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**CONNECTIONS BETWEEN SEPARATIST POLITICAL
PARTIES AND SEPARATIST TERRORIST GROUPS:
AN OVERVIEW**

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Danışman
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ABSTRACT

MASTER THESIS

**Connections Between Separatist Political Parties and Separatist Terrorist
Groups; an Overview**

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This study overviews the role of the European Union in desecuritizing the conflicts related to separatism. As a term, desecuritization means the removal of an issue from security agenda to the bargaining political sphere. In analyzing this desecuritizing impact of the EU, the study lays a great emphasis on separatist political parties, which have connections with separatist terrorist organizations. Two countries with different backgrounds are selected to discuss this research question, which are the United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey.

The EU seems to have played a catalyst role in desecuritization of Northern Ireland problem by facilitating the peace process in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, it seems to have a limited effect on desecuritization of the problem in Turkey, which presents itself as political reforms for the EU membership.

As examples from the UK and Turkey indicate, political parties can assist terrorist groups with their organizational capabilities. The related non-proscription of these parties may also likely to contribute to the terrorist violence in the country. Studying this relationship and the level of potential terrorist violence are beyond the scope and means of this study. Instead, it only overviews desecuritizing effect of the EU in a descriptive manner in these two selected countries.

**Key Words: 1) Separatist Political Parties, 2) Sinn Fein, 3) IRA, 4) PKK,
5) DTP 6) party proscription**

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Ayrılkçı Siyasi Partiler ile Ayrılkçı Terör Gruplarının Bağlantılarına Genel Bir Bakış

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Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

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Bu çalışma Avrupa Birliği'nin ayrılkçılık bağlantılı sorunları güvenlik gündeminden çıkartmada (desecuritization) oynadığı rolü incelemektedir. Terim olarak, bu kavram (desecuritization) bir konunun güvenlik sahasından çıkarılarak politik müzakere alanına taşınmasını ifade eder. Çalışma Avrupa Birliği'nin bu etkisini analiz ederken, terörist organizasyonlar ile bağlantılı olan ayrılkçı siyasi partilere büyük önem vermiştir.

Avrupa Birliği, ilgili barış sürecini kolaylaştırarak Kuzey İrlanda Sorununun güvenlik gündeminden çıkartılmasında katalizör olarak rol oynamıştır. Diğer yandan, Türkiye'deki sorunun güvenlik gündeminden çıkarılmasında sınırlı bir etkiye sahip olmuş, bu etki Avrupa Birliği üyeliği için gerçekleştirilen politik reformlar olarak tezahür etmiştir.

Siyasi partilerin, sahip oldukları örgütsel imkânları ile terörist grupları destekleyebildikleri de bir gerçektir. Bu partilerin kapatılmamasının ülkedeki terörist faaliyetlere katkıda bulunacağı da muhtemeldir. Çalışma bu olasılık ve sonucunda yol açabileceği terörist faaliyetler hakkında her hangi bir argüman sunmamaktadır. Sadece, Avrupa Birliği'nin bu iki ülkede güvenlik gündeminden çıkarma konusundaki etkisini genel hatları ile betimlemiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeleri : 1)Ayrılkçı siyasi partiler, 2) Sinn Fein, 3) IRA, 4) PKK, 5) DTP 6) parti kapatma

**CONNECTIONS BETWEEN SEPARATIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND
SEPARATIST TERRORIST GROUPS; AN OVERVIEW**

YEMİN METNİ	ii
TUTANAK	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
ABBREVIATIONS	viii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES	ix
INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER ONE

TERRORISM AND SEPARATISM: AN OVERVIEW

1.1. TERRORISM: A DEFINITION	9
1.2. SEPARATIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND SEPARATIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: A DEFINITION	14
1.3. PARTY PROSCRIPTIONS AND DEFINITIONAL CONVENIENCE OF THE CASE STUDIES	16
1.4. DESECURITIZATION AND THE STUDY	19

CHAPTER TWO

THE UNITED KINGDOM: SINN FEIN, HISTORY AND PARTY SPLITS

2.1. NORTHERN IRELAND HISTORY AND SINN FEIN; AN OVERVIEW	22
2.2. SINN FEIN SPLITS	29
2.2.1. 1922 Split	29
2.2.2. 1926 Split	32
2.2.3. 1970 Split	34
2.2.4. 1986 Split	38
2.2.5. Summary of the Splits	41

2.3. PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE RELATED BRITISH POLICY	42
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CHAPTER THREE
**TURKEY: SEPARATIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR
PROSCRIPTIONS**

3.1. SEPARATISM IN POLITICAL SPHERE; AN OVERVIEW	50
3.2. PARTY PROSCRIPTIONS IN TURKEY	52
3.3. MAJOR SEPARATIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY	54

CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN EXTERNAL IMPACT

4.1. EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE IN GENERAL	63
4.2. THE EU'S ROLE IN THE BRITISH CASE	64
4.2.1. The Main Policy-Line of the EU via the Haagerup Report	66
4.2.2 Basic Economic Supports	68
4.2.2.1. 'Objective' Status and 'Interreg'	68
4.2.2.2. Peace Program	71
4.2.3. EU's Basic Political Effects for Desecurization	74
4.3. THE EU'S ROLE IN TURKISH CASE	79
4.3.1. The Main Policy-line of the EU	83
4.3.2. Copenhagen Criteria	86
4.3.3. EU's Basic Political Effects for Desecurization	88
CONCLUSION	95
BIBLIOGRAPHY	103
APPENDIX	122

ABBREVIATIONS

DEHAP	Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi)
DEP	Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi)
DTP	Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi)
EU	European Union
HADEP	People's Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi)
HEP	People's Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi)
HEP	People's Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi)
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ÖZDEP	Freedom and Democracy Party (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
SHP	Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti)
UK	United Kingdom

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Election Results of the Sinn Fein in the UK	28
Table 2: Parliamentary Success of Turkish Separatist Parties After Elections	54
Figure 1: Splits of Sinn Fein	27

INTRODUCTION

As a major problem in world politics, the number of separatist movements has dramatically increased in the last decades. Between 1956 and 2002, 146 ethnic groups in 78 countries demanded greater territorial autonomy or independence from their central governments. In the vast majority of these cases, the governments have responded by refusing to compromise on any territory related issues.¹ The aggregation of the two current threats—separatism and terrorism—under the umbrella of separatist terrorism has become a particularly worrisome combination for those states facing them.

Democratic states suffering from this kind of separatist terrorism often face two forms of organizations in simultaneous existence; a separatist political party and a separatist terrorist group, such as the ETA and Batasuna in Spain, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Sinn Fein in the United Kingdom (UK), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in Turkey. Taking this particular condition as its starting point, this study excludes those conditions where only non-violent separatist political groups or parties exist (e.g. Lega Nord in Italy) or where separatist terrorism occurs without any political representation (e.g. the Tibetans in China).

States facing a separatist political party and a terrorist group tend to list separatism at the top of their security agenda. Governments cannot easily undertake some political reforms, cross-border cooperation, initiatives taken for decommissioning of terrorist weapons as such political acts are also seen as compromises to separatist terrorist organization, even though they can also act as catalysts to eliminate separatist movements within a state. Governments generally cope with the separatist threat by taking extraordinary means, such as introducing special laws, announcing state of emergency in terrorism-exposed territories or by

¹ Barbara F. Walter, "Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others?", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.50, No.2, April 2006, p.313. For additional analyses, see also: Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1993, pp.294-300.

training special military forces to fight against the terrorists. It seems quite difficult for any state to overcome any conflict sourced by separatist terrorism through political affairs without resorting to its legitimate right of using force. Nevertheless, according to the Copenhagen School² studies it is possible. As Ole Wæver notes, it is the desecuritization process, which is shifting issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere.³ The issues are desecuritized when they are dealt with via institutions and practices that do not implicate force, violence, or the "security dilemma."⁴

Dispatching high-level security issues, including those perceived as within the sphere of the separatist terrorism, to the political bargaining sphere seem possible by removing them from security agenda through a desecuritization process. During desecuritization, state perceives descending level of separatist terrorism, which also contributes more representation rights to the separatist parties involved without experiencing any proscription and individual punishment on party members. In this process, a separatist political party is valuable by reflecting two sides of the same coin: one is its separatist side that has a noticing part in the related state's security agenda, and the other side is its legitimate right of functioning in all political processes in state's political agenda. Indeed, as a process which transmits problems from security agenda to the political one, desecuritization may likely to find body easily in these separatist political parties. "Do they accommodate a room in security agenda or do they become a discussing matter in regular political progress?" is a remarkable sign for detecting the success of desecuritization in a country. In this regard, the trajectory of separatist parties that have connections with separatist terrorist groups tend to be a reflection of the degree of desecuritization of the separatist conflict.

² Copenhagen School is a school of academic thought. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde are the prevalent scholars and introduce a new dimension to security studies by stressing out that security has Military/state, Political, Societal, Economic, and Environmental aspects. Discussed by Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', in **Review of International Studies** 22 (1), 1996, pp. 81–93; Jef Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen; or, on the creative development of a security studies agenda in Europe', **European Journal of International Relations**, vol.4, no.4, 1998, pp.513–39.

³ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, **Security: A New Framework for Analyses**, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p.4.

⁴ Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization", in **On Security**, edited by Ronnie Lipschutz, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 46-86.

The critical security literature has several examples in which they stress out the successful role of the European integration in desecuritizing the conflicts, via building common identities and interests.⁵ In fact, the EU was a desecuritizing security project from its outset. The European integration progress has bound the member-states in a network of interdependence which made the resort to military means of resolving disputes progressively more difficult.⁶ When it comes to security issues, states are often assumed to act without accepting any external interference, such as intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and neighboring countries, which can have the capacity to help solve the conflict.⁷

This study, however, overviews the role of the European Union, which is a powerful external factor that affect the behavior of these states in desecuritizing the conflicts related to separatism. Its effectiveness comes from its well-designed institutions and decision-making mechanisms, which are capable of producing obligations and serving economic and political benefits. While its norms and standardization policies seem to contribute the elimination of the causes of separatism in the country, its political and economic assistance also pave the way for the desecuritization of disputes.

Among the available subset of countries for further study, two countries, the UK and Turkey are selected to discuss. Through these case studies, the study tries to analyze the desecuritization affect of the EU, on ‘Northern Ireland Conflict’ and ‘Kurdish Question’ (by EU’s words) with a special emphasis attached to the functioning of separatist political parties that have connections with terrorist groups in the UK and Turkey. In this context, Sinn Fein as an active century-old political party has co-worked with the IRA for decades in the UK, without any exclusion from

⁵ For examples, see: Katy Hayward, “Reiterating National Identities: The European Union Conception of Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland”, **Cooperation and Conflict**, , vol. 41, Sep 2006, pp. 261 – 284; Pinar Bilgin, “Securitiness of Secularism: The Case of Turkey”, **Security Dialogue**, 2008, p.605; Atsuko Higashino, “For the Sake of ‘Peace and Security’?: The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards”, **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol.39, N.4, 2004, pp.347-368.

⁶ Bill McSweeney, **Security, Identity & Interests: A Sociology of International Relations**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p.7.

⁷ Abeysinghe M. Navaratna-Bandara, **The Management of Ethnic Secessionist Conflict**, Dartmouth Pub., England, 1995, pp.vii-viii.

party competition. Conversely, in Turkey, beginning with 1990s, several separatist parties, which were proscribed and reincarnated one and other, have co-worked with the terrorist PKK to achieve their separatist goals.

On the one hand, the EU seems to have played a catalyst role in desecuritization of Northern Ireland problem. It has assisted the process by contributing the decommissioning of the weapons of the separatist terrorist group-IRA, by helping abolish the separatist plans for a 'united Ireland' by fostering cooperation between its two EU member states, the UK and the Republic of Ireland which also resulted in the exclusion of irredentist claim of the latter on the UK. It has also provided economic and continuous political supports to improve the living conditions in Northern Ireland. As a result of the desecuritization process in Northern Ireland conflict, separatist political party-Sinn Fein has remained its survival, contributed to the peace process and had a say in the future of the conflict during negotiations.

On the other hand, in Turkey, the EU does not seem to be as successful as in Northern Ireland. By quoting the problem as the "Kurdish Question", the EU has overlooked the ongoing terrorist attacks and has almost exclusively interpreted it as the sole product of underdevelopment and under-democratization in Turkey. Consequently, the EU involvement in the problem has not had any clear affect of the decommissioning of the weapons of the terrorist organization-the PKK. The EU furthermore has had no direct effect on diminishing the possibility of the irredentist claims of Northern Iraq on Turkey related to the current separatist problem or sustained no significant economic support to contribute to the regional development of those territories suffering most under the terrorist attacks. However, EU has managed to desecuritize the 'Kurdish Question' partly in Turkey through several obligations demanding several political reforms on the road for its EU membership. As a reflection of desecuritization on the separatist political parties in Turkey, the EU has also fostered for changes that make party proscriptions more difficult in Turkey.

There are several reasons for selecting Turkey and the UK for further focus. As chapter one mentions later, both the UK and Turkey have similar definitions of terrorism, resembling to those generally accepted in several international organizations and in prevailing academic studies. Despite this similarity, both states implemented different policies to the terrorism-related separatist political parties. This difference brought about the survival of a separatist political party in the UK, which later also took part in peace negotiations in Northern Ireland with the help of the EU. However, in Turkey, the frequently-held proscriptions of separatist political parties have opened a new phase in Turkish politics, where the quality of Turkish democracy is intensively debated. In practice, such debates have contributed to the process of making political parties more difficult to dissolve, which is thought by the EU as one of the factors contributing to the elimination of separatist demands in Turkey.

The EU membership of the UK and the candidate status of Turkey produce interesting outcomes in terms of the EU impact over both cases. The EU support to overcome the problem in the UK is further encouraged by the fact that it is a problem between its two member states: the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Additionally, the peace, political stability and the economic prosperity in the Northern Ireland is a direct contribution to the EU, itself. However, the candidate status of Turkey has kept the EU distant from involving in the conflict. Its impact on the Turkish state has appeared as several obligations on Turkey as prerequisites for its membership. Briefly, on the one hand, while supporting the Northern Ireland via economic assistance, the EU also provided a negotiation platform for the conflict resolution. Its efforts to engage separatist political party-Sinn Fein into peace talks have played a critical role in today's relatively mitigated atmosphere. On the other hand, in the Turkish case, the obligations of the EU for the Turkish membership have firmly initiated several reforms, including amendments that prevents easy party dissolutions; and also gives some cultural rights to Kurds in Turkey; all of which are the basic reflections of desecuritization of the problem in that country.

The EU's effect on the UK and Turkey also varies as a result of the existence of an adjacent state that manipulates the separatist movements in these states. Until the Belfast Agreement in 1998, the Republic of Ireland, through its constitution, had explicit territorial demands on Northern Ireland, which is under British sovereignty. Despite this factor, the EU has managed to foster cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and the UK, and finally reached the 1998 Agreement that abolished the irredentist sentiment from the Irish Constitution.

In the Turkish case, however, adjacent Iraq is simply not the same as the Republic of Ireland. For instance, there are no official irredentist aims brought up by the central Iraqi government on Turkey.⁸ The deployment of Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq at the border of Turkey in the 1990s after the Gulf War, however, has created a safety zone for the PKK terrorists among the Iraqi Kurds living at the border of Turkey. This development has apparently aided the separatist terrorist activities in Turkey, which were also supported by the separatist political parties. These developments have affected the perception and responses of Turkey towards any ethnic-based demands. Despite the persistence of the EU, Turkey could not undertake the political reforms regarding cultural and human rights under the heavy bill of the PKK terrorism. Consequently, the same developments have also become a serious cause of friction between the EU and Turkey during the latter's quest for membership.

In examining Turkey's partly desecuritization via its EU membership bid, and the desecuritization of the Northern Ireland problem, this study accommodates a significant place for the trajectory of separatist political parties which are in connection with separatist terrorist groups. Party proscriptions prevail in this examination about which a broad literature is dedicated. A common debate, for instance, argues that terrorist violence and political party competition are near opposite modes of political expression. Put differently, those which were excluded from legitimate party representation can resort to violence for the same political

⁸ After the 2003 Iraq War, the establishment of the Kurdish Local Government in Northern Iraq implies some irredentist items, but officially, the Republic of Iraq has no direct and formal policies in this regard.

goals. Against this axiom, however, Leonard B. Weinberg and William L. Eubank contend that terrorist events are substantially more likely to occur in free and democratic settings than in any other alternatives. Supported by evidence, they criticize and challenge the generalization that ‘in the absence of ballot box, bombs and bullets become attractive alternatives.’⁹

Additionally, in analyzing this party politics related to terrorism, this study does not constitute any causal relations between terrorism and party politics. Considering the logistic support of separatist political parties to terrorist organizations, further discussed in the following chapters, raises the question of whether the lack of proscription of parties can permanently assist terrorism and help increase the level of terrorist violence, or not. It seems true that political parties have the capacity to assist terrorist groups with their well organized capacities. Various examples concerning the revisions of some party offices into semi-terrorist camps exist, and are difficult to deny. However, this study argues nothing about the relations between the level of potential terrorist violence and the proscription or non-proscription of political parties in these countries.

While noting the similarities and differences in both UK and Turkey desecuritization, terrorism, separatism, separatist terrorist group and separatist political party are also loaded terms that require clear explanations. This is the goal of the first chapter. It overviews the terrorism debate and the related literature by focusing on some of the ‘terrorism’ definitions in academic studies, and its different uses in some of the western democracies and intergovernmental organizations including the EU. The first chapter also stresses out the similarities between the British and Turkish definitions of the term. It also notes the convenience of the cases to the definitions used in the study via giving brief explanations about the separatist terrorist groups, political parties and related party proscriptions in subject states.

⁹ Leonard B. Weinberg & William N. Eubank, Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose?, **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol.10, No.1, Spring 1998, pp.108-119 and Leonard B. Weinberg & William N. Eubank, Terrorism and Change in Political Party Systems, **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Summer 1992, Vol.4, Issue 2, pp.125-139; Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 97, No.3, Aug. 2003, pp. 343–361.

The following chapter focuses on the UK and the history of Sinn Fein. It examines the split periods in Sinn Fein party politics to present the fact that trajectory of the Sinn Fein prepared a ground for easy desecuritization in the Northern Ireland case. Thereafter, it concentrates on the peace process and the related desecuritization. Third Chapter studies the Turkish case. The section overviews the history of proscription of separatist parties as a consequence of their organic ties with the terrorist PKK, which will be useful for understanding the effect of party proscriptions on desecuritization in Turkey. The next chapter analyzes the role of the EU in desecuritization of the Northern Ireland Conflict in the UK and the Kurdish Question in Turkey with a special emphasis on the respective separatist political parties. This chapter particularly focuses on the Peace Process in Northern Ireland and the political reforms in Turkey. The final chapter concludes with an overview of the success of the EU in desecuritizing the conflicts by noting similarities and differences in the selected states.

CHAPTER ONE

TERRORISM AND SEPARATISM: AN OVERVIEW

States are often left to cope with the harmful effects of these separatist terrorist movements on their own. Therefore, while fighting with terrorism or creating policies toward domestic separatist political parties, states act according to their definition of key terms, such as terrorism and outlawing political parties. Labeling a group as ‘terrorist’ has been a matter of controversial debate among both states and academicians in international relations. Although certain intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations have tried to create their own definition of ‘terrorism’ and form lists of terrorist groups, a universally recognized definition in general and terrorist groups specifically still lacks. Therefore, states have proceeded to define the term through their own experiences.

Starting with ‘terrorism’, this chapter therefore seeks to describe all those key terms that are used throughout this study, including “separatist political parties” and “separatist terrorist groups”. It also explains the basic assumptions of ‘desecuritization’ and gives briefly an historical background about these two cases in terms of separatist political parties.

1.1. TERRORISM: A DEFINITION

Terrorism is a complicated phenomenon, and consequently, difficult to define. Violence in various modes, such as ethnic conflict, civil war, insurgency, or rebellion crosscut the definition of terrorism¹⁰ and has generated endless discussions among states and academicians in international relations.

¹⁰ For example, similar to terrorism definitions, Fearon and Laitin describe insurgency as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, **American Political Science Review**, Vol.97, N.1, Feb 2003, p.75. See also, Bruce Hoffman, **Inside Terrorism**, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, pp.28-40.

Terrorism as a term dates back to the French Revolution. It was first used in 1795 in France to explain the policy to protect the fledgling government of the French Republic against civil counterrevolutionaries by any means, including violence. This period was called the “Reign of Terror,” carried out by the Jacobins in France for the purpose of preserving the republican regime.¹¹ Since then, terrorism and its meaning have significantly evolved. Contrary to its initial motivation of protecting a regime, the term has come to mean deteriorating the legitimate regimes and political authorities by criminal, even violent methods. This change was documented in 1937 with the League of Nations which defined terrorism as “all criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.”¹²

The clear effect of terrorism on the political systems has also enforced the states to protect themselves from its destructive consequences. As a universal definition is lacking, they have therefore proceeded to define it through their own experiences. While such practices can be examined under the logic of state survival, the widely diverse definitions of terrorism have also led to intense inter and intra-state polemics to date. Accordingly, many states announce their official definition of terrorism and reveal the list of groups which they recognize as terrorist.¹³ The critical points here are the different wording and the conceptual framing of these definitions. While comparing diverse definitions of various states for a report on terrorism, Volker Kröning argues that, despite some similarities, many of the definitions are so flexible that they can also categorize many non-violent events as terrorist acts.¹⁴ To reduce this confusion, Kröning proposes another definition which declares an act as terrorist if it fulfils the following three criteria. i) if it constitutes a threat to law and

¹¹ Audrey Cronin, “Behind the Curve”, **International Security**, Vol. 27, N.3, Winter 2002/03, p.34; Hoffman, pp.15-16.

¹² League of Nations, “Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism” in Leo Gross, “International Terrorism and International Criminal Jurisdiction”, **The American Journal of International Law**, Vol. 67, No.3, July 1973, p.508.

¹³ For the full list of groups officially declared as terrorist in the UK, see <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act/proscribed-groups> (28 April 2008), for the United States; the list of foreign terrorist organizations; see: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm> (28 April 2008).

¹⁴ See also Earl Conteh-Morgan, **Collective Political Violence**, Routledge, New York, 2004, pp.254-56.

order and public peace (as in France, Italy and Spain); ii) if it affects the proper functioning of government and institutions (as in Portugal, Spain and the UK); and finally iii) if it intimidates persons or groups of persons (as in Portugal and the UK).¹⁵

Intergovernmental organizations have exerted many efforts to agree on a single definition of terrorism. The UN, in particular, leads the attempts to propose a universally recognized definition for the matter involved. In 2002, the report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism accepted that terrorism is mainly a politically motivated activity and aims to create an atmosphere of fear and threat by violence in order to achieve political or ideological goals.¹⁶ Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United Nations' Security Council initiated a new program on terrorism, which aims to encourage all states to fight against terrorism. To draw the borderlines of this common reaction, the Security Council has first sought to eliminate the definitional problem of terrorism. Efforts were brought to fruition in 2004, by the resolution 1566 of United Nations Security Council, which declares terrorism as:

*criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.*¹⁷

The European Union whose security concepts strongly resemble the perspectives of the UN also seeks to respond to the risk of terror in every occasion and tries to mobilize a common reaction against terrorism. Every year, under the efforts of the EU's significant pillar the "Common Security and Foreign Policy", a 'common position' is signed by the Council in which terrorism is defined and

¹⁵ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "General Report: Fight against Terrorism : Achievements and Questions", <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=241>, (25.08.2008).

¹⁶ UN Policy Working Group, "Report on the United Nations and Terrorism", 2002, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2002/un-wrkgng-grp-terrorism.htm> (25.08.2008).

¹⁷ United Nations, "Security Council Resolution 1566", 08.10.2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/542/82/PDF/N0454282.pdf?OpenElement>, (25.08.2008), p.2.

terrorist groups and individuals in various countries are listed. The EU has defined "terrorist acts" as intentional acts which may seriously damage a country or international organization by intimidating a population, exerting undue compulsion of various types or by destabilizing or destroying its fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures.¹⁸

Due to its aforementioned complicated character, scholars have also adopted different and at times even conflicting definitions of terrorism, while emphasizing some common points. Alex P. Schmidt and Albert J. Jongman make a complex definition of terrorism in their book, titled 'Political Terrorism' as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.¹⁹ Meanwhile, Walter Laqueur identifies terrorism shortly as the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted. According to him, "terrorism has been defined as the sub-state application of violence or intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change."²⁰ Meanwhile, Audrey Kurth Cronin makes a simple definition that embraces most of the common points in several terrorism descriptions. Cronin states that terrorism is the threat or use of seemingly random violence against innocents for political ends²¹ by a non-state actor. This description puts forth the basic elements of terrorism as its political nature, non-state character, its goal of targeting innocents, and its unpredictability without any binding rules and limitations.²²

¹⁸ The PKK and the IRA split groups RIRA and the CIRA were noted as terrorist groups in the Council Common Positions of 2001. The last version of the document was last revised in 2007. See, European Union, "Council Common Position 2007/931/CFSP", <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33208.htm>, (25.08.2008).

