since 2014, promoted conflictual relationships. The EU's agreements, reforms, and financial programes for Ukraine have triggered Russia's reaction considering regional and global security dynamics (Jayasundara-Smits, 2018, p. 457). Although the EU has kept reservation about entering the geostrategic conflicts with Russia, Ukraine war has become a symbolic case for changing and revising positions of three parties (Jayasundara-Smits, 2018, p. 460).

The relationship between the EU and Ukraine is based on assistance for building a stronger and more viable democratic state. It is known that Ukrainians want to form a more democratic state and closer ties with Europe. The EU accepts Ukraine as a priority partner country and as strategic country for its own interests. This mutual understanding between two countries has been strengthened through Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994, the European Neighbourhood Policy of 2003, and the Eastern Partnership Programme of 2009. In addition to these agreements, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement of 2014 became new pillar of the relations between two parties (Jayasundara-Smits, 2018, p. 456, 457). The EU has attached a meaning to its relations with Ukraine over prosperity after 2009 and security after 2014. After 2015, European Neighbourhood Policy has strengthened security dimension of the relations. Ukraine case became important pillar of the EU's

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. The EU has provided civilian assistance to Ukraine while emphasizing the importance of both civilian and military capabilities in international area (Shea and Jaroszewicz, 2021, p. 166). The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Ukraine aimed to strengthen border security and make the authority and legitimacy of local law enforcement, judiciary, police and security agencies more powerful. The EU's border assistance for Ukraine has been operating since 2005 (Loschi and Russo, 2021, p. 1492, 1493).

The EU organized two basic missions in Ukraine called EU Border Assistance Mission and EU Advisory Mission. EU External Action Service defined Border Asistance Mission as "to harmonise border control, and customs and trade standards and procedures with those in EU Member States. It helps to improve cross-border cooperation between the border guard and customs agencies and other law enforcement bodies and to facilitate international coordinated cooperation."[3] EU Advisory Mission aimed to assist the Ukrainian authorities in reforming the civil security sector. It felt negative effect of competition between the Eurasian Economic Union of Russia and Eastern Partnership of the EU. Some internal inefficiencies in the EU and disagreements between its actions and Ukrainian authorities' expectations decreased of EU initiatives about border management and security sector reform in Ukraine (Loschi and Russo, 2021, p. 1503).

There are two milestones for the EU to rebuilt relations with Ukraine. The first was Maidan revolution. The second was annexation of Crimea. The Maidan revolution encouraged the EU to get involved in Ukraine's reform process. This was a necessity of CSDP missions. Civil democratic control is at the core of CSDP assistance and the existence of civilian rather than military institutions is important for the EU. Patrol police and criminal investigation troops became basic references for the EU to implement a cooperation with citizens (Shea and Jaroszewicz, 2021, p. 169). After Maidan revolution, the EU's assistance to Ukraine concentrated on the military, the police, and military-industrial complex. But the EU alone was not enough to fulfill the requirements of these areas. NATO partnership and support was in a critical position (Shea and Jaroszewicz, 2021, p. 173). Global, regional and geopolitical

[3] For details see European Union External Action, https://eubam.org/what-we-do/.

tensions necessitated closer cooperation between the EU and NATO. Military aid of NATO and the role of the US remain critical. The EU continues to be considered as an economic rather than security or military actor (Shea and Jaroszewicz, 2021, p. 174).

The nature of the EU initiatives before the annexation of Crimea was based on conflict management and peace-building. After Crimea's annexation to Russia, the EU focused on state-building in Ukraine by promoting political and economic reforms. The annexation necessitated a combination between hard and soft policy instruments for the EU. But the EU faced with some difficulties while implementing a state-building role because of conflicting and unilateral foreign policy of Russia towards Ukraine. Russia effect on Ukraine made the EU's reinforcement and integration activities limited. In other words, Russia had capabilities to constrain the EU's actions in Ukraine. Crimea's annexation created new opportunity for Russia to constrain the EU. Besides, ongoing war process had created extra opportunity to strengthen its geostrategic dominance in the region. Former special advisor to President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Fyodor Lukyanov stated that Russian foreign policy has been based on seeking consolidation of its independent position on all issues since 2007. This self-seeking attitude in international area should be accepted as basic reason for disagreements between the EU and Russia (Maass, 2020, p. 401-403). "It is rational that the EU has not prefered military conflict with Russian forces. However, power alternative of Russia presents a challenge for the EU. Crimea crisis has revealed that the EU has been in a weak position to implement power politics. Conversely, Russia has executed a strategy of controlled crises against Ukraine and the West. It should not be unconsidered that the EU has a deficit to cope with global and regional crisis" (Mercan and Gürsoy, 2016, p. 266).

On the other hand, the EU's unarmed and non-executive civilian nature missions could not create satisfaction in representatives of related sector. For example, 28 per cent of Ukrainian border-guards felt that their own conditions improved after EU crisis management interventions. But, 64 per cent of them accepted EU presence ineffective. Perceptions about EU operations in Ukraine can be accepted as less optimistic (Loschi and Russo, 2021, p. 1498, 1499). EU missions and operations were limited to the reform of the civilian security sector. Therefore, the military aspects of the security sector were ignored. This situation reflected

divergence between EU and local Ukrainian understandings of the security sector (Loschi and Russo, 2021, p. 1500).

While the principles of war do not change, the nature of war changes due to developing technologies and weapon systems. Clausewitz stated that the strongest form of war is defense. But with defense alone, it is not possible to regain what has been lost in war. The challenge facing the EU is the difficulty it faces in fulfilling the requirements to stop the classical war waged by Russia, under the condition of the new war concept. Here, either Russia will understand that it has to adapt to the new war concept, or the EU will foresee that it may face a classical war at any time, take the necessary precautions and extend from there to the new war concept.

Conclusion

This article was aimed to collect specific reference points to help understand the EU's conduct and actions, missions and operations through a new war reading. Under the conditions of new war, the separation between civilian and military is progressively decreasing. Trans-border effects of events have made the international society more sensitive. These waves of effects have at the national level led to tendency to take internal precautions and isolationism. This dualism reflects the internationalization-nationalization dilemma. While the EU is an example for the internationalization aspect, this aspect is also facing a further effect of re-nationalization. The blocking of the EU's decision-making mechanisms by member states, the skepticism shown by member states towards membership and integration, the further rise of national sensitivities regarding foreign, security and defense policies, the increasing weight of national imperatives for member states, has led to a stagnation in the integration process. The EU which is a representative of liberalism at the international level, has attempted to maintain its emphasis on internationalization in its strategic vision through a change in its vision. This change was through a shift of the EU's focus on security to a focus on the global. Instead of a security strategy a global strategy was defined and a shift from an excluding stance to an inclusive stance took place.

Since EU member states are not under a direct territorial threat under current conditions, the main reference point of classical war which is national defense is not relevant to the case of the EU. Topics that rose to the front are counterterrorism, crisis management, peacekeeping, rescue, and stability. At the same time, the EU has externalized internal security. In the EU's perspective, security is beyond a topic of interest between member states. Migration, law, finance, education, health, food security, employment have all been regarded as topics where capacity must be enhanced due to the risks and threats they pose, as such the EU has decided on a policy of resilience. For conflict resolution, a wholistic approach which includes identity, socio-economic conditions, environmental and energy factors, was adopted. This is reflected in the shift from a security strategy to a global strategy, was a shift from an exclusionary stance to an inclusionary stance.

It is inevitable for the EU to confront discrimination in the current political trends and new war conditions where identity politics is prominent. In light of the fact that the goals of war are no longer territorial gains through military means but the steering of a society towards certain directions, the aspect of new wars which direct violence towards the civilian population becomes apparent. The EU's high-level peace or warm peace, is being challenged by the identity politics of new wars and this exact issue makes up the weak point of the EU. Besides, Russia's attempts to remind the classical war, as it did in Ukraine, create an effect that pushes the EU, which is trying to adapt to the new war concept, to classical war.

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The Implications of the war in Ukraine on the EU's stability policy towards the Middle East

Walid Khalid Abudalbouh*

Abstract

Since the spark of the ongoing war on Ukraine early this year, the global politics is certainly witnessing drastic as well rapid changes in its security structure, decision making process, and shifting alliances. The EU is indeed clear example reflecting such dramatic trend. As for the EU for instance, such changes raise the question of to what extent the current war in Ukraine has challenged the EU's decisions makers in rearticulating their stability perspective towards their southern Mediterranean neighbors. It appears that their security interests towards the Middle East seem to have travelled into a full circle. Changes in priority of the EU's security interests is expected to take place to somehow mirror those ones adhered during the Cold War. Hard security aspirations tend to– once again- supplant soft security ambitions. Issues related to conflict of identity, Islamic fundamentalism and illegal migration will remain significant security concerns but not a priority especially when compared with massing alliances to contain Russian " strategic expansion" or/and guaranteeing the flow raw materials: oil and gas in particular. To attain such demanding task however, it is assumed to be much more difficult to be achieved especially when considering political divisions and blur attitudes today amongst Middle Eastern states nowadays. Foreign policies of some Middle Eastern states – Gulf States in particular- do not relatively resemble those ones during the Cold War.

Introduction:

This paper will in specific try to tackle the pressing question of to what extent the current war in Ukraine has challenged the EU's decisions makers in rearticulating their stability perspective towards their southern Mediterranean neighbors. Beforehand, it will try to answer the following key question: how the EU perceives "stability" per se as a foreign policy objective and why? In it, the paper will demonstrate in brief a number of empirical incidents

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reflecting different time zone period to cite how elusive nature of "stability" had has been articulated to suit the EU's interests in the Middle East: the aftermath of the Cold War era, during the Arab Spring period, and since outbreak of the War in Ukraine took place early 2022.

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has repeatedly brought the notion of 'stability' as a key strategic objective towards its neighboring region and certainly the Mediterranean, starting from the 1995 Barcelona Declaration until exiting forms of cooperation that governs the nature of cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

The paper argued that, the EU seeks to invest on stability as flexible, double edge, foreign policy objective that corresponds to national security objectives emanating from its southern flank of the Mediterranean[1]. Hence, stability as such, is "in terms of the "stability of relationship": a state of order in the Southern Mediterranean flank that ensures the continuing pattern of cooperation between the shores of the Mediterranean conducive to EU's internal, as well as, external security interests, regardless of the nature of the political system exists in the south.

During the Arab Spring for instance, the EU failed not only to fulfill its commitments towards supporting political developments in the south and fulfill people aspirations for democracy and freedom. The EU stood paralyzed and approach "wait and see" policy, not in favor of changing the then existing political system status quo. Julien Barnes-Dacey, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said "the Arab Spring presented an opportunity to reshape developments on the ground, but Europe failed to deliver .. Ten years on from the uprisings some Europeans are now re-embracing the notion of authoritarian stability, as symbolized by the increasing embrace of President Sisi in Egypt" (Vohra, 2020)

[1] Abu-Dalbouh, Walid*, The EU and the Arab Spring: Redefining Stability Revisited, presented* in Third International Interdisciplinary Scientific Conference, Poland – Jordan – The European Union: A New Role of Europe in The Middle East After the Arab Spring, December 20th, 2012: Amman- Jordan

The EU, the Middle East and the War in Ukraine

Security interests towards the Middle East seem to have travelled into a full circle. Changes in priority of their security interests – with special reference to the EU – is expected to take place to somehow mirror those ones adhered during the Cold War. Hard security aspirations tend to– once again- supplant soft security ambitions. Issues related to conflict of identity, Islamic fundamentalism and illegal migration will remain significant security concerns but not a priority especially when compared with massing alliances to contain Russian " strategic expansion" or/and guaranteeing the flow raw materials: oil and gas in particular.

However, the real challenge facing the EU's foreign policy towards the Middle East today is much more difficult and sophisticated based on following realities:

1. Weak states

One of the main challenges facing the Western camp – the EU's in particular- is the fragile political system in the region in several Arab states. States such as Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are clear examples of such political conditions. The EU certainly needed strong states who can deliver and capable to maintain the continuation of the flow of interests emanated from the region. To high extent, such challenge has emerged to serious threat that goes beyond those emanating from traditional enemies. Anthony Cordesman defended that" Far too many countries [in the Middle East] have become "failed states" in ways that go beyond the threat posed by Iran, extremism, and ethnic and sectarian divisions. They have failed to make adequate progress in civil and economic reforms, and they have stopped short of reducing corruption and incompetence in national politics and governance" (Cordesman, 2020).

2. Gradual shifting in alliances: (Russia and China)

The mounting expansion power of Russia – mainly in military and security power – and China – mainly in economic and financial aspects – especially in the past decade, has

enormously influenced foreign policy attitudes for several Middle Eastern states where western influence and leverage is no longer the same – particularly when compared to Cold War era.

A. Military presence:

Today there are at least ten thousand Russian militants in Syria alone. Saudi Arabia and Russia signed a Military Cooperation Agreement in August 201. "The agreement came in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal of its Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) anti-air defenses and gives Russian defense contractors a foothold in the lucrative Saudi arms market" (Milburn, 2022).

B. Economic and financial investments

> "Washington's limited policy responses have focused almost exclusively on the Indo-Pacific region; the United States has said next to nothing about the impact of BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] and expanding Chinese ties in the Middle East, including the ramifications for the political-military balance in the region" (Dunne, 2021).

The economic and financial 'integration' of china towards M.E. region has grown profoundly high in the past decade, which made the Chinese presence indispensible influential player in the economies of the region. Since early weeks of 2022, five senior officials from oil-rich Arab monarchies visited China to discuss cooperation on energy and infrastructure. Also, Iran's foreign minister initiated $400 billion of Chinese financial commitment for investment purposes in Iran. In addition, China became the largest foreign investor in the region in 2016, and since BRI was inaugurated, Beijing has pumped at least $123 billion into the Middle East in BRI-related project financing" (Dunne, 2021). In the same vein, and as far as Belt and road initiative (BRI) is concerned, It is expected that the Chinese investments could reach well over $1 trillion by 2027, primarily in transportation infrastructure such as ports and

airports, as well as road, railway, and telecommunications networks, and power generation plants. Most importantly, in 2021, China surpassed the U.S. to become the world's largest crude oil importer where 40% of the country's oil imports come from the Middle Eastern states (Fulton 2019).

C. Other issues:

Mounting anti-western sentiments amongst people of the Mediterranean is growing due to failure of the West to solve major regional conflicts - with special reference to Arab-Israeli conflict - conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. What exacerbate such notion resides in the fact that many Arab citizens believe that the Western governments in general are generally responsible for the continuation of such conflicts and the cause of chaos that many parts of the region undergoing today. Furthermore, as for political stability, Arab regimes favor Chinese 'style' of cooperation since the later favors regimes political stability over people political stability in terms of political development, democratization and human rights issues. Suhail Khan contends that "the Arab Spring proved to be a turning point in China-Middle East ties, as the CCP began to tacitly support the authoritative rulers in the region to avoid any threats to its regime at home" (Khan, 2021).

In conclusion, the western camp and the EU in particular are facing serious challenges over how to contain mounting enemies. Stability as foreign objective must be reconsidered to absorb those changes that took place since the end of the Cold War in order – if not too late – to regain its dominance in the region and can accordingly confront its enemies emanating from its eastern front.

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12 MAY 2022
Thursday

Panel 2: Immigrants and Security (15.45-17.00)	
Moderator: Sevgi Çilingir, Dokuz Eylül University	
15.45-16.00	**Political Economy of Syrians in Turkish Labor Market and Beyond in the Age of COVID-19** **Tolga Bölükbaşı,** *Associate Professor*, Bilkent University, Ankara
16.00-16.15	**Populist Radical Right Parties and Securitization of Immigration** **Müge Aknur** *Associate Professor,* Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir
16.15-16.30	**Integration Prospects of Migrant Syrian University Students in Türkiye** **Zühal Ünalp Çepel, Tuğcan Durmuşlar & Sinem Abka,** *Assistant Prof. & PhD Candidates,* Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir
16.30-17.00	**Discussion and Questions**

Political Economy of Syrians in the Turkish Labor Market and Beyond in the Age of COVID-19

Hasan Tolga Bölükbaşı*

1. Introduction

Türkiye has for centuries been a bridge for commodities, investment, ideas, and people. In this sense, Türkiye is a typical case of a "liminal space" in the "spatial" sense of the term as it is used in the scholarly literature. The outbreak of the civil war in Syria led to a mass influx of Syrians into Türkiye. As a result of the crisis, more than 6.8 million people were forced to flee their country, creating the largest refugee population in the world.[1] The vast majority of the displaced Syrians reside in the neighboring Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Currently, only about 5 percent of Syrians live in refugee camps and over 90 percent of them live in urban areas outside of camps in host countries. More than a third of Syrians are living in poverty. Syrians in these areas are facing unemployment. They have limited access to basic services, education, and labor market opportunities. The challenges to their livelihood, therefore, are immense.[2]

This paper explores the political economy Syrians' income generation through participation in the Turkish labor market, entrepreneurship activities, and collection of social assistance. It situates Syrians' activities in a comprehensive security context in Türkiye. The paper addresses two sets of research questions. First, what does the the legal and institutional

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[1] The UN Refugee Agency UNHCR Refugee Data Finder (2022). Key indicators 2022. Accessed July 2022. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

[2] USA for UNHCR (2022). "Syria Refugee Crisis Explained". Accessed July 2022, Available at https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/#What%20is%20the%20UN%20Refugee%20Agency%20doing%20for%20displaced%20Syrians?

framework regulating Syrians' economic activities look like? Second, what are the major sources of income of Syrians living in Türkiye?

The paper reviews existing research on these research questions and policy debates revolving around these. It summarizes the key dimensions of the legal and institutional context of Syrians residing and generating income in Türkiye. It then surveys existing data on Syrians' sources of household income in Türkiye. This research relies on a review of official documents, statistics, semi-structured in-depth interviews with key government officials, experts with international public institutions, international and national civil society organizations, business associations, and think-and-do tanks.

2. Legal and Institutional Context of Syrians' Residence and Income Generation

The migration and residence status of Syrians in Türkiye are categorized under four types of status. First, Syrians can establish residence in Türkiye under the status of "temporary protection". The conditions under which temporary protection holders enjoy the right to residence and income are defined by the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013). Following their registration in Türkiye, Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTP) may lawfully stay in Türkiye until safe return to Syria becomes possible. SuTP enjoy the services provided under temporary protection, such as free health care services. Second, Syrians who meet the general requirements defined under the Law on Foreigners and International Protection may be granted resident permits.3 Third, Syrians may be naturalized and become citizens should they meet a set of predefined conditions by law. Finally, many Syrians remain entirely unregistered.

In terms of their right to work, Syrians have been allowed to work formally since 2016.4 However, the number of Syrians in the formal labor market remains very low. They face significant difficulties in the Turkish labor market, which stem from restrictive formal legal

3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2017). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Frequently Asked Questions. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/02/frequently_asked_questions.pdf.
4 Turkey: Temporary Protection Regulation. Available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/56572fd74.html.

conditions and significant structural problems including high informality, high unemployment rates, and other challenges.

Syrians' right of establishment is defined by the Turkish Commercial Code. Their right depends on their application for work permits before setting up an enterprise. Although they may benefit from incentives and subsidies for entrepreneurship, their take up of this right remains low.5

The legal and institutional framework regulating Syrians' social and humanitarian assistance is defined by national law. In addition to the Law on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity, Syrians benefit from other sources from government bodies and non-state actors, services from Social Service Centers and municipalities, the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) and the Conditional Cash Transfer Program. International public law also protects Syrians through cash transfers and services such as legal counseling, psycho-social support, assuring easier access to civil documentation, and specialized healthcare services.

3. Sources of Household Income

The three main sources of household income for Syrians are labor market employment, entrepreneurship, and social and humanitarian assistance. In terms of labor market employment, existing research shows that the primary source of income for Syrians remains labor market employment. 6 Although the employment income is the largest source of income, given the challenges Syrians are facing in Turkish labor markets, unemployment remains at very high levels among Syrians participating in Turkish labor markets. Recent research shows that the current unemployment rate among Syrian refugees have varied from 16 to 18 percent between 2017 and 2019.7 These figures overwhelmingly

5 Güven, Sibel, Murat Kenanoğlu, Omar Kadkoy, and Taylan Kurt (2018). Syrian Entrepreneurship and Refugee Start-ups in Turkey: Leveraging the Turkish Experience. Available at https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1566830992-6.TEPAV_and_EBRD__Syrian_Entrepreneurship_and_Refugee_Start_ups_in_Turkey_Lever....pdf.

6 INGEV (2017). "Suriyeli Multeci Hayatlar Monitoru" Available at https://ingev.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Multeci-Hayatlar-Monitorü.pdf

7 Turkish Red Crescent and World Food Programme (2019). *Refugees in Turkey: Livelihoods Survey Findings.* Available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70508.

underestimate the actual hardship Syrians face in securing livelihoods through labor market employment, however. This is because labor force participation among Syrians is very low, and therefore the hardship they are facing is significantly higher than these unemployment rates suggest.

A second main source of income for a limited number of Syrians is entrepreneurship. As the number of Syrians increased in Türkiye, the volume of Syrian-led entrepreneurial activity followed suit. The number of companies established by Syrians have been steadily increasing over the past decade.8 One key reason behind such increase may be the challenges Syrians face in formal labor markets. Despite the rising trend in Syrian entrepreneurial activity, Syrian entrepreneurs are facing significant challenges in Türkiye. According to a recent study, these include weak access to financial resources, limited knowledge about the legal and regulatory framework on entrepreneurship, weak access to the financial system, and the uncertainty on their legal status.9

A third set of sources of income for many Syrians is social assistance and humanitarian assistance. Assistance seems to provide either temporary financial relief for many Syrians or a regular source of income for a much smaller share of all Syrians. Although social assistance and humanitarian assistance are vital sources of income for many Syrians, these sources hardly meet their needs. The sources of social and humanitarian assistance include the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund, the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services, municipalities, EU funded operations and projects, and UN-funded and coordinated operations and programs. ESSN constitutes the largest of all these sources.10 While there exist comprehensive data on the benefits provided through the ESSN, data on the amount of assistance from these programs is neither comprehensive nor disaggregated. This is

8 Union of Chambers and Commodity Changes of Turkey Information Retrieval Division (2021). Kurulan Kapanan Şirket İstatistikleri. Available at https://www.tobb.org.tr/BilgiErisimMudurlugu/Sayfalar/KurulanKapananSirketistatistikleri.php.
9 Güven, Sibel, Murat Kenanoğlu, Omar Kadkoy, and Taylan Kurt (2018). Syrian Entrepreneurship and Refugee Start-ups in Turkey: Leveraging the Turkish Experience. Available at https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1566830992-6.TEPAV_and_EBRD___Syrian_Entrepreneurship_and_Refugee_Start_ups_in_Turkey_Lever....pdf.
10 European Commission (2020). European civil protection and humanitarian assistance operations: Turkey, Factsheet. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/europe/turkey_en.

especially true for benefits provided through the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund and municipalities.11

4. Conclusions

As a bridge for commodities, investment, ideas, and people, Türkiye is a typical case of a "liminal space". This paper addressed two sets of research questions. First, what does the the legal and institutional framework regulating Syrians' economic activities look like? Second, what are the major sources of income of Syrians living in Türkiye? The paper explored Syrians' income generation through participation in the Turkish labor market, entrepreneurship activities, and collection of social assistance.

The mass influx of Syrians into Türkiye stemming from the outbreak of the civil war in Syria led to the largest refugee population in the world. The paper showed that Syrians are facing significant barriers to being employed in formal labor markets and to exercise their right to establishment. Despite the immense body of rules addressing their needs in a changing economy, the challenges to their livelihood remain immense.

11 *See* Paksoy, Saadettin (2016). Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yapılan Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yardımlar: Gaziantep Büyükşehir Belediyesi Örneği. *Kent Kültürü ve Yönetimi Hakemli Elektronik Dergi,* vol. 9, No. 4.

Populist Radical Right Parties and the Securitization of Immigration

Müge Aknur*

Introduction

Public anxiety in Western Europe about immigrants and refugees has increased due to the 2007-2008 financial and economic crisis, the 2009-2010 Euro crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe as well as the terror attacks in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, London, Nice, and Manchester. Having been more of a societal and economic issue from the 1960s to 1990s, immigration has become a security issue in the last couple of decades. According to the Copenhagen School of security studies, securitizing speech acts are particularly important for turning a non-security matter like immigration into a security issue. Thus, immigration was transformed into an "economic security" issue threatening the well-being of Europeans due to their allegations of immigrants taking away their jobs. It also became a "cultural security" issue as a supposed threat to European identity, religion, and life style. Most importantly, immigration was seen as a "state security" issue due to the perception that it was a threat to European countries' peace, and stability, and territorial integrity.

Framing immigration as a security issue is mainly observed through the discourses of the political elite. Of these elites, Western Europe's populist radical right parties have concentrated on this issue more than the others. Indeed, their central discourse has securitized the immigration issue, which they have used for their political benefit by continuously highlighting societal and cultural insecurity. These parties have played a significant role in promoting rhetoric and policies that increase public anxieties concerning immigrants. To gain the votes of the economically and culturally suffering groups, the

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parties' leaders have securitized immigration through speeches, social media posts, and political advertising. As a sign of their effectiveness prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, a number of parties became junior partners in European coalition governments during the late 2010s.

Scholars have become increasingly interested in the securitization of immigration in the last two decades. There are a number of books written on this issue. For example, Huysmans (2006) draws on securitization theory to provide a detailed analysis of migration, asylum, and refuge in the European Union. Curley and Wong (2008) explore how various forms of unregulated and illegal human movement within Asia and beyond have come to be treated as 'security' issues. D'Appollonia (2012) discusses the new security-based immigration regime in the USA and Europe. Bourbeu (2013) analyzes the process of securitizing migration through a comparative study of Canada and France Bourbeu (2017), in his edited book analyzes the significant links between migration and security in a globalizing world through the different conceptualizations of experts from various fields. Finally, Lazaridis and Wadia (2015) in their edited book compares how various Western European states have sought to integrate 'securitization' measures into migration regimes since September 11.

A number of articles have explored the same topic. Ibrahim (2005) explores the securitization of race while Wojczwski (2020) focuses on populist discourses. Both Özerim & Mandacı (2013) and Ünal-Eriş & Öner (2021) also examine securitization of international migration by concentrating on radical right parties in Europe. More specifically, the latter article addresses how the securitization of migration has become the main unifying factor for populist radical right parties since the 2015 'migration crisis' through the cases of National Rally in France, Alternative for Germany, and the League in Italy.

This article first discusses how Copenhagen School scholars have developed the concepts of "societal security" and "securitization". It then analyzes the discourses of the leaders of five significant populist radical right parties in Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands concerning the securitization of immigrants.

I. The Copenhagen School view of Societal Security and Securitization

Having been considered as a social, cultural, or economic problem from the 1960s to 1980s, immigration has since become an internal security issue in Europe. Earlier, immigrants were considered as guest workers who would return to their home once they stopped working. Ultimately, however, many stayed to establish second and third generations. Throughout this period, they brought with them their life style, religion, culture, and food. Subsequent generations were no longer guests as they were living in their own country having been born there. As their population increased, they established their own ghettos with their own grocery stores, supermarkets, bakeries, hairdressers, and jewelry stores. This made the immigrant population more visible in the host countries, which caused some uneasiness among the native population who sometimes felt as if 'their' country was being 'invaded' by 'foreigners'.

This led to the transformation of the presence of guest workers and current immigrants into a security issue. That is, they were now a cultural security threat to the values, beliefs, and life styles of 'native' citizens, and a threat to the host country's cultural homogeneity. They were also an economic security threat to the host country's welfare since native citizens did not want to share their welfare benefits with immigrants. Finally, they were an internal security threat to the peaceful, homogenous lives of native citizens due to their different life styles, their pestering of native women, and their terror attacks. The 2015 refugee crisis made native-born Europeans more anxious about these perceived threats.

Consequently, the Cold War's territorial security problems were replaced by concerns about the security of societies. While states survive by maintaining their independence, societies survive by keeping their identity and culture. Once societies feel like they are losing their characteristics or values, they blame immigrants, accusing them of threatening the very existence of their identity and culture. Because they are culturally different, immigrants are seen as violating the host nation's norms and traditions. Rather than experiencing these different cultures as expressing a richness of diversity, native citizens treat immigrants as 'us' vs 'them'. As a result, populist radical right parties started to base their slogans on nationalism, such as "Germany belongs to the Germans" or "France belongs to the French."

Three scholars within the Copenhagen School, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998), introduced the theory of securitization by pointing out that, through elite discourses, an issue that was not previously considered as a 'security issue' can be transformed into one. More specifically, they argue that political actors have represented migration as a security threat to gain support from voters who were already unhappy with the presence of culturally different migrant populations in their country. As Eriş and Öner (2021, 162-163) put it, "populist radical right parties have put societal security and cultural insecurity at the center of their political manifestos and discourse. They have constructed immigrants, particularly culturally different immigrants, as a societal security threat."

II. Populist Radical Right Parties

Populist radical right parties have been getting stronger in the last couple of decades due to the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008, the euro crisis of 2009-2010, an increase in terror attacks in European cities, and particularly the refugee crisis of 2015. In many European countries, they are now a permanent political actor and have increased their electoral success by participating in coalition governments.

Mudde (2016, 296) argues that populist radical right parties share a core ideology that combines three characteristics: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Nativism, which combines nationalism and xenophobia, is the view that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the 'native' group ('the nation') while non-native people, who supposedly threaten the homogeneous nation-state, should be excluded. Authoritarianism refers to the belief in a strictly ordered society in which any violations of authority should be punished severely. It therefore requires strict law-and-order policies, with more police involvement and less political involvement in the judiciary. It leads parties to criminalize social problems and demands a safe environment that can only be created by reducing immigration. Finally, populism as an ideology considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: 'the corrupt elite' and 'the pure people,' whom populist radical right parties claim to represent. It claims that politics should express the general will of the people.

In the last ten years, populist radical right parties have demonstrated their political power, either by taking part in coalition governments or by acting as the main parliamentary opposition party. In Germany, for example, Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*—AfD) increased its vote share in federal elections from 4.7 percent in 2013 to 12.6 percent in 2017 and 10.3 percent in 2021. In France's presidential elections, Marine Le Pen, previously leader of the National Front (*Front National*) and now leader of National Rally (*Rassemblement National*), reached the second round in both 2017 and 2022. Le Pen was also very successful in legislative elections in June 2022, when National Rally gained 89 MPs in the National Assembly. In Italy, the Northern League (*Lega Nord*) won 3.9-8.3 percent of the votes in parliamentary elections under Umberto Bossi's leadership between 2001 and 2008. Since then, the League (*Lega* under its new name) has won 17.4 percent of the votes under Matteo Salvini's leadership. Salvini served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior between June 2018 and September 2019. Under Geert Wilders, the Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*—PVV) won 10-15 percent of the votes in parliamentary elections between 2010 and 2021 when it was the main opposition party, except in 2010 when it supported the coalition government. In Austria, the Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*—FPÖ*)* gained 10-26.9 percent of the votes between 1999 and 2019, participating in the coalition government three times.

A. Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*—AfD)

When Germany faced a labor shortage after the Second World War, its governments designed a program to invite guest workers to boost their countries' economies. This decision had a long and significant impact on German politics as the number of people with migrant backgrounds has risen continuously in Germany to make up 27.2% of Germany's population. That is, over a quarter of people living in Germany are either foreign-born or have at least one immigrant parent (Janjevich, 2022).

Since the 2015 migration crisis, Germany has become Europe's main destination for asylum seekers. After Chancellor Angela Merkel allowed 1.3 million refugees to enter into the country, her government became embroiled in bitter political infighting. In particular, this

led to a surge in support for right-wing policies and the rise of the populist radical right party AfD. Having been established as an anti-Eurozone party in 2013, AfD transformed itself into an anti-immigrant and anti-Islamist party. This enabled it to gain representation in the German Parliament in 2017 as the first radical right party since World War II. Its vote share grew from 4.7 % in the 2013 federal elections to 12.6 % in the 2017 elections before dropping slightly to 10.3 % of the votes in the 2022 elections (Gedmin, 2019; Uçar, 2021).

As an anti-immigrant and anti-Islamist party AfD supports the maintenance of German culture, language, and traditions as well as its Christian identity. Given its belief that the predominant culture is German, the party opposes multi-culturalism. According to AfD, Islam does not belong in Germany, endangers German culture and values, and contradicts the liberal constitutional order. AfD argues that Germany should reintroduce permanent border controls while the EU's external borders should be completely shut. The party is also associated with the hardline PEGIDA (*Patriotische Europäer Gegen Islamisierung Des Abendlandes*), Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the Occident (Chase and Goldenberg, 2019).

AfD leaders are well known for their securitizing speeches about immigrants and refugees. The party has also effectively securitized immigration through its advertising posters throughout Europe. These posters mainly concentrate on the following messages (see Figure 1): There is nothing wrong with being German; Germany belongs to Germans; therefore, the everyone should obey German rules in Germany; Islam does not belong to Germany and AfD will stop the Islamization of the country. Another message concerned diversification: Germany has its own diversification; it does not need immigrants for this purpose. Germans do not need immigrants to increase the population; they should give birth to their own German babies.

There are many other striking posters not shown in Figure 1, some of which are quite humiliating for Turks and Arabs, and Muslims generally. For example, one shows three young women wearing bikinis. Under the poster is written "Burkas? we prefer bikinis" Another poster shows three German women drinking wine while under the poster is written "Burqa? I prefer Burgundy." Another poster shows a baby pig. Under the poster is written

"Islam does not belong in our kitchen". While humiliating Muslims and identifying conservative clothing with bikinis or wine, the posters try to alert the German people to the alleged danger that they will no longer be able to do these things if the country is Islamized (Reitz, 2017).

Figure 1: AfD's Anti-Immigrant Posters



Source: Compiled by the author from Annika Reitz, "Political Campaign Strategies of the party Alternative for Germany: A Qualitative Study of Posters for the 2017 Federal Election," *Master's Thesis*, Jököping University, Spring 2019. http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1323039/FULLTEXT01.pdf

AfD's political elite are also well-known for their striking securitizing speeches concerning the immigrants and refugees. In a widely publicized interview with a German newspaper in January 2016, former AfD co-leader Frauke Petry said that German border police should be allowed to use arms "if necessary" to stop migrants crossing the border illegally (Daldorph, 2016). Former AfD co-leader Alexander Gauland is an outspoken supporter of a homogeneous national culture and identity. Following the announcement of the 2017

elections, he claimed that there is "an invasion of Europe by Muslims which began with the influx of refugees." He argued that "one million people – foreigners – being brought into this country are taking away a piece of this country." He continued, "we don't want to lose Germany to an invasion of foreigners from a different culture." He commented that Islam was not a religion like Catholicism because it could lead to the collapse of a state. He warned that the Islamization of Germany was a threat (Stone, 2017). AfDs' current co-leader, Alice Weidel, also stated that she does not want to see her country full of Muslims praying everywhere In addition, her twitter account has been full of racist statements. In one tweet in 2018, she called for the "immediate deportation of criminal immigrants." Furthermore, she claimed that asylum seekers were not actually the victims; rather, it was the Germans who were the victims. She claimed that Syrians and Afghans were killing each other because of their culture, which she described stone age and not belonging to Germany (Denijal, 2018).

B. National Rally (*Rassemblement National*) in France

Since the end of the 19th century, immigrants have flowed into France. In the early 20th century France was the European country that accepted the most immigrants, including many political refugees. Following the two world wars, immigrants mostly arrived from neighboring European countries whereas the majority of refugees in the late 20th century have arrived from North Africa, especially France's former colonies. This tremendous flow has increased opposition in France to immigrants, reversing previous welcoming policies. Currently, 10 percent of France's population are immigrants. That is, there were over 6.5 million immigrants according to a 2018 census (Boubtane, 2022).

The increasing number of immigrants and their impact on French economic and social political life has been a source of contention in French politics. The debate intensified in the 1970s due to economic slowdown and higher unemployment. This in turn led to the gradual rise of the far right. The oldest and most significant populist radical right party in France is the National Front (*Front National*), established in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen. In 2002, he reached the second round of the presidential election by focusing on concerns over immigration while his daughter and political heir since 2011, Marine Le Pen, repeated his

achievement in the 2017 and 2022 presidential elections. In 2018, she changed the party's name to National Rally (*Rassemblement National*) to soften its image.

Since its establishment, the party has adopted anti-immigrant and anti-Islamist rhetoric. It considers migration as a threat to French identity, cultural unity, and security as well as its economy and social life. The party conflates immigration and integration issues with religion as a challenge to France's secular identity. Party leaders have often used anti-immigrant discourse and proposed anti-immigrant policies (Squires, 2011; Boubtane, 2022). It is a populist party that aims to reduce immigration, particularly from Africa. It also prioritizes the rights of French citizens over immigrants, particularly in the job market and social housing and aims at toughening the requirements to gain French citizenship. It insists that applicants should demonstrate a strong commitment to France and its language. The party supports an end to the Schengen Area Agreement and the reinstatement of border checks (Rygen, 2008, pp. 166-170).

Prior to the 2017 national elections, Marine Le Pen accused the government of giving French nationals 'fewer rights than foreigners'. She argued that France could not remain a country unless its governments controlled the territory. She therefore promised that as soon as she became president, her first priority would be to restore France's borders. She also pointed out that mass immigration was a tragedy rather than an opportunity for the country. In making security the main concern of her campaign, she highlighted the 240 people killed between 2015 and 2017 in a series of terrorist attacks connected to ISIS-related Muslim groups (Dearden, 2017).

In the first round of the 2022 presidential elections in April 2022, Marine Le Pen received 23 percent of the votes while the incumbent president, Emmanuel Macron, received 27.6 percent. In the second round, Le Pen received 41.45 percent while Macron received 58.55 percent. In the legislative elections of June 2022, Le Pen achieved a historic success when her party became the leading opposition group by taking 89 seats in the National Assembly compared to six in the previous election (Trippenbach, 2022).