¹⁹ Leonard Weinberg and Paul Davis, **Introduction to Political Terrorism**, McGraw Hill Pub, New York, 1989, p.3.

²⁰ Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 75, N.5, Sep./Oct. 1996, p.24.

²¹ For detailed information about political ends, see: Loren E. Lomasky, "The Political Significance of Terrorism", in **Violence, Terrorism, and Justice**, eds. R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.86-115; Paul Gilbert, **Terrorism, Security and Nationality**, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, pp.51-54.

²² Cronin, p.33.

Noting the diversity of the definitions on terrorism, this study also notes the definitions of terrorism as they are defined in the cases it overviews, i.e., the UK and Turkey. Turkey has generated a definition of terrorism through the years in relation to its own experiences and relevant international developments. Specifically, the Turkish legislators put into effect a specific law regarding the struggle against terrorism. The Anti-terrorism Act of 1991 defined terrorism by describing all the acts accepted as terrorist. The law was later revised in 2006, which defines terrorism as:

*Any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.*²³

The UK has a similar definition of terrorism. In 1974, terrorism was defined as the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.²⁴ In the new millennium, in 2000, the Terrorism Act was put into force. It notes that:

*Terrorism is the use or threat of action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public [...] for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Such actions may involve “serious violence against a person, [...] serious damage to property, [may] endanger a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action; [may] create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”*²⁵

²³ “3713 Anti-Terror Law, Section 1, Article 1” in Vahit Baltacı, **Terör Suçları ve Yargılanması**, Seçkin Pub., Ankara, 2007, p.319.

²⁴ UK, “Temporary Provision on Prevention of Terrorism”, 1974
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1974/pdf/ukpga_19740056_en.pdf, (25.08.2008)

²⁵ UK, “Terrorism Act”, 2000, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000011_en_2#pt1-11g1, (25.08.2008).

The UK and Turkey are two countries that both have suffered from terrorism for decades. As a result, the terrorism definitions of the UK and Turkey converge. They both perceive similar threats as terrorism. In conjunction with the fact that every state may have sui generis reactions against the same threats, these two democratic states produce a different history for desecuritization of their separatist issues and for their related policies on the separatist political parties that have connections with terrorist groups which mentioned below.

1.2. SEPARATIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND SEPARATIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: A DEFINITION

Similar to terrorism, separatism is also a complicated term. In the dictionary it is defined as “the belief held by a racial, religious or other group within a country that they should be independent and have their own government or in some way live apart from other people”.²⁶ Different from secessionism, the term ‘separatism’ used in this study refers to several administration models that also accept the formal unity of the state. This study defines separatism as an act seeking to resist further incorporation, subordination within the larger political authority of which it is already a member.²⁷ This aforesaid subordination within a larger authority may include autonomy, regional governments, and self-rule systems.²⁸

Declaring a political party as ‘separatist’ is not a simple task, either. Political parties are bound to the laws of the political systems of the states in which they function. Furthermore, separatist movements are often not tolerated in the political systems they operate. The nation-states consider themselves as the principal guardian to preserve their indivisible territorial integrity, undoubted foundational principles of their regimes, unchallenged state authority and the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Therefore, separatist political parties often tend to obscure their separatism.

²⁶ Cambridge online dictionary, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=71847&dict=CALD>, (25.08.2008)

²⁷ Peter Lyon, "Separatism and Secession in the Malaysian Realm, 1948-65," in **The Politics of Separatism**, Collected Seminar Papers, University of London - Institute of Commonwealth Studies, October 1974-June 1975, p. 69.

²⁸ For several separatism definitions, see: Abeysinghe M. Navaratna-Bandara, **The Management of Ethnic Secessionist Conflict**, Darmouth Pub., England, 1995, pp.3-4.

For the purposes of this study, the following points are used to assess the ‘separatist’ nature of a political party (i.e., whether to define a political party as ‘separatist’ or not): The political party should have a plan for a specific group within a population, which is designed to provide distinct living conditions to them. This plan should be an official one declared in the party regulations, party programs or any explicit party documents. If they fulfill these criteria, the parties involved are called “separatist political parties”.

Meanwhile, terrorist groups also have political goals like legitimate political parties. If their explicit aim is separatism, the organization is called as ‘separatist terrorist organization’. On the one hand, as John Finn notes, these terrorist groups and political parties carries a great risk when seen as alternatives. Finn argues that exclusion from a political system may contribute to the sense of alienation and isolation, and make the excluded more likely to resort to violence. Ultimately, it may even change “electoral losers into anti-system oppositions”.²⁹ On the other hand, terrorism is not an outcome of political intolerance or the lack of political representation. Many democratic states in which political parties are completely free to compete for political goals can also harbor active terrorist groups.³⁰

In this sense, while experiencing democratic party competitions, the UK and Turkey are clear examples of the convergence of separatist political parties and separatist terrorist groups for the sake of separatism. There are several periods in the UK and Turkey during which a terrorist group and the related separatist political party have cooperated for separatist demands. While states have engaged in efforts to cut off these relations or benefit from them for the purpose of desecuritizing the separatist threats, terrorism and the related party politics may likely to damage the states facing them. This is because, as Anthony Richards notes, if a connection exists between a political party and a terrorist group, it is hard to break it. Additionally,

²⁹ John Finn, “Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of Anti-democratic Parties”, **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol.12, No.3\4, Autumn/Winter 2000, pp.65-66. See also Gül M. Kurtoglu Eskisar, “Political Parties Matter: Explaining Peaceful and Violent State–Islamist Interactions in Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey”, **Japanese Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 9, issue 2, pp.186-191.

³⁰ Leonard B. Weinberg and William N. Eubank, “Terrorism and Changes in Political Party Systems”, **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol.4, Issue 2, Summer 1992, pp.125–139.

political parties are often subordinate to their terrorist organization and dual membership between the two is a common feature.³¹

1.3. PARTY PROSCRIPTIONS AND DEFINITIONAL CONVENIENCE OF THE CASE STUDIES

Whether expressed through political or terrorist means, separatist goals often force states to react. To avoid the harmful effects of separatist demands, states, by their own definitions, have to decide on how to react against the separatist terrorist organizations and political parties. Due to asymmetry, it is often difficult for a state to rapidly eradicate a terrorist group or use military force exclusively.³² Therefore, if a state conceives a threat from a political party or from the combination of separatist terrorist activities and party politics, which constitute a direct threat against its unity, it can choose to close down the separatist political party as a measure of self-protection.

While analyzing this self-protection measures, in harmony with the definitions made for the study, the UK seems to be a plausible selection which accommodates rigid relations between a separatist political party and a separatist terrorist group; the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Fein. The linkage between Sinn Fein as a political party and the IRA as a terrorist organization has existed for decades. Sinn Fein is a left wing political party which was founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905. Despite many policy changes during years, the party has remained steadfast in pursuing its separatist goals. Due to the lack of a party proscription tradition in the UK³³, Sinn Fein has been able to continue its existence in British politics, despite several serious internal splits to date (1922, 1926, 1970 and 1986).³⁴

³¹ Anthony Richards, "Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, The Peace Process and Democracy", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol.13, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.72-73.

³² Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism", **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 97, No.3, Aug. 2003, pp. 343–361.

³³ It follows from the accords that the UK only banned the 'British Union of Fascists' Party in 1940. See, Stephen M. Cullen, "Political Violence: The Case of the British Union of Fascists", **Journal of Contemporary History**, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), pp. 245–267.

³⁴ Agnes Maillot, **New Sinn Fein**, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp.4-6.

In line with Sinn Fein's policies, the core aim of the IRA has remained similar throughout its existence, which is the establishment of a 32-County united Irish Republic.³⁵ The IRA, therefore, seeks to detach Northern Ireland from the existing British sovereignty and reunite it with the Republic of Ireland, by force if necessary, which it describes as the 'armed struggle'.³⁶ To achieve this goal, besides several attacks in the previous decades, the IRA has embarked on a thirty year armed campaign against the British presence in Northern Ireland that claimed over 1,800 lives from 1969 to the present time. The IRA has had 10,000 members over 30 years, 1,000 in 2002, and nearly 300 in active service units.³⁷

Many studies have shown the organic links between Sinn Fein – a separatist political party and the IRA – a paramilitary group - working together to achieve their separatist goals. Despite this linkage, however, the UK has never totally outlawed the Sinn Fein Party from politics. Instead, due to several terrorist linkages, the British state has judged and punished the related party members individually and put some limited restrictions to the party such as the broadcasting ban during 1980s.³⁸ Furthermore, the IRA and Sinn Fein have been the two primary actors acting in Northern Ireland's political life, even today.

In contrast to the UK, Turkey's reaction to the separatist political parties that have connections with a terrorist group has been significantly different from the UK. Separatist political parties have had a limited existence in Turkey. Along with the ongoing PKK terrorism threat, various separatist political parties are frequently banned and replaced by new ones in Turkish politics. When their separatist goals and organic ties with terrorist organizations are detected by the prosecutors, such political parties are put on a trial at the Supreme Constitutional Court and, are later closed down by this institution.

³⁵ Today, 6 out of 32 Counties of the island is under the sovereignty of the UK.

³⁶ Jonathan Tonge, "The Logic of the Peace Process", **Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change**, Prentice Hall Europe Pb., Hertfordshire, 1998, p.126.

³⁷ Ed Moloney, **A Secret History of the IRA**, Penguin Books, New York, 2002, p.14.

³⁸ BBC, The 'broadcast ban' on Sinn Fein, 5 April 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4409447.stm, (25.08.2008)

The related separatist terrorist organization, the PKK seeks to establish an independent Kurdish state in the south-eastern part of Turkey by terrorist violence. Although the leader of the organization was captured in 1999, and remains incarcerated, the organization has continued with its terrorist activities targeting both civilians and the military staff to date.³⁹ According to the Turkish Ministry of Justice, in addition to the 35,000 people, who were killed in military campaigns, 17,500 were assassinated between 1984, when the conflict began, and 1998. Overall, more than 37,000 people are estimated to have lost their lives due to the PKK terrorism.⁴⁰

Under this heavy bill, proscription of separatist parties has been widely exercised in Turkish politics. The 1982 Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court to proscribe any anti-system party. This arrangement aims to prevent any kind of act, carried out by any political party, which spoils the foundational principles of the regime and the state. These principles inevitably cover the indivisible integrity of the state, with its nation and territory. Nevertheless, various anti-system parties have emerged and were later proscribed in Turkish politics. Until now, more than twenty parties have been closed down.⁴¹ Party proscription is such a strong self-protection means for Turkish State in Turkey that the Chief Prosecutor of High Court of Appeals applied to the Constitutional Court in 2008 to proscribe the ruling party-Justice and Development Party, which garnered 46.6 percent of total votes in 2007 General Elections.⁴²

Anti-system separatist parties in Turkey particularly emerged with the 1990s. Several separatist political parties were proscribed for their connections with the separatist terrorist group-the PKK in the past.⁴³ Today, as the leading separatist party, the DTP is represented in the Turkish Parliament with twenty-one seats. The DTP

³⁹ For detailed information: Eric Rouleau, "Turkey's Dream of Democracy", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December. 2000), pp. 100-114.

⁴⁰ BBC "Kurdish rebels kill Turkey troops", 08.04.2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6537751.stm>, (25.08.2008)

⁴¹ Constitutional Court, "Decisions on Political Party Proscriptions", <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/kararlar/SPKAP.htm>, (25.08.2008)

⁴² Prime Ministry- Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), 2007 General Election Results, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do?jsessionid=QTTXLhrD0f2V2S4Rq2nBwT2FVGGTPGBnHX1G3h5DDHhZs120LpR03!1766523011>, (25.08.2008)

⁴³ Merih Öden, **Türk Anayasa Hukukunda Siyasi Partilerin Anayasaya Aykırı Eylemleri Nedeniy le Kapatılmaları**, Yetkin Pub., Ankara, 2003, pp.109-110.

has also been indicted for its connections with the PKK. The party is still undergoing a trial for proscription in the Constitutional Court.

1.4. DESECURITIZATION AND THE STUDY

According to the Copenhagen School, security is the move of a threat from the established rules of the game to a stage above politics. Securitization is an extreme version of politicization.⁴⁴ Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, two prevalent academicians of the Copenhagen School define securitization as an act which calls for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with a threat.⁴⁵ Similarly, in his work ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ in 1995, Wæver notes that securitizing an issue brings the fact that “state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it”.⁴⁶ Barry Buzan contents that securitization occurs when something is successfully constructed as an existential threat to a valued referent object (e.g. state), and brings exceptional measures in response. Buzan then gives several examples to securitization and notes the Soviet/Communist threat after 1947 as a successful securitization for the West, US 2003 attempt to construct Iraq as a threat as a limited success in this realm.⁴⁷

Desecuritization means the contrast of what Copenhagen School put forward for ‘securitization’. It is just the opposite of the process which involves the use of extraordinary measures that break the normal political rules of the game limiting fundamental rights and freedoms, pluralism and democracy. Desecuritization can be thought as politics of normality and emancipation as politics of normativity.⁴⁸ By removing policy questions from the security sector and plugging them into another

⁴⁴ Matti Julia, “Desecuritizing Minority Rights”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.37, No.2, June 2006, p.171.

⁴⁵ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, **Regions And Powers : The Structure Of International Security**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 491.

⁴⁶ Wæver, 1995, p.55.

⁴⁷ Barry Buzan, “Changing Agenda of Military Security”, in **Globalization and Environment Challenges**, eds. by Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou, Patricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, Springer, 2008, p.915.

⁴⁸ C.A.S.E Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto”, *Security Dialogue* 2006; 37; 443, p.455.

sector, desecuritization is totally a political strategy.⁴⁹ In this context, key proponents of the Copenhagen have argued in favor of desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda.⁵⁰ For Buzan, for instance: ‘security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics’⁵¹ On this ground, Buzan favors the desecuritization process during which securitization is reversed and issues are omitted from security agenda and put into the ordinary public sphere.⁵²

In this context, EU seems to have a powerful desecuritization impact on states. The EU serves to desecuritize various issues in member states by engaging them into the integration of economic and political games of Europe.⁵³ For candidate states, the negotiation process triggers changes in identity and interests through which securitized issues, such as minority rights, start to be develop. In this manner, EU apparently has an efficient institutional capacity. For example, in the case of Northern Ireland, Special EU Programs Body, which is designed for the execution of economic support programs, or in Turkish case, the regular progress reports of the European Commission seem to be effective in transmitting the impact of the EU in a proper way and monitoring the progress toward a desecuritization process with the lack of violence and instability in these countries.

To understand this desecuritizing effect of the EU on selected cases, this chapter analyzed the definitions of the terms used in this study and gave brief information about the cases in the UK and Turkey. In line with the definitions made below, in Northern Ireland case, the study explores the process of eliminating the threat of use of violence of the terrorist group-IRA, abolishment of the separatist project of a separatist party-Sinn Fein and transformation of a security issue into a cooperation between two EU states, the UK and the Republic of Ireland. In Turkish

⁴⁹ Paul Roe, “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization”, **Security Dialogue**, Vol.35, No.4, 2004, p.284.

⁵⁰ Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 204–9.

⁵¹ Buzan et al. 1998, p. 29.

⁵² Rita Taureck, “Securitization theory and securitization studies”, **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol 9., 2006, p.55.

⁵³ Ole Weaver, ‘The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-sovereign Security Orders’ in Michael Kelstrup and Michael Williams (eds), **International Relations Theory and European Integration: Power, Security and Community**, Routledge, 2000, pp. 250–94.

case, it notes the ongoing separatist goal of political parties and the rendering PKK terrorism as factors that erode the desecuritization process of the Kurdish issue. It also contents that perception of threats of the UK and Turkey are similar and resemble those accepted in various inter-governmental organizations and in the academic literature. However, in particular, this similarity produces different outcomes for the separatist political parties, which will be examined as a plausible indicator for the desecuritization in the selected states.

CHAPTER TWO

THE UNITED KINGDOM: SINN FEIN, HISTORY AND PARTY SPLITS

This chapter, after giving a brief background of the Northern Ireland Conflict, first presents a detailed analysis of the timeline of the Sinn Fein Party. It overviews the relations between the Sinn Fein and the IRA which began in the early decades of the 20th century. It provides an in depth investigation of split periods of the Sinn Fein which brings out the fact that a century-long history of the Sinn Fein has experienced serious changes and gradually adapted the party to the desecuritization process, mentioned in the chapter four. It also previews the relations of the Republic of Ireland and the UK in terms of the Northern Ireland conflict in a manner that emphasizes the role of the Sinn Fein in affecting these relations. Finally, it concentrates on the actors and developments in the peace process which will be useful for understanding the desecuritization in the 1990s.

2.1. NORTHERN IRELAND HISTORY AND SINN FEIN; AN OVERVIEW

Northern Ireland has been a great concern for the British politics for centuries. Accordingly, dynamics of separatism in the UK has a long history. Historically, the initiation of a Protestant emigration to the Catholic Northern Ireland by the English Rule in the 12th century is widely considered to have sown the seeds of the current dispute. In Ireland, which was under the British influence and hegemony for centuries, the distinct living conditions of these two religious groups and the remaining ‘plantation’⁵⁴ policy of the UK have aggravated the tension on the island. The apparent lack of harmony among residents and the discrimination against the Catholics under the Protestant British governments have ossified the discontent in Northern Ireland.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ “Plantation” is the grant of the Catholic lands by the Crown to the Protestants, by the help of a continuous and programmed emigration to Northern Ireland. This plantation policy has changed the demographic state from the 12th century to date. Paul Dixon, **Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace**, Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp.3-4.

⁵⁵ In some periods, under Protestant hegemony, the rights of Catholics to employ in public services and to attend universities were abandoned. Sedat Laçiner, **İngiltere, Terör Kuzey İrlanda Sorunu**

John Finn describes the roots of the conflict on a Catholic-Protestant basis and notes that Catholics begin their histories of brutal mistreatment by the British settling of the Ulster plantation with Scottish colonists in 1607. On the other hand Protestant histories begin with the savage Catholic uprising against the same plantation in 1641. When in 1689 King William's Protestant forces finally secured the plantation by defeating James's Catholic army, he notes that they entered in a conflict that has endured three centuries.⁵⁶ In line with the plantation policy, Protestant population has been more than Catholic one in Northern Ireland. After milestone events discussed below in the 1920s, the majority Unionist community held power for almost half a century. In the late 1960s, civil rights movement took place in the streets to put an end to discrimination. Violent confrontations and riots followed this civic initiative, which also gave impetus to the IRA activism in the country. This period was called as the period of "Troubles". It has also political consequences. At the climax of this violent course, in 1972, the Northern Ireland Parliament was dissolved and "Direct Rule" was established from London. The following decades faced numerous attempts to stabilize the situation, including European integration's economic supports. These periods also witnessed a high level of terrorism carried out by various paramilitary organizations, one of which was surely the IRA.⁵⁷

The paramilitary ceasefires of 1994 paved the way for negotiations between the political parties for mitigation of the conflict. In 1998, the Good Friday Agreement was reached. The next year, a Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly was set up and the devolution was restored. In spite of the suspension in 2002, Northern Ireland Assembly and the power sharing mechanism were restored, thanks to various political parties including the Sinn Fein. The region seems to be now experiencing its longest period of political stability.

ve **İnsan Hakları**, Avrasya-Bir Vakfı, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, Ankara, 2001, p.8.; John O'Beirne Ranelagh, **A Story of Ireland**, Cambridge Publishing Ltd, 1993, pp.259–260. Also the unemployment rate among Catholics was double the amount of the rate among Protestants, according to a survey in 1972. See, Ranelagh, p.260.

⁵⁶ John Finn, **Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law**, Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press Incorporated, 1990, p 47.

⁵⁷ For a detailed information on Northern Ireland Conflict, see: Nicholas Mansergh, **Nationalism and Independence**, Cork University Press, Cork, 1997; Jonathan Bardon and David Burnett, **Belfast: A Pocket History**, The Blackstaff Press, Belfast, pp.126-127 ; Dixon, pp.1-6.

However, in the past, the tensions between Catholics and Protestants, the disparity in their living conditions, and the discrimination against the Catholics paved the way for many civil resistance organizations. Some of these organizations were paramilitary ones defending armament and insurgency in Ireland before the 20th century. One of these paramilitary groups is the IRA. It has had many predecessors in history, including the Irish Volunteers, Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Young Ireland, and Fenians, which also have later contributed to its foundation. The tradition to use of violence in order to gain political results also grows out of this history.⁵⁸ For example, one of the ancestors of the IRA, independence-seeking ‘Fenians’, organized an unsuccessful rising as early as in 1867 through a bombing⁵⁹ campaign in England. The importance of these organizations is that they were the building stones of contemporary separatist terrorist activities of the IRA. The term, ‘IRA’ was first used for the rebel forces of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizens Army during the 1916 Easter Rising.⁶⁰ It is generally used for those who fought guerrilla warfare between 1919 and 1921, in order to support the survival of the Irish Republic declared in 1921.⁶¹

This period coincided with the post World War I period and brought the establishment of the “Irish Free State” as a dominion in 1922. This new state, however, did not include the Protestant-dominant Northern Ireland, which the Irish extremist nationalists are still fighting for. The conflict brought about influential groups in the region. The ‘Republicans or Nationalists’ and ‘Loyalists or Unionists’, are the mainstream conflict riders in the region, from which many splits, changes and subgroups have spawned. Generally taken, on the one side are the Republican-

⁵⁸ For the explanation on predecessors of the IRA, see: M.L. Smith, **Fighting For Ireland: the Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement**, Routledge, London, 1995, pp.11-14; Michael Hopkinson, **Irish War of Independence**, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp.3-4.

⁵⁹ Alan O'Day, **Terrorism's Laboratory: The Case of Northern Ireland**, Dartmouth Publishing Company, Hants, 1995, p.2.

⁶⁰ The Easter Rising is a rebellion erupted in Ireland in 1916. The Rising was an attempt by the militant Irish republicans to win independence from Britain. See Laçiner, pp.12-13 and Emin Gürses, **Ayrılkçı Terörün Anatomisi IRA-ETA-PKK**, Bağlam Yay, İstanbul, 2003, pp.27-28. For the use of the ‘IRA’ term, see also Asaf Çınar Gür, “The Problem of Northern Ireland As a Case Study of First World Nationalism”, Dissertation, Bilkent Uni., 2001, p.51 and Colm Fox, **The Making of a Minority**, Guilthall Press, Northern Ireland, 1997, pp.92-93.

⁶¹ Gürses, pp.22-23.

nationalists, who are mainly Catholic and seek to form a “United Ireland”. On the opposite side are the Loyalist-Unionists who are mainly Protestant and seek to preserve the status quo. Both of the groups have significantly shaped the political structure and have given birth to many different political parties, paramilitary and interest groups in the region. Sinn Fein and the IRA are two major Republican-nationalist groups studied here. Their connection started at the beginning of 1900s and became obvious at the Easter Rising.⁶² Sinn Fein became a political party contesting in the elections while the IRA became a paramilitary group for the same separatist goal.

Sinn Fein was founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith. The core claim of Sinn Fein is to be the party of all-Ireland.⁶³ Sinn Fein is active in the representative bodies of the UK. While acting in the House of Commons, the party participates in the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly as well. This assembly has been active since 1921 with periodical interruptions, and has administrative power on education, health, agriculture, trade, environment, regional development, employment, finance, social development and culture. However, it is fully dependent on the British government in matters like criminal law, police, telecommunication, international relations and currency.⁶⁴

Besides several restrictions on the party, Sinn Fein continues to operate as a legitimate political party with representation in Westminster and Northern Ireland without being totally banned. Despite the fact that, as John Finn notes, constitutional proscriptions against anti-democratic parties are a common feature in Western democracies,⁶⁵ the UK implements various restrictions on anti-democratic parties rather than proscribing them.

⁶² Fox, pp.89-93.

⁶³ For detailed examination of this policy, see: Michael Laffan, **Resurrection of Ireland : The Sinn Fein Party, 1916-1923**, Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1999.

⁶⁴ Brenda O’leary et. al, **Northern Ireland-Sharing Authority**, IPPR, 1993, London, pp.13-23. For a detailed examination of the political system of the UK, see: Cem Eroğul, **Çağdaş Devlet Düzenleri**, Kirlangıç Yayınevi, Ankara, 2005,pp.1-64.

⁶⁵ For a summary on the sources of these bans, their applications and their justifications see John Finn, “Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of Anti-democratic Parties”, **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Autumn-Winter-2000, Vol.12, No.3\4 pp.51-77.

These restrictions have appeared generally at individual level. For example, considering the parliamentarians, the UK put into effect the ‘Representation of the People Act’ in 1981 which prohibits any person from serving in the House of Commons who was convicted of an offence and imprisoned more than one year.⁶⁶ This statute aims to prevent in particular the participation of politicians to the parliaments who were imprisoned because of assisting terrorism. Some regulations are also designated directly for the political parties that have connections with terrorist groups. For instance, in Northern Ireland, the ‘Elected Authorities Act of 1989’ requires that all candidates for local elections must take an oath not to support proscribed organizations.⁶⁷ This act obviously targeted the IRA terrorism and its supporters in the electoral contest. Meanwhile, Sinn Fein activities have been suppressed in several ways. For example, members of Sinn Fein have been frequent targets for arrest under special powers.⁶⁸ Some leaders of the party have been even excluded from Britain. Additionally, various censorship mechanisms are implemented on Sinn Fein members. One of them was the Broadcasting Ban in 1988. According to this ban, organizations in Northern Ireland, which had been believed to support terrorism, were banned from direct broadcasting. Due to the connections with the IRA, the British government prohibited the direct declarations of the members of Sinn Fein. To overcome this limitation, Sinn Fein members ironically transmit their explanations through actors’ voices reading the transcript of their words.

As a party which has never been banned, Sinn Fein nevertheless also faced many splits due to various internal feuds and dissensions since its foundation. Accordingly, these splits of the Sinn Fein Party occurred in 1922, 1926, 1970 and 1986. (See figure 1 below) They divided the popular base of the party and allocated it to new parties. They also damaged the stability of the party by distributing the working cadres into these new parties. They gave birth to new parties which are


⁶⁶ Office of Public Sector Information (OPSI), Representation of the People Act 1981 (C.34), http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1981/cukpga_19810034_en_1, (25.08.2008)

⁶⁷ OPSI, Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 (c. 3), http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1989/ukpga_19890003_en_1, (25.08.2008)

⁶⁸ For the related arrests: Dermot P. J. Walsh, “Arrest and Interrogation: Northern Ireland 1981”, **Journal of Law and Society**, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1982), pp. 37-62.

Cumann na nGaedhael, now known as Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil and Official Sinn Fein (later Sinn Fein The Workers Party, later The Workers Party and Labor party) and finally the Republican Sinn Fein.

Figure 1: Splits of Sinn Fein



Nevertheless, Sinn Fein under its original name remains active. The party won 5 of the 646 available seats during the last 2005 general elections in the UK. (See Table 1 below for the all election results of Sinn Fein) The party still advertises its primary political objective as the Irish unity, i.e., separatist in nature. The separatist goal of Sinn Fein, quoted under ‘the Irish unity’ targets to establish a new mechanism to detach the Northern Ireland from the UK. This plan was explicitly announced in their 2007 election manifesto as: “the aim should be to identify steps and measures which can promote and assist a successful transition to a united Ireland and to develop detailed planning for a new state and a new society that all Irish people can share.”⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Sinn Fein’s official Election Manifesto of 2007, <http://www.sinnfeinassembly.com/media/AssemblyManifesto2007small.pdf>, (25.08.2008), p.18.

Table 1: Election Results of the Sinn Fein in the UK

Year	Election	# of Seats Won	% of Seats Won	Vote %
1921	NI	6	11.54%	20.5%
1924	UK	0	0,00%	0.2%
1950	UK	0	0,00%	0.1%
1955	UK	2	0,31%	0.6%
1959	UK	0	0,00%	0.2%
1982	NI	5	6.5%	10.1%
1983	UK	1	0,15%	0.3%
1987	UK	1	0.15%	0.3%
1992	UK	0	0,00%	0.2%
1997	UK	2	0.3%	0.4%
1998	NI	18	16.7%	17.65%
2001	UK	2	0.15%	0.7%
2003	NI	24	22.2%	23.5%
2005	UK	1	0.8%	0.6%
2007	NI	28	25.9%	26.2%
<p>* NI: Northern Ireland Assembly Elections UK: UK General Elections</p> <p>Sources: Library of House of Commons http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_publications_and_archives/research_papers/research_papers_2008.cfm (18.08.2008).</p>				

2.2. SINN FEIN SPLITS

2.2.1. 1922 Split

In 1919, the surviving leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising, containing twenty-seven Sinn Fein representatives assembled in Dublin and proclaimed them the parliament of all Ireland, Dáil Éireann.⁷⁰ This event led to the beginning of the war of independence against the British rule in Ireland between 1918 and 1924. Contributed by the successes in the subsequent local elections, in this period Sinn Fein gradually won the control of all county councils in Ireland, except for Antrim, Down, Londonderry and Armagh.⁷¹ Negotiations began between the British Government and the delegates of Sinn Fein which were appointed to bargain on behalf of all Ireland for the future of the island. As a result, negotiations ended with signature of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. It was signed by the representatives of the British Government and Sinn Fein delegates who were the legitimate representatives of the government of the Irish Republic, which was unilaterally proclaimed in 1919. By this treaty, British Government partitioned Ireland. Northern Ireland, which had its parliament at Stormont in Belfast, consisted of six of the nine counties of Ulster stayed as a part of the UK.⁷²

Following this event, the first split occurred. The Irish Civil war (June 1922 – April 1923) erupted between the supporters of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and oppositions of the Treaty. The pro-treaty "Free Staters", who reflected the majority of Sinn Fein members, established the Irish Free State in this period. The pro-treaty Sinn Fein members changed the name of the party to Cumann na nGaedhael. This

⁷⁰ Thomas Hennessey, **A History of Northern Ireland, 1920-1996**, Macmillan Pres, London, 1997, p.17.

⁷¹ United Kingdom Election Results, <http://www.election.demon.co.uk/stormont/counties.html>, (25.08.2008)

⁷² İsmet Gürbüz Civelek, **Terörizm ve Kuzey İrlanda Örneği**, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 1996, p.28; Nicholas Mansergh, **Nationalism and Independence**, Diana Mansergh, Cork, 1997, p.18.

movement was headed by Arthur Griffith who was the founder of Sinn Fein party and the prevalent delegate in the negotiations of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.⁷³

Following the civil war, in 1923, Cumann na nGaedhael engaged in efforts to state building and reconstruction in Ireland. It subsequently merged with the National Centre Party and the Army Comrades Association in 1933 to form Fine Gael political party. Today, Fine Gael is still active in Ireland.⁷⁴ This branch of Sinn Fein which split in 1923 with the initiation of Cumann na nGaedhael party is excluded from this study. Despite the fact that the party and its successors have claimed periodically all-Ireland policies, they are not separatist political parties and do not operate in the UK.

Meanwhile, the anti-Treaty side of the Sinn Fein was under the powerful figure of Eamon De Valera. After the Anglo-Irish Treaty was ratified in the unilaterally promulgated Assembly of Ireland, Valera left the Assembly and seeded the future split of 1926 in the party with his supporters.⁷⁵ According to the treaty, as noted, Northern Ireland remained under the sovereignty of the UK and the proclaimed Irish Republic in 1919 was bypassed by the 'Irish Free State'. Considering the treaty, De Valera objected first to the required fidelity of the Irish parliamentarians to the King. Second, he was sure that Ireland could not have an independent foreign policy as a part of the British Commonwealth. By these motives, Valera and his supporters reserved a distinct section in Sinn Fein.

In those years, the armed forces in Northern Ireland were mostly from the IRA troops. They had enormous impact on politicians. Sinn Fein leaders Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith on the pro-treaty side and Eamon De Valera on the anti-treaty side were both assisted by distinct sections of the IRA. Considering the fact that the IRA was also at the edge of partition according to the treaty, some key figures and old comrades were backing Collins including the Chief of Staff of the IRA, meanwhile a number of respected IRA veterans were supporting Valera and his

⁷³ T.G. Fraser, **Ireland in Conflict, 1922-1998**, Routledge, London, 2000, pp.3-6.

⁷⁴ Official Page of Fine Gael,

<http://www.finegael.ie/page.cfm/area/information/page/PartyHistory/pkey/1375>, (25.08.2008)

⁷⁵ De Valera was the President of the aforesaid Assembly and the leader of the Sinn Fein Party.

friends. During this period, thirty one people were killed in February and sixty one people died in March. Indiscriminate bombings, house burnings and various attacks further intensified the tension.⁷⁶ The IRA continued its armed campaign and created several hostage crises and clashes in the Northern Ireland. The IRA also spread its violence to London in June 1922 by assassinating Sir Henry Wilson who was a popular pensioned commander in the British Army.⁷⁷

In accordance with the split in the Sinn Fein, the IRA had its own division of power. This division created two groups: the supporters of the treaty forming the nucleus of the Irish National Army (Southern Ireland) and the anti-treaty forces, which continued to use the name Irish Republican Army. The split group that favored the treaty became the national Army of the Irish Free State at South and gave up its separatist goal for a United Ireland. Conversely, they accepted the 'Irish Free State' which had a dominion status under the sovereignty of the UK. The anti-treaty side which continued to use the name of the IRA also insisted on independency for a united-Ireland which meant a clear separation from the UK regarding the Northern Ireland. It refused to recognize either the Irish Free State or the Northern Ireland, declaring them both to be creations of British imperialism.⁷⁸

These years turned out to be a vulnerable period without offering much political stability. The UK was trying to recover from the First World War while trying to continue its domination over colonies and dominions such as in Ireland. In the meantime, Northern Ireland was in an adaptation period which was separated from Southern Ireland under the British sovereign. It was trying to develop devolved mechanisms independent from the UK to administer itself. During this period, the major figures in the IRA and Sinn Fein went under a split. A part of them, the pro-treaty side, stayed in the Southern Part of Ireland and became the official bureaucrats and security forces of the recently formed Irish Free State. The other part, opposed to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, became revolutionary and aimed to unite Ireland with full independency from the UK. This section was composed of the Anti-Treaty Sinn Fein

⁷⁶ Jonathan Bardon and David Burnett, **Belfast**, The Black Staff Press, Northern Ireland, 1996, p.95.

⁷⁷ Fraser, pp.5-8.

⁷⁸ Laçiner, p.17.

members, who continued their existence at the political competition, and the Anti-Treaty IRA members who pursued violence in Northern Ireland and the UK to force a political change for a united-Ireland. This instability culminated in a complex civil war. After 1922, in Northern Ireland, the Unionists/Loyalists who were satisfied by the status quo under the British sovereign were skirmishing with the Republicans/Nationalists who were demanding a united independent Ireland. Simultaneously, these nationalists were clashing with each other due to being anti-treaty or pro-treaty. Meanwhile, the British forces were trying to control Northern Ireland and were involved in clashes with all illegal armed forces.

Under these circumstances, the UK seemed not to be able to mitigate the existing tensions immediately, but it still had power to influence the political competitions. During this period, the relation between Sinn Fein and the IRA was clear. However, the UK did not block the contest of Sinn Fein in electoral competitions. In 1921, an election for Northern Ireland Parliament was held. Sinn Fein won 11.54 % of the seats and 20.5 % of the total votes in the elections.⁷⁹ This result was not as satisfactory as the former one in which Sinn Fein had won 73 of Ireland's 105 seats in the UK of Great Britain and Ireland parliament at the general election in December 1918. It was apparent that those which supported Sinn Fein in 1918 elections because of its all-Ireland policies did not completely vote for Sinn Fein in 1921 elections. Instead, many of these voters stepped back and satisfied by the new arrangement embodied by the pro-treaty side and the Irish Free State. The remarkable point is that under the lack of party proscription, Sinn Fein split by its own in 1922. It gave birth to several new parties. This resulted in a loss of popular support for Sinn Fein, as the major leading figures and popular base have recognized the new Irish Free State and gave up their separatist demands in the ongoing period.

2.2.2. 1926 Split

In 1926, a crisis occurred about the recognition of the Parliament of the Irish Free State, which had a dominion status of the UK. As a leader who led the anti-

⁷⁹ 1921 Northern Ireland Parliament Election Results,
<http://www.election.demon.co.uk/stormont/totals.html>, (25.08.2008)

Treaty Sinn Fein during the Irish Civil War (1922–23), De Valera made a new opening and protested the party's hard-line policy of abstentionism and the refusal to accept the legitimacy of the Free State.⁸⁰ Abstentionism means that even elected, the party members would not participate in the Assembly of Ireland, the Northern Ireland Assembly or the British House of Commons and protest the legitimacy of these institutions. De Valera consequently initiated the 1926 split and left the party, and founded a new anti-treaty party, Fianna Fail. In this party, De Valera and his friends softened the abstentionism policy and tolerated the oath of allegiance problem. The party entered into the Assembly of the Irish Free State. In 1932, Eamon de Valera was elected President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State. He executed the presidency for 21 years in the lifetime of the party. He implemented serious policies opposing the British interests. During his presidency, the requirement of the Oath of Allegiance to the British Crown and the ban on the IRA was lifted.⁸¹ Due to the fact that it is a party located in Ireland, it is excluded from this study.

On the other hand, Sinn Fein continued to operate throughout the 1920s. It had become a marginal political force by the end of the decade. Sinn Fein continued its abstentionist and separatist policies. Nevertheless, it also faced difficulties because of the loss of the prestigious leaders who had followed De Valera in his newly founded party, Fianna Fail, and the consequent loss of political support.

In this period, the relation that had united party with the IRA appeared in 1925, preceding the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis (Party Congress). In that year, the ruling part of the IRA, the IRA Army Council, voted in favor of withdrawing its allegiance to the Second Dail which approved the Anglo-Irish Treaty in order to avoid the split of Sinn Fein spreading to its own ranks.⁸² As a result, the IRA militants and remaining Sinn Fein members who objected to De Valera continued to conduct traditional Sinn Fein policies, including non-recognition of the Irish Free State and British sovereignty over Northern Ireland.

⁸⁰ Maillot, pp.11–14.

⁸¹ Dixon, pp.3-4.

⁸² Maillot, p.13.

Sinn Fein did not participate in the General Elections of the UK and the Elections for the Assembly of the Northern Ireland in 1929. However, De Valera remained as a powerful figure in the party. It was greatly likely for Sinn Fein voters to be attracted by the new policies of the Fianna Fail party. The fact that Fianna Fail joined the elections in Southern Ireland and ascended Valera to the Presidency is likely to be a great indicator for the loss of popular support of Sinn Fein which insisted on the refusal of the legitimacy of the Irish Free State in the south.

It is remarkable that in 1925 the IRA participated officially the Congress of the Sinn Fein and declared the refusal of recognition of the Irish Free State Assembly. The British government observed this obvious connection between Sinn Fein and the IRA. Sinn Fein was not proscribed even in this occasion and enabled to render its functioning in the UK. The lack of proscription let the 1926 split, after which Sinn Fein significantly again lost power.

2.2.3. 1970 Split

The main policies of Sinn Fein have remained fixed since its foundation. First, Sinn Fein, despite many splits, has preserved its bid for a United Ireland which means an obvious ‘separatism’ by detaching the Northern Ireland from the authority of the UK. Secondly, it has continued to follow its abstentionist policy against the UK Parliament. Until 1960s, the party by these two core politics continued its existence in the political system. Later the party came to be influenced by world-wide leftist political movements.

By the support of many Northern Ireland Catholics who demanded equality in employment and housing, they produced a new political movement from some members of Sinn Fein. This group led the formation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, which demanded relative demands from the government of the UK.⁸³ This leftist part of the leadership of Sinn Fein sought to end the historical policy of abstentionism and engage in a non-violent constitutional politics. In 1970,

⁸³ D.G.Boyce, **The Irish Question and British Politics**, MacMillan Press, London, 1996, pp.113-114.

another split occurred. Those members in the party who had hitherto supported the leftist policies became known as the Official Sinn Fein. The Official Sinn Fein was a Marxist-oriented party, which preferred to stress class struggles rather than sectarian disputes. The core aim was to unite the Catholic and Protestant workers under the same umbrella. The party's slogan was "Peace, Democracy, and Class Politics".⁸⁴

The party changed its name to 'Sinn Fein the Workers Party' in 1977 and then 'The Workers' Party' in 1982. Today, they have connections with the other communist parties in the world. Their political agenda is based heavily on social issues and emphasizes their resistance against the capitalist ideology and political hegemony.⁸⁵ As a result, the Workers' Party of Ireland, which continues to participate in the general elections in the UK, has given up the separatist aims of its ancestor Sinn Fein. The participation of tens of thousands of leftists in 1970s to official Sinn Fein with a major breakaway from the Sinn Fein inflicted a deep impact on the success of Sinn Fein in those years.

The remaining group in Sinn Fein after the split in 1970, has continued to pursue the policy of abstentionism and separatism, and named themselves as the Provisional Sinn Fein. They have consequently defined their task as to lead the all Irish people and form an all-Ireland administration. By these policies, the party represented the voice of the Northern Ireland's Catholics who demand separation from the UK.⁸⁶ In this period, Sinn Fein questioned whether to go ahead with violence or not. 'Provisional' wing with the support of the IRA engaged in paramilitary activities.

⁸⁴ Workers Party official website,
http://workerspartyireland.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/people_before_profit.pdf,
(25.08.2008)

⁸⁵ Gürses, p.31; James Goodman, "The Northern Ireland Question and European Politics", in **The Northern Ireland Question in British Politics**, eds. Peter Catterall and Sean McDougall Macmillan Pres, London, 1996, p.212-14

⁸⁶ Ranelagh, pp.269-70.

On the other side, the IRA was around in one form during the years of 1922 and 1969, until it divided into two.⁸⁷ Similar to Sinn Fein, this division was about the abstentionism policy and about the decision whether to continue or stop use of violence in Northern Ireland. Following the split, the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA appeared as the two new IRAs. The Official IRA chose the way to pursue a policy omitting a sectarian violence and an armed campaign against the Northern Ireland. They tried to form a new political base among the working class, both Catholic and Protestant, in the North and South in order to put an end to the partition. This policy contained the policy of recognizing the administrations in the south and the north, which was a direct opposition to the IRA's traditional separatist policy.⁸⁸ As the Official IRA has denounced its separatist goals, it does not constitute a working area for this study.

At this period, many Catholics were dissatisfied with the IRA's failure to protect themselves against the Protestants in this sectarian violence. Slogans as the IRA- 'I Ran Away' illustrated this discontent of the Republicans.⁸⁹ A significant number of the IRA militants were against the movement's leftist policies. Those under the leadership of Mac Stofain formed the Provisional IRA and pledged their allegiance to the 32 County Republic proclaimed in 1916. The Provisional IRA adopted armed defense of the Catholics and led an armed campaign in the Northern Ireland to end the British rule. As in the period of 1922–1969, they continued to refuse the recognition of the legitimacy of either the northern or southern Irish states. They contended that the IRA Army Council was the legitimate government of the all-island Irish Republic. Provisionals conducted an aggressive campaign in Northern

⁸⁷ Meanwhile the Provisional IRA, which is today called as 'IRA', had its own breakaways. Following the fact that the PIRA left its abstentionism toward the Parliament of Ireland, those who opposed this decision formed the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) in 1986. In 1997, the members of the Provisional IRA who did not accept the peace process split off to form the Real IRA (RIRA). For detailed information, see the US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf>, (25.08.2008), p.6 and Monica Anatalio, "In the Spotlight: Real IRA," Center for Defense Information, [<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/rira.cfm>], (25.08.2008)

⁸⁸ The Official IRA also used defensive violence. However, in 1972 it called a ceasefire and has given up its use of force totally. The contact between the Official Sinn Fein and Official IRA which were born during the same political crisis is left out of the scope of this research due to their policy of non-use of force. Hennessey, pp.193-4.

⁸⁹ Hennessey, p.171.

Ireland. They inherited most of the existing IRA organization and the more militant IRA members in the rest of Ireland. They also recruited many young nationalists from the North.⁹⁰

Late 1960s and the beginning of 1970s were chaotic years in Northern Ireland. The Republicans incorporated with the Provisional Sinn Fein and took control of the streets to defend the Catholic areas from any attack from the Protestants. The 'Provisional' IRA and Sinn Fein worked together in these periods. Andrew Silke, in his article about paramilitary vigilantism explains this cooperation well. He notes that, Sinn Fein advice centers in 1970s were run by the 'Civil Administration Officers'. These figures were both members of Sinn Fein and the IRA, and they performed dual responsibilities. In these chaotic years, the IRA also tried to regain its prestige. In the summer of 1970, they launched a bombing campaign, targeting primarily Belfast, with the aim of forcing Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland. By early 1971, the Provisionals had begun to attack the British soldiers.⁹¹

After the split, Sinn Fein (Provisional) became competitors with its official partner. A counterpart under the name of Official Sinn Fein, which split from the separatist Sinn Fein joined the elections and gained votes, as a competitive to the Provisional Sinn Fein. For example, in 1979, in spite of winning no chairs in the Parliament, the Workers' Party (Official SF) nominated 7 candidates for the general elections. It won 12,098 of the total 31,221,362 votes, with a ratio of 0.1 %.⁹² This means that those supporters who had voted for Sinn Fein in 1960s before the split, voted both for the Official and Provisional Sinn Fein after the split. The votes they garnered when they were in single entity, now divided into two for Officials on the one side, and for the Provisionals on the other side.

⁹⁰ Tom F. Baldy, **Battle for Ulster**, NDU Press, Washington, 1987, pp.50-56.

⁹¹ Andrew Silke, "Rebel's Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Fein and Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol. 11, No.1, pp.72-73.

⁹² House of Commons Information Office, 1974 UK General Elections Results, http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_publications_and_archives/factsheets.cfm, (25.08.2008)

The British government was also aware of the connections between the IRA and Sinn Fein during this period.⁹³ Especially, the pro-violence provisional wings of two groups fought at streets against Protestants together in those years. Nevertheless, Sinn Fein was never closed down. As a result, after the split in 1970, Sinn Fein gave birth to a new party which challenged its existential assumptions. Sinn Fein not only produced a rival party from its own cadres, but also lost some of its popular support as a consequence.

2.2.4. 1986 Split

The leadership of Sinn Fein perceived that the best way to achieve their cause might be to end their political isolation. For this policy, the first major step came in 1986 again in a party congress. Sinn Fein delegates voted 429 to 161 to end the policy of abstentionism against the Assembly of the Republic of Ireland. Meanwhile, the cadres of the party were divided around this issue of abstentionism. During the discussions, however, the internal contentions peaked between Gerry Adams who is now the leader of the Sinn Fein and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh. The latter was the one who realized the split in 1986 by founding a new party with the help of the cadres of Sinn Fein: the Republican Sinn Fein.

This party has claimed to be the true Sinn Fein and continued pursuing its abstentionist policy. The party believes in the illegitimacy of the Republic of Ireland. It notes that the members of the party only can owe their allegiance to the All-Ireland Irish Republic which was established by the founders of Sinn Fein in 1919, even though this state was by-passed in 1922 by the Irish Free State. They declare that their candidates will not take part in any Parliament under the sovereignty of Republic of Ireland or the UK, if elected. They present their candidates as a direct opposition to British sovereignty in the country and they are having the bid for all-Ireland parliament of the future.⁹⁴ Republican Sinn Fein party has eventually become

⁹³ Clive Walker, "Political Violence and Democracy in Northern Ireland", **The Modern Law Review**, Vol.51, No.5, Sep.1998, pp.605-622.

⁹⁴ The Republican Sinn Fein official website, <http://www.rsf.ie/elect07.htm>, (25.08.2008)

a marginal party with little popular support in the ongoing process. It has only managed to compete during 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly elections to date.

On the other hand, Gerry Adams and his followers became flexible on the issue and tried to eliminate the abstentionism policy on the Assembly of Ireland. The remained cadres of the Sinn Fein under the leadership of Adams began to be called Provisional Sinn Fein which later dropped its 'provisional' prefix. Provisional Sinn Fein joined the elections in Ireland and participated in all political processes. During 1980s and 1990s Sinn Fein occupied their seats in the Parliament of Ireland. Contrary to Ireland, Sinn Fein has participated in the electoral process in the general elections of the UK but lacked their seats in the House of Commons in an apt to abstentionist policy. They do not even fulfill the requirement of oath of allegiance or participate in the sessions. Today, Sinn Fein is still a member of the House of Commons in the UK. Unlike other parties, Sinn Fein continues to follow its abstentionist policy in the parliament.⁹⁵

This 'provisional' move was also supported by the Provisional IRA.⁹⁶ Policy changed occurred in both of the organizations. They declared that they no longer believed in the legitimacy of the short-lived 1918 Parliament created after the Easter Rising which was a great protesting symbol against the legitimacy of Irish Republic in the south. In this period, the IRA and the Sinn Fein seemed to be interconnected. The cadres of the IRA and Sinn Fein seemed to be composed of the same figures. Looking at the list of Chiefs of Staff of the IRA would be striking as well. Two principal actors of the Sinn Fein party Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness seemed to be the leaders of the IRA in the past. Adams' leadership of the IRA between 1977 and 1978, and subsequent leadership of McGuinness' from 1978 to 1982 is remarkable.⁹⁷ Additionally, the many prevalent figures such as Seán Mac Stiofáin, Dáithí Ó Conaill, and Joe Cahill, and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh served for the first

⁹⁵ The UK Parliament Official Website, <http://www.parliament.uk/directories/hcio/stateparties.cfm>, (25.08.2008)

⁹⁶ Tonge, pp.129–31.