Before the 2022 presidential elections, Le Pen again stated that she wanted to end illegal immigration and abolish birthright citizenship, which allowed children born in France to foreign parents to obtain French citizenship. She also said that she wanted to take precautions to preserve France's social and civilizational model. She promised that she would implement a ban on the Muslim headscarf in public places and also give priority to native French citizens for jobs, social housing, social security benefits, and healthcare (Meyssonnier, 2021).

C. The League (*Lega*) in Italy

From the late 19th century until the 1970s, Italy was a country of mass emigration. During the late 19th century and early 20th century, 750,000 Italians emigrated each year. There was also emigration from south to north within Italy. In contrast, as Italy grew economically during the 1980s, it became a host country for immigration. By the mid-1970s, immigrants from all over the world, but particularly from North Africa, the Philippines, and Eastern Europe, were moving to Italy to work in its service sector. By 2000, there were more than one million migrants who were having difficulties procuring documents to gain legal residence. Italian society in general was not happy with immigrants and generally treated them as criminals (Focus Migration).

Located on the southern Mediterranean border of prosperous Western Europe, Italy was vulnerable to immigration from the Middle East, the Balkans, and North Africa. In 2015, the Arab Spring and the Syria's civil war increased migrant flows to Italy, particularly from Eritrea, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Syria. By 2018, "Italy had the third highest number of non-EU nationals living in its country at 5.1 million, preceded only by Germany and the United Kingdom" (Salachi, 2019, pp. 11-12).

Lega Nord (Northern League) was established in northern Italy in 1991 as a regionalist and separatist party calling for the independence of Padania and opposed to accepting immigrants from southern Italy. In response to the 2008 economic crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis, the party evolved into a populist radical right party opposing immigration. It

also changed its name to the *Lega* (League) in 2018 as it abandoned its regionalism and separatist ideology to concentrate on anti-immigrant policies. Under Matteo Salvini's leadership, the party developed a nativist, exclusivist ideology based on an ethno-cultural conception of 'the people'. The party concentrated on opposing immigration, particularly Muslim immigrants, since it viewed Islam as a threat to Italy's Christian identity. Accordingly, its 2017 election manifesto demanded "to stop the invasion by the immigrants" and insisted on the immediate repatriation of all immigrants. In the 2018 elections, *Lega* received 17.4 percent compared to 4-8 percent throughout the 2000s and early 2010s. It then joined the coalition government (Ünal-Eriş & Önel, 2021, pp. 171-172).

As an example of an 'us' versus 'them' approach, Salvini first built divisions between native Italians and those considered 'outsiders.' by framing the outsiders – the immigrants – as criminals. To do so, he continuously highlighted crimes by immigrants on social media but not Italians, which led to Italians' believing that Italy's crime rate was increasing as a result of the rising immigrant population. To do this his posts cherry picked examples. In a 2015 post following the rape of a 50-year-old woman by a foreigner, he said, ""Yet another rape …. where a 50-year-old woman was beaten, and then raped, by a foreigner . . . How many more rapes will it take for Renzi (then Prime Minister) to move?" (McGinnis, 2021).

Salvini highlighted the party's zero tolerance for illegal immigration and criminals, using phrases like "Italians First and Foremost" to unify Italians against the perceived common enemy of outsiders and migrants. As interior minister, Salvini described Search and Rescue (SAR) NGOs helping immigrants in the Mediterranean as security threats, labelling them "accomplices of human trafficking". His main focus here was illegality rather than humanitarianism. He also accused the international community of plotting against Italy with "missions" to send migrants. He stated that his lifelong task was to defend Italy's borders, and its dignity and sovereignty against migrants (Ünal-Eriş & Önel, 2021, pp. 171-172).

Salvini also used his Facebook posts to blame migrants for Italy's economic problems, particularly high unemployment, by claiming that immigrants were taking the jobs of native Italians while ignoring the fact that the migrants generally take the jobs that Italians do not want. Moreover, he accused immigrants of stealing government funding from native citizens,

thereby worsening their economic conditions. For example, in a post in April 2015, Salvini wrote: "While in Sicily the highways close, viaducts collapse, and youth unemployment exceeds 50%, tonight another 1,200 immigrants will land in Palermo, which will be welcomed and maintained. In Italy, only immigrants can find the treasure" (McGinnis, 2021). These messages created contempt for immigrants among the Italian public.

Following the 2019 European parliamentary elections, Salvini withdrew from the coalition, hoping for snap elections so that his party could take power alone. Instead, the Democratic Party and the Five Star Movement formed a new coalition under Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte. When Conte criticized Salvini's security decree. Salvini responded by saying, "I will close the ports all over again if God and the Italian people give me the chance to be in government again." As part of his political discourse, Salvini securitized immigration from Africa and Middle East in the majority of his speeches (Ünal-Eriş & Önel, 2021, pp. 171-172).

D. Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*—PVV)

The Netherlands is Europe's most densely populated country. Of its 16 million population over 3 million are immigrants with a non-Dutch background. Little more than half are of non-Western origin while a majority come from Türkiye, Surinam, Morocco, and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Most immigrants live in the West of the country, mostly in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht (UCL).

The Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV) was established in 2006 as a nationalist, right-wing populist party under the leadership of Geert Wilders. Wilders took over from the charismatic Pim Fortuyn who had fragmented the Dutch political landscape with his campaign focused on immigration, Islam, civic integration, and national identity. PVV's three main themes concerned the protection of Dutch identity, sovereignty, and the welfare state. Its most significant principle is its fight against Islam, which it considers a dominating ideology rather than a religion. PVV's 11-point manifesto begins with a plan to "de-Islamize" the Netherlands. The party has anti-immigrant and anti-Islamist policies and holds xenophobic ideas. It supports the Judeo-Christian and humanist traditions as the dominant

culture in the Netherlands. The party would force immigrants to accept this. For example, the PVV manifesto calls for the closure of mosques, Islamic schools, and asylum centers, and the shutting down of the Netherlands' borders to immigrants coming from Muslim countries, forbidding Muslim women to wear headscarves in public, and banning the Koran (Damhuis, 2019; Bridge, 2018; Kraak, 2018). PVV won 10-15 percent of the votes in elections between 2010 and 2021, mostly by staying in opposition. In 2010, however, it supported the coalition government of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and Christian Democratic Appeal.

In 2008, Wilders produced a 17-minute film called *Fitna*, which attempted to show that the Quran encourages its followers to hate anyone who violates Islamic teachings. Among other issues, the film argued that Islam encouraged terrorism, anti-Semitism, and violence against women. In a 2008 interview with the Guardian, Wilders said that the Netherlands could not afford Islam and called for a ban on the "fascist" Quran. In many speeches, he claimed that Islam was not a religion but a political ideology; in fact, a totalitarian and violent ideology that belonged to a retarded culture. (Bridge, 2018).

In most of his speeches, Wilders securitized the issue of immigrants and Muslims in the Netherlands as a threat to the country's economic well-being and cultural identity. For example, in its 2010 manifesto, PVV framed Islamization negatively from an economic perspective by contrasting "idle Muslim migrants" with "hardworking natives." According to Wilders, the Dutch welfare state had become "a magnet for fortune seekers from Islamic countries." In another speech in 2015, he claimed that "The Netherlands is flooded with a tsunami of fortune seekers." Indeed, he frequently framed the influx of refugees as a flood or tsunami to portray immigration as an existential threat to Dutch society. He argued that 47 percent of Dutch people agree that their government should not accept more asylum seekers since they do not want their country to be Islamized, want to ensure safety, and want billions of Euros to be spent on Dutch people's needs rather than on asylum seekers. In the 2017 election campaign, Wilders declared that the Netherlands would no longer be Netherlands within a couple of years, claiming that the Dutch were losing their country (Damhuis, 2019).

Following the Paris attacks in November 2015 in which 137 people were killed and 368 injured, Geert Wilders gave the following speech to the Dutch parliament: "How many attacks must take place and how many innocent people must die before you start understanding the gravity of the situation Mr. President? … Islam does not belong in the Netherlands. As long as we keep our silence about the situation the terror attacks will continue." In addition, he claimed that terrorist attacks would continue as long as the Netherlands allowed mass immigration from Islamic countries. He concluded that there was no choice but to de-Islamize their country to make it safer (Kraak, 2018, 59).

Following sexual assaults on hundreds of women in Cologne and other German cities during New Year celebrations in 2015, Wilders claimed that the Netherlands was also becoming less safe while Dutch women in particular were feeling less safe. In an earlier speech, he suggested that the safety of women and their daughters in the Netherlands was more important than the rights of asylum-seekers (Kraak, 2018, 64).

E. Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*—FPÖ*)*

The Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*—FPÖ) that was established during the Cold War, in 1956, favored a politically and culturally unified Germany. FPÖ opposed the political hegemony of the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Austria. Jörg Haider, who took over FPÖ in 1986, changed it into a successful populist radical right party. Haider, as a Nazi sympathizer, adopted anti-immigration and anti-Islamist policies. He claimed that Islam is incompatible with European beliefs and culture since Islam's societal foundations were completely different to Western values. Throughout the 1990s, FPÖ described itself as the protector of Christians and considered Islam as a threat to Austrian culture. FPÖ's share of the vote in parliamentary elections grew from 5 to 26.9 percent by late 1990s (Hafez et al., 2019; Wodak 2005).

After Heinz-Christian Strache took over as FPÖ's leader the mid-2000s, the party's focus shifted towards migration issues and identity politics. Protecting the German language and

cultural community became a major concern. The party tried to show that it cared for their own citizens by adopting the slogan "Austria first". FPÖ then resorted to anti-Islamic rhetoric that framed Muslims as the primary "targets" in the party's anti-immigration strategies. The party attempted to draw parallels between current Muslim immigration to Austria and the Ottoman siege of Vienna. For example, party posters for Vienna's 2005 elections stated, "Vienna must not become Istanbul". One of the posters of 2006 national parliamentary elections included "No home for Islam" while the party's poster for the 2008 local election in Graz was "No home for radical Islam". In 2008, one of its posters for the Tyrol regional elections said, "The sound of church bells instead of muezzin song". The party defended Austrian culture and traditions while focused on welfare chauvinism. The party leader also proposed denying certain social benefits to immigrants (Hafez et al., 2019).

During the October 2015 local election campaign in Vienna, Strache demanded the strengthening of border controls, preferential treatment for Christian immigrants, and the erection of border fences to stop immigration. In January 2017, at FPÖ's New Year gathering in Salzburg, Strache described Islam as "misogynistic," "anti-liberal," and as having "a fascistic worldview." He told party loyalists that if Austria did not end Islamization, the process would end Austrians and Europeans. An FPÖ spokesperson said that any law against extreme Islam would be similar to those introduced in the aftermath of World War II, which banned Nazi symbols. Concerning immigration, Strache argued that Austria needed zero immigration or actually negative net immigration since all illegal individuals and criminals belonged outside the country (The Local, 2017).

In the 2017 election campaign, FPÖ openly stated its uneasiness with Islam and declared that it was ready to fight against all forms of religious fanaticism. The party criticized the government's "open policy," and opposed the influx of immigrants from Muslim countries and the wearing of face covering scarves in the public space (Hafez et al., 2019). After gaining 26 percent of the votes in the 2017 general elections, FPÖ joined the coalition government formed by the Austrian People's Party, (*Österreichische Volkspartei*-ÖVP) and led by Sebastian Kurz, who appointed Strache as Vice Chancellor. Strache's anti-immigration

discourse continued, including the idea of "population replacement" to claim that that traditional white Austrians were losing ground to ethnic minorities (Newsweek, 2019).

The ÖVP-FPÖ Coalition collapsed in May 2019 due to Strache's involvement in the Ibiza scandal in which video footage showed him offering to fix government contracts at a dinner party with a woman identified as a Russian oligarch's niece. Although FPÖ then lost political power, the anti-Islamist and anti-immigrant tone of Austrian politics continued because ÖVP adopted FPÖ's anti-Islamist and anti-immigrant rhetoric after forming another coalition government with the Greens.

Concluding Remarks

As this paper shows, the leaders of populist radical right parties in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands have not been reluctant to use provocative language to describe the increasing number of immigrants and refugees, and Muslim populations in their countries as a security, economic, and cultural threat. They have used extreme expressions, such as "No to Islam", "No to Islamization", "Ban the headscarf", and "Stop the construction of mosques and minarets". Wilders claimed that Islamization was an "existential threat" to Dutch people's identity and freedom while immigration flows increased domestic terror. These leaders also resorted to nativism by stating that "Italians come first", "Germany belongs to Germans," or "France belongs to the French". As FPÖ leader, Strache prioritized protection of the German-language cultural community, he proposed strict controls of mosques, Islamic schools, and religious kindergartens. If immigrants were willing to live in host countries, they had to live according to the host communities' cultural rules. The leaders of all five parties have stated that they will not permit the Islamization of their countries as they see Islam as a threat to their Christian identity. They even link Islam with backwardness, hatred, and terror.

All five parties are therefore against any further immigration and support immigration quotas. Their primary aim is to protect their country from any infiltration and defend its sovereignty against immigrants. Former AfD co-leader Petry even stated that the police

should shoot migrants attempting to enter Germany illegally. The League's leader Salvini argued that irregular migration brought crime and social conflict to Italy. During her 2022 presidential election campaign, Marine Le Pen promised that if she were elected president, she would call a referendum proposing drastic limits on immigration. All leaders even supported the idea of sending those who have already lived in the host country for generations back to their 'home' countries.

Although the leaders and political elite of the populist radical right parties often exaggerate the number of immigrants and their cultural or economic impact, they have managed to scare many people. They in fact, have succeeded in securitizing a "non-security" issue. Their exaggerated and provocative discourse has encouraged Western Europeans to perceive immigrants as a constant threat to their cultural and economic existence.

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Integration Prospects of

Migrant Syrian University Students in Türkiye

Zühal Ünalp Çepel[*] **Tuğcan Durmuşlar** [**] **Sinem Abka**[***]

Introduction

The civil war in Syria caused the migration of almost 4 million Syrian citizens to Türkiye. This has triggered concerns about social cohesion issues and the economic burden they may cause. Integration prospects of Syrian university students in Türkiye have a vital role in overcoming highly potential threats that may occur as a result of their exclusion and alienation from Turkish society. This study is an attempt to uncover the integration prospects of migrant Syrian university students in Türkiye. In this regard, it evaluates how the migration policies of Türkiye and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement have influenced the social integration of Syrian university students. It is argued that Syrian university students in Türkiye are directly influenced by the comprehensive policies of public institutions and universities. Yet, they still face educational, socio-cultural, and economic challenges. The research benefited from the primary and secondary literature along with the authors' own findings from an earlier study.

This study aims to analyze the integration prospects of Syrian university students in Türkiye by determining the fundamental problems they face in social, educational, and economic platforms and the factors which encourage or discourage their participation in the labor market. In the paper, the authors employed quantitative and qualitative methods to gather

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information regarding the opinions of Syrian migrants and especially Syrian university students. The latest quantitative data is provided by the Council of Higher Education (CoHE) and the findings of a questionnaire prepared by the authors, transmitted by Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (*Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı* - YTB) İzmir Office in 2019. Together with the CoHE data for 2021, the paper evaluates the responses of 22 Syrian students living in Izmir. In addition to the quantitative data, the authors employed qualitative data from in-depth interviews with two experts, one at Dokuz Eylül University, and the other at CoHE to reflect the public policies in migration-related fields.

Integration Policies of Türkiye after the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement

The Syrian civil war erupted in 2011 and the migration policies of Türkiye since that time have been highly interrelated. The civil war has caused the migration of millions of Syrians to the countries surrounding Syria such as Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Until recently, Türkiye has been the host of 3.7 million Syrians living in Türkiye (Ministry of Interior, 2022). The open-door policy of Türkiye has been maintained as a continuum of the historical state approach. However, with a declaration by the Ministry of Interior in 2022, Syrians who left Türkiye for Ramadan Fest were not allowed to pass the borders back to Türkiye.

Syrians in Türkiye cannot apply for refugee status since Türkiye has a geographical condition on the *1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 The Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees*. Even though the Syrians cannot hold refugee status, they have been granted temporary protection status since 2012. Meanwhile, Türkiye has adopted domestic laws in order to make Syrians and migrants of other nationalities benefit from fundamental rights such as education and health. The *Readmission Agreement* signed between Türkiye and the EU in 2013 has also contributed to the reforms in national migration policies. Both parties have also agreed on a roadmap for a visa-free regime. To construct the foundations of the regime, the EU demanded from Türkiye to reform the laws concerning the rights of foreigners and migrants. Türkiye had started to harmonize its legislation to the EU in 2005 with the *National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration* (Erdoğan, 2021).

In line with the demands of the EU, *Law on Foreigners and International Protection* came into force in Türkiye in 2013. This reform has benefited the migrants in Türkiye. Since the number of migrants had been massively increasing and practical matters needed specialized management of a bureaucratic organization, Türkiye established *Directorate-General for Migration Management* in 2013. The status of this organization was changed to *Presidency of Migration Management* in 2021.

Currently Türkiye has been following a policy of voluntary repatriation policy for the Syrian migrants. The President of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Türkiye will provide voluntary return of 1 million Syrians from Türkiye to northern Syria. However, Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that they will not accept the Syrians back to the country (Hubbard and İnce, 2022). In this situation, Türkiye seems to seek for new alternatives to its repatriation policy. In case of a voluntary repatriation of large number of Syrians from Türkiye, Syrian university students will not prefer to interrupt their studies under these uncertain circumstances.

Syrian University Students in Türkiye

Currently, there are 3,7 million Syrians living in Türkiye. 200.950 Syrians acquired Turkish citizenship by March 2022 (Ministry of Interior, 2022). 149.807 Syrians live in the third biggest city, İzmir, and this number corresponds to 3% of the city's population (Mülteciler Association, 2022).

The number of Syrian university students in Türkiye has been on the rise with the decisions of Syrians to maintain their lives in the country. In the 2018-2019 academic year, 20.701 Syrian students enrolled in Turkish universities (Council of Higher Education, 2018). This number has increased to 48.192 in the 2021-2022 academic year (Ministry of Education, June 2021). Since the total number of university students in Türkiye is 180.000, approximately one-fourth of this number is composed of Syrian students (Erdoğan, 2020). Syrian students are mostly enrolled at Gaziantep University, İstanbul University, Karabük University, and Mersin University. All Syrian students have the right to apply to a higher education institution in Türkiye. However, the universities are free to determine their own

admission criteria for international students. Turkish universities apply several entrance examinations such as Foreign Student Exam (*Yabancı Öğrenci Sınavı*-YÖS) or SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test), ACT (National College Admission Examination), or MCAT (Medical College Admission Test) (Yıldız, 2019, p. 79).

Syrians in Türkiye's state universities are exempt from international student fees. Moreover, they can apply for several scholarships such as Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) Türkiye Scholarships, and YTB and DAFI Programs by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), HOPES Projects of the European Union (EU), and SPARK Türkiye.

İzmir Case

The Syrian civil war has resulted in the migration influx of millions of young people and the interruption of their education processes in Syria. In the 2018-2019 academic year, 90 Syrian students have been enrolled at the universities in İzmir (CoHE, 2018). In the 2020-2021 term, this number increased to 320 (CoHE, 2020). This sharp increase indicates the rapid-growing number of young people. It is essentially important for the Turkish state to take these new types of societal facts into consideration. Because, the increasing number of students at universities means the increasing number of employment-seeking young people. Accordingly, a multi-level approach may be helpful in dealing with this current trend in Türkiye. The table below shows the number of Syrian students in the universities located in Izmir.

Table 1: Syrian Students in Izmir Universities

University	Male	Female	Total
Dokuz Eylül University	155	45	200
Ege University	40	25	65
İzmir Bakırçay University	0	1	1
İzmir Demokrasi University	1	0	1
İzmir Katip Çelebi University	28	19	47
İzmir Kavram Vocational School	1	0	1
İzmir Institute of Technology	3	1	4
Yaşar University	1	0	1
Total	229	91	320

Source: CoHE, 2020

The data given above reflects that, Dokuz Eylül University (DEU) has the highest number of Syrian students enrolled at its programs. This number has been a result of DEU's Internationalization Strategy which has prioritized an increase in the number of its international students. In the 2021-2022 academic year, the number of international students has been 1.520, 200 of which have been Syrian students (DEU Student Office, 2022).

Opinions of Syrian students on Education, Social and Cultural Life

University students have perceived a university degree as a guarantee for a qualified professional career. However, Syrian students in Türkiye have had language barriers, cultural and educational differences with Turkish society. The questionnaire results which were gathered by the authors from 22 Syrian university students of 2017-2018 academic year in İzmir have indicated that they expect several courses to be offered in the academic curriculum in order to overcome such barriers. The topics of the expected courses are enlisted as the following: Syria- Türkiye relations, cultural integration, the labor market in Türkiye, management skills, computer programs course, marketing courses, sign language,

English and other language courses, and TOEFL courses. In addition to the courses, the students expect several extracurricular activities such as training on job opportunities, career fairs, job interviews, intelligence games, sports, arts, music, community services, dramatics, speech, health, communication skills, and information about academic or professional organizations. The students prefer to have degrees in departments of medicine or law to fulfill the basic needs of themselves and their families.

Syrian students believe that language skills will improve their opportunities in the labor market. Being able to speak the Turkish language at an advanced level will enable them not to be recognized as "*foreigners*" within the society. The students believe that acquiring citizenship will also help them to overcome many problems. They expect financial and moral support, new scholarship opportunities, and traineeships related to their department in order to prepare them for the labor market. Although the Syrian students are financially supported by Türkiye Scholarships (800 TL - 51 € for undergraduate level, 1100 TL - 70 € for master students, 1600 TL - 102 € for Ph.D. students), they try to find a job in İzmir (Mülteciler Association, 2021).

The questionnaire results have indicated that Syrian university students do not plan to leave Türkiye after their graduation. Even though those students have temporary protection status since 2012, they plan to continue living in Türkiye. Moreover, the students have been looking for a job during their studentship in order to meet their needs since the scholarships have not been sufficient for their monthly expenditures.

Conclusion

This study argues that although Syrian migrant university students in Türkiye have the right to apply for studying at Turkish universities, they have been in need of financial and social support to continue their studies. The questionnaire results indicate that most of the students believe that Turkish citizenship will be beneficial for their future plans in the country. The study has found that almost 80% of the registered Syrian university students in İzmir plan to stay and work in the city following their graduation. Although İzmir has been

a transit city for a great deal of migrants during the last decade, the aim of Syrian students to stay in İzmir is an important indicator of changing social facts.

Syrian students have been financially supported by several funding frameworks provided by national and international authorities such as YTB, the EU, and UNHCR. The students expect several courses to be offered in their academic curricula. Türkiye-Syria relations, the Turkish labor market, the English language, training on trade, management, and marketing skills, and cultural integration are the courses that they expect to take in their programs. The students have also been interested in extracurricular activities consisting of career fairs, academic or professional organizations, community services, sports, and arts. This study unraveled that Syrian university students prioritize their Turkish language skills, university diploma, IT skills, and knowledge of Turkish politics and labor law in order to find a job. Therefore, if Türkiye will invest in the education of both Turkish and Syrian students, xenophobic approaches and marginalization will be left and socio-economic integration will be successful.

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13 MAY 2022
Friday

Panel 3: Trade and Energy Security (09.45-11.00)	
Moderator: Paolo Bargiacchi, Kore University of Enna	
09.45-10.00	**China and Foreign Seaport Investments at Home and Abroad: Some Preliminary Remarks** **Gül M. Kurtoğlu-Eskişar,** *Professor*, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir **Cengiz Mert Bulut**, *Ph.D. Candidate*, Shanghai University, China
10.00-10.15	**Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Anthropocene Period** **Emre İşeri,** *Professor*, Yaşar University, İzmir
10.15-10.30	**Rethinking Energy Security Issues in the New Era** **Ülviyye Sanılı Aydın,** *Associate Professor*, Celal Bayar University, Manisa
10.30-11.00	**Discussion and Questions**

China and Foreign Seaport Investments at Home and Abroad: Some Preliminary Remarks

Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskişar* **&** **Cengiz Mert Bulut** **

Introduction

China's accession to the World Trade organization in 2001,[1] increasing momentum of globalization and the rapid increase of the Asian Tigers after 1998 Asian Crisis[2] have significantly expanded international maritime trade since 2000s (See Figure 1). The rapid speed of globalization and recent innovations in maritime logistics have also elevated the overall significance of seaports as international epicenters of the maritime transport system. However, only a few international treaties exist on seaport regulations: Except for 1923 Geneva Convention, almost all existing laws (some unwritten) consist of bilateral treaties or agreements between international organizations and states.[3] As a result, leading countries like China (see Figure 2) have undertaken a range of political and legal steps to organize, enhance, or privatize the status, management, and efficiency of their seaports or their operation conditions in recent years.


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** Ph.D. Candidate, Shanghai University, China

[1] On the possible effects of WTO membership on the Chinese economy and its trade potential, see Elena Ianchovichina and Will Martin, "Impacts of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization," *The World Bank Economic Review* 18, no. 1 (2004): 3–27.

[2] Aside from their rapid development, these states (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) have been the subject of different definitions, such as the virtual state as they have shifted their manufacturing to foreign markets and specialized in sectors with high added value that require cutting-edge technology and outstanding human capital at home. (See Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of The Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century*, Revised ed. [New York: Basic Books, 2000]).

[3] To some degree, this result is due to the versatility of the ports: They are often treated as strategic assets that can serve multiple purposes, ranging from acting as energy hubs and offshore energy sources to serving as bulwarks of maritime boundaries and other elements of strategic security. As a result, a leading tendency among states is to ensure a port's security by itself, and approach foreign ownership from the lens of security.

Figure 1: International maritime trade, 1970–2020 (millions of tons loaded)



Source: UNCTAD

Since 2000s, China has increased its role as a global player in maritime transportation and sought to dominate the maritime trade route from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. As a result, China established ownership and concessions in various seaports in the Mediterranean, including Egypt, Israel, Türkiye, and Greece. This study briefly overviews the status of China's mainland ports and compares them with its port investments abroad through the example of the Greek port of Piraeus. We are interested in the following questions: Is China a fully cooperative international player that follows liberal principles regarding its maritime transportation and port investments? Or, is it a strategic player who cooperates with the existing local norms in countries it engages with regarding its seaport investments but not at home?

Our initial findings based on some of China's local ports and its port investments in Greece (Piraeus) suggest that there are remarkable dissimilarities between Chinese behavior at home and abroad. On the one hand China seems to comply with any existing norms and legal framework on maritime seaport concessions, acquisitions, and other related activities, including the Piraeus Port in Greece. On the other hand, it does not seem to equally welcome foreign infrastructure investments and encourage competition in its mainland ports despite its earlier economic liberalization reforms. We note that this behavioral divergence can affect China's image as a revisionist global power, instead of a status quo power, particularly by EU with relevant security implications.

Investment and Seaports in Mainland China

A Glance at Port Investment

Management of port investments in China began to undergo significant changes after China's gradual economic liberalization (Notteboom and Yang, 2004, 191). Congruent with the overall economic reform process in China, with few exceptions, local governments along with state-owned corporations began to operate Chinese seaports in 1980s. Notwithstanding further reforms and changes that went into effect since early 2000s, the Chinese state and local port operators do not act as completely independent actors with unrelated goals. On the one hand, Chinese local port authorities are functionally distinct from the Chinese state and other globally known Chinese terminal operators, such as COSCO. On the other hand, Chinese ministries facilitate the Chinese operators as the overseas implementers of China's cooperation with Maritime Silk Road countries by providing a preferable political and diplomatic environment through intergovernmental cooperation (Degang, 2018, 36).[4]

Until 2000s, China faced difficulties in financing capital-intensive port projects at home due to a lack of funds. Therefore, the State Council issued a regulation in 1985 that granted some tax incentives to Sino-foreign joint port ventures (Zhang & Chen, 2022, 125). Following Deng Xiaoping's open-door policy, the PRC further opened 31 local ports to foreign ships (NG & Tam, 2012).[5] As a result, a joint venture between an American-funded company and the Nanjing Port authority took place for the first time in 1987. Until 2001, 25 container terminals were jointly operated, managed, or acquired by foreign companies, led by the Hong Kong based Hutchison Port Holdings and Singapore based Port of Singapore Authority (Zhang & Chen, 2022, 125).


Following the accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the national Port Law in 2004, China introduced further reforms to separate the government and enterprise in port administrations at home (Jie, 2020, 14-15). This step meant that any investment

[4] Some of these activities include inter-ministerial cooperation, coordination, and policy processes.
[5] While the number of foreign ships calling at Chinese ports was between 2000-6000 per year, this number increased to 16,000 in 1982.

decisions, such as asset investments and research development would no longer be directly controlled by the central government. These reforms also ensured that Beijing would no longer own the ports, and enabled foreign investment to exceed beyond 49 percent. As a result, at least on paper, international businesses became free to participate in and run ports without the necessity of seeking a local Chinese partner (Notteboom & Yang, 2004, 193).

However, as the following data suggest, in practice, there are no examples of a foreign operator owning a majority stake in a Chinese container terminal in mainland China (Notteboom & Yang, 2004, 197). Share of foreign partnerships of terminals (e.g., the Pearl River Delta) which connect to the South China Sea and the Yangtze River Delta (home to the busiest ports in the world, such as Shanghai and Ningbo) is less than 15 percent. Instead, private sector participation in port operations in mainland China usually still takes the form of joint ventures between private terminal operators and public port companies. Put differently, foreign investors hold a minority stake in Chinese ports, and either engage in a partnership with a local port business or form a partnership with a Chinese or Hong Kong terminal operator.

Figure 2: Liner Shipping Connectivity: top 10 countries, 2006-2019



Source: UNCTAD


FDI at China's Seaports

Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) was the first foreign port company to invest in China. It is currently also the leading foreign company with the highest number of port investments there. PSA usually invests in Chinese ports by establishing a joint venture with Chinese state-owned companies or local port authorities. For instance, while PSA holds more than 50 percent stake in Lianyungang New Oriental container terminal company, it has a 40-49 percent stake in other container terminal companies in regions such as Dalian, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Fuzhou (PSA International, 2022). Another foreign investor for Chinese mainland ports is Dubai Ports Authority (DPW), which holds shares ranging from 12 percent to 29 percent in Yantai, Yiwu, and Qingdao in China. A third foreign investor is APM terminals, which are a part of the Danish shipping giant Maersk and has port investments in six regions in China, including Hong Kong. Similarly APM Terminals, which is a partnership of Smart International Logistics Co., Ltd in the Qingdao region, has a 30 percent stake here.

Their shares in different terminals in other ports in China are as follows: Dalian (15 percent), Shenzhen (30 percent), Shanghai (15 percent), Tianjin (15 percent), and Hong Kong (APM Terminals, 2022).

As these figures suggest, currently foreign terminal operators seem to find it difficult to operate without a Chinese joint venture for mainland Chinese ports. In fact, as Figure 3 indicates, the share of foreigners in Chinese seaports located in strategic regions, such as the Shenzhen-Guanzhou region has remained more limited than elsewhere.

Figure 3: Shareholding Structure Summary in China's Seaports (2013)



Source: Notteboom and Yang, 2013, 190.

Chinese maritime investments abroad:

In tandem with its efforts to liberalize its economy, and fuel its export-based growth model, China's maritime investments abroad gained traction since early 1980s when the Chinese shipping company COSCO started to send freighters to American ports and opened an office

there (Dooley, 2012, 56-57). With these investments, China sought to realize several goals simultaneously, such as to find new markets to expand the sales of its high value-added technological products, improve the cost-effectiveness of its existing international markets, gain the support of states in international institutions and platforms in exchange for commercial and economic benefits (e.g., Greece's objection to the EU's attempts to condemn China on several occasions) and to become a major maritime transportation player in seas surrounding Europe.

China's Investments at Seaports in Europe

China's interest in the European maritime shipping industry is not a new phenomenon. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the first foreign joint venture of the new administration was the Chinese–Polish Joint Stock Shipping Co. with Poland in 1951 (Journal of Commerce, 2021). Although this was an important step, it was also essential to have a national flag in the sector to reduce current expenses and capture potential profit areas. Therefore, a decade later, COSCO, the national shipping company was founded as a *state-owned enterprise (SOE)* in Beijing in 1961. Establishing its first joint venture with the Holland Parker Boat Group in 1980, COSCO consolidated its presence in Europe by buying out its partner in the UK in the late 1980s (Xiwen & Hansen, 2017, 1). COSCO also became the first Chinese company to be enrolled as a member of the World Economic Forum in 2000. It currently operates in 79 countries, with more than 154 worldwide branches, and 332 international and national routes, with a total of 254 ports (Gontika, 2022, 24). Later, in 2018, COSCO also acquired Orient Overseas International, one of the world's largest container transport and logistics service providers based in Hong Kong, as well as its rival, for approximately $6.3 billion (Goh & Miller, 2017). Together with China Merchants Port, which is another Chinese maritime financial group, their share of world's total TEU capacity corresponds to approximately 24 percent. (TEU = Twenty-foot equivalent unit)

China's expanding role on seaports in recent years also overlaps with its Belt and Road Initiative project, which aims to connect countries for commercial and cultural purposes

through rail, sea, pipeline, and road. Once established, China aims to have easy access to the heart of Europe from the South China Sea across the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal (Johnson, 2018). As a part of this goal, China invested in two-thirds of the world's 50 largest container ports until 2016 (Degang, 35).[6] A distinguishing characteristic of BRI is that deals are typically not tied to governance-related conditionality. Instead, they often involve development projects contracted to Chinese companies rather than disbursing to recipient countries (Eder, 2019). Therefore, instead of operating as a platform for mutual gains and cooperation for all involved international players, BRI is increasingly perceived as a tool to further Chinese priorities (Clarke, 2017, 71-73).

While these priorities serve primarily China's interests, Chinese authorities present them as a broad set of "policy coordination" (e.g., bilateral, and multilateral cooperation, organization of BRI forums, high-level visits, and training programs) to learn from the Chinese experience (Tzogopoulos, 2017). Also, notwithstanding the strategy of China to incorporate underdeveloped or developing countries through BRI into its economic network, its ultimate goal is to have easy access to the European market. Maritime transportation plays a significant role to realize this goal, as approximately 75 percent of European imports depend on sea routes (Linden, 2018, 5). During the economic crisis of 2008-2012, China came a step closer to realize this goal by attracting the Southern European states to its side through financial aid.

Chinese Maritime Port Investments Abroad: Greece as an example

Although China has made numerous maritime investments abroad in recent years throughout the world, few have attracted as much attention as its acquisition of the Piraeus Port in Greece. Following a failed attempt for agreement in 2006, which was rejected by the European Commission on grounds that it lacked an international open tender (Eurofo und,

[6] China Merchants Port Holding has investments in 49 ports in 19 different countries and regions, while COSCO has operations in 30 different seaports around the world. China's Grand Vision for Overseas Port Development," Nanfengchuang Magazine quoted in Degang, "China's Seaport Diplomacy: Theories and Practice," 35.

2010), in 2008 Cosco Pacific Ltd, a company of Cosco Group, and Container Terminal of Piraeus Port Authority (PPA) agreed on a concession agreement[7] worth €831.2 million. The same agreement further envisaged a 35-year management lease for two of the three piers (Terminals 2 and 3).[8] Later in 2009, COSCO Group established Piraeus Container Terminals Ltd. for the provision of loading/unloading and storage services for import and export containers handled via the Port of Piraeus (PCT). A year later in 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao met with Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou. They jointly announced that

> China will set up a China–Greece special fund on ship development to provide a package of financial support for Greek ship owners to buy Chinese ships and rejuvenate the bilateral marine transport cooperation. The two sides will expand the throughput of Piraeus port and build the port into a distribution and transit center of Chinese exports of cargo to the EU; strengthen the bilateral coordination and cooperation in the international marine field, establish the China-Greece research center of marine transport energy efficiency and emission reduction and boost the sustainable development of marine transport industry (Embassy of Republic of China in US).

COSCO Group then took over the full operation of Pier II in Piraeus Port, Greece and actively participated in the bid by the port authority of Piraeus in Greece to sell a majority stake (Psaraftis & Pallis, 2012, 39). In 2016, the same company acquired the majority (51 percent) shares of the Port of Piraeus for €280 million, following an agreement with the Greek privatization agency HRADF with an €88 million to be paid for another 16 percent within five years on the condition that COSCO invests an additional €350 million by then (Reuters, 2016). Since the acquisition, China invested heavily in the port: In 2008, Piraeus Port moved just 433,582 containers. In 2020, that number had grown more than tenfold to 5.4 million

[7] It is a type of partnership between the public authorities and a (typically) private enterprise that provide services or carry out works in a certain field, such as infrastructure development. "Concessions," European Commission - Europa, n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/15428/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native.

[8] Cosco Pacific Ltd offered in current prices €4.3 billion as the total fee for the period of concession of 35 years, of which 79 percent is guaranteed, while it will realise investments of €620 million, of which 50 percent was earmarked for tripling the capacity of the container terminal until 2015. "Port of Piraeus Authority 2008 Annual Financial Report," n.d., 9, https://www.olp.gr/en/investor-relations/annual-reports/itemlist/category/259-2008.

TEU (Notteboom, 2017) making it the largest container terminal in the Mediterranean (Piraeus Port Authority).

In retrospect, the leading factors that facilitated this outcome included the Greek debt crisis (2009-2018) intertwined with EU's harsh economic adjustment policies and improving bilateral relations between China and Greece with rising Chinese ambitions for BRI regarding Europe. Although Greece entered the Eurozone in 2001, its economic problems did not come to an end. Worse, the global economic recession that started with the housing crisis in the U.S. in 2007 severely interrupted its liquidity resources. As a result, Greece finally had to accept a bailout package from EU in 2010.