⁹⁷ Bowyer Bell, J., **The Secret Army: The IRA.**, Transaction Publishers, 1997, p. 520; Bishop, Patrick, Mallie, Eamonn, **The Provisional IRA.** Corgi Books, 1997, p. 315; Peter Taylor, **Provos The IRA & Sinn Fein**, Bloomsbury Publishing, 1997, p. 201.

Provisional IRA Army Council and both were also administrators in the Sinn Fein. Especially, Brádaigh was the first president of Provisional Sinn Féin and the founder of the Republican Sinn Fein.⁹⁸

This dual membership flourished a new strategy for both of the organizations. The IRA altered its propaganda strategy and attempted to mobilize a political as well as military movement. This strategy came into being in the 1981 Hunger Strike which was carried out mostly by the IRA members. It lasted for 217 days. During that time ten prisoners died. One of them was Bobby Sands who was elected to the British Parliament from Sinn Fein list. During the same period, Sinn Fein clearly supported the IRA strikers.⁹⁹ After this event the IRA and Sinn Fein garnered more public support. The connection between the Sinn Fein and the IRA became an effective tool to influence public opinion for separatist demands. This was the new policy of the IRA that uses violence and political propaganda via Sinn Fein in the meanwhile. The IRA was capable of launching countless ‘spectacular’ operations. Political support for the IRA was at its highest level with the level of votes to Sinn Fein. Both Sinn Fein and the IRA were playing converging roles. The IRA waged an armed campaign while Sinn Fein waged the propaganda war. Sinn Fein became the public and the political voice of the movement.¹⁰⁰ Numerous crises such as the Hunger Strike and the following bombing campaign have revealed this cooperation between Sinn Fein and the IRA. Danny Morrison, one executive of Sinn Fein, explained this policy at a 1981 Sinn Fein annual meeting as a "ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite [bomb] in the other".¹⁰¹

In this period, Sinn Fein also participated in the electoral process and damaged the British claim that the IRA was a criminal organization which succeeded only through intimidation.¹⁰² The cooperation between the IRA and the Sinn Fein began to influence the political agenda in the UK. In retrospect, their explicit support of the IRA prisoners seems to have paid off as the increasing number of votes to

⁹⁸ Richard English, **Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA**, Pan Books, 2003, pp.111–113.

⁹⁹ Tim Pat Coogan, **The IRA a History**, Roberts Rinehart Publishers, Colorado, 1993, pp.474–75.

¹⁰⁰ O'Brien, p. 128.

¹⁰¹ O'Brien, p. 128.

¹⁰² Dixon, p.287.

them. During the 1982 elections of Northern Ireland Assembly, Sinn Fein won 10.1 % of total votes. In the UK General Elections of 1983, Sinn Fein won the Belfast seat in the House of Commons.¹⁰³

To summarize, the 1986 crisis was about the abstentionist policy of the party, which resulted in a split. In 1980s, party had won a significant number of votes from supporting the IRA activities. By the end of 1986, by reversing its abstentionist policy, Sinn Fein divided its popular support. Under the lack of party proscription, Sinn Fein rendered to function despite its connections to the IRA, which undertook violent activities, such as Omagh Bombing of 1998 which killed 29 and injured 310.¹⁰⁴ This period also ended with the division of Sinn Fein's popular votes with a competitive party in the succeeding electoral processes, the Republican Sinn Fein.

2.2.5. Summary of the Splits

Every split in the Sinn Fein occurred because of a high-tension political issue. In 1922, the split occurred because of the Anglo-Irish Treaty that envisaged the remaining of Northern Ireland with its six Counties under the sovereignty of the UK. Pro-treaty and Anti-treaty members were the figures of the dissention in the party. This division produced new parties, first Cumann na nGaedhael and gave birth to Fine Gael Party which is still active in the Northern Ireland. In 1926, leader of the Sinn Fein left its membership and found a new party, Fianna Fail to protest the conditions brought by the Anglo-Irish Treaty. They protested the oath of allegiance as Irish parliamentarians to the Crown and the dominion status of the Irish Republic. The 1970 split in the party was of great importance. It was because of the question to continue or stop using force and abstentionism policy. Leaving the representative seats empty, and condemning or assisting terrorism became two major discussion points. As a result, those who believed in separatism and supported terrorist acts continued to work under the name of "Provisional Sinn Fein". This split created an electoral rival to Sinn Fein "Workers' Party" which still remains active. The last

¹⁰³ Bardon and Burnett, p.134.

¹⁰⁴ Guardian, "Timeline: Omagh Bombing", 20.Dec.2007,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/jul/26/northernireland>, (25.08.2008)

division occurred in 1986, as a result of the conflict concerning abstentionism policy in the Assembly of Ireland. Gerry Adams and his followers were flexible about the issue. The party was divided once again between the supporters of Gerry Adams and the supporters of ex-leader Bradaigh who subsequently established the Republican Sinn Fein Party. As seen, considering these splits in the party, it is common that all splits occurred in the edges of high-important issues such as “treaty approval, abstentionism policy, use or not use of force.”

2.3. PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE RELATED BRITISH POLICY

Peace Process in Northern Ireland is a multidimensional issue in British politics. On the one hand, it is a dispute between the neighboring Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. It is also an internal problem that exists on the community level for the U.K. Through these perspectives, the peace process seems to consist of several facts: the improvement of relations between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, the elimination of the terrorism carried out by the IRA, tendency of Sinn Fein to give up sponsoring the IRA terrorism and contributions of the EU. Before analyzing the role of the EU in desecuritizing the Northern Ireland conflict, this part briefly summarizes the peace process.

By 1970s, all involved parties in the conflict were looking for a permanent solution. Loss of lives due to terrorist activities, political instability in the region, being deprived of economic welfare and the lack of social cohesion brought the British state to deal with the issue. Consequently, throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, British governments produced series of initiatives. British government believed that the problem of Northern Ireland could be solved by creating a system in which both loyalist and nationalist communities have a representation right on Northern Ireland. Therefore, a new assembly was elected and a new executive was formed in 1973. It was a 11 person government consisting of 6 Unionists, 4

Nationalists and a 1 neutral from the Alliance Party.¹⁰⁵ It seemed to be a fair reflection of the divisions in the community. However, Sinn Fein was excluded on the grounds that it was a terrorist organization.¹⁰⁶

The following year, the Sunningdale Agreement was signed with the Irish government. This agreement introduced a consultation mechanism between the Irish and British governments over Northern Ireland affairs, particularly on security. However, in 1974, a general strike by Nationalist, Catholic workers began. It was a clear withdrawal of popular consent from these new arrangements, and resulted with the return to the direct rule by the British government.¹⁰⁷

At the outset of the 1980s, the idea to form a devolved assembly in Northern Ireland re-emerged. The intent was to elect a new assembly, but to give little power at the beginning. The British government planned that the powers of the assembly would be increased gradually along with the popular support. The SDLP¹⁰⁸ and Sinn Fein boycotted the assembly.¹⁰⁹ It was during this period (1985) that the Anglo-Irish agreement was signed, which enabled both governments to address the conflict as a joint problem. The Anglo-Irish Agreement between the UK and the Republic of Ireland on the one hand and the talks in UK's domestic politics about the possibility of a devolved government in the Northern Ireland on the other became correlated in this course of time. Meanwhile, the negotiations about the devolved assembly turned into a platform to condemn the afore-said Anglo-Irish Agreement.¹¹⁰ Such being the case, efforts of devolution failed again in 1986.

The Agreement recognized that any change in the status of Northern Ireland could only come about with the consent of the majority of people in Northern

¹⁰⁵ Jonathan Tonge, "The Logic of the Peace Process", **Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change**, Prentice Hall Europe Pb., Hertfordshire, 1998, pp.99-100.

¹⁰⁶ Neil McNaughton, **Understanding British and European Political Issues**, Manchester, Manc.University Pres, 2003, pp.136-37.

¹⁰⁷ Mari Fitzduff, **Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland**, United Nations University Press, 2002. p 122.

¹⁰⁸ The Social Democrat and Labour Party was founded in 1970. It is overwhelmingly Catholic in membership and support. Party played a critical role in peace negotiations along with the Sinn Fein in the 1990s. Dixon, pp.9-10; Ranelagh, p.275; Laçiner, pp.21-22.

¹⁰⁹ Fitzduff, p.123.

¹¹⁰ Fitzduff, pp.122-23.

Ireland. It also established an intergovernmental conference where both governments could discuss matters of policy affecting Northern Ireland.¹¹¹ Sinn Fein, however, saw it as confirming the partition and rejected it. According to Anna Kasia, the effects of the agreement were twofold. First, it broke the national discourse of the conflict resolution and evaluated it also as a inter-state problem, which was highly paid attention by the EU. However, the level of violence also increased after the Agreement. This was due to the insecurity felt among the Loyalists, who thought that the Agreement was a step towards a united Ireland. The Anglo- Irish Agreement led to widespread demonstrations, and Unionists' campaign for non-compliance in the peace politics. Despite the resistance, the Agreement was an essential feature in widening the prospect for peace.¹¹²

At this point, Sinn Fein declared its new political strategy. The approach of Sinn Fein in 1980s was to emphasize the role of peaceful methods in uniting Ireland. Sinn Fein's entrance into electoral politics in the 1980s became the core element of the peace process. At that time, many of the Sinn Fein supporters committed themselves to an eventual path of 'Totally Un-armed Struggle' (TUAS), which outlined the favorable national and international political configuration for progress on the Republican goals in the absence of an armed struggle.¹¹³ However, these years were the period of Sinn Fein's mixed strategy, which simultaneously included both competing in the elections and supporting terrorism.

In 1989, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland began a series of meetings with all political parties to see if any agreement could be reached between them about possible political ways forward. Sinn Fein was excluded again because of its refusal to condemn the use of violence.¹¹⁴ In 1993, John Hume, the leader of the SDLP, and Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, restarted their series of talks to open up a new session in the conflict by aiming a political solution and the end of

¹¹¹ Boyce, pp.112-125.

¹¹² Anna-Kaisa Kuusisto-Arponen, "The End of Violence and Introduction of 'Real' Politics: Tensions in Peaceful Northern Ireland", *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, Vol. 83, No. 3 2001, p.124.

¹¹³ Kieran McEvoy, "Law, Struggle, and Political Transformation in Northern Ireland", *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 27, No. 4, Dec., 2000, p.544. pp. 542-571.

¹¹⁴ Fitzduff, p.124.

violence.¹¹⁵ Discussions between them continued throughout 1993, and finally they agreed on some principles to end the violence. In this period, it was revealed that, although the British initially denied it, the British government through some intermediaries had already engaged in secret talks with the intermediaries of Sinn Fein/IRA.¹¹⁶ These talks focused on how Sinn Fein could be included in open political discussions with the other political parties on the future for Northern Ireland, once they renounced violence.¹¹⁷

In 1993, the Downing Street Declaration was revealed. It was a joint declaration issued by the authorities of the UK and the Republic of Ireland. This declaration disclosed the neutrality of the British Government in the conflict.¹¹⁸ This was an important development, since, in the past, Britain had always been seen as an ally of the Loyalists. By this declaration, however, it announced itself as neutral arbiter between two communities. This declaration also pledged the governments to seek a peaceful constitutional settlement, and promised that parties linked with paramilitaries, including Sinn Fein, could take part in the talks, so long as they renounced violence.¹¹⁹ Sinn Fein favored this peace process with the condition that the future of 32 County Ireland will be determined by the will of the citizens of the 32 County, which indicated both the citizens of the Republic of Ireland and the British Citizens in the Northern Ireland.¹²⁰

In 1994, the IRA called a ceasefire. In this period, President Clinton of USA supported a settlement and sent Senator George Mitchell as a neutral envoy to prepare a new political agreement.¹²¹ Following these events, in 1995, the British and Irish governments produced a document for cooperation on an island-wide basis. It

¹¹⁵ Boyce, pp.143-44.

¹¹⁶ These secret talks were also accepted by a British bureaucrat- Graham Archer during a reportage with Ahmet Taner Kışlalı-a Turkish journalist. Qouted from: Yılmaz Altuğ, **Terörün Anatomisi**, Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1995, p.13; Boyce, p.145.

¹¹⁷ Fitzduff, pp.124-25.

¹¹⁸ McNaughton, p.138.

¹¹⁹ Philip Lynch, **Politics of Nationhood: Sovereignty, Britishness and Conservative Politics**, Palgrave Pub, New York, 1999, p.120

¹²⁰ Lawrence John McCaffney, **The Irish Question**, University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1995, p. 173.

¹²¹ McNaughton, p.138. For the detailed effect of the Clinton government on the peace process, see: Boyce, pp.162-65.

suggested a formation of North/South body, comprising elected representatives from Northern Ireland assembly and the Irish Parliament. It also suggested the formation of a parliamentary forum for representatives from the North and South, and an intergovernmental conference. In this vein, in May 1995, the government entered into ministerial dialogue with Sinn Fein, which also committed itself to discussing arms decommissioning. In the meanwhile, all other political parties were invited by the government to reenter into political dialogue with the governments about possible ways forward for the political future of Northern Ireland.¹²²

In March 1995, the British government made paramilitary decommissioning a requirement for entry into political talks. The IRA felt it was sufficient for entry into talks that they had called a ceasefire. They believed that discussions about decommissioning should be part of the process of dialogue and not precede it.¹²³ This period is closely related to the Sinn Fein, which seemed to be the mediator to negotiate with the IRA. In this period, as the leader of the Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams gave regularly series of briefings to IRA about the political developments.¹²⁴ In an attempt to resolve the issue, an International Body on Decommissioning was set up, and chaired the political dialogue. The first issue was the commitment to exclusively peaceful means for resolving political issues. Second one was the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. Third, it envisaged an agreement that such disarmament should be verifiable. Fourth, it opposed the use of force by any party. Fifth, it abided by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations. Finally, it committed to trying to stop the “punishment” beatings that were being inflicted by the paramilitaries for social control reasons at the local community level.¹²⁵

In response to these principles, the IRA called an end to their ceasefire in February 1996, accusing the British government of wasting the opportunity for peace. It then exploded a huge bomb in London. The Loyalists, however, maintained

¹²² Fitzduff, p.127.

¹²³ Ranelagh, p.286.

¹²⁴ Brian Rowan, **Behind the Lines: The story of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires**, The Blackstaff Pres, Belfast, 1995, p.90.

¹²⁵ Tonge, pp.157-58.

their commitment to ceasefire.¹²⁶ The British government gave commitments to Sinn Fein on policing reform, employment equality, to address contentious parading by Protestant Orangemen through Catholic areas, and the transfer of the Republican prisoners from jails in Britain to jails in the Republic of Ireland. Crucially, the Labour government announced that decommissioning was secondary to actually getting people into talks and the demand for decommissioning prior to entry into the talks was dropped. The IRA then declared another ceasefire in July 1997.¹²⁷

After Sinn Féin had signed up to the Mitchell Principles, the party was allowed into the multi-party talks.¹²⁸ For the first time ever, talks, which included almost all the parties to the conflict including the two governments, most of the major political parties, and parties representing the main paramilitary organizations, including IRA and Sinn Fein, started and were chaired by Senator George Mitchell from USA. In April 1998, after 48 hours of intensive non-stop negotiations, all parties finally accepted the Belfast Agreement.¹²⁹

This agreement is generally known as the Good Friday Agreement. It has five main provisions.

1. There should be a devolved government in Northern Ireland along strict proportional lines with all elements of the community properly represented.

2. There was to be real progress towards the solving of sectarian issues such as the decommissioning of terrorist weapons, reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the gradual withdrawal of British troops and reform of the criminal justice system.

3. There was to be increased co-operation and some power sharing between the governments of the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and the devolved Government of Northern Ireland.

4. All sides in the agreement should renounce the use of violence once and for all

*5. The Republic of Ireland should give up its historic objective of uniting Ireland and should amend its constitution and laws to remove specific terms which were offensive to Protestants.*¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Fitzduff, p 128.

¹²⁷ Fitzduff, p 129.

¹²⁸ Steven J. Brams, Jeffrey M. Togman, "Cooperation Through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case", **Political Science and Politics**, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 1998, p.32.

¹²⁹ Fitzduff, p.129.

¹³⁰ McNaughton, p.140. See also, Sid Noel, **From Power Sharing to Democracy : Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies**, CAN: McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2005, p 46.

The Belfast Agreement of 1998 was also the clear abandonment of the 1937 Irish constitution's irredentist claim on Northern Ireland.¹³¹ A number of other issues were also addressed in the Agreement, such as setting up a Human Rights Commission, the development of social, economic, and cultural inclusion policies, the necessity to recognize the needs of victims, the acceleration of paramilitary prisoner releases, the normalization of security arrangements as the threat of violence diminished, and the setting up of independent commissions for the criminal justice system and policing.¹³² The Good Friday agreement was then voted on the island. The referendum passed with confirmation by over 71 per cent of the people of Northern Ireland, and 94 per cent in the Republic of Ireland.¹³³

In August 1998, however, a bomb exploded in the town of Omagh which killed 29 people, both Protestant and Catholic. It was the act of an extremist IRA prolongation called the Real IRA. Sinn Fein and IRA, neither of whom were responsible for the attack, all condemned the issue. According to McNaughton, the reactions confirmed the community's desire to see an end to violence.¹³⁴ The political parties and the governments again asked Senator George Mitchell to conduct a review of the decommissioning process in September 1999. It is noteworthy that in this period, Sinn Féin publicly called on the IRA in October 2001 to begin decommissioning its weapons.¹³⁵ It was followed by a subsequent announcement of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning. Later, IRA confirmed that it would appoint a representative to the Independent Commission on Decommissioning.¹³⁶

As mentioned in this chapter, the peace process has been knitted by complex events and figures. At the state level, the efforts of the UK and the Republic of

¹³¹O'leary et. al, p..6.; Dixon, p.4; Ekavi Athanassopoulou, **United in Diversity : European Integration and Political Cultures**, GBR: I. B. Tauris & Company, London, 2007. p 77.

¹³² Fitzduff, p 130.

¹³³ Fitzduff, p 131.

¹³⁴ McNaughton, p.139.

¹³⁵ Stefan Wolf, Conflict Management in Northern Ireland, **International Journal on Multicultural Societies- IJMS**, Vol.4, No.1, 2002, p.66.

¹³⁶ It is notable that a terrorist organization participated the decommissioning of its weapons, under this circumstance, desecuritization seems more possible during which the UK feels no terrorist threat. See: Fitzduff, p 131.

Ireland were prevailing and leading in the period. At the domestic level, contributions of various political parties were effective including the Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, the European Union also monitored and supported every single step of this process, which is analyzed further in the next chapter. Hancock stresses out for the period after 1998 that despite low levels of intra-communal violence and the occasional act by spoilers, large scale violence did not break out and none of the major parties went back to war. He believes in that the Northern Irish peace process has managed to bring a longed-for sense of peace and normality to the region.¹³⁷

As analyzed in this chapter, by its past, Sinn Fein has become an effective figure in reaching peace process and in desecuritizing the issue. In this regard, this chapter highlighted ironic events on account of Sinn Fein. For example, They were both the leaders of the Sinn Fein: first, De Valera which left the party in 1926, founded Fianna Fail Party, contested in political elections and became the President of the Irish Free State that introduced a territorial claim on Northern Ireland in its Constitution in 1937 under his leadership; second, Gerry Adams, who was an ex-IRA leader, negotiated at the peace talks and signed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement which meant the withdrawal of this claim and the end of the all-Ireland ideal.

By noting historical events in reaching today's peaceful conditions, this chapter also summarized basic events that have enabled the desecuritization of the conflict. Sinn Fein splits, basic dissensions in the party politics has given birth to new parties and opened new discussions about non-sponsoring terrorism in the party ranks. These splits provided a moderate tone in policing which paved the way for new parties such as SDLP that contributed the peace talks. Moreover, many party members gave up separatist demands and formed new parties such as Official Sinn Fein. All of these factors assisted the process of desecuritization of the issue. After losing many party members to non-separatist and non-terrorist wings of politics, Sinn Fein, also itself, from a different point of view, has prepared itself to the peace process.

¹³⁷ Hancock,p.2

CHAPTER THREE

TURKEY: SEPARATIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR PROSCRIPTIONS

Introduction of separatist political parties into the Parliament in Turkey is a crucial topic in Turkish politics. The fact that they have not acted independently from the terrorist organization-PKK has led the Turkish state to perceive these parties as a matter of security concern. This fact becomes the prevailing factor that deteriorates the desecuritization process in Turkey which will be mentioned in the next chapter. In this regard, this chapter explores the separatist political parties and the related party proscriptions in Turkey. It also gives figures about the total bill of PKK terrorism in Turkey which is distinctly very high in comparison to many separatist movements in the world. Finally, the chapter concentrates on some remarks about the Turkish case which will be useful to understand the EU's desecuritizing impact to which this study is dedicated.

3.1. SEPARATISM IN POLITICAL SPHERE; AN OVERVIEW

In contrast with the UK, separatism conducted simultaneously through a political party and a terrorist organization does not have a long history in Turkey. In fact, it was only in 1990 that a separatist political movement represented as a political party first appeared in the Turkish parliament. Furthermore, there is no explicit and concrete separatism plan embraced both by the political party and the terrorist organization, such as the case in the British case. In Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein and the IRA was cooperating for an independent Ireland in the early decades of the 20th century, which built the milestones of the separatism plan against the UK. However, in Turkey, the initiation of a separatist plan with plausible phases was put forth by the terrorist organization in Turkey in 1970s long before that a separatist political party entered into parliament.¹³⁸

¹³⁸ For the details of the separatist plan of the PKK, see: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, **Kendi İfadesi ile PKK Kimdir Ne Yapmak İstiyor**, MGK, Ankara, 1994, p.15.

The political organizational roots of separatist claims date back to 1960s. After the military coup in 1960, a liberal constitution was put into effect. In this liberal atmosphere, separatists organized in several civic organizations such as the Revolutionary East Cultural Association (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları). Another civic organization was Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association of Higher Education or Apocular ("Apoists") which largely consisted of students, led by Abdullah Öcalan.¹³⁹ This organization was the core of the PKK terrorism. In 1978, this group was formed and named themselves as the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaran Kurdistan- PKK). It is a terrorist organization with the aim of creating an independent Kurdish state by carving out territories from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.¹⁴⁰

After the establishment of the PKK, its members met in clandestine congresses. The PKK terrorists refuse the state authority in the regions whose habitants were predominantly Kurds. In this period, similar to the Kurdish separatist political parties in 1990s, the PKK attempted to manipulate the identity and cultural rights of the Kurdish people in Turkey. To this end, in addition to these meetings, the PKK has also attempted to attract followers by attempting to grasped the state authority in favor of themselves via trying to collect its own taxes, and to bring health and security services to its sympathizers.

Following the coup d'état of 12 September 1980, the organization became largely active.¹⁴¹ The group began launching terrorist activities as early as 1984.¹⁴² As a terrorist organization, the PKK has adopted a strategy of targeting a wide range of civilians, including mayors, schoolteachers, and tribal chiefs. Anyone perceived as an actual or potential collaborator with the state is seen as a potential target.¹⁴³

¹³⁹ Michael Radu, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK", *Orbis*, Vol.45, No.1, Winter 2001, pp.49-50.; Martin van Bruinessen, "Between Guerrilla War and Political Murder: The Workers' Party of Kurdistan", *Middle East Report*, No.153, *Islam and the State*, 1988, p.42; Aliza Marcus, "Hearts and Minds in Kurdistan", *Middle East Report*, No.163, Mar-Apr 1990, p.42. pp.41-44; M. Sami Denker, *Uluslararası Terör Türkiye ve PKK*, Boğaziçi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997, pp.57-59.

¹⁴⁰ Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, pp.13-15.

¹⁴¹ Svante E. Cornell, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics", *Orbis*, Vol.45, No.1, Winter 2001, p.39. (pp31-46)

¹⁴² Aylin Güney, "The People's Democracy Party", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.3, No.1, 2002, p.123.

¹⁴³ Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 1998, p. 28.