The Greek financial crisis meant a turning point for China's maritime investments in that country, which dates back to 2008. Since the liquidity crisis for Greece began in 2007, it is possible to argue that China was involved in the Greek debt crisis even before the EU intervention. Furthermore, the EU bailout package was widely perceived to protect the interests of the EU's core states, which then led to acrimonious debates both within Greece and between Greece and core EU states to date. The growing skepticism about EU policies and actions during the debt crisis has influenced Greece to stand closer to Chinese investment and Chinese-style economic governance.[9] Meanwhile, from the Chinese side, the acquisition of the port of Piraeus can be also related to their efforts to further BRI to reach Europe. By increasing its share in the Piraeus Port to 51 percent in 2016 and 67 percent in 2021 already implies that China is no longer an external actor in the maritime transportation and politics of EU.

Another indicator of China's growing proximity to the EU market is another acquisition related to Piraeus Port. In 2019, the COSCO Shipping Europe and Greece's PEARL S.A companies signed an agreement which allowed the Chinese company to buy 60 percent of the shares in the railway company (Costco Shipping, 2019, 10). This Land-Sea Express service (now the China–Europe Land-Sea Express Route) starts at the Port of Piraeus and

[9] China has often expressed its desire to transform ad hoc economic systems into one encouraging long-term global policy cooperation. For more, Xianbai Ji and Guanie Lim, "The Chinese Way of Reforming Global Economic Governance: An Analysis of China's Rising Role in the Group of Twenty (G-20)," *The Chinese Economy* 55, no. 4 (September 8, 2021): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2021.1972546.

traverses the Balkans via North Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, and the Czech Republic (Railfreight, 2021). Following the BRI project to build a Eurasian corridor, this railway service enables a route from Asia to the interior of Europe in a relatively faster and short transit.[10] According to Dionysis Boulantzas, director of Ocean Rail Logistics approximately 31-32 trains run per week in 2021, depending on the capacity of the railway line (Papatolios, 2021).

The growing proximity of China to EU through its port investments followed by the rail line, however, may not be limited to the economic realm: Increasing bilateral relations between China and Greece due to port investments has also allowed China to influence the strategic decisions of the EU in international matters directly related to itself. In 2016, Greece prevented the EU from issuing a statement condemning China's activities in the South China Sea and on another issue condemning China's human rights history. European Parliament Member Marietje Schaake then underlined that Greece should understand that the EU is not just a market but a community of values. This emphasis is important as it shows that China's investments in the EU are perceived as a direct threat to its core values. Former German chancellor Angela Merkel's statement that EU countries have to "speak with China in one voice" before 2018 further revealed the perception of China as a security concern for the unity of EU (Horowitz & Alderman, 2017).

Conclusion

At the time when they were initiated, China’s reforms related to its mainland maritime ports were regarded as a part of its efforts to liberalize its economy and integrate itself into the international economic system. However, a closer look at the current conditions suggests that independent foreign investment and partnership levels at its mainland ports are still not too high. Similarly, at a first glance, China's investments in Piraeus Port and its surroundings seem compliant with the international law. However, due to the sparse nature of

[10] A goods from Asia can reach Hungary in 25-26 days on average in this way. “From Sea to Land, Rail Transforms Transport through the Balkans.”

international law on maritime ports, and the complex implications of these investments for the locals and EU, there is a growing perception of Chinese investments as a threat for Europe. The compliance of Chinese behavior with the international practices and norms of European ports also remains ambiguous. For instance, when COSCO aimed to expand the passenger port and station in Piraeus in March 2022, it was blocked by Greece's highest administrative court due to its violation of national and European environmental regulations. COSCO's ongoing investment and huge commitments can lead to more disagreements between the parties later. The ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict is also likely to securitize the subject of port investments in Europe and in mainland China further in the foreseeable future.

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Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Anthropocene

Emre İşeri[*]

The age of Anthropocene remarks a new geopolitical context that regional sustainable (energy) transition proposals should be prioritized over classical geopolitical notions of national security (Dalby, 2020). Nonetheless, Turkey and Greece are in geopolitical rivalry ostensibly over potential fossil fuels in the disputed offshores of the divided Cyprus Island and their prospective transportation route (i.e. the East Med pipeline) to the European Union (EU) energy market. The Eastern Mediterranean is one of those regions that closely feel the effects of climate change.

Indeed, the region's temperature rise is 20% above the world average (WWF, 2021). Intuitively, one would expect regional decision-makers to prioritize sustainable energy policies bestowed with high potential for renewable energy. However, those littoral states, for our purposes Greece and Turkey, have been in geopolitical rivalry over those hydrocarbons located in the offshore fields of Cyprus and their transportations routes to European energy market. Following examination of various energy security approaches (liberal markets/trade, geopolitics, and environmental) and conceptualization of the Eastern Mediterranean as a subregional security complex, the seminar will trace prospects for a paradigm shift from the prevailing energy geopolitical approach to environmental one.

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Rethinking Energy Security
Issues in the New Era

Ulviyye Sanılı Aydın*

The developments in the last century have turned the world political landscape in a different direction from the route shaped by traditional thoughts, blurring the distinction between domestic and foreign policy issues of the states. Undoubtedly, the critical factor in the evolution of this process is human and its needs. In this context, the issues occupying the agenda of the states are also changing. Probably, energy security is one of the most discussed issues in international relations of last decades. It is closely related to the multidimensional nature of energy security, which was shaped in parallel with the developments in international political economy. Energy is not just a need. If to explain basically, an increasing amount of demanded energy as a result of the growing world population and technological advances is an important factor in the context of environmental problems and climate change. Moreover, the fact that the fossil energy resources are not equally available in each country determines the geopolitical dimension of energy security issues.

After the Second World War, a rapid economic development process has started in the states, especially in the Western countries. This process has supported with technological innovations. The successes in the health sector and the end of collective wars have led to prolongation of human life and population growth. As a result, the need for energy resources in economic activities and social life has increased rapidly. Although the 1987 Brundtland Report has drawn attention to "sustainable development", the need for energy resources has reached higher volumes with globalization.

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In these years it was once more recognized that fossil energy resources are the most important input of economic activities, which are the basis of development but also the most important factor in the context of climate change and environmental problems. Thus, it is required the issue of energy security to be evaluated from a different perspective in international relations.

The IEA defines energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price. According to the OSCE, energy security means having stable access to energy sources on a timely, sustainable and affordable basis. Access to energy is not only crucial in supporting the provision of basic needs - such as food, lighting, water, and essential health care, but it is first and foremost a precondition to economic growth, political stability and prosperity. This is why energy security forms an important part of the states' comprehensive approach to security.

Since the 1990s, the issue of energy security has been addressed on a multidimensional platform. On one side, global energy demand is increasing to fulfill the growing human population needs, with fossil fuels being the most dominating source. Increasing production and commercial activity with globalization has also increased the demand for energy. Although the demand for fossil energy resources has decreased during the pandemic period, it exhibits an upward trend in general. On the other hand, energy security calls attention to the environment and climate change. One of the most significant environmental problems associated with fossil fuel use is the emission of greenhouse gases, leading to global warming and creating problems related to climate change. Increasing the supply of renewable energy sources would replace fossil sources and significantly limit the dominating carbon-intensive fossil fuels in the future energy system. Energy transitions and the growth of cyber criminality have expanded the scope of what constitutes energy security. The evolution of the international system towards multi-polarity in the post-Cold War period is closely related to the geopolitical importance of energy security. Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has had a dramatic impact on the global energy system. Russia was the world's largest oil and natural gas exporter in 2021, and energy markets have been thrown into turmoil, with major energy security and supply risks worldwide. Russia's invasion of Ukraine

and its global repercussions have put major strains on oil markets. The war has pushed up prices and caused disruptions in natural gas markets also. According to the IEA, despite these challenges, the latest studies find that the global clean energy transition holds new promises for economic and social development on the continent, with renewables, including solar, critical minerals and green hydrogen offering strong growth potential if managed well. The world countries are poised to benefit as increased international ambitions for cutting emissions helps set a new course for the global energy sector amid declining clean technology costs and shifting global investment patterns. Clean energy spending, which barely rose in the five years following the 2015 Paris Agreement, is now growing at about 12% a year, with the most being spent on renewables, grids, and efficiency. That's the good news from recently released *World Energy Investment 2022.* But this clean energy spending isn't well distributed and is concentrated in advanced economies and China. And while overall global energy investment is set to increase by 8% in 2022 to reach USD 2.4 trillion, half of the rise simply reflects higher capital costs. That’s not enough to tackle today's energy shortages or put the world on track to cut CO2 emissions to net zero by mid-century.

All these developments require to rethink energy security issues.

13 MAY 2022
Friday

Panel 4: Humanitarian Concerns and Human Rights (11.15-12.30)	
Moderator: Armağan Gözkaman, Beykent University	
11.15-11.30	**In re-security: Evolving Trends, Diverging Interpretations and Escalating Confrontations** **Paolo Bargiacchi,** *Professor*, Kore University of Enna, Italy
11.30-11.45	**From Human Security to National Security: Illiberal International Order and New Multipolarity** **Serhun Al,** *Assistant Professor*, İzmir University of Economics, İzmir
11.45-12.00	**Security Challenges in West Africa and the Sahel** **Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu**, *Associate Professor*, Yaşar University, İzmir
12.00-12.30	**Discussion and Questions**

Evolving Trends, Diverging Interpretations and Escalating Confrontations in the Field of International Security♦

Paolo Bargiacchi*

Abstract:

Scope and content of international security has evolved since 1945. Many states and some international organizations are currently reshaping their own perceptions on security and revising architectures of security at regional and global level. For its part, the UN General Assembly has revitalized its role in the maintenance of peace and security by adopting resolution 76/262 on the standing mandate for a debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council. However, these evolving trends also lead to diverging and competing interpretations of international security among the main global actors. The outcome of this complex scenario is the escalation of tensions and confrontations at international level. Further, international rules and institutions are under stress by centrifugal forces, the UN Security Council is often deadlocked by tensions among its Permanent Members, and the prohibition on the use of force is applied restrictively while the self-defence exception is broadly construed, if not misinterpreted. The article wonders about the future of the UN system and highlights the risk of a possible failure. The exit strategy to strengthen the resilience of the UN system is to implement a new kind of multilateralism. In 1945 the UN Charter multilateralism was built around the Security Council in the name of collective security. Today, it is time for a more inclusive and comprehensive multilateralism, mainly based on the collective responsibility of all UN member states and bodies rather than on the primary responsibility of the Permanent Members within the Security Council. Collective proactivity should be the 'password' for moving towards a 'UN 2.0' as recommended by the UN Secretary-General ahead of the Summit of the future in 2023.

Keywords: International security; perceptions of security; UNGA resolution 76/262; multilateralism; 2023 Summit of the future; UN 2.0.

♦ This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. POWERS (*Peace, War and the World in European Security Challenges*) Jean Monnet Network is at http://powers-network.vsu.ru/en/home/.

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1. Evolving trends in the field of international security

Since the adoption of the UN Charter, the interpretation and application of the scope and content of the notion of "international security" has evolved. Today, the UN Security Council considers many more situations as "threats to peace and international security" under Chapter VII of the Charter. The whole UN system has acknowledged and is implementing the new concept of human security. Some international organizations play an important role in reshaping perceptions and architectures of security at regional and/or global level. For instance, NATO's strategic concepts are being continuously adapted and revised to the changing circumstances of the international relations; the EU proposes itself as a global security provider; the African Union supports the withdrawal of its member states which are also state parties to the International Criminal Court from the Rome Statute because the African Union perceives the Court as a security threat for African states. More in general states, to begin with major Powers (including the five Permanent Members of the Security Council), have shifted, at least in part, their own perceptions on national, regional, and international security from classical inter-state threats to global transnational threats such as terrorism, non-international armed conflicts, climate change, and non-state actors' malicious and hostile activities.

From this evolved landscape on security, three main consequences follow:

1) the scope of the notion of "international security" has greatly expanded and now include global multidimensional threats, many of which (i.e., climate change and arms proliferation) are not "armed" threats under Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter;

2) the post-war world divided in two ideological blocs with two competing visions of international and regional security has been replaced by a multipolar world with multiple concepts and architectures of security at global, regional, sub-regional and national level. Virtually, almost each bloc of states and almost each major international organization (EU, African Union, NATO, ASEAN, etc.) have now their own policy and vision on security with their own goals, tenets, principles, and dogma;

3) the national security of major Powers tends to become more and more also a matter of international or regional security to the extent that major Powers equate their own security needs, goals, and threats with those of other states to the cry of 'my security is the security of all'. The US Global War on Terror is a clear example of this attitude at global level.

These evolving trends have triggered multilevel dynamic evolutions in the domain of international security but the related institutional (at least, within the UN system) and legal frameworks (at least, within the UN Charter) have not properly evolved as well. Today, the international community must tackle and deal with new security threats and challenges as well as new regional and global security actors, but it still uses old and small institutional and legal 'bottles' to the extent it keeps on relying upon the post-war legal and institutional framework on security. This conundrum has triggered a sort of spill-over effect within and outside the UN Charter, the UN Security Council and, in general, the whole UN system.

As a matter of international legal framework, there are expanded concepts of self-defence against non-state actors and cyber threats which are grounded on alleged new general rules of international law rather than on Article 51 of the UN Charter. For instance, the United Kingdom expressly advocates a "modern law of self-defence [adapted] to modern developments and new realities […] because we are part of an [international] legal system that can and does adapt to deal with the cases of the future"[1]. Expanded concepts of self-defence are invoked, right or wrong, to even legitimize extrajudicial killings of suspected terrorists or foreign agents like the Iranian General Soleimani.

As a matter of international institutional framework, the UN system and some regional organizations are redefining their own internal frameworks, powers, and priorities. The ASEAN "has been the driver of regional institution building in the Indo-Pacific"[2]; the African Union is strengthening its internal structure; and the EU is trying to build up military integration within the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy.

[1] Attorney General's Speech at International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The modern law of self-defence*, 11 January 2017.
[2] Caballero-Anthony, *The ASEAN way and the changing security environment: navigating challenges to informality and centrality*, in *International Politics* (2022), at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00400-0.

1.1. The UN General Assembly resolution 76/262 on the standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council

The armed conflict in Ukraine and the stalemate within the Security Council between Russia and the western Permanent Members has started a much-needed process of revitalization of the General Assembly's role in the maintenance of peace and security, especially with regard to the relationship of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Should the revitalization process be successful, the General Assembly might be able to contribute more effectively to the global security architecture than in the past, also rebalancing the internal equilibrium between the General Assembly and the Security Council in this field.

In the last months, the General Assembly held its 11th emergency special session on Ukraine upon request of the Security Council for the first time in 40 years. The previous 10th emergency special session had been instead convened 25 years before following a request of Qatar regarding the Israeli decision to build a unit housing project in East Jerusalem. More importantly, with resolution 76/262, adopted on 26 April 2022, the General Assembly decided to convene a formal meeting within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more Permanent Members and to hold a debate on the vetoed subject. A standing mandate for a debate when a veto is cast might be a game-changer as well as the invitation addressed to the Security Council to submit a special report on the use of the veto at least 72 hours before the discussion in the General Assembly. It is the first time that a UN body has taken action to modify the use of veto.

In the Preamble of resolution 76/262, the General Assembly recalls "its authority under Article 10 of the Charter" in the maintenance of international peace and security, and also recalls that "the International Court of Justice has observed [its] competence on questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security". More importantly, the Preamble recalls "that in carrying out its duties under [the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security] the Security Council acts" on behalf of all UN Member States pursuant to Article 24 (1) of the Charter. Resolution 76/262 is therefore strongly linked to the UN Charter in recalling the intra-system relationship between its two

main bodies in the field of international peace and security. Resolution 76/262 is not only 'full' of international law, but it also contains a strong reminder to all UN Member States and bodies not to lose sight of the institutional framework of the UN system. The fact that both Russia and the US voiced support for resolution 76/262 (including support for paragraph 3 of the resolution)[3] and for the standing mandate to hold a debate where the Permanent Member is supposed to explain its reasons for the veto to the whole UN membership is undoubtedly a step forward.

Of course, the veto power stands in the way of a full and proper functioning of the UN system and General Assembly's resolutions have no power to modify or limit the veto power. Notwithstanding some initiatives, shared by many states, seek structural reforms of the Security Council and restrictions on the use of the veto, any reform or restriction today seems utopian. Nevertheless, resolution 76/262 remains a valid instrument for greater accountability for the use of the veto within the UN system through a political process of explanation, dialogue, and discussion before the UN plenary organ. As a matter of binding consequences, the impact of explaining the reasons for casting a veto to the General Assembly will be minimal and might not probably act as a deterrent for Permanent Members. However, the 'duty' for Permanent Members to explain the political and legal reasons for their vetoes is a long-awaited step that scholars and stakeholders have been advocating for more than 25 years. Resolution 76/262 might have healthy long-term consequences for political dialogue within the UN system and it might also contribute, at least indirectly, to changing the UN architecture on international peace and security.

After its adoption, resolution 76/262 has been soon applied after China and Russian Federation vetoed on 26 May 2022 a draft resolution aimed at strengthening the sanctions regime against North Korea. Accordingly, on 8 June 2022 the General Assembly held its first debate on vetoes cast by the two Permanent Members and issues of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The Security Council transmitted in advance its special report on the use of the veto to the General Assembly, China and Russia took the floor to

[3] In paragraph 3 of resolution 76/262, the General Assembly "*Invites* the Security Council, in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, to submit a special report on the use of the veto in question to the General Assembly at least 72 hours before the relevant discussion in the Assembly".

explain the reasons for vetoing the draft resolution, and around 50 states (including the other Permanent Members, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Japan), plus the European Union, made comments on the Security Council special report and the situation in the Korean peninsula. The President of the General Assembly noted that "a more efficient and accountable United Nations can help build a more resilient world" and reminded to the whole General Assembly that the "revitalization of the United Nations was among his key priorities for the session"[4].

2. Diverging interpretations on the concept and scope of "security" at international level

Different and revised concepts of security in international politics lead to diverging and competing interpretations and implementations on behalf of the main global players or actors. At least three features or criteria affect and reshape these diverging interpretations from one player to another.

The first feature or criterion depends on how the single political actor balances state security and human rights within its own theoretical framework for national, regional, and international security. Within the European legal space, for instance, human rights always come first, and even national security must give way to full protection of human rights. In fact, for decades the European supranational courts (the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights) advance a broad interpretation of scope and content of human rights, sometimes in harsh conflict with EU member states (for instance, Hungary and Poland in the field of migration and asylum) or with state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (for instance, the United Kingdom in respect of extraterritorial application or domestic litigation of the Convention in the field of counterterrorism and overseas military operations)[5]. Apart from these conflicts, however, there is no real or effective

[4] United Nations, *General Assembly Holds Landmark Debate on Security Council's Veto of Draft Text Aimed at Tightening Sanctions against Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, GA/12423, 8 June 2022.
[5] See the draft Bill of Rights introduced by the UK government on 22 June 2022 aimed at repealing and replacing the 1998 Human Rights Act that implements the European Convention on Human Rights within the UK legal system. The proposed Act reforms the law relating to human rights and "clarifies and re-balances the

balance between human rights and security within the European legal space, at least at supranational level: human rights always come first. In the wider world, the approach is sometimes different instead. Of course, human rights are supported, recognized, and protected by most states but, at least for some of them, human rights prevail only as long as national security is not threatened. The Global War on Terror launched by the US in the aftermath of 9/11 is a clear example of this 'unbalanced' approach. In the name of national security, human rights are still being limited in places like Guantanamo and CIA-run 'black prisons' or in overseas counterterrorism operations whose goal is the extrajudicial killing of suspected terrorists.

The second feature or criterion depends on the exact meaning attributed to the notion of "indivisible security" by global or regional actors. For instance, China has repeatedly underlined that international security should be one and indivisible for the whole international community. In the Euro-Atlantic area, the Russian Federation has strongly invoked the principle of equal and indivisible security because it is fundamental to the entire European security architecture. Indivisible security essentially means that the security of any state is inseparable from others either at regional or global level. It also means that each state has the obligation not to strengthen its security at the expense of the security of other states. A working principle of indivisible security requires a middle ground, namely a political, conceptual, and legal compromise on its scope and content to be found among the global players and their different interpretations. Yet, achieving a compromise today seems quite difficult because there are serious differences in the understanding of this principle. For instance, Western states are highly proactive in promoting their own model of security in the wider world and, according to their understanding, their model is the only model of international security because it is founded on some values (freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, pluralism, etc.) which are considered universal and absolute for the whole international community. This understanding is firmly opposed by many non-Western states. Regional blocs of states and regional organizations, each of them

relationship between courts in the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights and Parliament". Cf https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-03/0117/220117.pdf.

with its own specific vision of security, further enlarge the gap and the differences between these diverging interpretations and, sometimes, contribute to heighten the political tension.

Finally, the third feature or criterion depends on how the political actor manages the relationship between security and democracy. Except for a few exceptions, all UN member states may be considered "democratic" in the widest sense of the word. Yet, there are many kinds and forms of democracy, including the so-called 'illiberal democracies'. The whole picture on democracy at world level therefore becomes complex and fragmented. But, above all, there are diverging interpretations about the role and weight that democracy should have in international relations and the relationship between democracy and international security. The EU is strongly committed in spreading democracy all over the world upon the premise that there is no human security and international security without a EU-styled democracy. The US pay sometimes lip-service to the democratization of the world because in some situations their main, if not only, concern seems to be about their own national security rather than the democracy of other states. Of course, the US are always ready and willing to engage with democratic states or to support the process of democratization in non-democratic states. Yet, the US are also ready to engage with the Taliban if their homeland security may benefit from the engagement. To this regard, the 2020 Doha Agreement, and the statement of President Biden, as of 16 August 2021, on US priorities in Afghanistan leave no doubt[6]. Democracy is important for national and international security of the US, but security can be however achieved even partnering with non-democratic states, allies, and entities because, if needed, spreading democracy in the wider world should give way to national security. Finally, most states, including China and Russia, firmly believe that forms of government, including the choice of what kind of democracy to adopt, and its functional relationship with issues of national and international security are not matters for international law and international relations. Accordingly, many of these states oppose any

[6] "We went to Afghanistan almost 20 years ago with clear goals: get those who attacked us on September 11th, 2001, and make sure al Qaeda could not use Afghanistan as a base from which to attack us again. We did that […] Our mission in Afghanistan was never supposed to have been nation building. It was never supposed to be creating a unified, centralized democracy. Our only vital interest in Afghanistan remains today what it has always been: preventing a terrorist attack on American homeland": *Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan*, 16 Aug. 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-afghanistan/.

attempt from Western states to promote democracy in other states and within the international relations.

3. Escalating confrontations in international relations and the future of the United Nations: moving towards a new kind of multilateralism through collective proactivity of all UN member states and bodies

All these different conditions, criteria, and approaches in the field of international security rise, if not escalate, tensions and confrontations at global, regional, and sub-regional level. International rules and institutions as well as the whole international legal system are under stress and risk to be torn apart by centrifugal forces. It seems as if the UN Charter is presently unable to meet the security challenges of current international relations and the demand for increased and revised security advanced by states. It seems as if there is too much 'new wine' for the 'old bottles': post-war legal rules and concepts seem unfit for the globalized world of today.

The wide and almost absolute prohibition on the use of force, contained in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, is interpreted more and more narrowly by the states and, as a result, armed force is used more and more in international relations with the claim or pretext that its use is lawful under international law. Self-defence exception has turned into a sort of large legal umbrella for any kind of individual or collective international military operation, whatever the objective, the target, the scope, and the scale. Today, self-defence is a legal and political justification good for all seasons, especially after that, according to some powerful states, the 'old' anticipatory defence from temporally imminent threats has now evolved into a 'modern' pre-emptive defence from future, if not hypothetical, existential threats. To this regard, cyberspace is a dangerous amplifier for these expanding approaches and interpretations. Within this evolving legal landscape, confrontations and tensions among states, non-state actors, and other entities are escalating and sometimes take the form of armed conflict.

A worrying question is about the future of international law and international institutions.

Are the United Nations doomed to fail like the League of Nations? Are we running the risk of some states leaving the United Nations? This scenario and these questions were utopian until a few years ago. Today, instead, the taboo of not leaving international organizations might be broken forever after the United Kingdom left the EU (and maybe in the future also the European Convention on Human Rights), the Russian Federation was expelled or withdrew from the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights, and many African states are threatening to leave the International Criminal Court. Even if this worst-case scenario should not materialize, it is logical to wonder if the United Nations are doomed to play in the future a marginal role in international affairs and if the whole system of international relations is entering a new systemic configuration intended to replace the post-war equilibrium and architecture.

As anticipated, the overall landscape is worrying: the prohibition on the use of force in international relations is applied restrictively while its main exception – self-defence – is broadly construed, if not misinterpreted or violated at all. Security has become a multilevel notion whose conceptual, political, and legal borders are difficult to draw, and its scope and content is changing and widening day after day. The UN Security Council is often deadlocked by tensions among the Permanent Members before the most controversial and dangerous situations (Syria, Ukraine, Middle East, etc.) and a new Cold War between the West and the 'others', restyled in forms, words and symbols, is probably already among us rather than still looming on the political horizon.

Is there an exit strategy to avoid a political earthquake in international relations with unpredictable and dangerous consequences? Is it possible to strengthen the resilience of the UN system to contain these centrifugal forces? If the UN Security Council is unable to fulfil its role, then it should be up to the rest of the UN system and bodies and member states to start playing a more active role in international affairs. The General Assembly will need to further strengthen its revitalization process (resolution 76/262 is an important first step in this direction but it is not enough) and the advisory and contentious jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice should be more frequently triggered by the General Assembly and the UN member states.

In 1945 the United Nations would not have been founded without the Permanent Members having the power of the veto, but today the United Nations will not survive without member states and UN bodies other than the Security Council taking the lead and sending a strong message to the Permanent Members. In 1945 the multilateralism of the UN Charter was mainly, if not only, built around the Security Council in the name of "collective security". Today, that kind of multilateralism is under severe strain. One should therefore wonder if the time has not come to move from the idea of "collective security" to the idea of "collective responsibility" to protect and implement peace and security at international level. It is time for a new kind of multilateralism, more inclusive and comprehensive, and mainly based on the collective responsibility of all UN member states and bodies rather than on the primary responsibility of the Permanent Members within the Security Council.

Collective proactivity should be the 'password' for moving towards a 'UN 2.0', namely a UN system more prepared "to safeguard global commons, improve the provision of global public goods and respond better to future global risks". The UN Secretary-General's recommendation to convene the "Summit of the future" in 2023 to "contribute to a more tech-savvy, efficient and results-oriented UN 2.0 – a progressive world body that functions at high bandwidth" goes exactly in this direction[7]. The world has changed, and the UN system must change accordingly along a pragmatic, collective, and realistic path without empty rhetoric and utopian goals.

[7] Al-Thani (Permanent Representative of Qatar to the UN) & Eneström (Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN), *Moving towards a UN 2.0*, 19 October 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/10/19/moving-towards-a-un-2-0.

From Human Security to National Security: Illiberal International Order and New Multipolarity

Serhun Al*

The United Nations-led initiatives such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) aimed to transform the notion of security from solely state-centric perspectives towards a more people-centric understanding. This process evolved in correspondence with the US-led building of politically and economically liberal international institutions against the lure of transnational Soviet-style socialism. By the 1990s after the fall of Soviet Russia, traditional understanding of national security was challenged with significant scholarly criticisms and human security concept began to be circulated as an alternative particularly with the UNDP report in 1994. Human security shifts the attention from the state and its territorial-national security towards a more people-centric perspective. Human security incorporates freedom from fear (peace), freedom from want (economic, environmental, health security) and freedom from indignity (human rights, minority rights). The nuanced approach of human security has been that people should be protected against state aggressions and crimes against humanity under their own state authorities.

Although this notion has partially pushed for democratization agenda worldwide and promoted liberal policies towards immigrants, refugees, minorities and broader citizenry across the borders in the 1990s and early 2000s, the rise of authoritarian states such as China and Russia to the global stage and regional destabilizers such as Iran along with rising illiberalism in the West reinforced the national security, i.e. territorial security and national unity. This paper will unpack the conditions under which hopes for human security in the 1990s have been dashed with new securitization and militarization in contemporary world politics along with the return to national security perceptions.

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Security Challenges in West Africa and the Sahel

Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu*

Introduction

Security challenges in the Sahel and West Africa are many. Countries in the region suffer from increasing cross-border security threats including armed conflicts, violent extremism, terrorist attacks, illicit trafficking in people, drugs, small arms and light weapons and other illicit goods, coup d'états, political instability and post-election violence, maritime piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea as well as environmental challenges. The degrading security situation exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and forced many people to flee their homes, leading to a wave of refugees. A recent report by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, 14 January 2022) noted that the internal displacement in the Sahel region increased almost tenfold in the last decade and reached 2.5 million people. The majority of those refugees come from Mali where civil violence erupted in 2012 in Northern Mali and rapidly expanded to other parts of the country as well as to neighboring countries.

The regional and international organizations have been struggling to tackle those challenges in cooperation with several external players, most notably, France. Yet, those efforts have all failed to overcome the existing security threats in the region. Some experts even argue that Operation Barkhane, an anti-insurgent force started in 2014 and led by France, further accelerated the regional instability and "did more harm than good."[1]

Here, it should be noted that the region is traditionally and historically accepted to be under French sphere of influence. This is simply because most of the countries in the region are

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[1] See, for example, Shurkin et al., 2021.

former French colonies. Following their independence, France maintained its relations with those countries and enhanced its engagement in their security landscape. It established security partnerships with many of those countries and deployed its forces in countries including Central African Republic and Mali (Sıradağ, 2014). It is therefore no surprise that France was the dominant country in terms of troop contributions to the international and regional missions/operations deployed in the region.

However, early in 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron said that France and allied forces were withdrawing forces from Mali (France 24, 17 February 2022). The decision was announced in a joint press conference where Macron was accompanied by its African counterparts, Ghana's President Nana Afuko Addo, Senegal's President Macky Sall, and European Council President Charles Michel ahead of the Sixth EU (European Union)-African Union Summit[2] (France 24, 17 February 2022; Onishi et al., 17 February 2022). Mali's military junta later announced that it would withdraw from the military accords it signed with France (DW, 3 May 2022). It is very likely that several other European countries will follow the course and reduce their troop deployments in the near future. This, coupled with the failure of French-led military operations, provoked the growing involvement of outside players in the region including Russia, China and even Turkey.

This paper will first provide a brief overview of the security threats in the Sahel and West Africa with a special focus on Mali. It will then discuss if the military engagement of external powers have been successful in contributing to the peace and security in the region. It argues that it requires concerted and inclusive efforts to address the region's protracted security challenges and the coordination and cooperation between regional and international actors in this process is vital.

An Overview of Security Challenges in the Region

Countries in West Africa and the Sahel face a protracted humanitarian crisis. The rising levels of violence linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel resulted in record of violence in

[2] The summit was held in Brussels on 17 and 18 February 2022.

2021 (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 24 January 2022). Armed groups reportedly carried out more than 800 deadly attacks last year (UNHCR, 14 January 2022). Terrorist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State continue their attacks to both security forces and civilians especially in Mali (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 24 January 2022). The situation is perhaps best summarized by Lyammouri (2021: 2): "Given the lack of adequate protection of civilians, communities have formed their own ethnic-based militias… This has subsequently led to a cycle of unprecedented violence… Some communities are targeted by jihadists because they are accused of collaborating with security forces, while others are targeted because they are accused of collaborating and/or supporting jihadist groups."

As the security situation deteriorates in the region, more African countries use foreign security companies. Mercenaries offer a variety of services including the protection of African leaders as well as mining sites. They also provide logistics, advising and training to state forces and intervene in the conflict and post-conflict zones (Cascais and Koubakin, 15 April 2022). However, the increasing involvement of those private armies in conflict-ridden countries worsens the security situation in the region. It is not easy to determine a precise number of those mercenaries operating in Africa but experts estimate that around 1,000 Russian mercenaries are operating in Mali while around 1,200-2,000 Wagner operatives are present in the Central African Republic (Durmaz and Abdullahi, 28 April 2022; Fabricus, 21 January 2022). Russian mercenary group Wagner is regularly accused of committing human rights abuses in different conflict areas. For example, in April 2022, Wagner is allegedly involved in a massacre in Moura, a village in central Mali where between 200-400 civilians were reportedly executed both by the Malian armed forces and Wagner mercenaries (Roger, 6 April 2022). There are also other private military and security companies that are very active in Africa. They include French agency, Secopex, operating in Somalia and Central African Republic, British group, Aegis Defence Service, operating in 18 African countries and Israeli mercenaries engaged in Cameroon (Durmaz and Abdullahi, 28 April 2022), all charged with crimes and human rights violations against civilians.

The region was also hit hard by several environmental challenges. The effects of the climate crisis are felt more strongly in the region while temperatures increase 1.5 time faster than

the world average (UNHCR, 14 January 2022). The region is characterized with sudden changes in the environment and strong climate variability that adversely affect the lives of many people. These environmental challenges including the recurring droughts throughout the Sahel increase the risk of food insecurity and lead "environmentally induced migration" (Essoungou, 2013). As noted by Essoungou (2013), "the combined effects of population growth, land degradation (deforestation, continuous cropping and overgrazing), reduced and erratic rainfall, lack of coherent environmental policies and misplaced development priorities, have contributed to transform a large proportion of the Sahel into barren land, resulting in the deterioration of the soil and water resources." In 2012, nearly 18 million people faced starvation across the eight countries in the region. In 2014, another 4.7 million experienced acute malnutrition.[3]

The increasing levels of insecurity is aggravated by other security threats such as maritime piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea that affect all coastal states. According to an IMB (International Maritime Bureau) report released last year, nearly 43% of all reported acts of piracy incidents around the world occur in the region (ICC, 2021). Another UN report published earlier had also noted that the attacks in the region more than doubled in 2018 (UNODC, 17 May 2019). Pirate incidents erupt trade activities and eventually hampers socio-economic development in the region. For example, West Africa alone lost $2.3 billion between 2015 and 2017 to maritime crime (UNODC, 17 May 2019). A more recent UN document (10 January 2022) indicated that piracy and armed robbery cost Gulf of Guinea $1.94 billion annually that could have been invested in the development of coastal economies. Piracy and organized crime, that is very common in the Gulf of Guinea, perpetuates instability and poverty across the region.[4]

As seen, the region is home to several security challenges such as the extremist violence, ethnic tensions and armed conflicts, the increasing number of private security companies,

[3] See: The Wilson Center, "Event: The Sahel and Beyond the Headlines: Population, Environment, and Security Dynamics", https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-sahel-beyond-the-headlines-population-environment-and-security-dynamics#:~:text=The%20Sahel%20is%20particularly%20vulnerable,in%20water%20and%20food%20availability.

[4] United Nations, "Organized Crime Perpetuating Instability, Violence, Poverty across West Africa, Sahel, Executive Director Tells Security Council", SC/14761, 10 January 2022, https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14761.doc.htm

human-rights violations of foreign mercenaries, governments and state security forces, illicit trafficking, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, political instability and military coups. Those security challenges, combined with the failure of stabilization efforts implemented both by African states and regional/international organizations have serious humanitarian and developmental consequences.

International Stabilization Efforts

There have been several regional and international efforts to overcome the security challenges in the region. According to a recent IPI Global Observatory Analysis, external forces deployed over 21,000 personnel across the Sahel in the last decade to help address those multiple and interrelated crises (Wilén and Williams, 12 April 2022). Among them, MINUSMA (the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali) is one the earliest attempts. It was established in 2013 by the Security Council Resolution 2100[5] after a Tuareg movement (MNLA: Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad) attacked government forces in the north of the country along with other Islamic armed groups. This was followed by a military coup d'état and the suspension of the constitution as well as the dissolution of the government institutions by the military junta.[6] MINUSMA is accepted as "the world's most dangerous mission" suffering great number of casualties. In early 2022, United Nations Staff Union President announced that at least 25 personnel were killed in terrorist attacks during 2021.[7]

As of November 2021, 18,108 personnel have been deployed to the mission. Among them, there are 12,286 troops along with 3,384 civilians, 1,745 police officers, 500 staff officers and 193 UN Volunteers. The majority of those troops come from African countries including Chad, Egypt, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea while Germany is

[5] United Nations, "Security Council Establishes Peacekeeping Force for Mali Effective 1 July, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2100 (2013)", SC/10987, 25 APRIL 2013, https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10987.doc.htm.
[6] For the details, see: MINUSMA, "History", https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history.
[7] United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "At Least 25 Peacekeeping, Associated Personnel Killed in Malicious Attacks during 2021, United Nations Staff Union President Says", ORG/1722, 3 February 2022, https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/org1722.doc.htm.

among the top ten military contributors.[8] It is also interesting to note that Mali is Germany's largest foreign deployment (Hertel, 8 November 2021). Despite the expectations that Germany's contribution to the mission might soon be over (Hille, 2 February 2022), the German government agreed to raise the number of its troops in MINUSMA to 1,400 troops but to reduce its contribution to EU's training mission in (EUTM-Mali: The European Union Training Mission in Mali) (DW, 11 May 2022). In March 2022, Sweden announced the pullout of its troops from the UN mission in the country (Reuters, 3 March 2022). The decision came after Denmark announced the withdrawal of its troops out of Mali. Here, it should be noted that it was the military government in Mali that demanded the departure of Danish contingent due to the deterioration in its relations with the EU (DW, 27 January 2022).