Suicide bombings, car bombings, kidnapping civilians and military personnel therefore became widely used tactics of the PKK. The organization also plants mines, which has caused many civilian and military deaths. Until the coup d'état of 12 September 1980, the PKK murdered 354 people in various terrorist activities in the south-eastern part of Turkey.¹⁴⁴ In 1987, the PKK attacked 14 villages and killed 242 villagers all of which were civilians. In the same year, they leveled up 137 schools to wreak havoc on the Turkish educational system which they saw as centers of assimilation.¹⁴⁵ During this terrorist violence, connections between the PKK and the several separatist political parties have occupied the political agenda, and party proscriptions have become a frequent case in Turkey.

Similar to the UK, Turkey has also implemented various individual punishments against party members. For example, carrying symbols of the PKK is an offence and needs individual judging under the Provisions of Terrorism Act.¹⁴⁶ If this offence occurs collectively under the organization of a separatist political party, it can be noted to proscribe that organizing political party. This dual punishment, both on the individual and party levels have therefore generally ended with party proscriptions in Turkey. Especially, Turkey's strict regulations for political parties have kept separatist political parties under close scrutiny.¹⁴⁷ The detailed Political Parties Law, the related provisions of the Constitution have provided a continuous judicial monitoring on the political parties. Any party program, regulation, manifesto or activity bearing unlawful items are banned by a Supreme Court mechanism, which is able to charge the party for total proscription.

3.2. PARTY PROSCRIPTIONS IN TURKEY

In democracies, party proscriptions generally occur as the last resort. Regardless with the fact whether they contribute or hamper the democratic

¹⁴⁴ Nihat Ali Özcan, **PKK Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi**, Asam Yayınları, Ankara, 1999, pp.42–47.

¹⁴⁵ Michael Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey", **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol.13, No.4, Summer 1990, p.68.

¹⁴⁶ Vahit Baltacı, **Yeni TCK ve CMK'da Terör Suçları ve Yargılanması**, Seçkin Pub., Ankara, 2007, p.330.

¹⁴⁷ For examples, see Ergun Özbudun, **Contemporary Turkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic Consolidation**, Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, pp.141–145.

consolidation, it is a conventional self-protection system from damages of anti-system movements.¹⁴⁸ Proscription of political parties is arranged by constitution in Turkey.¹⁴⁹ Considering the related provisions of the constitution, separatist parties that have connections with terrorist groups are tried for total proscription when they erode the foundational principles of the state and the regime. For example, violating the ‘indivisible integrity of the state with its nation and territory’ is expressed in twelve different articles of the constitution.¹⁵⁰

In 1990s, several separatist political parties were outlawed according to these provisions of the constitution. The People’s Labor Party (HEP), Democracy Party (DEP), The Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) and Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) were proscribed one after another. Today, as the latest link to this separatist tradition, Democratic Society Party (DTP) is represented with 21 members in the parliament. Like the case that the ancestor parties of the DTP faced, the Supreme Court prosecutors asked the Constitutional Court to ban the party for its separatist spirit and connection with the PKK terrorism.

Party proscriptions cut off the relations between the party and the terrorist group for short periods. However, these parties rapidly produce new parties with the same cadres and the same separatist policies. They carry on assisting terrorism and manipulating the same popular bases. Related popular votes transfer from the previous one to the replacement separatist parties. (See **Table 2** for the election results of all separatist parties in Turkey)

¹⁴⁸ Finn, “Electoral Regimes”, p.64.

¹⁴⁹ Article 69 of the constitution notes the conditions under which a party can be proscribed. See, Constitution of Republic of Turkey, Chapter 2, Section 4, Article 68 and 69.

¹⁵⁰ Articles 3, 5, 14, 26, 28/4, 28/6, 28/8, 58, 68, 81, 103, 118, 122, 130 in the Constitution of Republic of Turkey. HEP was judged for proscription on the ground that declarations of party leaders were against the articles 2, 3, 14, 68 of the constitution.

Table 2: Parliamentary Success of Turkish Separatist Parties After Elections

Election Year	Party	# of Seats Occupied	% of Seats Won	Vote %
1991	HEP	22	4.8%	0,00%
1995	HADEP	0	0,00%	4.17%
1999	HADEP	0	0,00%	4.75%
2002	DEHAP	0	0,00%	6.2%
2007	DTP	21	3.8%	0,00%
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Due to the national 10 % election threshold, parties that gain less than 10 % of total votes cannot enter the parliament.• In 1991 HEP members entered to the parliament from the list of Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP). In 2007, all DTP members were elected as independents. <p>Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul (25.08.2008)</p>				

3.3. MAJOR SEPARATIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY

To understand the trajectory of separatist political parties in Turkey, perusing the history of those proscribed parties is useful. This period began with the HEP. It was founded in 1990 by eleven representatives of the Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP), a center left wing party. During the 1991 elections, the SHP and the HEP formed an electoral pact. Twenty-two HEP representatives were elected to the Turkish parliament from the list of the SHP.

The HEP's 1992 party program argues that there is a "Kurdish Problem" in Turkey, which it claims can be solved through conferring the right to self-determination to the Kurdish population in Turkey. This proposal includes a referendum and the establishment of a federation.¹⁵¹ The separatist HEP, thus revealed by the party program, also had links with the terrorist PKK, however. Indeed, some observers note that the election campaign of HEP was conducted by the members of the PKK in the south-eastern parts of Turkey.¹⁵² This connection also came up at the parliament in several occasions. One of the HEP representatives, Leyla Zana, for instance, caused a major stir in the parliament when she came into the hall wearing a headband consisting of the same colors of the PKK flag. Further, she sparked an oath of allegiance problem in 1991 in the parliament similar to the cases in the UK. Zana took her oath of allegiance in Kurdish in swearing ceremony.¹⁵³ As mentioned in the previous chapters, Sinn Fein faced splits over the issue of oath of Allegiance to the Crown. In Turkey, however, even though Leyla Zana attempted to read her oath of allegiance in Kurdish and changed the text, she was not confronted harshly by her fellow party members, and no party split and divisions followed.

In these periods, terrorist activities were infiltrated in various political party meetings. For example, the HEP in regard to its program was attaching great importance to the Navrouz Holiday in 1992. On the other hand, the PKK had also decided to engage in the same celebrations along the same lines with the party members. In March 1992, during the Navrouz celebrations in Turkey, the PKK members in the crowd were stopped and detained. However, 92 people died and 341 were wounded during this event.¹⁵⁴ Later, fourteen of twenty HEP parliamentarians took security forces responsible for the large number of deaths in the celebrations. Yet, this event seemed to occur under intense terrorist propaganda. Nevertheless, the

¹⁵¹ Halkın Emek Partisi, **Program**, 1992, pp.17–18.

¹⁵² Ümit Özdağ, **Türkiye'de Düşük Yoğunluklu Çatışma ve PKK**, Üçok Yayıncılık, Ankara 2005, p.62.

¹⁵³ Doğu Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey", **Journal of Democracy**, Vol. 11, No.3, 2000, p.129. Philip Robins, "The Overload State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue", **International Affairs**, Vol 69, No.4, 1993, p.667.

¹⁵⁴ Navrouz holiday is the symbol of the arrival of spring and is widely celebrated among Kurds in Turkey. In 1995, Nevruz was also declared as a Turkish holiday celebrating the day Turks left their Central Asian homeland. Konrad Hirschler, "Defining the Nation: Kurdish Historiography in Turkey in the 1990s", **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 37, No.3, p.154.

HEP representatives persisted in occupying the same lines with the PKK terrorists in this crisis and consequently resigned from the parliament.¹⁵⁵

The HEP was banned after a trial in the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it had become a focus of illegal political pursuits and engaged in activities against ‘the indivisible unity of state with its territory and nation’.¹⁵⁶ The decision also contended that the PKK and the HEP had the same bases in terms of human resources. While reaching its verdict, the court pointed out to the difficulty of distinguishing the PKK terrorists from the HEP sympathizers.¹⁵⁷

The ÖZDEP was subsequently founded in 1992. Yet, from the outset, the foundation principles of the party, its relevant activities and declarations were found unlawful. The Constitutional Court therefore applied for the closure of the party for the similar reasons as it did for HEP.¹⁵⁸ The court stressed the similarity of the separatist goals of the PKK and the ÖZDEP by referring to their insistence for the right of self determination for Kurds in Turkey. Indeed, party’s program was decided as separatist, which contradicted with the constitution and the Political Parties Law. As a result, the party was similarly banned. Sensing the approaching verdict beforehand, however, the political cadres of the ÖZDEP started to work for a new separatist party in 1993.

These developments gave birth to the DEP, which was subsequently founded in the same year by the members of the former HEP and the ÖZDEP. This new party was also viewed as a replica of the HEP in political discussions.¹⁵⁹ Similar to its predecessors, the DEP reiterated its separatist plan by the declarations of its executive board during several occasions. The DEP’s document of the “Plan for

¹⁵⁵ Robins, p.666.

¹⁵⁶ Mustafa Koçak, **Siyasal Partiler ve Türkiye’de Parti Yasakları**, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2002, pp.202–211.

¹⁵⁷ Constitutional Court, Case of Party Proscription: HEP

¹⁵⁸ Koçak, pp. 190-93.

¹⁵⁹ Mark Muller, “Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: The Elimination of Kurdish Representation during the 1990s”, in Robert Olson (ed.), **The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East** (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), p.187.

Local Administrations” was the prevalent one which proposed federal elements for the state structure.¹⁶⁰

The period during which the DEP operated was the years that the PKK peaked its terrorist violence. Indeed, the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan himself declared in 1994 in Lebanon that the PKK was conducting terrorist violence in Turkey with all of its capabilities.¹⁶¹ Meanwhile, some of the DEP representatives gave explicit support to the PKK. For instance, in response to a PKK bomb, which killed a group of young military cadets at a railway station in February 1994, a DEP representative denied the terrorist character of the PKK¹⁶² and declared that “in war, everyone in uniform is a target.”¹⁶³ This stance and the increasing tension in public opinion led to the elimination of the legislative immunities of some of the DEP representatives, who were then arrested at the entrance of the parliament and were later charged under Article 125 of the penal code, “crimes against the state”, which, at the time, carried the death penalty. They were ultimately sentenced to prison for pursuing illegal separatist activities and assisting terrorism. Additionally, four leading representatives of the DEP were sentenced to seven years in prison for being PKK members.¹⁶⁴

In this period, many other DEP members of the parliament also fled to Europe and joined the PKK’s “Kurdish Parliament-in-Exile.” Gülistan Gürbey notes that this “parliament in exile” brought the DEP and PKK members together in exile.¹⁶⁵ This organization was actually a symbolic conference of the PKK attempts to widen its terrorist violence by embracing political as well as military methods.¹⁶⁶ These relations, and connection with the PKK, however, paved the way for that party’s end. Similar to its predecessors, the DEP was closed down in 1994 on the grounds that it deteriorated the founding principles of Turkish Republic.

¹⁶⁰ Democracy Party, **DEP Yerel Yönetimler Planı**, 1993

¹⁶¹ Milliyet, 11.07.1993

¹⁶² Nicole F. Watts, “Allies and Enemies: Pro Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990–1994”, **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1999, p.648.

¹⁶³ Sabah daily, 17 February 1994.

¹⁶⁴ Milliyet, 01.08.2007, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/08/01/son/sontur13.asp>, 25.08.2008

¹⁶⁵ Gülistan Gürbey, “The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey Since The 1980s”, in **The Kurdish Nationalist Movement** in the 1990s by Robert Olson, The University Press of Kentucky, 1996, p.25.

¹⁶⁶ Philip Robins, **Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War**, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1988, p.177.

Once again, the HADEP was founded by the same cadres.¹⁶⁷ This party advocated a separatist policy, too. It criticized the current regime, claiming that it is authoritarian and over-centralist. Instead, it offered decentralization, including strengthening of the local governments. The program also requested the elimination of the central government's supervision over local authorities. In addition, it asked for 'local parliaments' and a model in which mayors, police chiefs, district governors should be elected rather than appointed by the center. The party also demanded the transfer of education, health, and local security services from central government to local governors.¹⁶⁸ In this frame, HADEP, with the motivation of its separatist bid, demanded a federal model, which was also found to contradict the foundational principles of the Turkish state.

At the outset, the party seemed to adopt a moderate tone and tried to keep its distance from the PKK. For instance, it chose not to join the meetings of the PKK-led "Parliament-in-Exile." Until its Congress in 1996, everything seemed different to some extent from its predecessors. During that congress, however, some masked men dropped the Turkish flag on the floor and replaced it with the PKK banner. As a result, all party members were arrested, including the party's leader. In 1997, HADEP seemed vulnerable to being closed down as a party considering the sensitivities of the National Security Council.¹⁶⁹ During that same year, the Council had indeed declared Kurdish separatism as major a risk, by taking into account the connections between the HADEP and the PKK.¹⁷⁰

Later, in 1999, HADEP was sent to trial for proscription. The prosecutors argued that the HADEP had merely become the window-dressing for the illegal PKK activities. The party offices and other capabilities were consequently considered as the tools for terrorist propaganda. In addition to this connection, the PKK leader

¹⁶⁷ Hamit Bozarslan, "Turkey's Elections and the Kurds", **Middle East Report**, No.199, April-June 1996, p.17.

¹⁶⁸ HADEP-Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, **Yerel Yönetimler Planı**, p.3

¹⁶⁹ State Security Council is the leading meeting point of highest civil and military bureaucrats in which they formulate, determinate the national security policy. The decisions taken there generally become the policies of the current governments.

¹⁷⁰ Resmi Gazete, N. 24932, 10.11.2002, <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr>, (25.08.2008)

Öcalan later stated that the PKK not only made money contributions to the HADEP, but also nominated and approved its candidates for the general elections.¹⁷¹ According to this electoral process, the prosecutors noted that PKK threatened to kill those people who did not vote for the HADEP during the elections.¹⁷² In the light of these events, the party met the same fate as its predecessors, and was proscribed by the Constitutional Court for pursuing separatist goals and its connection with the PKK.

Under these circumstances, as a measure against being banned, the party members initiated a new party, the DEHAP, which was the direct continuation of the HADEP. After its proscription, such was the case in former separatist parties, HADEP party delegates joined the new party. For example, 35 mayors of municipalities immediately transferred to the DEHAP lines.¹⁷³ Party conducted and proposed the identical policies of the former separatist political parties.¹⁷⁴

DEHAP was not different from the predecessor parties regarding its ties with the terrorist group, either. According to the second leader of the PKK, Şemdin Sakık, the PKK was the preeminent human resource of this political party.¹⁷⁵ Party activities were similar to the PKK's. In conjunction with this fact, in September 2005, DEHAP organized a convoy consisted of about 2000 party supporters from southeast to the near of the Imralı Island. Party planned to carry out a demonstration for the release of the prisoned leader of the PKK. This journey was also a direct support to the latter. Some clashes broke out between the DEHAP members and the local nationalist groups during this journey. Following the rising protests against DEHAP, the party announced its merger with another Kurdish organization- the Democratic Society Movement (DTH) initiated by Leyla Zana in 2005. This movement became the infrastructure of the DTP, which has been the last separatist political party with members in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

¹⁷¹ State Security Court, **Ocalan Case**, under the section of "Election Tactics, New Ceasefire Initiative".

¹⁷² The Supreme Court, "Decision on HADEP", 2003.

¹⁷³ Radikal, "35 Belediye Başkanı DEHAP'ta", 26.02.2003, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=70196>, (25.08.2008)

¹⁷⁴ For details, see BBC, DEHAP Election Manifesto, 02.10.2002, www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/progs/dehap_prog.doc, (25.08.2008)

¹⁷⁵ Tuncer Günay, "Şemdin Sakık'tan Mektuplar", Marduk, 2005, p.28

The DTP was founded in 2005 by the cadre that had administered the same-line parties which were banned by the Constitutional Court due to their separatist tendencies and their connections with the separatist terrorist organization—the PKK. Although the DTP labels itself as social democratic mass party,¹⁷⁶ it is a political party, which promotes separatism by favoring distinct living conditions for the Kurds living in Turkey. In line with its separatist goals, the party has proposed new projects, such as the ‘Democratic Autonomy Project,’ which envisages a federative state model.¹⁷⁷ This plan specifically advocates the formation of local assemblies. The party further argues that this local division by assemblies can be achieved by observing the ethnic demographic distribution patterns of Turkey. This project also proposes regional assemblies to have extensive legislative and executive capabilities in addition to foreign affairs, finance, defense, security and law. As such, the DTP has also expressed its separatist goals. In fact, far away from being a mass party, the DTP seems to be the party of one section of population, the Kurds in Turkey.¹⁷⁸

The DTP has been shown to have numerous connections with the PKK. The DTP gives logistic support to the PKK. Many of the party members were charged with supporting terrorists and terrorism. Many party buildings were declared as semi-terror camps by judicial decisions.¹⁷⁹ Also, numerous party members were found to have assisted terrorists financially. For example, the leader of the DTP organization in Kara Çoban District and his cousin were judged for creating a fund for assisting terrorists and were sent to prison in 2006. Additionally, two DTP committee members were caught by security forces while delivering bullets, food and other equipments to the PKK terrorists.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ Democratic Society Party official page, <http://www.dtp.org.tr/?sf=icerik&icerikid=223>, (25.08.2008)

¹⁷⁷ Democratic Society Party, **Regulation**, <http://www.dtp.org.tr/?sf=icerik&icerikid=223> (25.08.2008), p.1

¹⁷⁸ DTP, “Democratic Autonomy Project”, presented in the Second Extraordinary Congress in 2007, <http://www.dtp.org.tr/?sf=icerik&icerikid=229>, (25.08.2008)

¹⁷⁹ During a police search of the provincial Office of the Democratic and Society Party in Siirt, the authorities also discovered the pictures of several dead PKK terrorists hanging on the walls and many illegal organizational documents of the PKK hidden in the office. See Milliyet, 09.02.2006, “12 DTP’li tutuklandı”, <http://www.milliyet.com/2006/09/02/siyaset/siy08.html>, (25.08.2008)

¹⁸⁰ Supreme Court, “Indictment document of DTP”, pp.50-51,59.

The connection between the DTP and the PKK became particularly explicit after a dramatic event which also occupied the Turkish media for months. In 2007, near the village of Daglica, the PKK terrorists attacked Turkish military forces. Besides several deaths, eight soldiers were abducted by the PKK militants to Northern Iraq. In the following days, three DTP representatives, Aysel Tugluk, Fatma Kurtulan and Osman Özçelik, went to Iraq as intermediaries and contacted several PKK militants to release the abducted soldiers. These DTP members and the party have come under intense criticism after they were seen shaking hands with the PKK leaders before the cameras.¹⁸¹

Following similar events, the Constitutional Court has indicted that speeches and actions taken by party members have proved that the party has become a focal point of terrorist activities against the sovereignty of the state and indivisible unity of the country and the nation.¹⁸² The trial has not yet come to an end. Today, the DTP remains active and is represented in the Turkish parliament.

As examined in this chapter, related to separatist political parties, Turkish case has been full of party proscriptions. At the state level, Turkish state's perception of separatist threat has been still on agenda. Turkey has been under threat of terrorist violence carried out by PKK terrorists. The contributions of separatist political parties to remove this perception is still lacking, too. As mentioned in the next chapter the European Union also monitors the every single development about these parties closely. Under these circumstances, separatist political parties, lastly the DTP seem not to contribute the desecuritization efforts in Turkey with its linkage to PKK. Unlike in the British case, trajectory of separatist parties does not open discussions about about non-sponsoring terrorism in the party ranks. Rather than facing splits, the proscribed parties have reincarnated in new ones. It is apparent that they do not even give up their separatist aim or cut their relations with terrorism. By noting these historical events and party proscriptions, this chapter summarized the basic events that have disabled the desecuritization of the conflict.

¹⁸¹ Akşam daily, 04.11.2007

¹⁸² Milliyet, 16.11.2007, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/11/16/son/sonsiy14.asp>, (25.08.2008)

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN EXTERNAL IMPACT

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the EU in desecuritizing the conflicts in selected states, the UK and Turkey. It investigates the impact of the European Union in shifting the Northern Ireland conflict and Kurdish Question (in EU terms) out of emergency mode into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere by attaching special importance to the separatist political parties in these countries.

The Chapter begins with general role of the EU in desecuritizing security problems and its related peace-building manner. As an organization, which was also born with the security incentives, seems to be the most successful peace making project. Then, the chapter provides a detailed analysis of first, its role in desecuritization of the Northern Ireland Conflict. This effort was sustained heavily by economic assistance. After examining the economic supports planned for improvement in the living conditions of the Northern Ireland, the chapter investigates EU's political effects that produce a Anglo-Irish Cooperation. In this sense, it analyzes the Europeanization of the issue and mentions about the standardization policies and identity policies of the organization. It also notes the infiltration of the Sinn Fein party into desecuritization process and its contributions to the peace period.

The subsequent part of the chapter concentrates on the role of the EU in desecuritizing the Kurdish Issue in Turkey. This section notes the EU's negligence of the heavy bill of the PKK terrorism. While demanding political reforms and non-military solutions to the problem, EU elaborates the issue with political dimensions, in contrast to Turkey, which was bound to refuse the removal of the issue from security agenda. EU interconnects the separatist PKK terrorism and the separatist party politics directly with the living conditions of Kurds in Turkey and put several reforms as prerequisites for Turkey's future EU membership. These reforms generally consist of using of Kurdish language in broadcasting and publishing; and

of smooth functioning of Pro-Kurdish Parties (separatist parties). After that, the chapter examines the matter of “Copenhagen Criteria” which is the milestone of Turkish desecuritization of the issue. In line with this policy, last part of the chapter notes the amendments in Turkish Constitution and the Law on political parties and the exercise of separatist party politics in the country.

4.1. EUROPEAN UNION’S ROLE IN GENERAL

The European Union (EU) seems to be the most successful integration project of the world. Today, it is striding towards a single constitution, designed to bind all of its member states into a unique political base. As a political entity, the EU is viewed as creating a framework for a European identity, which makes the costs of conflict across borders too high to continue. In this sense, it highlights the shared needs and the creation of common identities.¹⁸³ The role of the EU in this desecuritization process has been also evaluated by the organization itself. The EU’s advisory body the European Economic and Social Committee¹⁸⁴ prepared a document of opinion entitled as “the Role of the EU in the Northern Ireland Peace Process” in 2008. In this report, the EU support for the peace building in Northern Ireland is introduced as a successful effort that can be used as a toolkit for any conflict resolution. **(See Appendix 1)**

The EU has used various methods, ranging from identity politics, economic aids to political openings in order to override the existing problems. The EU, itself, has pointed out that its total policy on conflict resolutions is a combination of indirect and direct intervention, by which it works as a catalyst and has helped the peace processes by creating the environment for a successful settlement.¹⁸⁵ The efforts of the EU to handle existing problems goes through “preserving the shared

¹⁸³ Mitchell Pace and Stephan Stetter, “State of the Art Report. A Literature Review of the Study of Border Conflicts and their Transformation in the Social Sciences”, **EUBorderConf** , 2003 <http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/files/stateofheartreport.pdf> (18.12.2008), p.15.

¹⁸⁴ This organ is the only consultative body at European Union level that gives the Commission, the Council and the Parliament the points of view of the people "on the ground" - those most directly affected by EU legislation. It is an **assembly of 344 members from the 27 Member States** of the EU. Members are appointed for a renewable **four-year term**. They are appointed by the **Council of Ministers** on the basis of lists drawn up by national governments. See official webpage, <http://eesc.europa.eu/> (28.12.2008).

principles of openness, participation, inclusiveness, accountability, fairness, effectiveness, coherence and legitimacy".¹⁸⁶ Through a shared respect for common values; the rule of law, good governance and democracy, the EU aims to contribute to global peace. It also supports political and social reforms and the protection of human rights.¹⁸⁷ By this manner, as Javier Solana clearly expressed, the EU targets a peaceful, stable and united world.¹⁸⁸ In fact,

*As the world's greatest "role model" for peace-building, the EU, together with its member states, have the expertise, the experience, the diversity, the resources and the reputation to support conflict resolution and peace-building wherever it is required in the world.*¹⁸⁹

EU's desecuritizing effect reflects itself as a process of peace-building which begins with an end to violent conflict and moves through stages towards political stability, peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and ultimately social harmony, economic prosperity and a shared society.¹⁹⁰ Accordingly, since its outset, the EU has produced direct or indirect influential policies on the sources of conflicts in the UK and Turkey. Relating to the political parties that have connections with terrorist organizations, the EU becomes a factor that affects decisions of these states in responding these parties as a matter of security or a political concern.

4.2. THE EU'S ROLE IN THE BRITISH CASE

For the EU, 'Northern Ireland Crisis' is, first, a conflict between its two member states. The Republic of Ireland, which declared its ownership of the Northern Ireland by its Constitution in 1937¹⁹¹, and the United Kingdom are both parties to this inextricable issue. Following its foundational principles, the EU has

¹⁸⁵ EU European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on **The role of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process**, Brussels, 23 October 2008, p.2.