EUTM Mali was established in 2013. It is a training mission that aims at supporting the efforts to restore state authority in Mali, strengthen the rule of law in the country and contribute to political stabilization and improvement of security situation in Mali. To this end, it does not only provide training to Malian military units, but also provides strategic advice and assist the Malian Armed Forces and G5 Sahel Joint Task Force.[9] Since its establishment, EUTM-Mali has provided training to more than 15,000 Malian armed forces.[10] It falls within the framework of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) along with the EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) (Baudais and Maiga, April 2022), launched in 2015 after the invitation by the Malian government. EUCAP Sahel Mali also provides advice and training to the Malian police, gendarmerie and National Guard and works in close cooperation with EUTM Mali.[11] However, EU foreign policy Chief Josep Borrell recently announced EU's decision to halt its training missions in Mali because of the presence of Russian military contractors, most notably the Wagner Group, which is held responsible for serious human rights violations. "**We cannot collaborate with reprehensible events", Borrell said: "we cannot be training people who are responsible for those kinds of behaviors" (Africa News, 12 April 2022).**

[8] United Nations Peacekeeping, "MINUSMA Fact Sheet" https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
[9] EUTM Mali Mission, https://eutmmali.eu/eutm-mali-mission/
[10] EUTM Fact Sheet, https://eutmmali.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/20220113_Fact-Sheet-EUTM-sans-elections-22FEB_ENG.pdf.
[11] EUCAP Sahel Mali, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucap-sahel-mali/about-eucap-sahel-mali_en?s=331.

Mali also received security assistance from foreign donors including the USA that has regularly provided training to Malian soldiers. The USA also offered logistical and intelligence support to France's Barkhane forces. However, the country suspended its military cooperation with Mali following the coup d'état in 2020 (Diallo and Ross, 21 August 2020). The broader departure of European forces from the country started with the pullout of French forces (Reuters, 3 March 2022). Tensions between France and Mali increased after the army seized power in Mali in 2020. Bilateral relations further deteriorated when French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian defined the transitional military government as "illegitimate" and "out of control" in early 2022 and the decision of the Malian government to expel the French ambassador (BBC, 31 January 2022).

France played a key role in international missions deployed in Mali or in neighboring African countries. Operation 'Serval' was France's first counter-insurgency operation in the country, established in 2013 in order to stop the advance of Islamist insurgents (Boeke and Schuurman, 2015). Almost a year later, another French-led Operation, Barkhane succeeded Operation Serval. Operation Barkhane had a wider geographic focus and spread out between Mali and the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. With approximately 4,500 soldiers and a budget of nearly €600m per year, it is France's largest overseas operation (ECFR, n.d). The priority of the Barkhane Operation is counterterrorism but it is also engaged in development activities and combat patrols alongside Malian forces, provides intelligence gathering and military training (ECFR, n.d.). Out of the 4,300 French troops in the Sahel, 2,400 were deployed in Mali (NPR, 17 February 2022).

France is also contributing to the complementary Takuba Task Force, a special task force formed by elevenw European countries together with Mali and Niger in 2020 in order to support local counterterrorism efforts in the Liptako region (a tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). The force would operate under the command of Operation Barkhane and fight with terrorist groups while also providing advice, assistance and support for Mali's armed forces in coordination with (MINUSMA), the European Union's civilian and military missions (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Mali and EUCAP Niger) and G5 Sahel partners (Harris et al., 2 March 2022; Sahel Coalition, 3 June 2020). Although it carries the European flag, nearly half of Takuba's forces (out of the 900 soldiers) are French. The objective of the Takuba

Task Force was to eventually replace French Barkhane Operation (Lory, 3 February 2022). Yet, the EU officials declared that the joint operations of the Takuba and Malian forces were suspended due to the unwillingness of the Malian military government to hold democratic elections and to halt their collaboration with the Wagner group (NPR, 17 February 2022). Experts note that it is very unlikely to see a total withdrawal of Western forces in the Sahel and West Africa or the end of their counterterrorism efforts in the region but instead, they will likely increase their support to African initiatives such as G5 Sahel Joint Force (Harris et al., 2 March 2022).

Regional Efforts

G5 Sahel Joint Task Force was launched in 2017 by the five Sahel countries, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania with an overall aim to improve conditions for socio-economic development and security within the member states (Lyammouri, 2021: 4). It was a trans-regional organization formed from pre-existing armies of the five member states (Dieng, 14 September 2021). As part of a technical arrangement, signed in 2018 between the European Union, the G5 Sahel and the United Nations, the Force receives support from the UN and the EU.[12] For example, the EU provides financial and technical support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, totaling about €70 million annually (Wilén and Williams, 2022). It was even recommended to establish a separate United Nations support office that would provide logistical and operational support as well as tactical and strategic support to the Joint Force "as an interim measure until the G5 Sahel develops and strengthens its own capacity to support its own force."[13] It was believed that the force could make significant contributions to the stabilization efforts in the region in cooperation with other initiatives.[14]

[12] UNSC, "Situation in Mali", S/2020/476, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2020_ 476.pdf
[13] Ibid.
[14] United Nations, Meeting Coverage and Press Releases: "Success of joint Sahel counter-terrorism force hinges on cooperation, funding to fill capacity gaps, key peacekeeping official tells security council", SC/12956, 15 August 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12956.doc.htm.

Five years after its inception, the joint force conducted several operations against terrorist organizations but struggles to reduce violence in the region (Dieng, 14 September 2021). This is because G5 Sahel also suffers from several challenges including the lack of resources and stable funding, limited military capacity and differences in national priorities between the member states (Dieng, 14 September 2021; Lyammouri, 2021: 4). These obstacles were compounded with the decision of the Chadian transitional government to recall half its contingent from the task force. The move was justified on strategic grounds that a mobile force -rather than the presence of forces with heavy weapons- was needed in order to better adapt to the organization of the terrorists (Al Jazeera, 21 August, 2021). Recently, however, Mali's military government also announced that it is pulling out its forces from the G5 Sahel due to the lack of progress in the fight against the armed violence (Al Jazeera, 16 May 2022).

In 2020, the incumbent Chadian President Idriss Deby had announced that Chadian troops will withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (Al Jazeera, 10 April 2020), another regional effort established by the Lake Chad Basin countries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. When it was established in 1994, the Force was a solely Nigerian initiative until 1998, when it became multinational by incorporating military units from Chad, Niger and Nigeria in order to deal with common cross-border security problems in the Lake Chad region (Albert, 2017: 123-124). However, it was not until the late 2014 that the Lake Chad countries, plus Benin, created the MNJTF in its current form (International Crisis Group Report, 7 July 2020). The deterioration of the security situation in the region is the major reason behind the establishment of a joint military force that would curb arms smuggling and fight Boko Haram and the ISIS affiliate - West African Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Doukhan, 2020). The Force helped stop Boko Haram's advance especially in 2015 and 2016 and helped to free civilians captured by the terrorist group. Nevertheless, like most of the regional initiatives, the MNTJF also suffers from funding problems, diverging priorities and commitments of the member countries and structural limitations (International Crisis Group Report, 7 July 2020).

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) is accepted as the region's principal organization for security cooperation (Tejpar and de Albuquerque, 2015: 1). Having 15 members, ECOWAS was set up in 1975 in order to promote economic integration and foster

self-sufficiency for its member states.[15] During this initial period, ECOWAS did not have a security mandate. As Tejpar and de Albuquerque (2015: 1) put it: "Realizing that conflict and insecurity were major obstacles to economic development, ECOWAS developed its main conflict prevention and management frameworks." ECOWAS Conflict and Prevention Framework (2008) highlights that the Organization fulfills its mandate through non-military means and preventive diplomacy initiatives including diplomatic pressure, sanctions and mediation efforts.[16] For example, in early 2022, ECOWAS agreed to close borders with Mali and imposed tough sanctions by agreeing to cut financial assistance to the country in response to military regime's delays to hold elections after the 2020 military coup (Africanews, 10 January 2022).

In February 2020, Smail Chergui, head of the African Union Peace and Security Commission announced the temporary deployment of a 3,000-strong force in the Sahel region. *The decision was reportedly taken at the AU summit held in early 2020 (Al Jazeera, 27 February 2020).* However, so far no troops have been deployed to the region.

Concluding Remarks

West Africa and the Sahel witnessed a surge in violent extremism especially in the last decade. Other issues such as the increasing number of foreign mercenaries, food insecurity, environmental challenges and pirate incidents that cost serious economic losses for the regional countries affect the lives of many people. This paper sough to provide an overview of the complex and persistent security threats in the Sahel and West Africa. It then explored the regional and international efforts to address those recent security challenges in the region. The paper argues that traditional security understanding that privileges security over development does not help to overcome those interrelated challenges but inclusive efforts are need to address the region's protracted security challenges along with the cooperation of regional and international actors. Unless the root causes of the ongoing conflicts such as

[15] See, ECOWAS, "Basic Information," https://ecowas.int/?page_id=40.
[16] ECOWAS, Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08: "The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework", https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39184-doc-140._the_ecowas_conflict_prevention_framework.pdf

state weakness, poor governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization and lack of policies towards sustainable development are addressed, it is not likely to achieve long-term peace, security and stability in the region.

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13 MAY 2022
Friday

Panel 5: Emerging Themes in Security Studies (13.30-14:45)	
Moderator: Gül M. Kurtoğlu-Eskişar, Dokuz Eylül University	
13.30-13.45	**Militarization of Space: Risks and Remedies** **Sıtkı Egeli,** *Associate Professor*, İzmir University of Economics, İzmir
13.45-14.00	**Environmental Security and Climate Change** **Senem Atvur,** *Associate Professor*, Akdeniz University, Antalya
14.00-14.15	**Temporary Protection in the EU** **Sevgi Çilingir**, *Associate Professor*, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir
14.15-14.45	**Discussion and Questions**

Militarization of Space: Risks and Remedies

Sıtkı Egeli[*]

The number of satellites in Earth's orbit has more than tripled since 2015, to reach 5,000 in year 2022 (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2022). Those satellites serve civilian, government and military entities for applications ranging from communication, earth-observation, navigation and timing to intelligence gathering and missile early-warning. Over the years, satellites' continued presence has come to constitute such an intrinsic and indispensable part of modern life that their uninterrupted services are taken for granted. Yet this widely held assumption of uninterrupted availability is unfounded and potentially dangerous. To the contrary, there are enough indications of satellites' vulnerability to not only natural, but also to human-induced interference and destruction. In this sense, it is no secret that ever since the placing in orbit of the first satellite in 1957, techniques have been persistently pursued to harm satellites or to interrupt or compromise their services. The range of options are multiple: anti-satellite missiles, cyberattacks, electronic jamming, and directed energy beams sent from Earth's surface, or alternatively, kinetic and non-kinetic attacks executed by other satellites and craft that are themselves positioned in space (Egeli, 2021, p. 117).

A straightforward and best-publicized option is DA-ASAT (Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite), along with which kinetic energy weapons, most commonly missiles, are fired towards satellites. Four states (U.S., China, India, and Russia) have already demonstrated such capability by conducting live-fire DA-ASAT tests (Raju, 2021). Yet, an important shortfall of DA-ASAT involves the debris cloud it creates and the consequent the danger to other including one's own satellites. The ease and speed with which the culprits would be identified and responded in kind constitutes another weakness (Claus, 2019, pp. 8-13). Given

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those drawbacks, several states opted to deploy DA-ASAT capability primarily as a retaliatory tool to deter similar offensive ASAT activity by their adversaries.

Debris cloud and ease of attribution reducing attractiveness of DA-ASAT option could be offset by resorting to non-kinetic ASAT alternatives. This may take the form of electronic attack aimed at radio frequency (RF) uplinks and downlinks that satellites use, whereby electronic warfare techniques could be used to jam, spoof, intercept or pollute the content those links, as a result of which satellites' services could be interrupted and even their control could be seized (Atherton, 2018).

Another non-kinetic alternative is presented by directed-energy weapons, primarily high-power lasers, which could also be used to dazzle sensitive electro-optic sensors onboard remote-sensing satellites. Both U.S. and Russia are credited with testing this capability especially against satellites at lower LEO orbits (Weeden and Samson, 2018).

Vulnerability of satellites and their ground-based elements to cyber interference constitutes yet another attractive non-kinetic alternative for disrupting satellites. Possibilities include data theft, jamming, spoofing and even seizing control of satellites by gaining unauthorized access to either satellites themselves or their ground-based control and communication nodes. In fact, during the course of the last decade, there have been several reported cases of satellites being hacked, even briefly hijacked by state and non-state actors (Lewis, 2016).

Lastly, placing of a satellite or spacecraft in orbit which could then reorient itself into the orbital path of another satellite before closing in for inflicting damage or disruption is yet another alternative to interfere with satellite activity. The means to achieve such 'space-to-space' harm and interference have been actively pursued since the beginning of the Space Age (Harrison, 2020, p5-8). Recent technological advances in spacecraft capable of conducting the so-called 'rendezvous and proximity operations' (RPO) have raised concerns over the disruptive impact of such space-to-space engagements on space security.

Overall, close to a dozen nations already deploy or possess the technological prowess to deploy offensive capabilities that could be used to hamper or harm space assets. The expansion of space rivalry into the so-called cislunar domain between the Earth's outmost

orbits and the Moon (Rogoway, 2018), as well as the upcoming competition over celestial bodies such as the Moon and asteroids, risks further complicating the picture and adding to the risks and uncertainties.

Unfortunately, sixty years into the space age, there is very little in the way of arms control treaties, transparency, confidence-building measures, or norms of behavior to prohibit or restrain space-to-space engagements. A main challenge and complication is that, most spacecraft are inherently dual use in that they could readily transition from benign commercial and scientific uses to hostile and intrusive operations. Thus, any arms control arrangements seeking to ban or restrict spacecraft capable of conducting hostile operations must first tackle the daunting task of differentiating them from legitimate spacecraft and satellites. One obvious yet painstaking remedy is to move away from material-based to behavior-based arms control in space (Bohn, 2020). This implies that instead of arms control's traditional preoccupation with objects and capabilities, space arms control should focus more on behavior and how space capabilities are deployed and employed. In the specific context of rendezvous and proximity operations, this means that rather than trying in vain to restrict or outlaw certain categories of spacecraft, it makes more sense to regulate their behavior, especially for cases in which they will be operating in close proximity to one another. One such possibility concerns the signing of the space equivalent of INCSEA (incidents at sea) agreements dating back to Cold War era (Samson and Weeden, 2020). The latter are already being used successfully to deconflict close encounters between military vessels and aircraft. There is no reason why same approach could not be used for RPO activity in space.

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Environmental Security and Climate Change

Senem Atvur*

The economic and social transformation due to the Industrial Revolution had drastically changed the relation between humans and nature and triggered the emergence of ecological degradation. Human-induced (anthropogenic) pressure on the environment has caused the ecosystems to deteriorate faster than their renewal capacity. Therefore, the deepening of ecological problems such as pollution, biodiversity loss, and atmospheric changes has been accelerated. The complex and interdependent nature of ecosystems has produced unexpected impacts. Particularly, the perception of ecological problems' transboundary effects enabled the introduction of environmental issues into the international relations agenda.

This study focuses on the environmental security literature, which draws attention to the correlation between ecological problems and the security issues from different perspectives, and the security impacts of the climate crisis. In this regard, different perspectives of environmental security will be briefly examined, and the differences between state-centric, human-centric, eco-centric, and post-humanist environmental security aspects will be underlined. The security risks posed by climate change and how these impacts have transformed into existential crises will be analyzed. Thus, it is aimed to start a new discussion on redefining security in the age of climate change.

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From Environmental Security to Ecological Security

Since the middle of the 20th century, as the damages to the ecosystem became more visible, the transboundary effects of environmental degradation started to be understood. Pollution, which is defined as "the change of physical, chemical and biological properties of air, water and soil in undesirable ways by human activities" (Odum and Barrett, 2008, p. 523), occupies the most important place among environmental problems. Air, water and soil pollution are interdependent processes and occur as a result of basically similar actions. Anthropocentric activities such as industrialization, urbanization, the use of fossil fuels as the main energy resource, and industrialized agricultural production, which has accelerated due to the increasing population, have directly affected the increase in pollution and environmental degradation. As Since ecosystems function on the principle of complex interdependence, damage in one ecosystem affects not only the species living in that area but also other ecosystems and various species including human beings.

The ecological problems we face today are, undoubtedly, linked to the capitalist system, which prioritizes profit accumulation and growth. Because capitalism considers nature as an unlimited and free resource, it rapidly consumes ecological resources, causes nature to become commoditized, and irreversibly disrupts the ecological balance. The mass production and consumption, and the domination of nature through the expansion of the human living space are among the root causes of the ecological problems. Foster (1999, pp. 14-26) emphasizes that the relations of production, demographic trends, and technological progress should be considered historically and socially as causes of environmental destruction. Therefore, he underlines the necessity of focusing on the transformation of dominant social relations for finding solutions to the ecological crisis.

The impact of economic growth on the environment and natural resources began to be conceived in the late 1960s. Scientists from different countries and fields came together with the initiative of the Club of Rome and prepared the report entitled “Limits to Growth”. In the report, variables such as population, food production, industrialization, pollution, and consumption of non-renewable natural resources were analyzed. The analysis revealed that the constant increase in these variables triggered rapid growth. It has been stated that the

elements involved in this dynamic process change over time, and it is difficult to predict the future direction of growth due to the interdependence between these elements (Meadows et al., 1972, pp. 25-30). In this context, the report emphasized that an economic system based on exponential growth could not be sustained due to limited resources.

Ecological risks emerging in different parts of the world in parallel with the discussion on the concept of security have brought the environmental dimension into the national and international security agenda. The growing ecological risks have been influential in the review of national and international security policies and environmental degradation has become one of the new security threats considered for redefining security (Brown, 1977; Myers, 1989; Mathews, 1989). Studies have revealed that due to the interdependence of ecosystems, political systems cannot stay out of ecological degradation and that they contain risks that might deepen the existing political fragility in both developed countries and the Third World. Moreover, there are also studies stating that environmental problems are new threats to national security. Ullman (1983) argued that defining national security only in military terms and focusing only on military threats by ignoring other dangers would reduce the security of states. He also claimed the necessity of redefining national security by taking into account the threats posed by environmental problems such as famines, floods, droughts and devastating natural disasters including epidemics.

Environmental security is an approach related to the fear, insecurity, and instability created by ecological problems that have turned into a crisis. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the environmental security literature has been developed with different approaches. The Copenhagen School focuses on the relation and interaction between certain units in its sectoral analysis that takes security beyond the military dimension (Baysal and Lüleci, 2015, pp. 71-72); one of these sectors is environmental security. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998, pp. 79-80), who are important names of the Copenhagen School, define the concept of environmental security in terms of human interaction with the planet (biosphere).

“What is at the focal point of security” and “how security is provided by whom” are the main questions in security studies. The question of “the security of who/what” could be answered differently within the environmental security literature. According to the national security

perspective of environmental security, the state is at the center. This approach focuses on problems that threaten the state, such as migration, as well as the possibility of intra-state or inter-state conflict that might be prompted due to the pressure and scarcity of natural resources. The recognition of nature as a threat brings to mind the process of securitization. In this context, linking ecological problems with conflict could cause the environment to be defined as a threat to the security and the integrity of the state. It has been argued that especially the increasing pressure on the environment and the degradation and/or the scarcity of resources would trigger the intrastate and interstate conflict when ecological problems aggravate existing social and economic disabilities (Homer-Dixon, 1999). While this perspective focuses on conflict, it also risks ignoring the factors that underlie the problem of accelerating ecological degradation. Although the development of the environmental security approach carries the risk of securitization of the environment and environmental problems, on the other hand, it has the potential to criticize and change this perspective (Barnett, 2001). Studies focusing on the links between the environment and security in terms of resource scarcity and violence have become the keystone for the formation of environmental security literature. At the same time, studies and international initiatives that drew attention to transboundary environmental problems have accelerated both the debate on redefining security and the evaluation of environmental problems with different perspectives such as desecuritization, economic inequality and human security (Dannreuther, 2013, pp. 137-139).

The traditional approach to security analyzes the interrelation between environmental problems, scarcity in particular, and violent conflicts. On the other hand, the human-centric and eco-centric approaches mostly criticize the securitization of ecological problems through conventional security studies (Uysal Oğuz and Atvur, 2021). Furthermore, the studies focusing on the nexus of human and environmental security have led to a new perspective to assess desecuritization of the ecological problems, and to reveal the links between economic inequalities, social inequity and the ecological crisis by prioritizing the security of human populations (Matthews et al., 2009). It is inevitable that people, who are dependent on nature for their most vital needs, will be directly affected by ecological problems. Social and economic inequalities and vulnerabilities have been deepened by

environmental degradation, and the problems experienced especially in accessing water and food, which are the basic needs for life, could be aggravated. In this context, the human and economic dimensions of environmental security gain importance (Dalby, 2008), and the referent object of security has turned out to be the humans and human welfare.

The most critical approach in the environmental security literature is undoubtedly ecological security. Ecological security presents a holistic perspective to address the root causes of the ecological problems. This approach emphasizes the creation of legally binding international regulations and regimes to preserve ecological balance and strengthen the principles of justice and equity. This approach also deems these changes mandatory in order to cope with the risks of the ecological crisis threatening the biosphere, thus the whole Planet. The ecological security approach takes nature out of human-centered perspectives and evaluates humans as a part of nature; it offers a new perspective that balances ecology and security by holistically considering the needs of ecosystems and all living things. A connection is established between the protection of the environment through international conventions that bring binding rules and new international regimes limiting the states, and the equal and fair distribution and use of natural resources (Timoshenko, 1990; Pirages and DeGeest, 2004). The ecological security approach deals with environmental problems, the international system and International Relations from an alternative perspective. It aims to solve intertwined and complex security problems on the basis of common interest and collective effort, by addressing them on the scale of planet Earth, the only living space of human beings. Thus, the referent object of ecological security is the biosphere or the Earth, which comprises the various interconnected ecological, social, and political systems. Despite the resemblances and overlapping aspects with ecological security, the posthuman security approach also offers a new perspective by prioritizing non-human elements in accordance with post-structuralist assumptions. The post-colonialist and ecofeminist assumptions are embraced within the post-humanist security perspective that aims to decenter the “human” in the notion of politics (Cudworth and Hobden, 2011, p. 139; Mitchell, 2017). The referent object of the post-humanist approach is undoubtedly the non-humans.

Climate Crisis and Security Impacts

One of the most current debates in security studies is related to climate change. Environmental security with its all aspects takes into account the multiple impacts of climate change and aims to analyze how to cope with this crisis. In this regard, the climate crisis has started to intersect with two discussions, the Anthropocene and the 6th Extinction. Anthropogenic activities such as the acceleration of industrialization, the increase in the consumption of fossil fuels, the expansion of the agricultural areas, and the use of various natural resources started a new process that radically transforms nature, ecological cycles, and the Planet Earth. This new geological era is called the "Anthropocene" (Dalby, 2013). The atmosphere which is composed of different gases called greenhouse gases filters out the harmful rays from the sun and traps the heat, and thanks to this, the Planet Earth becomes livable. In the Anthropocene, the structure of the atmosphere has changed due to the greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide, and as a result, the process of global warming and climate change have accelerated. Human activities such as industrialization, agriculture, deforestation, and urbanization intensified the greenhouse effect, thus, the average temperature of the Earth began to increase. Before the Industrial Revolution, the rate of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was 280 ppm (parts per million), while at the beginning of the 21st century, this rate increased to over 370 ppm. According to NASA's April 2022 measurements, atmospheric carbon dioxide levels have reached 417 ppm (NASA, 2022). This rapid change has triggered different ecological, social and political risks in different parts of the planet. In this context, scientific studies are conducted showing that the consumption-oriented economic system started the 6th Great Extinction process on Earth, and climate change accelerates this extinction (Barnosky et al., 2011, pp. 51-57). The extinction or endangerment of animal and plant species, which is also known as biodiversity loss has been creating irreversible damage to nature. This is the most important threat considered from the ecological and especially posthuman environmental security perspective.

While the global average temperature is increasing, this phenomenon accelerates the melting of glaciers, changes the ocean currents, and intensifies the extreme weather events such as more severe storms, torrential rains, precipitation anomalies and drought. In the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, the change caused by human-induced activities, in connection with population growth and economic growth, is accepted as the main reason of the warming observed since the middle of the 20th century. Global warming began to deteriorate climate systems while worsening social and economic conditions as well as political stability (IPCC, 2014, pp. 4-5). Climate change creates complex problems that affect biodiversity and human life, in addition to political, social and economic systems. For instance, sea-level rise directly threatens coastal settlements where population density and economic activities intensify; extreme weather events destroy both people's living spaces and vital economic sectors. Especially drought and precipitation anomalies degrade agriculture and animal husbandry. These risks are focused by the human-centered environmental security approach, and the climate threats are considered in the context of aggravating vulnerabilities.


In the report presented to the General Assembly by the UN Secretary General in 2009, climate change is defined as a "threat multiplier" that increases existing political, economic and social threats and insecurity (UN Secretary General, 2009). According to Professor Pavel Kabat, the Chief Scientist at the WMO, climate change "has a multitude of security impacts - rolling back the gains in nutrition and access to food; heightening the risk of wildfires and exacerbating air quality challenges; increasing the potential for water conflict; leading to more internal displacement and migration," and he added that "it is increasingly regarded as a national security threat" (UN News, 2019). Although climate change has not directly influenced several states or societies, as a threat multiplier it creates multidimensional and complex challenges.

In the report prepared for the G-7 member countries in 2015, climate change was defined as a global threat to security in the 21st century. The report states that the fragility caused by climate change will increase the struggle for local resources and force people to migrate due to the insecurity of their habitats. The report further argues that extreme weather events and other climate-related disasters will negatively affect economic and social life and cause political tensions. In this regard, one of the most important security problems that are predicted to deepen due to ecological destruction and global climate change is the new migration flows. It has been revealed that the ongoing refugee and migrant mobility will be

increased because of climate change, and approximately 162 million people are presumed to be at risk due to the rising sea level. Additionally, at least 50 million people will be affected by the adverse effects of climatic changes, especially drought (Myers, 1997, p. 175). If floods, droughts and hurricanes become more frequent and severe, especially in poor Southern countries, it is predicted that the millions of coastal and inland residents will be forced to leave their homes and countries. The consequences of rising sea levels and changes in precipitation regimes, especially in the agricultural sector, will negatively affect the national economies. Therefore, the economic and political instability due to poverty, famine, health problems, and potential internal conflicts could trigger new migration flows. Moreover, fluctuations in food prices will create new challenges related to access to food, and transboundary water management will be interrupted. Since these elements are intertwined, it has been stated that the security risks created by climate change will increase if effective mitigation and adaptation policies are not implemented (Rüttinger, 2015). Additionally, according to Perch-Nielsen et al. (2018), ecological, economic, infrastructural and social adaptation policies should be carried out in order to reduce the effects of migration-related problems caused by climate change, and to prevent possible social destructions.


The assessment report published by the IPCC Working Group II in 2022 shows that the observed impacts of climate change on ecosystems and human systems have been aggravating. As Figure 1 reflects, different regions face different risks. Changes in the structure of terrestrial, freshwater and ocean ecosystems, and species range shifts are highly observed nearly in every region. Moreover, in Map 1, changes in agricultural and ecological droughts and human vulnerability are shown. It is clear that the socially and economically vulnerable regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa or Southeast Asia are more fragile against the impacts of climate change. In this context, the ecological risks overlap socio-economic vulnerabilities, and the climate resilience in the Global South becomes more challenging.

Figure 1- Impacts of Climate Change on Ecosystems and Human Systems



Source: IPCC, 2022, p. SPM9.

Map 1- Climate Vulnerabilities



Source: IPCC, 2022, pp. 8-42.

The threats posed by climate change could be regarded from different environmental security perspectives, because the climate crisis creates existential challenges for different referent objects. For instance, states will have to face the impacts of sea-level rise, economic burdens of extreme weather events, migration flows, or political disturbance; there is also a risk of total destruction for small island states. Furthermore, biodiversity loss is one of the most complex problems threatening not only the functioning of the ecosystems but also the sustainability of human systems. Increasing physical, social, psychological and economic vulnerabilities, pandemics and displacement are the most crucial challenges that the communities and individuals have to tackle. However, one of the most essential issues regarding the future of the Planet is the rights of the next generations and the question of what we will leave for them.

The security risks posed by climate change will obviously lead to greater future global peace and security threats. The nexus of different security concerns in terms of climate change such as global inequalities, regional conflicts, or the deterioration of living conditions requires a holistic perspective and more drastic collective measures. In this regard, the UN report dated 2009 focusing on the negative impacts of climate change on ecosystems, forested areas, agricultural activities, water resources, human health, production, habitats and communities highlights that climate change, as a global problem, can only be coped with a global perspective, and it is necessary to develop global cooperation and harmonize the states' mitigation and adaptation policies (UN Secretary General, 2009). The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement are the basic documents adopted as a result of long international negotiations over determining the framework of global cooperation for climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. The UNFCCC, adopted in 1992, stated that the change in climate systems is a common problem of humanity and emphasized the necessity of cooperation with the participation of all countries (UN, 1992). The Paris Agreement, which was signed in 2015 and entered into force in 2016, is the most recent among the global steps taken to combat climate change and it is the first official agreement signed on this issue. The main objective of the Agreement, which focuses on the post-Kyoto period, is to keep the global temperature rise at 2°C; and if it is possible, to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C compared to the pre-industrial period (UN, 2015). Parties pledge to take the necessary measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combat climate change, by preparing their Nationally Determined Contributions-NDC that include the climate actions they foresee in the post-2020 period (UNFCC, 2019). Although the international efforts play an important role in climate combat, the NDCs remain insufficient to reach the Paris targets (Climate Action Tracker, 2022) because of the lack of binding regulations and sanctions. The impacts of climate change create multidimensional and interdependent security risks on the global system; especially vulnerable communities and states that have not contributed to the emergence of the problem become more fragile to the climate crisis. Therefore, more equitable mitigation and adaptation policies should be prioritized to address the problem on the basis of common interest and common security, and the responsibility of the developed states must be reminded to provide financial and technological support to underdeveloped

and developing countries. In the meantime, one of the most important initiatives to cope with the climate crisis could be the redefinition of security in the age of climate change.

Conclusion: New Security Framework for Climate Crisis

Climate change is an unprecedented security concern. It has become a vital threat related to the survival of life on the Planet and should be tackled with a new paradigm based on common risks and damages, considering local and global impacts together. Undoubtedly, new security and economic policies that will balance the needs of nature and people are required. In this regard, it is necessary to redefine security according to the parameters of climate change and the Anthropocene Era and to redesign security approaches. Since climate change is an existential global challenge threatening every security object in the global system, a new holistic discussion that refers to different perspectives of security through an ecological lens is indispensable (Uysal Oğuz and Atvur, 2021).

Climate change is a systemic problem directly linked to the structure of the economic system. The capitalist system which is based on competition, interest and consumption aggravates the impacts of climate change and the interrelated threats to the ecosystems, human systems, and the global system. These new threats are in fact derived from the structure of the system which maximizes production and consumption, guarantees the accumulation of capital, transforms all values into an economic good, and prioritizes the individual interests. In such an order, it seems difficult to construct common interest or develop transnational cooperation. Therefore, while these problems have posed existential threats against the different referent objects, a radical change to survive on this planet is fundamental.

Climate change with its multidimensional impacts strengthens the connection between environmental security and the other security perspectives. Interconnection between ecological degradation and deepened socio-political inequalities or systemic disparities aggravates existing challenges like exceeded carrying capacity, negligence of democracy, low living standards and poverty, and injustice. The root causes of climate change should be considered to mitigate and cope with the security threats, sustain life on Earth, and find an

equilibrium between ecological sustainability and life in dignity. In this regard, the safety of the Planet Earth, the only home of humanity with all its ecological and socio-political systems, could be the focal point of security concerns and the initiatives to solve the global problems, climate change in particular. Hence, if the political will and economic priorities could be shifted towards the protection of the planet, the security agenda would also be reshaped (Atvur, 2019).

The growing existential threat for the life on Earth requires an alternative political paradigm that emphasizes transnational cooperation/collaboration based on common interests for combating climate change. Ecological problems as existential threats also require increasing the responsibility of the state. In this regard, the risk of securitization of ecological problems, especially of climate change, is imminent. However, accepting ecological problems as an existential threat might help to increase the state's awareness and to strengthen their involvement in the global initiatives (Atvur, 2019). But there might still be the problem of the militarization of ecological degradation and humanitarian crises. Therefore, redesigning the state mechanism in the light of grassroots movements' demands could be a key to finding more effective solutions to the intermingled ecological, social, economic and political problems. Hence, the new state could address climate change as a security threat without securitizing it. Eckersley (2004) suggests that the "green state" aims not only the transformation of domestic policies but also to spread ecological and democratic policies towards the international system and law. In this regard, emphasizing the global security risks by underlining the importance of the survival of the planet could develop transnational cooperation based on mutual trust which is crucial to eliminate the risk of militarizing ecological and humanitarian crises.

The global initiatives or recommendations remain ineffective or unimplemented. Therefore, building transnational collaboration between the people of different nations against the common impacts of climate change could be the basis of more binding global regulations, as climate change directly affects ordinary people and jeopardizes life on Earth. Global solidarity might be the cornerstone of an egalitarian, ecological and fair regime that might guarantee a secure planet for all. The future of the planet and the next generations relies on the rising consciousness and collective actions of the different actors -from local to national

and global- working together for building an alternative global system. The truth is that climate change is a security problem; however, it is beyond the context of classical or critical security approaches. Establishing a new security perspective by comprehending common global problems as a common threat to the Planet Earth could help build a world free from security concerns no matter what the referent object is.

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Temporary Protection in the EU

Sevgi Çilingir*

States offer protection for individuals who have had to flee their country of origin due to dire circumstances that prevent them from living decent lives and enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms. This is especially important for liberal democratic states which were built upon the acknowledgement of universal human rights. Although the main duty of states is to protect their own citizens, they also take responsibility for others in need of such protection, such as people fleeing war, their own state, or statelessness. This humanitarian approach led states to develop international and regional legal frameworks to guarantee basic rights for such people. The European Union (EU) developed its own law, complementing the UN framework (Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol). It acknowledged asylum as a fundamental right (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 18). Under EU primary law, the Union was tasked with and assigned competence alongside member states for developing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (TFEU, Title V, Ch. 2).

Temporary protection is a category of international protection offered under EU law, in addition to refugee status and subsidiary protection. Although it is not a new concept, it appeared on the current EU political agenda with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It was an instrument designed long before this crisis but had remained dormant for more than twenty years. This paper seeks to explain the legal context and the main characteristics of temporary protection in the EU, in view of the utilization of CEAS.

The main difference of temporary protection from other categories of international protection is signified by its name. Refugee status and subsidiary protection last as long as

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the circumstances in the country of origin that led to asylum continues and therefore, it is not considered safe to return to. In contrast, temporary protection is guaranteed for a limited period of time. The idea of temporary protection within an EU framework appeared due to experiences of crisis situations, such as waves of asylum seekers arriving at EU borders due to international or civil war in the vicinity of EU territories. In these cases, hundreds of thousands, even millions of people arrive at the EU, which creates a burden on the part of both receiving member states and the people seeking protection. Asylum systems become overburdened, with financial costs as well as the unintentional slowing down of bureaucratic procedures. As a result, people in need of protection and the associated benefits that would be granted, have to wait for months, even years until the protection status is determined.

To solve this problem, temporary protection was introduced to EU law as an emergency mechanism. It is covered by a directive under CEAS, named as *Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof*. As the name suggests, it is designed for managing a large number of arrivals in a short period of time, which would create a burden for the receiving states, typically located at the EU borders. Since solidarity and sharing of responsibility between member states is among the main principles of the Union, especially in the field of asylum, immigration and border controls (TFEU, Art. 80), the directive aims to help receiving states.

Notwithstanding the benefits of such a measure for helping people in need, while increasing solidarity within the EU, when the name and contents are considered together with the historical development of this legislation, it may be seen that it has the typical problems of EU integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) in general and CEAS in particular. It is a Council directive, which shows that the decision-making procedure involved member state representatives, but excluded the European Parliament, which consists of representatives of EU citizens that were elected directly by the European people. This is not surprising, considering the fact that in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which covers topics such as managing immigration to the EU, providing the EU's internal security and facilitating judicial cooperation within the EU, member states vigorously

protect their sovereignty, although they must share their authority with the EU as an institution.

When the legislative process is considered, the inability of the Union to offer a common protection status had been apparent for many decades. During the Balkan wars of the 1990s, temporary protection was offered to people fleeing genocide at the heart of Europe. But it was regulated at the nation-state level, contradicting common statements and declarations made by member states at European Council meetings. It took four more years from the first proposal by the Commission to actual legislation, which entered into force in the second half of 2001. By that time, the asylum crisis due to the Kosovo war of 1998-1999 was over.

According to the directive, temporary protection in the EU must be activated by a Council Decision that sets the target group and the date by which this group is to be protected, which is taken after the Commission's proposal, by a qualified majority vote (Art. 5). It offers "immediate" protection (Art. 2), surpassing the normal asylum procedures, covered by other directives and regulations within CEAS. Between 2001 and 2022, the EU faced multiple crises in which a massive influx of displaced people happened, such as the Arab Spring, Syrian refugee crisis, and the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. None of these crises were enough to foster a common will or a common perception of necessity among the member states to provide an EU-level protection by taking this Council Decision. The situation changed with the current war which not only signifies a common humanitarian incentive among EU members to help Ukrainians fleeing war, but also a common will to stand against Russian aggression in Europe, demonstrated on many fronts.

However, from the perspective of the displaced people, it is important to note that the level of rights provided by the directive do not guarantee enough protection. In parallel with most EU secondary law instruments within CEAS, the directive sets minimum standards. As mentioned above, the time period is shorter than what might needed if the war continues. If a person belonging to the group of displaced people described in the Council Decision which activates the directive applies for asylum - which would grant refugee status or subsidiary protection status unless his first application and/or appeal are refused (refusal would be

unlikely in a case of a widespread, active combat situation), his protection under the temporary status ends (Art. 17-19).

Considering the abovementioned factors in the structure of the legislation and the previous political obstacles for creating a common position in a divergent EU, the paper concludes that temporary protection which is offered by the EU during the current Ukrainian crisis, does not signal a new policy direction under CEAS. Nor does it guarantee the best protection possible for people who need it. It appears rather as a situation-specific development, the results of which will be seen in the near future, depending on how the war proceeds.