¹⁸⁶ EU, Committee of the Regions, Round Up Of The First Atelier, 10 September 2008, europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/540&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr, (28.12.2008).

¹⁸⁷ Pace, p.9.

¹⁸⁸ EU, **A Secure Europe in a Better World**, 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (28.12.2008)

¹⁸⁹ EU European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), Opinion on **The role of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process**, Brussels, 23 October 2008, p.2.

¹⁹⁰ EESC, p.2.

¹⁹¹ Paul Dixon, p.4.

played the role of a mediator between these two states in order to override the existing crisis, and reach a peaceful and cooperative future between its members. To this end, the EU has consistently supported the peace process in Northern Ireland based on the British–Irish cooperation and the non-violent political articulation of unionist and nationalist actors including the political parties. In this context, the EU arises as a valuable body in implementing policies concerning Sinn Fein.

Accession of both the Republic of Ireland and the UK, into the European Community in 1973, coincided with the period of high terrorist violence occurring in Northern Ireland. Terrorist incidents had begun in Northern Ireland as early as in 1969¹⁹²; the year in which the negotiations started for the EU membership of the UK. It was just after the intensive negotiations in Brussels and Luxembourg, when the terrorist violence in Northern Ireland increased in 1972.¹⁹³

At the outset, the British insisted on encapsulating the issue as a domestic affair. After the EU membership of the UK and the Republic of Ireland, however, the conflict was gradually recognized as an internal affair of the EU, too. Especially following the high level of violence throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the problem became a great concern among the other member states of the EU, in the European Parliament, and among some members of the European Commission.¹⁹⁴

The first major initiative taken by the European Community, therefore, was the ‘Haagerup Report’ commissioned by the European Parliament in 1984. It conceptualized the conflict on behalf of the EU and created a working base by marking what actually the problem is.¹⁹⁵ The efforts exerted in the following years reached a consolidated solution in 1998 by the Belfast Agreement, which is widely known as the Good Friday Agreement. This agreement was a peaceful frame of

¹⁹² The first British soldier lost his life in fight against the IRA in July 1970. See: Coogan, p.472.

¹⁹³ Dennis Kennedy, **Living With The European Union**, Palgrave Publisher, New York, 1999. p 148.

¹⁹⁴ Kennedy, p 164.

¹⁹⁵ Mathias Jopp and Peter Schlotter, “Western European Security Cooperation Trends, Perspectives, and Evaluation”, **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 17, Jan 1986, pp. 175 – 183.

conflict resolution, which had also initially documented the decommissioning of the IRA weapons.

The EU is still working on to consolidate this peace process, and exerting efforts in systemizing its regular support programs. For instance, in 2007, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso set up a new Task Force led by the Regional Affairs Commissioner to look into the future of EU-Northern Ireland cooperation. Published in 2008, the Report proposes numerous ways for the region to become more involved in EU policies and notes the significance of EU's efforts to provide research, advice and sharing of experience in the peace process.¹⁹⁶

4.2.1. The Main Policy-Line of the EU via the Haagerup Report¹⁹⁷

The European Parliament took a groundbreaking step in 1983 when it asked its Political Affairs Committee to draw up a report on the situation in Northern Ireland, including its political aspects. It was the first time an institution of the European Community had taken formal notice of the political situation in Northern Ireland.¹⁹⁸ Prior to this report; the EU actors, mainly consisting of the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) and Commission officials, perceived the conflict in Northern Ireland as a matter between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.

In 1984, the European Parliament (EP) published the "Haagerup Report". Labeled the problem as 'one of the gravest political and social problems existing in the Community', the report was designed to explain the situation of conflict in Northern Ireland 'to non-British and non-Irish' MEPs. The Haagerup report referred to this case as an identity conflict for the MEPs. It also tried to discover different

¹⁹⁶ For the related press release, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/540&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr>, (28.12.2008).

¹⁹⁷ Report's name comes from Niels Jørgen HAAGERUP who was the Vice-Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament between 16.09.1980 / 20.01.1982 and 21.01.1982 / 23.07.1984.

¹⁹⁸ Kennedy, p 154.

ways to assist the region within its regional policy and social fund.¹⁹⁹ Indeed, the report indicated a limited role for the EU in creating an integrated economic plan for the region. It recommended power-sharing as the ultimate solution within Northern Ireland.²⁰⁰ The report outlines the history of the conflict and declares that the Anglo-Irish history is dominated by the Irish Rebellion and British suppression. It stresses out that ‘the conflict is one of culture and of loyalties, of memories of historic struggles rather than disputes of doctrine’.²⁰¹ It acknowledges the integrity of the contrasting national identities involved in the conflict and aims to create a situation in which they can be peacefully expressed.

The Report emphasizes the ‘Europeanness’ toward common goals and in the meanwhile accepted the differences and varieties. Therefore, it proposes two communities in the Northern Ireland to bring about a political system with an equitable sharing of governing responsibilities while accommodating their identities as well. In its own words, it tries to ‘defuse the conflictual potential of national difference’.²⁰² It also emphasizes importance of the co-operation between the United Kingdom and Irish Government.²⁰³ In this frame, it paved the way for setting up of a joint Anglo-Irish parliamentary body, in which some MEPs took part.²⁰⁴ Additionally, it proposes to involve the political parties in the peace process. Therefore, the report encourages the British and Irish governments to improve the prospects for progress with the active participation of all law-abiding parties in Northern Ireland.²⁰⁵ The ongoing process showed that this report had an overarching impact in the peace process. The report played a crucial role in consolidation of the peace process with its provisions which basically instigated Anglo-Irish partnership and the political activism toward a peaceful solution.

¹⁹⁹ Report Drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs committee on the situation in Northern Ireland (Haagerup Report) European Parliament Working Documents 1983-4: 1-1526/83, pp.5,13.

²⁰⁰ Katy Haward, “Reiterating National Identities: The European Union Conception of Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland”, **Cooperation and Conflict**, No.41, Vol.3, 2006, p. 268

²⁰¹ Haagerup Report, pp.18,29.

²⁰² Katy Haward, Reiterating National Identities: The European Union Conception of Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, **Cooperation and Conflict**, 2006, No.41, p. 271.

²⁰³ Haagerup Report, p.16.

²⁰⁴ Haagerup Report, pp.70-73

²⁰⁵ Haagerup Report, p.73.

By building concrete steps such as in the Haagerup Report, the EU has provided a guideline for future agreements and cooperation in the peace process. The Anglo-Irish Agreement, which came in the following year of the report, gave priority to intergovernmental agreement and put devolved government as a reward for agreement between moderate unionists and nationalists. The provisions of the Agreement are not far removed from what Haagerup had proposed. Similar issues were emphasized, including the scope for cross-border cooperation, greater recognition of the identity of the two traditions in the North, and devolution based on power-sharing.²⁰⁶ Later, the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 was closely inspired by the model suggested by Haagerup. First, it clearly defines the conflicting parties in terms of parts of the Irish-British problem. Similarly, it emphasized certain themes, such as ‘human rights’ and ‘equality of opportunity’. Second, with regard to the institutional recognition of the dimension of cross-border cooperation, the new North/South and the British–Irish bodies reflect the application of Haagerup’s support for the ‘establishment of joint British–Irish responsibilities in a number of specified fields, politically, legally and otherwise.’²⁰⁷

4.2.2. Basic Economic Supports

4.2.2.1. ‘Objective’ Status and ‘Interreg’

The major economic supports come from, EU’s sub-institution, the “Directorate General for Regional Policy,”²⁰⁸ which aims to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion by reducing disparities within the regions of EU. Therefore, the policy contributes positively to the overall economic performance of the organization.²⁰⁹ This policy has great significance for the EU, and about one third

²⁰⁶ Wolf, pp.49-50.

²⁰⁷ Haagerup Report, p.73.

²⁰⁸ This body was created in 1968. See, Regional Policy Inforegio, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/history/index_en.htm, (28.12.2008)

²⁰⁹ Directorate General for Regional Policy of EU, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/regional_policy/index_en.htm (28.12.2008)

of the EU's budget is devoted to it through programs such as 'Objective' and Interreg'.²¹⁰

After the UK and the Republic of Ireland had become members of the EU, Northern Ireland was given "special status" by being granted "Objective One" status. For EU, objective one regions are those regions that are in need of a regional support. To qualify for objective one status, the GDP per capita for the region must be below 75% of the EU average.²¹¹ Despite this fact, Northern Ireland, although having a GDP per capita above the qualification threshold, benefits from objective one status because of the peace process.²¹² Even in the new millennium, 'objective one' projects are active. For example, the EU has approved a transitional 'Objective 1 support program for building sustainable prosperity in Northern Ireland' for the period of 2000-2006. This project has continued to offer economic assistance to the region while noting the political instability and terrorist violence of the last thirty years which has damaged the investments and tourism incomes.²¹³

The 'Objective' assistance has played a great role in increasing the regions GDP's and employment rates. For instance, it follows from the related data that the average GDP of Objective 1 regions grew from 64 % of the EU average in 1995 to 70 % in 2003. The annual change in the GDP growth in 1995–2003 period was 2,7 % for Objective 1 region of EU, compared to 2,3 % for all EU. Besides the

²¹⁰ Breffni O'Rourke, "EU: Final Progress Reports Mark Beginning Of The End Of Enlargement Process", <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/11/mil-031107-rferl-163531.htm> (28.12.2008).

²¹¹ European Commission, Directorate General Regional Policy, **Annual Management Plan 2008**, 19 December 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/regional_policy/document/amp2008_en.pdf, (28.12.2008)

²¹² The other regions are Southern Italy, East Germany, most of Greece and Portugal, and much of Spain and some of the Republic of Ireland. In the United Kingdom, Cornwall, South Yorkshire and much of Wales. See: Regional Policy-Inforegio, Objective 1: Map of eligible regions and regions receiving transitional support, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/objective1/map_en.htm (28.12.2008).

²¹³ Regional Policy-Inforegio, Northern Ireland Transitional Objective 1 Programme "Building Sustainable Prosperity", 2000-2006, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv_PAY=UK&gv_reg=520&gv_PG M=220&LAN=7&gv_PER=1&gv_defL=7 (28.12.2008)

development of basic infrastructure in the Objective 1 regions, 411.000 net jobs were created in Objective 1 regions.²¹⁴

‘Interreg’ is another program which aims to stimulate interregional cooperation in the European Union. It started in 1989, and has been financed under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). It was launched as Interreg I for the programming period 1989-93, and continued as Interreg II for the subsequent period 1994-99. It has moved on to Interreg III for the period 2000-2006. Interreg IV will cover 2007-2012. The significance attached to the project is so high that for the 2000–2006 round of structural funding, The Interreg “received almost half of the total Structural Funds available.”²¹⁵ It is designed “to strengthen economic and social cohesion throughout the EU, by fostering the balanced development of the continent through cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation.”²¹⁶ These Interreg funds are designed for various issues like environmental protection, improving energy efficiency and renewable energy sources; developing small and medium-sized enterprises; increasing cooperation in legal and administrative areas; increasing human and institutional potential for cross-border cooperation.

The amount of money provided by the EU for peace and reconciliation within Northern Ireland and between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has increased steadily since 1989 in parallel to the improvement in cross-border relations.²¹⁷ Today, the EU continues to include the Northern Ireland Region in development plans. As an example, The European Commission approved in 2007 a regional development program for Northern Ireland for the period 2007-2013 within the framework of the "Regional Competitiveness and Employment" objective. The total budget of the program is around € 614 million and the Community funding

²¹⁴ Selected data quoted from: European Commission, Directorate General Regional Policy, Annual Management Plan 2008, 19 December 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/regional_policy/document/amp2008_en.pdf, (28.12.2008), p.14

²¹⁵ Brigid Laffan and Diane Payne, **Creating Living Institutions: EU Cross-Border Co-operation after the Good Friday Agreement**, Centre for Cross-Border Studies, Armagh, 2001, p.32.

²¹⁶ EU, Activities of the European Union: Summaries of the Legislation - Interreg III, <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/g24204.htm> (28.12.2008)

²¹⁷ Etain Tannam, “The European Commission's Evolving Role in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Northern Ireland 1989—2005”, **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol.42 , No.3, Sep. 2007, p.344.

through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) amounts to around € 307 million.²¹⁸

4.2.2.2. Peace Program

'Peace Program' is a cluster of special projects designed for the Northern Ireland. The underlying logic of these economic packages was to assist the peace process by the assumption that economic deprivation contributes to paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland. It was also thought that financial benefits for maintaining peace would become an incentive for paramilitary leaders and their supporters to maintain the ceasefires.²¹⁹ Peace program is directly related to the peace in Northern Ireland. Main objectives of the Peace program can be summarized as:²²⁰

Objective1. Addressing legacy of the conflict: i.e. the program will address specific problems generated by the conflict in order to assist the return to a normal peaceful and stable society.

Objective2. Taking opportunities arising from peace: i.e. the program will encourage actions which have a stake in peace and which actively help to promote a stable and normal society where opportunities for development can be grasped.

Objective3. Paving the way to reconciliation. i.e. the program will build an inclusive process and promote actions that will pave the way to reconciliation.

By these incentives, European Commission President Jacques Delors visited Northern Ireland in 1992 for peace. That year, with the completion of the 'Single Market', new opportunities were created for cross-border commerce and business in North-South trade.²²¹ In line with these positive events, in 1994, just after the

²¹⁸ Regional Policy-Inforegio, Operational Programme 'Northern-Ireland', 2007-2013, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details_new.cfm?gv_PAY=UK&gv_reg=520&gv_PGM=1006&LAN=7&gv_PER=2&gv_defL=7 (28.12.2008)

²¹⁹ Tannam, p.343.

²²⁰ Catherina Lynch, "Evaluating the Peace-Building Impact of Structural Funds Programmes: The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland", **Evaluation**, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007, p.10.

²²¹ EU European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on **The role of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process**, Brussels, 23 October 2008, p.8.

paramilitary ceasefires, Delors met the three Northern Ireland MEPs²²² and agreed on a new EU package. Thereby, he initiated the Peace programs.²²³ This first 'Peace' program was a special EU structural funds program and called "the European Union's Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the six Border Counties of Ireland." It emerged in 1994 as "Peace 1". It was a clear response by the EU to positive developments in the peace process and encourages progress towards a peaceful and stable society.²²⁴ The program was the product of an intensive six-week period of negotiations conducted between the Commission, Northern Irish civil service departments, political leaders, Irish civil service departments and government leaders.²²⁵ As it was noted:

*PEACE I program was allocated a total amount of €500 million by the EU for the period 1995 -1999. Some 80 percent was spent in Northern Ireland and 20 per cent in the Border Counties of Ireland (Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, and Sligo)...It was designed to focus on the areas and sections of the population most affected by the conflict... It was given wide scope for action, covering social inclusion, economic development and employment, urban and rural regeneration, and cross border co-operation...PEACE I funded over 13,000 projects across Northern Ireland. A large part of the funding was delivered through local partnerships, voluntary and community groups.*²²⁶

Peace 1 initiative, made partnership schemes between local councils in Northern Ireland for receiving aid. It also set up cross-border Commission offices to provide information on aid. This mechanism also brought about grass-roots involvement and inclusion of local communities.²²⁷ In 2000, considering the success of Peace I, Peace II followed the process. The European Council in March 1999 decided to extend the program for further five years; 2000-2004 in consideration to

²²² Cathal McCall, **Identity in Northern Ireland : Communities, Politics & Change**, Pulgrave Pub., New York, 1999, p.144.

²²³ Kaisa, p.124.

²²⁴European Union, "EU Structural Funds in Northern Ireland",
http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/about_us/office_in_northern_ireland/funding/peaceii.pdf
(28.12.2008)

²²⁵Tannam, p.343.

²²⁶ European Union, "EU Structural Funds in Northern Ireland",
http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/about_us/office_in_northern_ireland/funding/peaceii.pdf
(28.12.2008)

²²⁷ Tannam, p.346.

continuing special needs associated with the peace process. Total EU funding for Peace II for the period 2000-2004 was €531 million with around 80% of the available funds allocated to projects in Northern Ireland.²²⁸ By 2005 more than 5,300 projects have been supported by Peace II.²²⁹

In Peace II, Special EU Programs Body (SEUPB) was founded, which was responsible for administering the program and contacting European Commission on managing the program. The SEUPB also chairs the monitoring committee, which comprises members of the Irish Department of Finance, Northern Irish department of Finance and Personnel, business, voluntary sector, trade union and agricultural representatives.²³⁰ Although this coordination was enabled by the British and Irish governments, this system has reinforced the role of the European Commission in the conflict. This project was a clear example of the Commission's effectiveness by using its financial supports to increase cross-border cooperation.²³¹ In 2007, PEACE III came into operation for the period 2007-2013 with EU funding of EUR 225 million. In total the EU has contributed EUR 1.338 billion to these Programs.²³²

The specific aims of this project are to assist Northern Ireland and the border region of Ireland to address the legacy of the conflict; and to take advantage of opportunities arising from the peace process. "Economic renewal, social integration, inclusion and reconciliation, locally based regeneration and development, outward and forward-looking region, and cross-border co-operation" are the basic goals of the program.²³³

²²⁸ Jonathan Tonge, "The EU and the Irish Border: Shaping Aid and Attitudes? ", **Centre for International Borders Research (CIBR) Working Papers in Border Studies**, CIBR/WP05-1, p.11.

²²⁹ EU European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on **The role of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process**, Brussels, 23 October 2008, p.8.

²³⁰ Special EU Programmes Body- SEUPB, **Second Interim Activity Report 2002-2003**, Belfast, April 2005, p.3.

²³¹ Tannam, pp.346-47.

²³² EU European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on **The role of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process**, Brussels, 23 October 2008, p.8.

²³³ Catherina Lynch, p.9.

4.2.2.3. EU in the International Fund For Ireland (IFI)

Before the foundation of the IFI, following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985, the European Parliament passed a resolution welcoming the agreement and proposed to support the economic development by direct funds. The EU Parliament's financial support for the Agreement had two important consequences. First, it made it extremely unlikely that either Britain or Ireland would easily renounce the Agreement because of the possible cost of withdrawing IFI funds. Second, from being an internal matters which seemed not to be a business of neither Dublin nor the EC by the British Conservative Government, it was now very much the concern of both.²³⁴

A remarkable amount of the EU support was granted through the IFI which was set up by the British and Irish Governments in 1986 to promote social and economic advance and to encourage reconciliation between nationalists and unionists on the island of Ireland.²³⁵ The EU is one of the main contributors, along with the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It is a project bearing the EUR 849 million that has supported over 5,700 projects in Northern Ireland, and the border counties of Ireland for over 20 years. By 2013, EU funding to the IFI will have totaled EUR 349 million.²³⁶

4.2.3. EU's Basic Political Effects for Desecuritization

It has been within the European Parliament that the 'Europeanization' of the Northern Ireland Problem took place. In the first direct elections to the European Parliament (1979), three MEPs were elected from Northern Ireland (Ian Paisley, John Hume and John Taylor).²³⁷ These elections also paved the path for a strengthened, shared regional identity of Northern Ireland, as a part of the EU, which both

²³⁴ Paul Brennan, **Ireland: Politics and Society- Ireland, Europe and 1992**, University of Sorbonne Press, Paris, p.71.

²³⁵ Feargal Cochrane, Rosaleen Duffy, Jan Selby, **Global Governance, Conflict and Resistance**, Palgrave Pub., New York, 2003, pp.149-150.

²³⁶ International Fund For Ireland, **Fund News**, available at: <http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/publications/fundnews.pdf> (28.12.2008).

²³⁷ These figures are prevalent political leaders of theParties in Northern Ireland Politics

Nationalists and Unionist politicians could claim to represent.²³⁸ However, these politicians generally define themselves as regional representatives, defending regional interests and maximizing the flow of EU funds to the region.²³⁹

This engagement into European politics also transformed the current conflict from national fronts to a supranational level. As long as the EU projects increased in number, a deeper interest occurred in Northern Ireland among the Commission officials and the other EU member states. The designation of the Commission officials to administer Peace was the sign of a concentrated approach to cross-border cooperation and to Northern Ireland. Throughout the years, the case of Northern Ireland has not been remained simply as ‘member state’ issues, but as issues of relevance to the European ‘project’ and as issues to which the Commission should pay attention.²⁴⁰

This identity succeeded in bringing conflicting parties together. The Anglo-Irish rapprochement was created through the efforts of the EU in the peace process. For example, the Haagerup Report emphasized the role of the EU in supporting an ‘Irish–British understanding’. This harmony led to an expression of the ‘determination of both governments to develop close cooperation as partners in the European Community’. This phrase has gradually become popular in all occasions, including the 1993 Downing Street Declaration and the 1995 Framework Documents and the intergovernmental agreement incorporated in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The value of joint EU membership in forging relations between the two governments over Northern Ireland has gained a key role and it transformed the EU as a framework for British–Irish cooperation at the heart of the peace process. The harmonious relations between London and Dublin, as two European Union capitals, brought also the need for new institutions to be established for the conflict resolution

²³⁸ P. Hainsworth, “Business as Usual: The European Election in Northern Ireland”, in P. Hainsworth (ed.), **Breaking and Preserving the Mould: The Third Direct Elections to the European Parliament (1989) – The Irish Republic and Northern Ireland**, Policy Research Institute, Belfast, 1992, pp.143-61.

²³⁹ P. Murray, “The European Parliament and the Irish Dimension”, in (ed.) Paul Hainsworth, **Breaking and Preserving the Mould: The Third Direct Elections to the European Parliament (1989) : the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland**, Policy Research Institute, Coleraine-Northern Ireland, 1992, pp.342-47.

²⁴⁰ Tannam, p.3453.

in Northern Ireland. As a consequence of the combined efforts of political parties, local authorities, chamber of commerce and other special interest groups; foundation of the Northern Ireland Centre was created in Europe in 1991.²⁴¹ This kind of institutionalization supported by the EU also created various effective negotiation platforms.

The European Union also served the peace process by bringing common issues to be discussed on the EU axis between the contradicting parties. For example, as required by the Belfast Agreement, the North/South Ministerial Council brings together the executive responsibilities from Northern Ireland and the Irish government to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island. This mechanism also bears the consideration of the EU affairs and relevant matters including the EU policies and programs.²⁴² Membership of the EU, its rules and policies have facilitated commercial and other co-operation between the North and South by removing barriers. For instance, under the impact of the Single European Market, the North-South trade has increased comparatively rapidly, as has economic interpenetration, particularly in the form of larger southern companies buying into northern enterprises.²⁴³ By the help of development and rapprochements in various sectors, in time, the exaggerated concepts of national identity, which inflame the problem may be softened by a common European sense of identity, and improve the status of peace brought about by the 1998 Belfast Agreement.²⁴⁴

The standardization policies of the European Union also have helped mitigate the tension in Northern Ireland. The basic factor, promoted by the IRA to gain support from Catholics, was the disadvantaged positions in their conditions, such as employment. Thanks to the EU fair employment directives, a 50 to 50 recruitment strategy was introduced whereby one Catholic and one Protestant applicant are selected from a pool of suitably qualified candidates in Northern Ireland.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Kennedy, p 13.

²⁴² Simon Bulmer, **British Devolution and European Policy-Making: Transforming Britain into Multi-level Governance**, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, Gordonsville, 2003, p.198.

²⁴³ Kennedy, p 9.

²⁴⁴ Kennedy, p 167.

²⁴⁵ Graham Ellison, "A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World?: Police Reform, Political Transition, and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland", **Police Quarterly**, Vol.10, No.3, Sep. 2007, p.251.

Similarly, 'Equity' considerations were first introduced into the public policy domain in Northern Ireland in 1991 in the form of a program called 'Targeting Social Need'. This policy aimed at improving social and economic conditions by targeting resources on Northern Ireland's most disadvantaged areas and people, with the objective of reducing the discrepancy between Catholics and Protestants.²⁴⁶

These efforts of the EU have also penetrated the population dynamics of the conflict. Through the help of openings, the peace process has taken the form of a bottom-up process, and has secured the support of the population. Hancock argues that since 1970s, a large number of community conflict resolution oriented activities have taken place, largely run by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and quasi-autonomous NGOs and groups in the region. These activities have included behind the scenes talks with various parties, community reconciliation activities, youth-oriented and sports activities, environmental activities and ecumenical activities. Each has a positive role in reaching of the Good Friday Agreement. They created a base for the political process and prepared communities to begin living together in peace.²⁴⁷ Pace agrees with this impact, and notes that the EU's role was found to be more positive when the EU managed to empower political and wider civil society actors interested and willing to promote cooperation across conflicting parties. The EU's impact was strongest when it supported local and grassroots organizations. The EU successfully maximizes the conflict parties' cooperation efforts and civil society development, facilitated new partnerships between organizations on both sides of the border. Further, Pace highlights the political significance of this European solidarity towards areas of greatest tension within the EU by analyzing Northern Ireland.²⁴⁸

This process was followed by a new political culture. After centuries of confrontations and conflict, political mediation had to begin by establishing connections between the parties involved, and by introducing a new culture of

²⁴⁶ Ruth Fee, "Contract Compliance: Subnational and European Influences in Northern Ireland", **Journal of European Social Policy**, 2002; p.114.

²⁴⁷ Landon E. Hancock, The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom, **International Studies Review**, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 2008, pp.195-96.

²⁴⁸ Pace, p.278.

political dialogue.²⁴⁹ This dialogue helped inevitably in decommissioning of weapons and using non-violent political tools. It is worth mentioning that the funding power of the Commission has been used as ‘an instrumental carrot’ in Northern Ireland.²⁵⁰ Northern Ireland Conflict has been a clear observation, as the European Union envisaged, in which the cooperation superseded the costs of the conflict.

These incentives paved the way for various changes in the political parties in the Northern Ireland. The EU’s involvement in the problem apparently facilitated the strategy of closer cooperation of Irish and British states, and also strengthened the moderate political ground for the largest political parties in Northern Ireland for new power-sharing arrangements in the future. Aided by an array of external and internal forces, and supported by ceasefires, this peace process was carried out through joint declarations and multiparty talks to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The European Council’s declaration welcoming this agreement also proves the significance attached by the EU to political parties:

The European Council welcomes devolution to Northern Ireland and the establishment of the British-Irish and North-South institutions under the Good Friday Agreement, recognizing that these developments represent very significant progress towards full implementation of the Agreement. The European Council congratulates the political parties, the United Kingdom and the Irish Governments and Senator George Mitchell on achieving this progress. The European Council reaffirms its political and practical support for Northern Ireland and for cooperation between North and South”²⁵¹

Sinn Fein in particular has been one of major actors as a political party in this peace process. Despite its initial rigid “nationalist” discourse, Sinn Fein has engaged into more compromising policy with the effect of the EU. The Party program, published in 1971, was favoring a strong Irish national state which would distance itself from the ‘rich men’s club of former colonial powers in the EC.’ In 1984, the party manifested the “One Ireland, One People, and the Only Alternative” and noted

²⁴⁹ For details: Robert L. McCartney, **Manifesto Europe '99**, Published by UK Unionists, 1999.

²⁵⁰ Katy Haward, “Defusing the Conflict in Northern Ireland”, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, 2 January 1999, p.18. Available at:
<http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/files/NIWorkingPaper.pdf> (28.12.2008)

²⁵¹ Helsinki Conclusions, Section VI Northern Ireland, 1999, Nr. 72,
<http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Council-Presidency%20conclusions.pdf> (28.12.2008)

the EU as an entity which acted for the interests of the larger EU states at the expense of Ireland. By these motives, furthermore, in 1992, it opposed the Maastricht Treaty and campaigned for ‘no’ in the related referendum.²⁵²

After the referendum and the confirmation of the treaty, however, Sinn Fein felt itself bound to recognize the effects of the EU and to create policies within the EU. It began to adapt itself to the new era and combined the conflict with the European integration. In 1992, the Party President argued that involvement of the British government in Ireland is a European issue. By the same token, in 1993, Sinn Fein demanded an enhanced EU role in the conflict. Then the party announced that it would establish an office in Brussels.²⁵³ The party was committed to the creation of a sovereign independent all-Ireland state which would define its own relationship with the EU. During the early 1990s, the party began to argue that the EU opened up new political opportunities as well as threats, and started to demand from the EU to step forward for the political legitimacy for the republican cause of ‘united Ireland’.²⁵⁴ The party believed that the EU integration would encourage the British withdrawal from Ireland and would increase the North-South economic and social integration in congruence with the embedded Republican aim of uniting the Ireland.²⁵⁵ Regardless with Sinn Fein’s EU vision, it contributed to the peace process thanks to significance attached by the EU to the political parties. Adams-Hume’s conversations and the participation of the Sinn Fein to the peace talks in the 1990s gave impetus to the peace and had a direct effect on the IRA in decommissioning of weapons.

4.3. THE EU’S ROLE IN TURKISH CASE

Turkey applied for the membership at the end of the 1950s and signed an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (today’s EU) in 1963. However, this application has become a sui generis road for the EU membership. Unlike other applicants, long years after, it was only in 1999 the

²⁵² Goodman, p.216

²⁵³ Guardian, 7 December 1993.

²⁵⁴ Goodman,p.221

²⁵⁵ Mitchell Mclaughlin, “Northern Chair of Sinn Fein”, Guardian, 5 April 1993. and see also Sinn Fein, **European Election Manifesto: Peace in Ireland**, A European Issue, Belfast, 1994.

Helsinki summit that Turkey was formally granted the status of candidate country.²⁵⁶ Additionally, it was 2005 that the EU opened accession negotiations. During this long process from 1960s to 2000s, terrorism in Turkey was perceived differently by the European Union in comparison to the Turkish point of view. Interestingly, the PKK was accepted as a separatist terrorist organization only in the 2000s by the EU institutions. From the EU's point of view, separatist terrorism in Turkey seemed to be the sum of various factors resulting from lack of democratic consolidation, including socio-economic underdevelopment of intensively Kurdish-populated regions of Turkey, the non-recognition of Kurds as a minority group, human rights violations, legal but unlawful restrictions on cultural rights.²⁵⁷ For EU, Turkey should make progress in these realms without any security concerns, despite the fact that PKK has similar demands. Under the PKK terrorist threat, it is likely to take time for Turkey to step forward and desecuritize its Kurdish Question.

Gunther evaluates the efforts of the Union as helping solve the problem within the confines of Turkey's territorial integrity and transforming Turkey into a healthy democracy that will benefit all of its citizens.²⁵⁸ However, considering the several deeply-rooted democracies which have been facing terrorism in the world, EU's causality between the democratic failures and the emerge of separatist terrorism, is lack of confirmation. As Mesut Yilmaz did, while serving as Turkey's Prime Minister, Mr. Yilmaz and the other Turkish officials, have responded to this perception by arguing that the EU "romanticizes" the problem by turning terrorists into "freedom fighters struggling for their self-determination."²⁵⁹ The European Parliament on the one hand and the Commission on the other both seem to have exerted their efforts from this romanticized point of view. Their policy show itself as various obligations, warnings, and stipulations for the matter involved. For the EU, separatist terrorism in Turkey evolves around its standardization policies and

²⁵⁶ Ertan Beşe, **Terörizm, Avrupa Birliği ve İnsan Hakları**, Seçkin Yay., Ankara, 2002, pp.217-18.

²⁵⁷ Quoted from the EU Regular Progress Reports on Turkey from 1998 to 2008.

²⁵⁸ Michael M. Gunter, Turkey's Floundering Eu Candidacy And Its Kurdish Problem, **Middle East Policy**, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 2007, p.122.

²⁵⁹ Amikam Nachmani, **Facing a New Millenium : Coping with Intertwined Conflicts**. Manchester, , GBR: Manchester University Press, 2003, p 50.

obligations for democratization, which are generally held in the Progress Reports of Commission and conferences and opinions made by the Parliament.²⁶⁰

According to the Association Agreement, the European Economic Community was nothing more than an economic institution for Turkey. The Agreement was limited to trade and financial matters.²⁶¹ However, next decades faced expanded goals for the European integration. The enlargement in the 1980s, which was shaped by the accession of Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, however, reflected a major shift and prioritized the political matters over economic ones. The Community introduced additional criteria for membership such as adherence to the rule of law, democratic principles and respect for human rights by highlighting shared norms and values.²⁶² In 1989, the EC rejected Turkey's membership for several economic, social and political reasons.²⁶³ Instead, the EC Commission proposed the implementation of a comprehensive package called as "Matutes Package" consisted of economic, trade and political measures which were planned to improve the EC-Turkey relations.²⁶⁴ Subsequently, in the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, political requirements came to the front and became fixed requirements for future members. This summit was a well-known meeting and became known as the source of the "Copenhagen Criteria". This meeting became a milestone in Turkey's application process. These political criteria, especially by noting Turkey's human rights implementations which the EU directly tied to its

²⁶⁰ For several EU documents, see: Beşe, pp.217-47.

²⁶¹ F. Stephan Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, **Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty**, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 2002, p.46.; See also, Dışişleri Bakanlığı, **Türkiye ile Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Arasında bir Ortaklık Yaratın Anlaşma (Ankara Anlaşması)**, 12 Eylül 1963. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ile-avrupa-ekonomik-toplulugu-arasinda-bir-ortaklik-yaratan-anlasma_ankara-anlasmasi_-12-eylul-1963-tr.mfa (28.12.2008)

²⁶² Ignacio Sanchez Cuenca, "The political basis of support for European integration", **European Union Politics**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2000, pp.147-171; Sevilay Elgün Kahraman, "Rethinking Turkey-European Relations in the Light of Enlargement", **Turkish Studies**, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2000, p.5.

²⁶³ Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community [SEC (89) 2290 fin./2], Brussels, December 20, 1989. For a detailed discussion of Turkish and EC considerations regarding Turkey's application, see Heinz Kramer, "Turkey and the European Union: A Multi-Dimensional Relationship," in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, eds., **Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power**, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 203- 232.

²⁶⁴ Harun Arıkan, **Turkey and the EU: Awkward Candidate for EU Membership**, Ashgate Pub, London, 2003, pp.66-67.

actions against the PKK terrorism and separatist political parties in Turkey, play a role in desecuritizing the Kurdish Question in Turkey.

Subsequently, the European Commission's 1995 White Paper underlined the Copenhagen conditions, like the Agenda 2000. In both documents, issues related to Kurds in Turkey emerged as a serious obstacle to the EU-Turkish relations.²⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the treatment of Kurds in Turkey attracted great concern from the EU when the Commission began to present its country specific reports on enlargement in 1998.²⁶⁶ Kelly notes that unresolved problems regarding Kurds in Turkey with its human rights component became a convenient argument for the Europeans to reject Turkish Candidacy for accession.²⁶⁷ Although, Turkey's economic qualifications were better than many of the Central and East European states, due to these political requirements, particularly regarding human rights, Turkey could not become an EU member like the later applying East European candidates²⁶⁸ It will take time for Turkey to meet these political criteria, starting with several political reforms undertaken after the capture of the PKK leader-Ocalan and the observed serious decline terrorist violence. After that basic reform and harmonization packages put into effect for adapting EU standards. In the meanwhile, Turkey was granted the status of candidate country at the EU's Helsinki summit in 1999. In 2002, European Council committed the EU to opening accession negotiations in 2005 after Turkey's fulfillment of political criteria by 2004.²⁶⁹

Certain EU requests, such as education in Kurdish and formal uses of Kurdish language have created a lot of debate in Turkey. Turkish state officials have been reluctant to accept such EU conditions under terrorist and separatist demands. As long as the PKK terrorism has come to be no more a serious threat for the survival of the Turkish State, governments have undertaken several reform packages to adapt

²⁶⁵ Vera Eccarius Kelly, "From Terrorism to Political Activism in Europe: The Transformation of the Kurdish Diaspora to a Transnational Challenger Community", Dissertation submitted to Te Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, April, 2002, p.164

²⁶⁶ European Commission, **Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union**, Brussels, European Commission Pub., 16 July 1997.

²⁶⁷ Kelly, p.165.

²⁶⁸ Larrabee, p 51-52.

²⁶⁹ Chris Rumford, "Resisting Globalization: Turkey-EU Relations and Human and Political Rights in the Context of Cosmopolitan Democratization", **International Sociology**, 2003, p.380

EU obligations regarding the Kurds living in Turkey, which also means the desecuritization of the issue.

4.3.1. The Main Policy-line of the EU

EU's conceptualization of the problem in Turkey seems to be a combination of separatist terrorism and human rights. For EU, however, it seems mostly a problem of underdevelopment of Turkish democracy under the quotation of 'Kurdish Problem'. According to the EU, further democratization through giving Kurds cultural rights is the best solution to the problem. Unlike in the British case, EU's efforts consist of mostly political provisions, without any credible economic support to Turkey to improve the socio-economic conditions of the regions suffered from separatist terrorism. EU seems to neglect the terrorist aspects of the problem and demand rapid reforms as a consequence of desecuritization.

"The Resolution on the arrest of Mr.Ocalan and the need for a political solution to the Kurdish question", and held in 25 Feb.1999, is a reflection of this policy which stresses out the basic differences between Turkish state and the EU in coping with the issue. As the EU Parliament publishes, this document is not totally a resolution on the capture of a terrorist leader but also a resolution on Kurdish question. The motive that brings together the problem of the PKK and the alleged 'Kurdish Problem' is the EU's belief that the lack of democratic consolidation in Turkey is the main underlying reason behind separatism in Turkey. However, it is noteworthy that the Kurdish question has involved not only a growing Kurdish ethnic assertiveness in the form of an identity politics which calls for the recognition of difference, but also in the form of a campaign of violence and terrorist activity by the PKK to achieve its objective of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, especially in 1990s.²⁷⁰

²⁷⁰ Fuat Keyman, "Articulating Citizenship and Identity: The "Kurdish Question" in Turkey" In E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu (Eds.) **Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences**. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2005, p.268.

This resolution begins with the regret that the EU and its Member States were unable to reach a common position on the Ocalan case. Indeed, it was mostly two European Union states, Greece and Italy which exerted efforts to harbor Ocalan and not to extradite him to Turkey. Also, in his attempts to find a political asylum as a terrorist leader in 1998 and 1999, Ocalan enjoyed support from various leftist political parties along with the implicit support of the Government officials in Italy, France and Greece.²⁷¹ After condemning the terrorist actions of the PKK, the resolution sought to establish a link between the PKK terrorism and the Turkish state's policies on Kurds in Turkey. It calls on the Turkish authorities to show their commitment to a political solution to the Kurdish question. The resolution emphasizes the recognition and guarantees of the rights of the Kurds (civil, political, educational and cultural) in Turkey along with the economic and social development of the region. It also urges Turkish authorities to allow the free participation of all existing democratic political parties in the coming elections. It particularly noted the HADEP, and expressed its demand to stop the harassment and imprisonment of party's leaders and activists, although these so-called members were judged for linking with the PKK terrorism.²⁷²

Especially during the 1990s, those engaging in terrorist activities have sought refuge in Europe. Realizing that success in Turkey will be limited; the PKK assumed the goal to create a Kurdish Diaspora in rich European countries and began moving masses of people to these countries. Those who arrived through illegal means were extended economic and legal assistance. By this way, the PKK formed its base of support in EU countries.²⁷³ The PKK sympathizers in the EU countries became effective in relations between the EU and Turkey. However, they were not able to

²⁷¹ Michael Radu, p.544; Ümit Cizre, Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Borders, Identity, and Hegemony", in **Rightsizing the State**, eds. Ian Lustick, Brendan O'leary and Thomas Callaghy, Oxford Univeristy Press, England, 2001, p.247.

²⁷² European Parliament, **Resolution on the arrest of Mr. Ocalan and the need for a political solution to the Kurdish question**, B4-0223/99, 25 Feb. 1999.

²⁷³ Sedat Laçiner, Mehmet Özcan, İhsan Bal, **European Union With Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union**, Publication of International Strategic Research Organization(ISRO), Ankara, 2005, p.79

affect the Council of European Union; it seems that they had an impact on European Parliament and partly on European Commission.²⁷⁴

The Turkish bid for EU membership paved the way for the conclusion that the Kurdish issue is not only an important domestic matter but also a crucial issue in the EU accession process of Turkey.²⁷⁵ Turkey's disputed performance in human rights has been a great concern for the EU. The EU reports on Turkey confirm the centrality of this issue in the accession process. In its 1998 Regular Report on Turkey, the European Commission stated that a civil, non-military solution is necessary to solve the problem.²⁷⁶ It also argues that, the Kurdish issue is so important in EU-Turkey relations, and Turkey's future EU membership depends on the solution of this problem.²⁷⁷

The problem in Turkey, with no doubt, is the reflection of an assault on democracy perpetuated by the PKK terrorism and the related political support, which come from separatist political parties (as called by the EU-Pro-Kurdish parties). The ongoing PKK terrorism still carries the risk to prevent further democratic openings and new arrangements in Turkey as regardless of the fact that whether they are certain steps toward the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, which means desecuritization of the issue. However, the initial cultural demands of the PKK in 1970s and the recent obligations came from the EU institutions have coincided. Such being the case, cultural rights become likely to be security affairs. Nevertheless, the EU aims to overcome this conflict-ridden issue by political guidance. The EU is still working on to consolidate basic cultural rights of the Kurds in Turkey, in an assumption that it will contribute to the eradication of the separatist terrorism in the country.

²⁷⁴ S. Amer Latif, "An Analytical Study of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) as an Insurgent Movement", Dissertation, Catholic University of America, Washington, 1999, pp.230-231.

²⁷⁵ Ergil, p.123.

²⁷⁶ European Commission, Progress Report on Turkey, 1998, p.20

²⁷⁷ Zeki Sarıgil, **Endogenizing Institutions**, Dissertation submitted to Pittsburg University, 2007 p.166.

4.3.2. Copenhagen Criteria

Copenhagen Criteria is the milestone of the desecuritization movement in Turkish Case. Series of issues carrying security concerns turn into political reforms, put forward as obligations for the EU membership of Turkish State. In this period, for instance role of the military in the country, high security emergency provisions became issues of political negotiations rather than being security issues.

At the Helsinki Summit of 10-11 December 1999, the European Union declared Turkey "a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states."²⁷⁸ This summit brought the "Copenhagen Criteria" to the literature and according to the political conditions of which, a candidate country should have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities.²⁷⁹ On this basis, the EU asked the Turkish government to reform its legal system and to solve the Kurdish problem by peaceful means. Gunther Verheugen, the European Commissioner responsible for enlargement at the time, said on one of his visits to Ankara that the Kurdish issue was the crucial part of the Accession Partnership Document that was being prepared to delineate the necessary steps for Turkey's admission into the EU.²⁸⁰ These criteria were reflected in domestic politics with the words of attending Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz: "The road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir".²⁸¹ Subsequent to the Accession Partnership Document, Turkish Parliament undertook a National Action Plan and thereafter eight harmonization reform packages to meet these criteria.²⁸² These consistent and continuous reform efforts of Turkey

²⁷⁸ Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, <http://presidency.finland.fi/doc/summit/summit.html>. (26.12.2008)

²⁷⁹ Metin Heper, "Political Culture as a Dimension of Compatibility", in **Turkey and the West**, ed. Metin Heper, Heinz Kramer, and A. Öncü, London, I.B.Tauris, 1993, p.4.

²⁸⁰ Milliyet, 22 March 2000.

²⁸¹ Diyarbakir is the largest city in the South-East Turkey and mostly Kurdish populated. For the phrase, see: Turkish Daily News (Ankara), 17 December 1999.

²⁸² Between February 2002 and July 2004, Turkey initiated 8 harmonization packages. See: TBMM, **TBMM'nin Kurumsal Kapasitesinin Güçlendirilmesi AB Eleştirme Projesi Avrupa Parlamentosu Çalışma Ziyareti**, 8-11 April 2008, Brussels, p.23.

culminated also directly in the EU decision to open accession talks with Turkey in October 2005.²⁸³

The main obstacles to Turkey's EU membership are in the field of democratization and human rights. Recent EU evaluations of Turkey's prospects for membership have consistently stressed out the shortcomings in Turkey's human rights record.²⁸⁴ In response, the National Action Program presented by the Turkish government in March 2001 aimed to tackle down this obstacle by meeting the requirements of Copenhagen criteria. The program also noted that the treatment of minorities, including Kurds in Turkey, the role of the military, Cyprus, and relations with Greece were among the most critical areas where changes were needed.²⁸⁵ Since then, Turkey has taken a number of steps to address the EU concerns. In October 2001, the Turkish parliament passed a series of reforms that significantly eased restrictions on human rights.²⁸⁶

As a result, eight legislative packages were adopted by Turkish Parliament in the 2002-2004 period. Through these reforms, Turkey has announced its commitment to human rights in international conventions and rulings. The packages also helped shifting various issues from emergency mode the political sphere. Turkish politics signaled for a desecuritization in various realms including the Kurdish Problem. As a result, list of improvements occurred for the matter involved: Civil-military relations were adjusted to meet the European standards. Important changes were made to the judicial system, including the abolition of the State Security Courts. Freedom of expression extended. The easy punishments for criticism against the military, the state, the parliamentary system, the government, the legal system, or Turkish identity were abolished. Laws and rules related to the freedom of gathering, assembly, and demonstration were adapted to the EU laws. Civil society has gained impetus. Television broadcasting in languages other than

²⁸³ For all impacts of reforms, see: B.Rubin and A. Çarkoglu (eds.), **Turkey and The European Union**, London: Frank Cass, 2003; M. Uğur and N. Canefe (eds.), **Turkey and European Integration: Accession prospects and issues**, London, Routledge, 2004.

²⁸⁴ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2002.

²⁸⁵ "EU tells Turkey to do more," Turkish Daily News, March 27, 2001.

²⁸⁶ Leyla Boulton, "Turkey Approves Reforms to Ease Curbs on Human Rights," Financial Times, September 24, 2001.

Turkish was made legal. Private schools became able to use languages other than Turkish. The state of emergency has been lifted everywhere despite the ongoing PKK terrorist threat.²⁸⁷

4.3.3. EU's Basic Political Effects for Desecuritization

As mentioned above, the EU relates separatism and the related PKK terrorism with lack of cultural rights, and undemocratic implementations in Turkey. This is the assumption of the EU on which it designed its perspective through several Commission and Parliament's documents and declarations. It follows from the analyses on the progress reports, related reports on Turkey that the EU interconnected the separatist PKK terrorism and the separatist party politics directly with the living conditions of Kurds in Turkey. The most related complaints about these cultural rights concern the use of Kurdish in broadcasting, publishing, education and in public services. Meanwhile, the lack of minority status of Kurds, short living of Pro-Kurdish Parties (in European Union terms) are the following deficiencies of these political and cultural rights, as EU claims. The other elements which Copenhagen criteria brought such as balanced civil military relations, consolidated human rights are also correlated to the issue but seem to be complementary to what the EU implies with the cultural rights.

A regular progress report of Turkey was prepared by the European Commission in 1998. The report brought up various issues about the separatist terrorism in Turkey. The traditional rhetoric of the EU, 'Kurdish Problem' starts with the criticism of non-recognition of Kurds as a minority:

*In Turkey there is a de jure and de facto difference in the treatment accorded to the minorities officially recognize under the Lausanne Treaty and those outside its scope. The Turkish authorities do not recognize the existence of a Kurdish minority, considering them to be simply Turks of Kurdish origin...A civil solution could include recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism.*²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷ Nachmani, pp. 246-7; BBC News, 3 August 2002; available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2170331.stm (28.12.2008)

²⁸⁸ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 1998, p.20.

What EU does not seem to recognize, however, is the fact that accepting Kurds as a minority would mean the destruction of the foundational principles of the Republic. Unity and indivisibility of the Turkish state within its territory, and its people also encapsulate the Kurds in Turkey and avoids any discrimination under the Turkish citizenship. This principle has been stressed frequently in the political party proscription cases, and relates to the definition of minority status in Turkey.

Minority status was only given to the basic Non-Muslim populations in Turkey. Only those groups are recognized as minorities in Turkey according to the Lausanne Treaty provisions which are Armenian Christians, Orthodox Greeks, and Jews.²⁸⁹ Considering the foundational principles of the Turkish regime and the Constitution, it is impossible to extend minority status to any part of Turkish Muslim population, which included also Kurds in the country. By the same bases, Turkey has accepted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's Copenhagen Document of 1990, which addresses the minority rights, and the Framework Convention on Minorities, and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, with a reservation that preserves the conditions in Lausanne Treaty.²⁹⁰

The EU has complained about this lack of minority status given to Kurds in different occasions. In November 2006, Hans Jorg Kretschmer, the outgoing head of the EU Commission in Ankara called on Turkey to recognize the identity of the Kurds and supported the notion of *Turkiyeli* [of Turkey] as a replacement for the term "Turk." He also declared: "It is necessary to recognize the identity of the Kurds, to recognize that Kurds are Kurds, and Kurds are not Turks."²⁹¹ According to the EU, Kurdish cultural rights as minority rights are not being respected sufficiently yet. However, after 2000s, the EU began to call Turkish authorities to recognize Kurds as a minority on the basis Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities which Turkey did not sign.²⁹²

²⁸⁹ Heinz Kramer, **Changing Turkey : Challenges to Europe & the United States**, Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. p 40.

²⁹⁰ Aslan Gündüz, "Human Rights and Turkey's Future in Europe" **Orbis**, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 24-25.

²⁹¹ Gunter, "Turkey's Floundering EU Candidacy", p.121.

²⁹² European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2002, p.26.

This policy of the EU asserts that exercising of cultural rights are a part of protection of minorities. Basically, this perspective highlights the right of using Kurdish in broadcasting, language education and in daily speech.²⁹³ In 1983, the military regime banned the use of the Kurdish language. This ban was lifted in 1991. As a result, the use of Kurdish in everyday conversation was allowed but the ban on the use of Kurdish in the media, namely in publication and broadcasting and education or in the public realms remained throughout the 1990s.²⁹⁴ Various publications were banned or confiscated and several authors and publishers were sentenced to prison in these periods.²⁹⁵ In the 2002 progress report, it is underlined that Mr. Sülhattin Önen, a minibus driver in Diyarbakır, was indicted for listening to a cassette of Kurdish music. He was charged under 169 of the Turkish Penal Code (“support for a terrorist organization”) and was given a suspended sentence for 45 months.²⁹⁶

In 2001, the reform package was accepted to change 34 articles of the constitution. Baskin Oran notes that the changes improved freedom of thought and speech as well as organization of political parties in Turkey. In addition to the constitutional amendments in 2004, seven EU Harmonization packages improved the level of democracy in Turkey. Especially the second package in 2002 lifted the ban on publishing in Kurdish and made education and broadcasting in Kurdish legal²⁹⁷ after the years that EU criticized the situation as “For instance, TV broadcasting in Kurdish, while apparently tolerated for non-political programs, is still officially not allowed.”²⁹⁸ 2004 Regular Report documented that several Kurdish language schools opened in the Southeast of Turkey. Broadcasting in Kurdish have started on a restricted scale. The report emphasizes that there has been greater tolerance for the expression of Kurdish culture in its different forms.²⁹⁹ However, In 2005, the EU was criticizing Turkey that the exercise of cultural rights is still precarious. No local

²⁹³ For the similar cases according to linguistic rights in several European democracies, see: Pulat Y. Tacar, **Terör ve Demokrasi**, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1999, pp.184-88.

²⁹⁴ Michael Gunter, **The Kurds and the Future of Turkey**, New York. Sn. Martin’s Press, 1997, p.62.

²⁹⁵ Zeki Sarıgil, p.179.

²⁹⁶ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2002, p.45.

²⁹⁷ Karl Vick, “Turkey Passes Rights Reforms in Bid for EU,” The Washington Post, August 4, 2002.

²⁹⁸ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 1999, p.14.

²⁹⁹ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2004, p55.

broadcasting in Kurdish has yet been authorized, Kurdish language courses have closed down and politicians continue to be convicted for using the Kurdish language in certain contexts.³⁰⁰ In 2006, the EU highlights that with the closedown of Kurdish private courses, there are no possibilities to learn Kurdish in the public or private schooling system. Furthermore, there are no measures taken to facilitate access to public services for those who do not speak Turkish.³⁰¹

In 2004, the first broadcasts in Bosnian, Arabic, Circasian and Kurdish were aired on radio and television by state broadcasting corporation TRT in 2004. In regard to the Progress Report in 2007, broadcasting in languages other than Turkish has been widening and indicates that there are four local radio and TV stations broadcasting in Kurdish.³⁰²

In parallel to the developments in cultural rights, the EU has envisaged a stable democracy through sustained political parties. In this line, the EU has proposed several amendments in Turkish Constitution and the Law on political parties for the smooth exercise of party politics in the country. However, the linguistic restrictions spilled over the political parties, particularly the separatist ones, in Turkey. Due to the restriction on the use of languages other than Turkish by political parties has been heavily criticized by the EU, In October 2005, a court sentenced DEHAP deputy leader Reşit Yardımcı to six months imprisonment for greeting a DEHAP conference in Kurdish in 2003.³⁰³ Also, several investigations and court cases have been opened against officials and executives of the Democratic Society Party (DTP) for breaking the Political Parties Law which forbids the use of languages other than Turkish by political parties. (Article 81/c)³⁰⁴

³⁰⁰ Commission Of the European Communities, **2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper**, Brussels, 9.11.2005.

³⁰¹ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey , 2006, p.21.

³⁰² European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2007, p.22.

³⁰³ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2005, p.38.

³⁰⁴ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2007, p.22.

About political parties, in line with the EU's obligations, Turkey first has tried to make the party proscriptions more difficult. Despite the fact that the grounds for political party bans remained same, party proscriptions have become more difficult. Dissolution of political parties are bounded to set of principles, new punishments are initiated such as the deprivation of state financial support. These new arrangements first benefited the separatist political parties and its members which have been complaining about the strict conditions they face. For instance, 2001 Progress Report notes that HADEP political party frequently faces difficulties from the authorities, including police investigations.³⁰⁵

Sanctions on political parties become possible only when these actions committed by members are endorsed by the party as a whole.³⁰⁶ The offence should be the 'party policy' not an individual one. However, this new arrangement remarked the party proscriptions in the past such as HEP which was mostly dissolved as a result of the individual declarations of party members.³⁰⁷ Under the new law introduced in 2002, Constitutional Court may decide to deprive a political party of financial assistance, rather than dissolving it.³⁰⁸ In 2003, party proscriptions became more difficult. Following an amendments in Political Parties Law, party proscriptions were made possible only if the case is filed for "reasons stipulated in the Constitution".

Alternative punishments besides party proscriptions have not been totally valid for all parties. For example, in 2003, these methods were not applied to separatist political party-HADEP. They were not applicable because it did not reach the 10 % threshold and gained financial assistance from the state. That's why it is totally proscribed. It was banned on the basis of 169 Article of the Penal Code and 46 members of the party were prevented from engaging in political activities for a period of five years.³⁰⁹ Following the political party proscription cases of the AKP

³⁰⁵ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2001, p.29.

³⁰⁶ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2001, p.26.

³⁰⁷ Constitutional Court, HEP Party Dissolution Case, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/KARARLAR/SPK/K1993/K1993-01.htm> (28.12.2008)

³⁰⁸ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2002, p.37.

³⁰⁹ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2003, p.33.

and the DTP in 2008, EU states that legal provisions on political parties need to be amended in line with the best practices in EU member states, as outline by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission. This is a priority of the Accession Partnership.³¹⁰ This Commission issued a resolution entitled as "Guidelines on Prohibition and dissolution Of Political Parties and Analogous Measures". The provisions of it were not far away from the ones in party proscription cases in Turkey. For example, it notes that:

*Prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties may only be justified in the case of parties which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby abolishing the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. The fact alone that a party advocates a peaceful change of the Constitution should not be sufficient for its prohibition or dissolution.*³¹¹

In this relation, Ergun Ozbudun clarifies that the European norms on party closure are clear. The justifications for party closure and banning are limited to use of violence and reliance on violent means, promotion of violence and seeking to undermine fundamental democratic principles.³¹² On the other hand, this report stresses out the significance of the committing the offence as a policy of the party. It manifests that for dissolution, not only individual party members; party itself should pursue political objectives by using unconstitutional means. Such being the case, in consideration to the proscription cases in Turkey which are full of individual offences, EU criticized the situation in Turkey and call for the adaptation of this resolution.³¹³

As a result, in desecuritizing the conflicts, the EU implements distinct policies towards the UK and Turkey. Turkey's bid for the EU membership paves way for a series of obligations for Turkey embedded in the "Progress Reports" as democratic openings. On the other hand, the membership of the UK in 1973 with the

³¹⁰ European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey, 2008, p.18.

³¹¹ Council of Europe, Venice Commission, **Guidelines On Prohibition and dissolution Of Political Parties And Analogous Measures**, 9 December 1999, p.3.

³¹² Ergun Özbudun, "European Criteria For Party Closure", Today's Zaman <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=140834> (28.12.2008)

³¹³ Council of Europe, p.3.

neighboring Republic of Ireland has also assisted the period of mitigation of Northern Ireland Problem by various methods ranging from political support to economic packages.

In Northern Ireland conflict, the EU seems to be a successful catalyst and an efficient desecuritizing external factor. Northern Ireland Problem, without any doubt, is the reflection of an assault on democracy perpetuated by the IRA terrorism and the related political support come from a separatist political party, Sinn Fein. Starting with the decommissioning of weapons, EU has gradually managed to abolish the separatist plans by facilitating cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and the UK. It also has served economic and political assistance in order to provide better and equal living conditions to Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. As a consequence of this desecuritization process, Sinn Fein has survived as an active party and contributed to the peace process.

In Turkish case, EU seems to have limited impact on desecuritization of the conflict involved. In addition, regarding the EU's impact on Turkish politics, the European integration seems to provide both inspiration and model for solutions to internal problems as well.³¹⁴ EU quoted the case in Turkey as "Kurdish Problem" and basically evaluates it as a problem of underdemocratization. In Northern Ireland Case, in desecuriting the conflict, EU has engaged in efforts to eliminate directly the threat of separatist projects and terrorism. However, in Turkish case, EU seems to neglect the heavy bill of PKK terrorism and has no direct effect on decommissioning of PKK weapons. Also, it seems to propose for Turkey internal reforms to overcome the separatist demands by EU assumption that 'The more Turkey gives cultural and representative rights to Kurds in Turkey, the less it faces separatism'. These obligations consist of the use of Kurdish in broadcasting, publishing, and education and in public services and guarantees for Pro-Kurdish parties for functioning without any restrictions. In this sphere, EU has managed to desecuritize the issue partly by the several political reforms held by Turkish Government for the EU membership.

³¹⁴ For the role of EU in several conflict resolution processes, see: Pace, p.9.

CONCLUSION

This study overviewed the role of the EU as an external impact on desecuritization of the Northern Ireland Conflict and the Kurdish Question, with particular emphases on separatist political parties that have connections with terrorist organizations. Despite several differences in the selected cases, EU seemed to affect the desecuritization processes successfully in the UK and in a limited scope in Turkey.

The core of the desecuritization process is to remove issues from emergency mode of security agenda to bargaining process of political sphere. Desecuritization is the ability to negotiate problems with non-military measures at all. Taken as such, removing conflicts from security agenda requires the end of related threat perceptions for states. As mentioned by examples in the chapters, level of desecuritization in Turkey and the United Kingdom is closely related to the eradication of the terrorist violence and separatist demands in these countries. In this scope, EU seems to be more successful in Northern Ireland case about helping eliminate the terrorist activities and separatist demands in the UK.

The Northern Ireland case is not only a domestic concern but also a conflict between two EU member states, the UK and the Republic of Ireland. EU's first attention to the issue basically centered on the rapprochement between the UK and the Republic of Ireland. The membership of both to the Union in 1973 eased the cooperation and coordination. The initial result of this cooperation became the common declaration that the Northern Ireland Case was a concern of both states. EU's policy of the improvement of Anglo-Irish relations nurtured the peace process which attached importance to the Sinn Fein. As a result of this cooperation, in 1998 The Good Friday Agreement abolished the territorial claim of the Republic of Ireland on the UK. This development was apparently the end of possibility of all-Ireland ideal of IRA's separatist plan. In facilitating a close cooperation between its two members, EU managed to eliminate the separatist threat perception of the UK which would be an obstacle for the desecuritization of the conflict. However, Turkish Case

is not an EU affair that needs the cooperation of its two members. Considering the separatist PKK plan aiming an independent state for Kurds with grasping the territories of the Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, EU is far away from eliminating this separatist demand. Recent events present that Turkey perceives direct threats from the Northern Iraq for the matter involved. Considering several PKK camps and the implicit expanding policy of the Local Kurdish Government³¹⁵ in the Northern Iraq, separatist demands targeting Turkey's territorial integrity are still on security agenda of Turkish State, which has been deteriorating the desecuritization process as well.

In British case, EU membership also institutionalized the participation of Northern Ireland representatives to the European Parliament since 1979. Haagerup report was also the result of these parliamentarians which put a solution plan in the region. On the other hand, Turkey had faced the lack of lobbying activities in EU's institutions. It leads to EU's negligence about understanding the level of separatist terrorist violence in Turkey, and the logic behind the Turkish state's reluctance to desecuritize the issue. It was too late for EU to recognize the PKK terrorist organization. EU afforded no concrete steps for accepting the vitality of the PKK violence, while exerting efforts for decommissioning of the IRA weapons with all intents and purposes. The EU's behavior has changed toward Turkey gradually and it has been at late 1990s that EU recognized there is also a PKK problem in Turkey. During this transition period, the perception of various terrorist detainees was only human rights sufferings, for EU. In this relation, in 1995, Leyla Zana who was known with her Kurdish oath of Allegiance from a separatist party won the Sakharov Prize of the European Parliament while linking with the PKK terrorism.³¹⁶ Unlike in the Northern Ireland Case, the lobbying in Turkish case has worked in contrary to Turkish official policies, while the UK was enjoying millions of pounds economic support and political backing from the EU through lobbying.

³¹⁵ Ayşe Betül Çelik and Andrew Blum, "Future Uncertain: Using Scenarios to Understand Turkey's Geopolitical Environment and its Impact on the Kurdish Question", *Ethnopolitics*, Volume 6, Issue 4, November 2007, pp.569 – 583.

³¹⁶ William Chisslett, "Turkey's EU Membership: The Moment of Truth", Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper, 19 October 2004, p.11.

EU's support to the UK was basically economic. To phase out paramilitary organizations and for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, EU believes to be economic development in the region as a prerequisite. Not only via standard supporting programs but also by creating financial programs in peculiar to Northern Ireland, EU assisted continuously the region and the peace process. "Peace Programs" have been special projects that imply the Northern Ireland peace in this framework. The EU has supported every step in the peace process by responding with new openings. The EU believes in the utility of financial aids for maintaining peace, which also contribute to the economic and social development of Northern Ireland. This economic dimension of the European integration has had a motivating and largely positive effect on cross-border cooperation on the island. Additionally, the EU argues that they are incentives for paramilitary leaders and their supporters to maintain the ceasefire. For example, following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, the European Parliament passed a resolution welcoming it and holding out the prospect of funds from the EC to support a program of economic development. The much publicized Special Support Program, essentially a gesture of support in the wake of the first terrorist ceasefire, is largely handled to tackle social deprivation, to assist the process of reconciliation and recovery and to search for a negotiated settlement by improving the environment for a future settlement.³¹⁷ Another example is the creation of the Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation, and the increased EU contribution to the International Fund for Ireland after the announcement of the IRA and Loyalist ceasefires in 1994.

These aids and programs not only supported the underdeveloped sections of the population but also gave impetus to political developments. The EU's economic support has contributed to significant economic development and thereby helped to create the conditions that led to the peace process. Same rhetoric is emphasized in the Turkish case and the socio-economic development in majorly Kurdish populated regions is said to be important to tackle down the separatist terrorism. However, in contrast to the case in the Northern Ireland, Turkey has been deprived of any credible financial supports under the 'Objective', 'Peace', 'Interreg', 'Urban' programs.

³¹⁷ Kennedy, p 165.

Because these projects have been held only for member states to eliminate the regional discrepancies.

The conflict in Turkey was earlier only a problem of development or a concern of regional backwardness or a terrorism problem, since 1999 the Turkish political public started to talk about linguistic rights, removal of the state of emergency, return to and reconstruction of the post-conflict zones, and release of the Kurdish parliamentarians.³¹⁸ The attempts at the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria have started a process of gradual desecuritization in Turkey. In the period between 1999 and 2005, Turkey passed eight EU harmonization packages. Through the adoption of these packages, the country entered into a process of reform in the realms of democracy and human rights. Even in those areas which had been constructed as top security issues in Turkey, a process of desecuritization has started. Political reforms could only be possible through refraining from security speech acts and through passing legislation on sensitive issues, even some top security priorities. A significant desecuritization move is the removal of the ban on Education and Broadcasts in languages other than Turkish. Granting rights of education and broadcasting in mother tongue to Kurds in the country could be given as an example in this regard.

Desecuritization of the problem has been only in agenda, and has not been completed yet. Every single step towards this desecuritization still carries the risk of turning the situation into securitization. The terrorism bill of the PKK in Turkey is so high that cannot be compared with those in the Northern Ireland. On the other hand, the instability in the Northern Iraq and the deployed PKK terrorists at the Southern borders of Turkey, long years lasted PKK settlements in the country show the fact that Turkey still has been under the threat of PKK separatist terrorism. Such being the case, it is not likely to desecuritize all of the security problems immediately. On the other hand, IRA in the Northern Ireland engaged in decommissioning of its

³¹⁸ Çelik, Ayşe Betül and Bahar Rumelili. 2006. "Necessary but Not Sufficient: The Role of the EU in Resolving Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Greek-Turkish Conflicts", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, pp.10-11.

weapons and broke up its terrorist campaigns. Under these circumstances, the British government desecuritized its Northern Ireland Conflict along with the supports of the EU.

Moreover, the conflict in the Northern Ireland is technically a problem in the European Union. Thereby, by assisting the peace process it does not only arrange the internal affairs of one of its member but also gives impetus to the politically stabilized peaceful integration of the Union. Whilst, Turkey's lack of EU membership affected the EU's way of involving the problem in Turkey. The lack of economic supports, strong political obligations on Turkey has been a result of this unique relation. Interestingly, it is also related to the process of EU evolution. Many implementations carried out by the UK was not always in harmony with today's EU norms. The political conditions put forward in the 1990s coincided with Turkey's intensive fight against the PKK terrorism. These criteria turned into a rigid obstacle against Turkey's membership and paved the way for series of obligations. On the other hand, during 1970s, various implementations of the UK³¹⁹ such as the 'Internment Law' or 'Broadcasting Bans' were not more modern than Turkey's implementations in the same realms. The UK eliminated the terror and normalized its political infrastructure before the EU had focused on political matters. Additionally, EU was never at the stage to call for democratic obligations to the UK for the sake of a reward such as the membership.

The reflections of the desecuritization appear mostly in party politics in these states. In this regard, Sinn Fein in the UK and several separatist political parties in Turkey are different political portraits. In spite of having similar terrorism definitions, these states have different reactions against separatist political parties which have connections with terrorist organizations. The lack of party proscription in the UK and the frequent proscriptions in Turkey bring about different outcomes in terms of the aforesaid desecuritizing EU impact in these cases.

³¹⁹For related implementations, see also: Hayati Hazır, **Siyasal Şiddet ve Terrörizm**, Nobel Yayınevi, Ankara, 2001, pp.128-32.

Sinn Fein has experienced serious changes and gradually adapted itself to the desecuritization process through several splits and intra-party dissensions. A century-long history of the Sinn Fein without being proscribed by the government has faced remarkable stage of training for articulating into non-violent politics. Foundational dissensions in the party politics have given birth to new parties and opened new discussions about non-sponsoring terrorism in the party ranks through decades. The removal of abstentionist policies gradually in this process has brought about direct negotiations with British and Irish officials to desecuritize the ongoing conflict as well.

The UK and the EU have similar tendency about providing the survival of political parties, even they are separatist. The situation concerning the separatist Sinn Fein Party which has collaborated with the IRA terrorism in various periods is that UK implements generally individual punishments or restrictions and limitations on the party rather than a total proscription. The periods such as the 1980s, under which the UK was suffering from IRA terrorist activities, witnessed extra measures over Sinn Fein. Provisional Sinn Fein, which was collaborated with the IRA terrorism, faced serious restrictions during this period. For example, the amendment that prohibits any person from serving in the Parliament who was sentenced to more than one year, or the following broadcasting ban that forbids the direct declarations of individuals or groups in media that support terrorism, were targeting Sinn Fein in particular. However, these restrictions were aimed to cut off relations between Sinn Fein and the IRA; they could not manage at all. Later in 1990s, Sinn Fein and IRA became the legitimate partners of peace talks conducted with the Government of the United Kingdom.³²⁰

In the Haagerup report, EU invited all political parties to the peace process. However, due to the relations with the IRA, British Government was denying to involve Sinn Fein into the negotiations about the future in Northern Ireland. For

³²⁰Joanne Hughes and Caitlin Donnelly, "Attitudes to Community Relations in Northern Ireland: Signs of Optimism in the Post Cease-Fire Period?", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol.16, No.3, Autumn 2004, pp.567-592; Michael Cox, "Bringing in the 'International': The IRA Ceasefire and the End of the Cold War", **International Affairs**, Vol.73, No.4, 1997, pp. 671-693.

instance, Sinn Fein was excluded from the talks of 1989 during which the British Government started talks with all Northern Ireland political parties. However secret negotiations between the Sinn Fein and the British Government about the decommissioning of weapons of the IRA, during the Adams-Hume negotiations turned out to be critical steps in the peace process. The reluctance of the British Government to talk with Sinn Fein was criticized many times by the EU. The period resulted with the Belfast Agreement in 1998 which was intensively supported by the EU. Union's political support to articulate Sinn Fein in the negotiations was clear. Briefly, what EU has done according to the Sinn Fein is the continuous effort that engaged the Sinn Fein into the peace process. In this regard, the most critical point comes out as the endurance of Sinn Fein as a separatist party in British politics and its role it played in the desecuritization of the Northern Ireland Conflict.

Due to the lack of a consolidated desecuritization, Turkish state routinely has proscribed political parties if they violate the constitution or laws in one way or another. The proscribed parties have reincarnated in new ones. Several separatist parties came into being in Turkish politics after 1990s in this manner. This study noted several common points of these parties. First, they do not give up their separatist goal. Without any exceptions, they all install a separatist plan in their party policy. They are documented in party regulation, party program, election manifesto or party declaration. Similarly, Doğu Ergil argues that all of these banned parties have an identical agenda, which is the decentralization of the Turkish administrative system.³²¹ The projects proposed were like systems of federal states and autonomies which this study refers them as separatist. Second, the cadres that found the replacement parties are the same cadres that carried the previous party to the proscription. In that sense, same figures have occupied seats in the parties. For example, Ahmet Turk who is now the leader of the last separatist party-DTP was also the leader of the first separatist party in the Parliament-HEP. Third, these parties do not isolate themselves from terrorism. The same party bureaucrats with their criminal terrorism background tend to carry on assisting terrorism. The prevalent party figures, who were sentenced from being member of the PKK, are at the frontlines of

³²¹ Ergil, p.130.

the party today. Considering these events, Turkey seems to be engaged into a cycle in which the same events reappear with regard to separatist political parties which are connected to PKK terrorism. As a result, separatist political parties remain in the sphere of security, and erode the desecuritization efforts.

The impact of the European Union related to the political parties is clear. Today it is more difficult to proscribe a political party. Amendments through EU obligations were made and alternative punishing mechanisms were improved. Deprivation of state financial assistance is one of them. Moreover, the offence for being proscribed should be come from party politics rather than individual party members' initiatives. EU's emphasis to political parties to compete continuously in politics, the related obligations for Turkey, gave birth the afore-said changes. EU's point of view that requires the improvement of cultural rights of Kurds in Turkey, also has supported some cultural policies of the separatist parties. It is still a great dilemma for Turkey to distinctly define the cultural rights from the separatist and terrorist ones, just because of the decades-along misuse of cultural rights by the PKK terrorism for the matter involved. Even in this frame, EU's efforts to initiate cultural rights in Turkey brought an interesting scene in Turkey that nobody could hope during the intensive war against PKK terrorism in the 1990s. This scene has been experienced in 2009, mainly through the EU's obligations: Kurdish Parliamentarians sing in Kurdish and speak in Kurdish in a Kurdish state-led TV channel.

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APPENDIX 1

Diagnostic kit: Socio-economic and political analysis	Reference Manuals: Experience from elsewhere (e.g. from conflict resolution facilities) Compendium/database of programs/projects Consideration of conflict settlement theories	Strategic visioning: Objective (supra-national) long-term view lenses combined with risk-taking approach Lessons learned applied Knowledge gained and developed Assessment of stage of conflict Determination of intervention path, depending on the stage of the conflict and the location (within EU, on its borders or beyond)
	FINANCIAL TOOLS	NON-FINANCIAL TOOLS
Big tools (macro level)	EU financed networks focussing on conflict transformation EU institutions, policies, opportunities EU ethos, methodology, example	Europeanisation (at national level) EU norms, values, institutions, procedures (including social partner involvement) Neutral Space to facilitate dialogue/build consensus. Even-handed approach to generate trust. EU peace-making model - leading by example Close partnership with major donors
Levers and spanners (meso level)	Bespoke EU PEACE Programs Structural funds Skewed to target conflict resolution (defined with appropriate "distinctiveness" criteria) Bi-lateral/cross-border cooperation Agreements and initiatives Social partnership model Program level evaluation	Task Force (gathering local information, identifying opportunities and areas for co-operation, encouraging participation in EU-wide programs) Partnership approach working with local political and social partners Local consultation leading to local ownership of program design and development. Engagement of local institutions Removal of barriers using EU policies

Source: EU European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on **The role of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process**, Brussels, 23 October 2008, p.2.